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
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THE  
EVANGELICAL REPOSITORY.  
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No. I.—SEPT., 1862.

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APOLOGY

FOR

THOSE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINES

WHICH MAINTAIN AND ESTABLISH

THE FREENESS OF THE GRACE OF GOD TO ALL.

IN reply to a pamphlet, entitled *The Doctrinal Declaration of the Conference of the Evangelical Union, reviewed and brought to the test of Scripture, by a Minister of the Church of Scotland. Edinburgh: Paton and Ritchie. 1862.*

PREFATORY.

IN the Note, which is prefixed to this Review of the *Doctrinal Declaration*, the author says, that "he has, in his own limited sphere, during the last fifteen months, conversed with a considerable number, belonging to different parishes, and connected with more than one denomination, in the south of Scotland, where his lot is cast, all earnest inquirers after peace, who disclaim all sympathy with the objects of the Union, but whose spiritual enjoyment is nevertheless sustained by the peculiar views advanced by that body on such vital subjects as regeneration, repentance, and faith, who can experience no satisfaction from a distinct exposition of the doctrines of our Presbyterian Confession on the same momentous questions." We were aware of the spreading, far and wide, of the peculiar views, which are maintained by the Evangelical Union. We were aware that they are penetrating into many congregations of various denominations, and ascending even into not a few pulpits. And we rejoiced, and rejoice, in the dissemination of what appears to us to be important and evangelical truth. But we were rather surprised to learn that, in the particular region of "the south of Scotland," in which the reviewer's lot has, it seems, been cast, the individuals who concur with the Evangelical Union, in its theology, "disclaim all sympathy with the objects of the Union." These individuals,

we suspect, must have had "the objects of the Union" represented to them by an enemy, and perhaps therefore misrepresented. For, so far as we know, its only objects, as a Union, are to maintain and defend the doctrines inscribed on its banners, and so to proclaim and enforce them as to win souls to the Saviour and to the enjoyment of everlasting salvation. The Union is far more theological, evangelical, and evangelistic, than ecclesiastical. And its objects are really gained, when such views of the gospel are held forth and embraced, as are fitted to make bad men good, and good men better. It does not, so far as we are aware, enter into the aims of those who are most deeply interested in the Union, to get surrounding ecclesiastical communities disintegrated. They have never dreamed of initiating a crusade against the existing denominations. They began their movement by simply seeking to win souls to the Saviour, without having any ecclesiastical aim in view. They had not even any distinctive theological aim. Their evangelical views were prized by them, not as a nucleus of a theological system, and far less as a rallying-point for an ecclesiastical organisation, but simply as means for the attainment of the great practical ends which are realised in the turning of the ungodly unto God, and in the closer and sublimer walk of the truly godly with God. It was only when they were not allowed to work in the denominations to which they originally belonged, that they formed themselves into a distinct Association. And even yet they do not look upon the *Union* as being characterised by anything distinctively ecclesiastical. Their hearts would be satisfied if the great evangelical verities, the doctrines of "grace free to all," for which they contend, and especially the three glorious universalities—the universality of the love of God, the universality of the propitiation of Christ, and the universality of the influence of the Holy Spirit,—were taken up by the preachers in the existing denominations, and faithfully and earnestly proclaimed to the masses of the people.

There is another item of the prefatory Note which calls for a remark. The author says that "he trusts that those into whose hands the following pages may come, will obtain a copy of the *Doctrinal Declaration* by the Conference of the Evangelical Union, and carefully compare the two documents for the purpose of learning what the difference between the two systems really is, and with an honest desire to be led by the Father of lights into all the truth." We admire the spirit which gives expression to such a wish. Not that it is in itself any very elevated pitch of nobility. But it is so different from the illiberality that is prevalent in Scotland,—an illiberality that leaves no stone unturned to get the entire literature of the Evangelical Union universally ostracised, and, if possible, put under a bushel and ignored,—that we cannot but feel a predisposition to enter upon the reviewer's critique with sentiments of personal respect. We trust that there will be no occasion for letting down these sentiments, as we proceed with the examination of the Review. It is evident, at all events, that the critic has the fullest confidence in the results of his own investigations. He fears not a candid comparison of the contents of his pamphlet with the contents of the document which he passes under review. He is a man of decided views. And it is pleasant, if there must be controversy, to have to grapple with an antagonist of that sort of type.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE REVIEWER'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

The author begins his review by making the following observations :—

“The careful perusal of the above Declaration of Doctrine, by all interested in the advancement of the Lord's work, is at the present time very necessary. The religious body from which it emanates, has been in existence for twenty years. Though the people ostensibly professing the doctrines of the Declaration are not very numerous, it is well known that a considerable amount of sympathy with their principles exists in a more or less disguised form among the members of other denominations.”—p. 5.

We thank him for speaking so much of the truth regarding the Evangelical Union. He says farther,—

“It is not supposed that the questions here raised will cause much interest in the Churches in England. Those peculiar tenets are not in a distinct form held, as far as is known, by any denomination in that kingdom. There are in the north of England one or two congregations, connected with the Union, but the cause does not seem to be extending southwards.”—pp. 5, 6.

We think otherwise. We suppose that “the cause does seem to be extending southward;” if we may judge, at least, from the increasing circulation of the literature of the Union in that direction. There are many ministers of the gospel, for example, in various of the English denominations, who are devoted friends of the *Evangelical Repository*. We know this for a fact. We also know that the theology of the Union is both prized and preached by clergymen in the Church of England, by ministers in the various Methodist connections, and by Nonconformist ministers, not a few, among the Independents and Baptists. Indeed several of the Baptist ministers in England were trained in connection with the Academy of the Evangelical Union. And a still larger proportion of the English Independent ministers got their theological education in the same institution.

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS CONTINUED.

## SANDEMANIANISM AND EVANGELICAL-UNIONISM.

Our author proceeds with his introductory observations; tending, rather noteworthy, in a statistical direction :—

“Sandemanianism, which, in its general features, is very similar to the system of the Evangelical Union, was never viewed with much favour by the English mind; and six small and gradually diminishing congregations constituted, according to the census of 1851, the whole strength of the adherents of Sandemanian doctrine.”—p. 6.

This is reason, our author thinks, for coming to the conclusion that it is not in England that much progress is likely to be made by the views of the Evangelical Union. We differ. We believe that there is less bigotry, and more of an unsophisticated appreciation of the gospel, in England than in Scotland. And hence, we conclude, that the views of the Evangelical Union will make, though likely under other ecclesiastical phases, more rapid progress in the south than in the north. Indeed, the distinct organisation that exists in the north is probably not needed for the south. For every one who knows anything of the



ecclesiastical and evangelical condition of the broader and more genial end of the island, knows that the originators of the Union would never have required to stand, even for one day, alone, if their lot had been cast in the south.

But the reviewer makes two mistakes regarding Sandemanianism. The first is, in supposing that its extent in England is to be measured by the number of professedly Sandemanian congregations. For the truth is, that it was only in exceptional cases, so far as England is concerned, that that system embodied the results of its diffusion, in churches that became separately and denominationally Sandemanian. Its chief trophies were found in churches, which retained their former ecclesiastical relations and denomination. The second mistake is more serious, in as much as it seems to indicate that the author is liable to present his own guesses about things, or his wishes in reference to them, as if they were more than his mere subjective guesses and wishes;—as if they were objective facts. He says, “Sandemanianism is, in its general features, very similar to the system of the Evangelical Union.” Perhaps he has said so, again and again, before his statement appeared in print. And if he has, his confiding auditors perchance would feel that it would certainly be their duty and interest, to keep at as great a remove as possible from a system, that was akin to so formidable a word as “Sandemanianism.” If this really be the case, the reviewer was guilty of raising a false alarm. He is, we fondly trust, incapable of speaking insincerely; and therefore we must content ourselves with saying that he speaks of what he knows nothing about. The system of views, which is characteristic of the Evangelical Union, springs out of the doctrine of *the universality of the propitiation of Christ*. This was the first distinctive tenet that was got hold of; and it was by working it out into its legitimate consequences, or carrying it as a torch throughout the perusal of the Scriptures, that almost all the other views of the Unionists were attained. Hence their tenet regarding the universal love of the divine Father. Hence too their tenet regarding the universal influence of the divine Spirit. Hence too their tenet regarding the salvability of every man, or the possibility of every man becoming a believer in Jesus, and becoming consequently one of those who are “chosen unto salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth.” If “the system of the Evangelical Union” has any “general features” at all, these are they. And yet,—would an uninformed reader have believed it?—in each of these doctrines Sandemanianism is diametrically opposed to the Union! “That Christ died,” says Mr. Sandeman, “that he gave himself a ransom for many, is indeed a truth fully ascertained in the Scriptures;”—“that Christ died *for me*, is a point not so easily settled.” (*Letters*, p. 14.) He continues thus,—

“This is a point which the Scripture no where ascertains; so far from it, that it often affirms the final perdition of many, not merely hearers of the gospel, but who have heard and received it with joy; yea of those who have made such progress, that their only deficiency is, that their fruit came not to perfection. It affirms, that such as have been enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and have been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, may yet fall away irrecoverably. Yea it declares, in passages plainly pointing to zealous professors of Christianity, that wide is the gate and broad is the

way which leadeth unto destruction, and many there be which go in thereat; that strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it; that many shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able; yea that notwithstanding their great confidence about their acquaintance with Christ, and their interest in him, and their experience of his presence with them, he will at last say unto them, *I never knew you, depart from me.* When they are condemned then as hypocrites and unbelievers, they are not condemned for want of Aspasio's faith; and that for these two reasons. The first is, *It was never true that Christ died for them.*"—*Letters*, pp. 13, 14.

Mr. Sandeman says again,—

"I would willingly know by what authority Aspasio calls every one to believe that Christ died for him. The Scripture no where says, that Christ died for such a one who now for the first time hears the gospel: what then shall persuade him that it is true?"—*Ditto*. p. 20.

According to Mr. Sandeman, it "means the same thing to say Christ died for any person, and, that person shall be eternally saved." (*Ditto*. p. 33.) And again and again he pours contempt,—for he was a contemptuous writer,—upon the doctrine, which was such a delight to Boston and the Erskines, that the gospel unfolds God's gift of Christ, and of eternal life in Christ, as a gift to men indiscriminately, to men without distinction and exception,—*"to mankind-sinners as such."* Indeed, both Mr. Sandeman and Mr. Glas were Calvinists of a very high type. Mr. Sandeman vindicates the application of the expression, "I create evil," to the divine production of moral evil. (*Letters*, pp. 162-166.) And Mr. Glas holds that the hardening of Pharaoh's heart "was, from the beginning, a work of sovereignty, and not of judgment." (*Works*, vol. iii. p. 57.) He thinks, moreover, that Christian "love to all men, even the enemies of the gospel, doing them good for evil, blessing them and praying for them, which is the proper fruit of faith, and accompanies brotherly love, is *for the sake of the unknown elect.*" (*Ditto*, vol. ii. p. 136.) Such are the views of the originators of Sandemanianism. And yet, says the Reviewer of the Doctrinal Declaration, "Sandemanianism, in its general features, is very similar to the system of the Evangelical Union"! He might as truly have averred that black is remarkably similar to white!

The system of the Evangelical Union agrees, indeed, with Sandemanianism, though not with it alone, in regarding faith as the "belief of the truth." The two systems also agree, though not with one another alone, in holding that the work which Jesus Christ wrought out is Righteousness, and that this Righteousness is the only ground of justification and eternal life, on which human sinners can repose in safety. We believe also that Mr. Sandeman did service in his day and generation in contending earnestly, (although also, alas, bitterly, cynically, and uncharitably), that nothing should be added to "the bare righteousness" of "Jesus Christ the righteous," when the refuge of the sinner is exhibited to view. But, as regards the object of faith, and its intrinsic adaptation to produce in the believer peace and hope and joy and holiness, the system of the Union differs as decidedly from Sandemanianism, as it does in regard to the extent of the atonement, and the objects of predestination and foreordination. If we might measure metaphorically the distance between systems by miles, we could say with truth that the

system of the Reviewer of the Doctrinal Declaration is three hundred and sixty-five miles nearer, than is the system of the Doctrinal Declaration itself, to the system of Sandemanianism.

THE REVIEWER'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS CONTINUED.

Having administered to the Union this somewhat bitter dose of Sandemanianism, the reviewer hastens to drop into the ill-flavoured cup a few sweetened and rather soothing drops. He makes reference to "Morison," and says,—

"At those times when the country has been blessed with a spirit of religious awakening, the characteristics of his creed have in Scotland received the most marked attention.

"During the prevalence of great anxiety on the most important of all questions, the teaching of the Evangelical Unionists has been found to exert a decided and immediate influence. Those who formerly were given to grossest dissipation, have been led by its principles to abandon their profligacies. Those who were given to Sabbath profanation, have been rendered diligent in the observance of the means of grace."—p. 6.

He reserves, indeed, his own doubt that much, if not all, of this apparent good, may be superficial and delusive. Nevertheless he does not, at this stage of his Review at least, give very obtrusive prominence to his doubt. And therefore we must thank him, we suppose, for the testimony which he spontaneously bears to the somewhat beneficial effect of the Evangelical Union movement. It would appear, even our Reviewer being judge, that there is something in the doctrines exhibited in the Doctrinal Declaration which is fitted,—whether divinely or not we do not at present stop to inquire,—to make considerable impression, and that too in the direction of what is holy and blissful, upon the minds of those who come under their influence. The fact is not unworthy of the attention of philanthropists. May not the doctrines, after all, be of God? May they not be some of the chosen weapons of the Holy and Loving Spirit, which it is his special delight to wield for the conviction and conversion of sinners? Our Reviewer would, of course, be disposed to answer these questions in the negative. For he says,—

"As will be seen, the main and fundamental peculiarity of this system is the disavowal of the special influence of the Spirit of God upon the mind of man, and the adjustment of all the other articles of the faith so as to correspond with such a theory."—p. 7.

He is certainly wrong, however in this allegation. We have already mentioned what is "the main and fundamental peculiarity of the system," its back-bone. It is the universality of the propitiation of Christ. And this, along with the connected views of faith, repentance, and "peace with God," formed the burden and staple of the preaching of the founders of the Union, whilst they yet maintained that there was a very special and infallibly efficacious, and consequently a very limited, influence of the Holy Spirit. It was only when the bearing of the universality of the atonement upon the extent and nature of the Father's love, on the one hand, and upon the extent and nature of the Spirit's influence, on the other, was duly weighed and unbiassedly examined in the light of Scripture, that the idea was reached, that there was such a harmony of aim and operation among the Divine Three, that the Holy

Spirit truly loves all men, and sincerely desires the bliss of them all, and does what is needed on his part, even as Christ has done what was needed on his, for the salvation of all. He seeks to convince "the world." (Jo. xvi. 8.) The members of the Union believe, without exception, in the existence and personality of the divine Spirit. They believe, moreover, without exception, in the necessity of his influence in order to salvation and sanctification and glorification. And they do not "disavow" that there are "special influences" of the Holy Spirit. So far as is known to us, they believe that there are such influences. At all events, we ourselves do. But if our Reviewer mean, as we presume he does, that there is a disavowal, on the part of the Union, of a will-necessitating influence of the Holy Spirit, we believe that there is not a single man in the whole connection who would not be ready to exclaim, with all his heart, and, if he had a plurality, with all the voices he could command, "It is true, Sir, perfectly true; we delight to say that it is true." That, *and that only*, is the influence which we disavow. And yet our disavowal of it is not "the main and fundamental peculiarity of our system."

The Reviewer adds:—

"To those who have little acquaintance with the 'faiths of the world' in past times, this must be an experiment fraught with the greatest interest. Morison, it may be taken for granted, was sincerely anxious for the elevation of his countrymen. Finding that the old theology had lost much of its attractiveness, his ardent mind led him to construct new avenues to the hearts of the people. Like Pelagius, in the earlier period of the history of the Church, he seems to have thought that the greatest obstacle to the advancement of religion in the land, was the tendency of the population unduly to distrust themselves, and to place too much dependence on the exercise of an unseen influence. It seems to have been his impression that, by rendering the deep things of God more level to the capacity of man, and more in accordance with man's notions of justice, he could remove the unconcern and the unbelief that had baffled the efforts of the most strenuous advocates of the doctrines of free and sovereign grace."  
—p. 7.

It was scarcely to be expected that the Reviewer, after making so great a mistake in reference to the doctrines of the Union, should be capable of doing justice to the persons who compose it. And it is not to be wondered at, that having thought it a right, or at all events, a politic and felicitous thing, to represent the theological system of the Union as "very similar to Sandemanianism," he should seize the earliest opportunity of coupling together, in ominous copartnery, "Morison" and "Pelagius." Such alleged alliances may help, in the estimation of the reviewer, to instil the most wholesome prejudices into the public mind, and predispose his own admirers and readers to be on the out-look for very dangerous errors in every tract, pamphlet, and book, that emanates from the Evangelical Union. And they who are swayed by his judgment, will be apt to think that their credit for perspicacity in orthodoxy will be at stake; so that, if they find it difficult to discover the rank and noisome heresies that must be everywhere swarming, they may be tempted to exercise their ingenuity in the way of liberally inventing them for the Unionists. We rather suspect, however, that our author knows as little about "Pelagius" as he does about "Sandemanianism"; though they are both of them convenient names wherewith to brand. And we are certain that he knows almost nothing about

"Morison." For this latter personage did *not* think "that the greatest obstacle to the advancement of religion in the land, was the tendency of the population unduly to distrust themselves, and to place too much dependence on the exercise of unseen influence." It was *not* his impression that any alteration should be made on "the deep things of God," so that, "by rendering them more level to the capacity of man, and more in accordance with man's notions of justice" than the Scriptures exhibit them, "he could remove the unconcern and the unbelief that had baffled the efforts of the most strenuous advocates of the doctrines of free and sovereign grace." We may add, moreover, that we have not the least doubt, that if Pelagius were to rise from the grave, he too would be ready to testify that he was grossly misunderstood and misrepresented.

#### THE REVIEWER'S INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS CONCLUDED.

The author would have liked, he says, instead of bringing the doctrines of the Evangelical Union to the test of Scripture, to have tried them by what he calls a more direct, but what we should be disposed to call a more indirect, process.

"It would be an interesting work, were it practicable, to use the tests which the Scriptures unfold, in estimating the moral and spiritual characters of those who, by the lessons of the Evangelical Union, are now rejoicing in the possession of perfect peace."—p. 8.

He adds, however,—

"But as this exercise, if not altogether incompetent, would be very invidious, a different method must be followed. By reversing the maxim of the Saviour, a 'tree is known by its fruit,' a sound principle may be obtained, *vis.*, that of trying the system *reverse* by the application of the infallible standard which the Bible contains. If the peculiar doctrines unfolded in the 'Declaration' are found to be at variance with the divine Word, we sincerely hope that those who have lulled to rest all their fears by the belief of such tenets, will learn the necessity of trying the foundations of their confidence. We fondly trust that honesty of purpose, and a regard for the glory of the Almighty as a God of truth, will lead many to think seriously of these peculiarities of faith assumed by them so hastily. We trust that they will yet 'stand in the ways, and see, and ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, that they may find rest for their souls.'"—p. 8.

It is well that our critic has resolved to try the system which he criticises, not through the lives of its supporters, but by a *direct*, or *immediate*, appeal to "to the law and to the testimony." For besides the invidiousness of the other method, and the intricacies and casuistries into which it would lead, there would need to be, on the part of him who employed it, as our reviewer will perhaps himself perceive on reconsideration, at once a peculiarly sagacious mind, a peculiarly capacious heart, and a noble soul. And then, moreover, it is really not safe for those who live in glass houses to throw stones; and had our author made the attempt, which he deems "very desirable," others might have been tempted, in a spirit of righteous retaliation, to apply the test to his own theology, by taking into account the prominent or more hidden peculiarities, at once of his own character, and of the character of his most ardent doctrinal admirers within the bounds of his pariah. And, besides, many others would remember, even though he himself should forget, that the Indians, east and west, and

heathens almost everywhere, are adepts at the same kind of reasoning. And hence, thousands upon thousands of them want to have nothing to do with a christianity that is represented by the "Christians," who traffic dishonestly in their ports, or overrun their lands, sometimes in the spirit of robbers, and sometimes in the character of rakes. It would, we repeat, require no little wisdom, and also great impartiality in any one to attempt, with any prospect of success, the practical problem suggested;—wisdom to discriminate the real and adequate from the inadequate and unreal representatives; and impartiality, to be willing to apply the discriminative test, and to state, in perfect candour, the results. When such a wise and impartial judge appears, we shall be happy to put our case into his hands. And indeed it is our joy already that both we and our reviewer, and our other critics and opponents, are on our way to the bar of One who is infinite, at once in impartiality, and in wisdom, and in love.

Our reviewer winds up his introductory observations by making some criticism on the sectional arrangement of the Doctrinal Declaration. It displeases him, apparently, that the first section has reference to the freedom of the will. He says, "This system is arranged in such a way as to unfold the supremacy of man, other systems with equal plainness proclaim the supremacy of God." And he adds, "we cannot admit that such an arrangement has been made without design." He continues, "We are inclined to take it for granted that the principal forces are placed in the foremost rank, and arranged so as most successfully to support and defend those that are to follow." His assumption, however, is gratuitous. There was really no plot, and there was scarcely even any plan, in the arrangement of the sections. As is said in the introduction to the document, there is no "attempt to give this *Declaration* the systematical form of an outline of a complete theological system." The arrangement, such as it is, rose spontaneously in the mind of an individual, and it was never canvassed at all by his brethren. It is such, however, as is by no means unaccordant with nature. It starts from the heart of consciousness, the most natural of all springs from which any stream of thinking on things moral and religious can flow. And as the current rolls on, it widens and deepens, till its volume presents to view the grander features of evangelical theology. The shrewd suspicions of our author are all mere mirages, the baseless fabrics of his own visions. He did nothing but dream when he thought that the Declaration was "arranged in such a way, as to unfold the supremacy of man." We take, it is perfectly true, a totally different view from that of our reviewer, in reference to the moral nature of man, and the moral character of God. We could not for a moment think ourselves right, if we did not greatly differ from him. But when he imagines that we ascribe "supremacy" to man, in antithesis to the supremacy which others ascribe to God, he really substitutes his own fancy for our fact. And a very ridiculous fancy it is; as much so as is that other favourite fancy—the Sandemanianism of our theology. Man, we believe, is made to be a subject, not a sovereign. The idea of his supremacy never entered our mind.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

In the *Doctrinal Declaration*, the freedom of the will is asserted. The reviewer quotes the following sentences; and then makes his comments upon them:—

“The human will is free; not merely in the evasive sense that we are free to do as we choose, which is often not true, but that we are free to *choose*, which is always true.’ ‘In opposition to the scheme of a necessitated will as held, not by Calvinists only, but (as would appear) by all classes of infidels, the Evangelical Union Conference holds tenaciously the doctrine of free will, as lying at the foundation of all religion, natural and revealed.’—p. 9.

The reviewer thinks that this is “very strong language;” and he “cannot too much admire the candour with which such a statement is made.” We are glad that he has found again something to commend. For we believe that he is right when he ascribes to the Conference of the Evangelical Union a spirit of candour. But we beg to assure him that it required no very special stretch or strain of this virtue, to nerve the members of the Conference, to avow their conviction that the will is free, and that its freedom forms part of the very basis of religion and morality. Notwithstanding the odium that has for centuries been heaped, in Scotland, upon theological “Free-willers:” notwithstanding the terms of insult that have been attached to the doctrine, as being a thing of Popery, and of Pelagianism too, and of spiritual idolatry;—for “the idol of free-will” has been a charge, for generations, against anti-Calvinists, and is stereotyped upon the title page of Dr. Owen’s *Display*; notwithstanding the certainty of running counter to manifold popular prejudices, and of thus incurring manifold and merciless reproaches;—the Evangelical Unionists cannot take to themselves any very supererogatory merit for avowing their conviction that man’s will is free, and that, if it were not, he could not be morally responsible. Their consciences has informed them of their own freedom of will; and the simplest exercise of their logical faculty has assured them that if there were no freedom antecedent to, and in, their choices, men would be mere machines in mind as well as in body. And if they were, they would be as incapable of moral accountability as are other mere machines. They see, moreover, that when theological discussion is not expressly on the carpet, all men around them proceed on the assumption that their choices are the sons and daughters of liberty, because emanating from freedom. They notice, besides, that since philosophy has been emancipated, to some considerable extent, from the ecclesiastical fetters which, in former times, it was constrained to wear, it has culminated, at least so far as the minds of its noblest cultivators are concerned, in the ineradicable conviction of the freedom of the will. Witness Immanuel Kant in Germany. Witness Thomas Reid in Scotland. Witness Victor Cousin in France. And witness, in a lower sphere, and yet amid the confluence of peculiarly strong ecclesiastical and theological prejudices, Dr. M’Cosh of Belfast.

It is not, however, by Authorities that this question is to be settled. The appeal must be carried higher. It must be carried to the sources,

whence all those who might be considered Authorities, have drawn their convictions. And it is matter of gratitude that these sources are as really accessible to every man, for himself, however humble an inquirer he may be, as to the most distinguished savans, whose names are illuminated on, and illuminate, the roll-book of fame.

Our reviewer attempts, at least in a partial way, to ascend to these sources. He maintains that the freedom of the will "consists in the liberty possessed by a rational being to follow without *external* violence the bent of his own inclination, in whatever way that inclination may have been formed." (p. 10.) In other words he identifies, with Jonathan Edwards, and in opposition to John Locke, *will* and *inclination*; and he holds that "the freedom of the will" is found in the consequents and not in the antecedents of the volitions that are put forth. A man's will is free, he thinks, when, after the action of the will is consummated, he can do what he has willed. The freedom which he allows is thus not a freedom *in* the will, and antecedent to its acts or volitions. It is not, in other words, a freedom *of* the will, but a freedom *after* the will. A man's will is free, according to the reviewer, if he is able to steal, for example, after he has chosen or determined to attempt the theft. But no thief is free, he would maintain, to choose or not to choose, to determine or not to determine, whether he shall make the latrocinical attempt. The choice, which the thief makes, is, it seems, *inevitable* in the circumstances, and could not be otherwise than it is, without subverting all the antecedents of the act, that have been running on from everlasting.

Such is the freedom which our author allows, and which, he contends, is the only freedom that can be legitimately spoken of in connection with the will. We might say in reference to it, with Calvin,—who, however, agrees with our author,—“why has such an insignificant thing been dignified with so proud a title? Egregious freedom indeed!” (*Quorsum attinebat rem tantulam adeo superbo titulo insignire? Egregia vero libertas, si homo quidem non cogitur, &c. Institutio. ii. 2, 7.*) Our critic does not reason directly in support of his “egregious freedom.” But he reasons, at least a little, in opposition to the counter-theory, the theory of the Evangelical Union. He says,—

“We venture to appeal to those into whose hands these pages may come, and ask what is the nature of the freedom of the will of which they are conscious? Do they in judging of their personal liberty ascend higher than to the carrying out of the purposes of their wills? If they are free to act as they resolve, do they not consider themselves as really free? If the will is concerned in any action, do they not consider themselves virtuous, or blameworthy, according to the quality of the action? Does human language establish any other doctrine than that when actions are *voluntary* they must partake of a moral or immoral nature? and does not human law universally give effect to such decisions?”—p. 10.

We would “venture” to answer the queries, which he has “ventured” to propose. The first is,—“Do we, in judging of our personal liberty, ascend higher than to the carrying out of the purposes of our wills?” We answer, for ourselves, that we do. When the reference is not to bodily freedom, such as that of which a prisoner or a paralytic is deprived, but to that which is called in the schools “moral freedom,” we always “ascend higher than to the carrying out of the purposes of our wills.”



And we presume that when Adam judged himself, after having eaten of the forbidden fruit, he did not blame his hand for moving "according to the bent of his inclination," and after he had inwardly purposed to take and eat. He would blame his inner self. And he would blame his inner self, because he had, in his will, cherished the inclination and formed the purpose. The second query is,—“If we are free to act as we resolve, do we not consider ourselves as really free?” We answer, for ourselves, that in all matters of morals, we do not consider ourselves as really free, if we find no other freedom in ourselves than mere freedom to act as we have resolved. In the matter of bodily liberty, indeed, we consider ourselves to be really free, when we can act as we incline and resolve. But as regards moral liberty, liberty to be good for example, we do not consider ourselves to be really free, unless we are free to resolve to do what is good. Neither should we consider ourselves to be really free to be bad, if we had not liberty to resolve to do what is wrong. The third query is,—“If the will is concerned in any action, do not we consider ourselves virtuous or blameworthy, according to the quality of the action?” We answer, for ourselves, that most assuredly we do; but then the moral quality of the actions referred to, that is, of outward actions, is, as all the world admits, derivative. It is derived, as men say, from the motives that precede the actions; or, in other words, it is derived from the moral quality of those inner actions, which are overlooked altogether by our critic, the acts or actions of the will. Surely we need not inform our critic that outer actions, apart from inner actions, the actions of the will, can have no moral quality at all. The two remaining questions are as follows,—“Does human language establish any other doctrine than that when actions are voluntary they must partake of a moral or immoral nature? and does not human law universally give effect to such decisions?” Human language, we reply, establishes many other doctrines. And when it admits into its vocabulary the expression “voluntary actions,” it refers, in so far as these are amenable to “human law,” to outward actions. But human language recognises other actions, acts namely of will, from which the actions called voluntary derive their element of voluntariness. And it is on the assumption that men are free in these prior acts, that human law holds men to be accountable when their outer acts are voluntary. If human law proceeded on the assumption that murderers could not help the volitions that were the antecedents of lifting up their murderous hands, the lunatic asylum, and not the gallows, would form the invariable termination of the murderer’s career.

#### JOHN LOCKE ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

But our author, perhaps not altogether unconscious that he had failed to establish his case successfully, by his interrogative argumentation, resorts to some other methods of treating the subject.

In the *Doctrinal Declaration* there is a reference to “the scheme of a necessitated will as held, not by Calvinists only, but (as would appear) by all classes of infidels.” The reviewer says that “it is not according to fact that the Calvinistic view of the freedom of the will has been held by all classes of infidels.” He adds,—

"It is known to all who are acquainted with the history of the question, that Chubb, and the very lowest of the tribe of infidels, who did so much for the contamination of the morals of England, in the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, held the views of the will maintained by the Conference of the Evangelical Union. Calvinists have no reason to be ashamed of any doctrine regarding human nature, that received the deliberate support of men of such acumen as Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards. But a more pertinent inquiry would be, Has their view of free will been held by any men worthy of consideration, who were not Calvinists, and not Infidels? There is no name held in greater honour in England, than the name of John Locke. Though no Calvinist himself, he strenuously maintained the freedom of the will, in such a way as virtually to support the view advocated by Calvinists."—pp. 10, 11.

Our reviewer, we suspect, does not understand John Locke. It is true, indeed, that the illustrious philosopher held peculiar notions on the subject of the will. He held that "it is as insignificant to ask whether man's will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square; liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue." (*Essay*, ii. 21, § 14.) He imagined that to ascribe liberty to the will, would be to ascribe a power to a power. He forgot that when liberty is affirmed of the will, the real idea is that liberty belongs to the person who wills, though, of course, to the person as exercising the faculty of will. He conceived, again, that "a man, in respect of willing, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free,"—"because he cannot avoid willing the existence, or non-existence, of that action" (§ 23); forgetting that the question is not, whether a man be free to use, or not to use, his faculty of will. It is admitted that man is not free to refrain from willing. But the question in dispute is, whether, when using his faculty of will, he is free to determine in this direction rather than in that, or in that rather than in this,—free to choose this and to refuse that, or to choose that and to refuse this. Having such views of the will, it is not to be wondered at, that Mr. Locke should hold that "freedom consists in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall choose or will." (§ 27.) And yet he did not imagine, with Jonathan Edwards and our critic, that this is man's true freedom. On the contrary, he held that "the mind has in most cases a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another." And he says:—

"In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not using of it right, comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into, in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. *This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will.*"—§ 47.

"This, as seems to me, is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings; and I desire it may be well considered, whether the great inlet, and exercise of *all the liberty* men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of the actions, does not lie in this, that they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the things requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power; and indeed all that needs. For, since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice, all that we can do, is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire."—§ 52.

The illustrious philosopher did not notice that the acts of men, in suspending their desires, are simply acts of will, or choices. And while, therefore he did not approve of *the expression* "the freedom of the will," he contended substantially for *the thing*, which the Evangelical Union means by the expression. He held that man's true liberty is antecedent to his choices, and results in them. He thus maintained, not indeed what he would call "the freedom of the will," but what both he and we would unite in calling "the freedom of the man." And he maintained this freedom of the man, *not* as the reviewer thinks, "in such a way as virtually to support the view (of the freedom of the will) advocated by Calvinists," but in a way entirely the reverse.

If farther proof were required that our reviewer has misapprehended, and indeed reversed, the real sentiments of Mr. Locke in reference to man's freedom, that proof would be obtained in the philosopher's letter of Jan. 20, 1693, to Mr. Molyneux. He says,—

"I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our maker, and I cannot have a clearer preception of anything, than that I am free; yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both, as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And, therefore, I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion; that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it."—*Works*, vol. iii. p. 487, *ed.* 1751.

It is evident from this interesting, though semi-melancholy, statement, that the freedom of which Mr. Locke had the clearest possible conception, as a thing inherent in himself, and of the reality of which he was "as fully persuaded as of any truths he most firmly assented to," is not the freedom that is consequent on choice. Such a freedom was never yet supposed by any man to present the smallest apparent antithesis to the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Never yet has it been imagined that it would be impossible or difficult for God to make an agent possessed of such freedom. The freedom referred to is that which is antecedent to choice. It is the freedom for which the Evangelical Union contends; and which it is said in the *Doctrinal Declaration*, is denied "(as would appear) by all classes of infidels."

#### INFIDELS AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

The statement of the Declaration, as will be noticed, is not, that "the scheme of a necessitated will is held *by all infidels*." It would have required something like a little omniscience to have warranted such an averment. And to this omniscience in miniature, the draftsman of the Declaration and his brethren made, we are certain, not the slightest pretension. We do not know precisely the meaning which the draftsman himself attached to the expression which he employed. And perhaps it would have been better had he said, "by almost all classes of infidels." But when, for ourselves, we consented to the expression, as part of the Declarative Document of the Conference, we understood it as simply denoting that "the scheme of a necessitated will was held, not by Calvinists only, but also *by infidels in general*." We understood, in other words, the expression "all classes," as Calvinists often understand the single word "all." And most assuredly *infidels in general* do maintain the scheme of a necessitated will.

Take, for example, all that class of infidels, who have, for the prominent feature of their creed, the doctrine of atheism. Of these the late Professor Dugald Stewart says, "Every modern atheist I have heard of has been a necessitarian." (*Dissertation, Part ii., Note MM.*)

Take, again, all that class who have pantheism for the prominent feature of their belief. In modern times these are the followers of Spinoza, whose whole system is, from centre to circumference, a strictly concatenated scheme of absolute necessity. He says, "There is nothing contingent; but all things are, by the necessity of the divine nature, determined to exist and to operate in a definite manner." (*Ethica, i. 29.*) He says again, "Will cannot be called a free, it is only a necessitated, cause," (*non potest dici causa libera, sed tantum necessaria, vel coacta.*) "God," he adds, "does not act from freedom of will." (*Ditto., i. 32.*) He says again, "Things could not be produced by God in any other way, or in any other order, than they have been actually produced." (*Ditto., i. 23.*) We quote one other proposition,— "In the human mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause, which is also determined by another cause, and that by another, and so on to infinity." (*Ditto. ii. 48.*) Such is Spinozism. And indeed, it is demonstrable, we think, that every pantheist, of every school, if he only be capable of logically thinking out his system, must be opposed to the doctrine of free-will. Yet, as all are aware, a very large amount of the infidelity of the present day, more especially in Germany, is nurtured in the bosom of pantheism.

Then there is that large class of infidels, who have, for the prominent feature of their creed, an artificial socialism. These, in this country, are, in general, the followers of the late Robert Owen. And he founded his entire system on the doctrine of necessity. He says,—

"Hitherto, the world has been governed under the supposition, that the feelings and convictions have been produced by the *choices* of the individual, and that they are under the control of what is called *free-will*. The languages of all nations are filled with the terms, that you must love or hate, believe or disbelieve, certain qualities and creeds, or if you disobey, you will be punished here and hereafter; and for so loving, hating, believing, or disbelieving, men are now praised and rewarded, as though there were great merit in so doing."—*New Moral World*, chap. iii.

Mr. Owen, in opposition to all such notions of free-will, contends that "the character of man is, without a single exception, always made *for* him," and not *by* him. Every man, he holds, is "the creature of his circumstances," and therefore there can be no such thing as sin, properly so called; no man can be morally responsible. (See *Essays on the Formation of the Human Character.*)

Perhaps we might refer to the French Encyclopædists and their followers as, in some respects, a distinct class of infidels. Their philosophy was the outgrowth of the sensationalism of John Locke, rigidly abstracted from the modifying elements, with which that theory of the origin of our ideas was, in his own mind, wholesomely connected. And their infidelity was the most terrific that has ever yet burst upon the world. It was necessitarian throughout the whole length of its back-bone, and into its very core, and in-through and out-through to

every point and pore of the whole system. "Man's life," says Baron d' Holbach, "is a series of necessary movements; his conduct, whether good or bad, virtuous or vicious, useful or prejudicial either to himself or to others, is a concatenation of actions, a chain of causes and effects, as necessary as all the moments of his existence."—"The same necessity that regulates the physical, also regulates the moral world, in which everything is, in consequence, submitted to fatality." (*System of Nature, Part i., chap. xi.*) Baron d' Holbach was a disciple of M. Diderot, one of the ruling spirits of the movement; and it may be well to let Diderot speak for himself. He says to the Duke of Saxe-Gotha,—

"Consider it clearly, and you will see that the word liberty is a word without meaning; that there are not, and that there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what agrees with the general order, with organization, with education, and the chain of events. It is these that dispose of us invincibly."—"But if there is no liberty, there is no action which deserves praise or blame; there is no vice, no virtue, nothing that should be rewarded or punished. What is it, then, that distinguishes men? Good-doing or evil-doing. The evil-doer is a man who must be destroyed, and not punished. Good-doing is good fortune, and not a virtue. But although man, whether doing good or evil, is not free, he is nevertheless capable of modification; and it is on this account that the evil-doer should be publicly destroyed. Hence the good effects of example, of discourses, of education, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur, of wretchedness, &c. Hence, too, a kind of philosophy that is full of commiseration, and that is strongly attached to the good, but is no more angry with the evil, than with a hurricane which fills our eyes with dust."—"If you adopt these principles, they will reconcile you to others, and to yourself. You will neither be pleased nor displeased with yourself for being what you are. To cast no reproaches on others, and to feel no repentance for oneself;—this is the first step to wisdom." (*Correspondance Littéraire, i. pp. 304-306. ed. 1814.*)

We need not refer in detail to other classes of infidels. They interlace with one another, and with those already specified. Our reviewer himself specifies David Hume, Adam Smith, and Lord Kames, and speaks of the "wicked use" which they made of their doctrine of necessity. The party to which they belonged rejoiced, as if they had gained a triumph, when Jonathan Edwards published his *Careful and strict Inquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame*. And in our opinion they did obtain a most notable triumph.

We might also refer to the associates and followers of George Jacob Holyoake. But it is unnecessary. The expression in the *Doctrinal Declaration* is sufficiently vindicated.

There may, indeed, be individual infidels, who hold the freedom of the will, in the natural sense of the expression, the sense defined by the Evangelical Union. But, most assuredly, these are exceptional cases. And if they were only able to think consistently, their infidelity would either drive out from their minds their doctrine of free-will, or their doctrine of free-will would deliver them from their infidelity. There is no consistent middle-ground, in thought, between absolute necessity, on the one hand, which naturally runs itself up either into stark atheism or pantheism, and christianity, on the other, which is founded upon the assumption of *responsibility for choices*, and consequently, on the assump-

tion of free-will. All who hold the doctrine of free-will, as the Evangelical Union holds it, must regard man as morally accountable for his secret character as well as for his overt acts. And hence they cannot be far from the recognition of christianity. Chubb recognised christianity. It is utterly untrue that he belonged to "the very lowest of the tribe of infidels," or that any who sympathized with his sentiments belonged to those dregs. "The lowest of the tribe of infidels" can never comprehend those, who maintain that there is a God, and that He is glorious in holiness, and that man has free-will, and is therefore the accountable subject of God's moral government. And Chubb pleaded for these principles. He was, indeed, staggered,—and who need greatly wonder?—by the prevalent notions of the eternal generation of the Son of God, and the eternal spiration of the Holy Spirit, and he was thus driven into Arianism, and thence led into notions inconsistent with the true inspiration of the Scriptures. He had gleams, moreover, of the benign relation of God to the whole human family; and he could not reconcile these with the prevalent notions said to be scriptural, regarding the absolute reprobation of the heathen. His difficulties grew within him. But he never lost his hold of the existence and glorious character of a personal God. He never lost his hold of the moral accountability of man, and of the duty of all to live in love, and of each to live for others. He never renounced christianity. His doctrine of free-will, learned from Dr. Samuel Clarke, kept him from descending into the lowest depths of doubt. And it was another class altogether, who, "in the end of the seventeenth century and beginning of the eighteenth," wrought havoc among the moral principles of the population. So far as their principles were affected by definite views regarding the freedom of the will, they were, in the main, the followers rather of Thomas Hobbes and his disciple Anthony Collins, who advocated the very same theory as that for which the Reviewer pleads, than of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Thomas Chubb.

## LEIBNITZ AND FREE-WILL.

The reviewer makes another mistake in connection with this subject. He supposes that Leibnitz held the same view of the will as he himself holds, and as Jonathan Edwards maintained. He says, "Calvinists have no reason to be ashamed of any doctrine regarding human nature, that received the deliberate support of men of such acumen as Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards." The language is general, but the particular doctrine to which our author refers, is, that "the freedom of the will consists in the liberty possessed by a rational being to follow without *external* violence the bent of his own inclination, in whatever way that inclination may have been formed." This is indeed the doctrine of Jonathan Edwards, as it was the doctrine of Collins and of Hobbes. But it was not the doctrine of Leibnitz. Leibnitz, on the contrary, says that "if this were what men mean by liberty, when they ask whether the will is free, their question would be truly absurd." (*Nouveaux Essais*. ii. 21, 15.) "When men reason," he says again, "on the freedom of the will, they do not inquire whether man can do what he wills, but whether he has sufficient independence in his will itself." (*Quand on raisonne sur la liberte de la volonte, ou sur le franc*

arbitre, on ne demande pas, si l'homme peut faire ce qu'il veut, mais s'il y a assez d'indépendance dans sa volonté même. *Nouv. Es.* ii. 21, 21.) And, while it is the case that he held what he called "the principle of determinant reason," (*Théodicées.* i. 44), and applied it to the will, and supposed accordingly that every volition is determined by something extraneous to the will, he everywhere opposes the idea that the will is "necessitated." (*Nouv. Es.* ii. 21. 49; *Théod.* i. 34, 43, &c.) "I am," says he, "far removed from the opinions of Bradwardin, Wiclif, Hobbes, and Spinoza." (*Théod.* i. 67.) This will suffice for Leibnitz. It would appear that it will require a more accurate mind than that of our critic, to make anything like reliable historical references to the opinions of men.

But on another account still, it would have been better if the reviewer had left unwritten his idea that "Calvinists have no reason to be ashamed of any doctrine regarding human nature, that received the deliberate support of men of such acumen as Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards." Romanists might on the same principle give themselves up to repose, in reference to every one of their peculiar tenets and practices. They might refer to Pascal and Fenelon, or point to Gregory and Bernard, and say, that they "have no reason to be ashamed of any doctrines or ceremonies which received the deliberate support of such men."

#### THE REVIEWER'S MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE EVANGELICAL UNION ON THE WILL.

It is more to our present purpose, however, to reiterate our sincere regret that a vein of misrepresentation runs through all the statements of the reviewer. Almost every thing he touches upon, whether historical or logical, he more or less perverts. And the perversion often amounts to unconscious inversion, or even caricature. On this very subject of the will, for instance, on which, as we have seen, he has committed so many historical blunders,—some of them as gross as that concerning "Sandemanianism," and "Morison and Pelagius,"—he commits, in a way which it is extremely difficult to account for, another class of mistakes. He misrepresents, egregiously, the Evangelical Union. He gives the following definition of the doctrine of the will, as held by the Evangelical Unionists:—

"According to the other class, man is not free unless the will itself can act capriciously—unless he be, by the law of his nature, free from the necessity of following any rule in the formation of the volitions of his will."—p. 10.

Now this is really a caricature of the doctrine of the Evangelical Union. We do *not* hold that "man is free from the necessity of following any rule in the formation of the volitions of his will." Every man who thinks on these subjects knows right well that there are laws, according to which man must act in the forth-putting of his volitions. But what the Evangelical Unionists hold is this, *that, in matters of choice, man is free to choose.* And although they also hold that in these matters of choice, man "*can* act capriciously;"—for the word "caprice" exists, and is derived from consciousness, and is consequently the symbol of a human phenomenon;—yet they do not hold that he is generally, and still less that he must be invariably, capricious in reference to what he chooses.

Our reviewer says again,—

“But why has the Conference of the Evangelical Union introduced their members to a controversy so thorny as this—a question confessedly fitted to exercise the powers of the most acute and most gifted of minds? Their object is by one bold effort to erect an insurmountable barrier to the introduction of the doctrines of free grace. They wish to show that the special operation of the Spirit of God on the heart of man, is a moral impossibility—and that whatever the Bible, according to its obvious letter, may teach on that vitally important subject, cannot be consistent with soberness and truth.”—p. 12.

Here is a string of egregious misrepresentations. For, first, it is not true that the object of the Conference was, “by one bold stroke to erect an insurmountable barrier to the introduction of the doctrines of free grace.” The members of the Union maintain, to a man, all “the doctrines of free grace,” and glory in them. Secondly, it is not true that “they wish to show that the special operation of the Spirit of God on the heart of man, is a moral impossibility.” They believe that there is a special evangelical operation of the Holy Spirit of God on the heart of man: an operation eminently fitted to the wants of the heart, as the seat of unholy affections. They are far from regarding this as “a moral impossibility.” *It is only a will-necessitating influence on free-will which they regard as a moral impossibility.* Thirdly, it is almost a positive calumny when the reviewer proceeds to say that the members of the Evangelical Union wish to show “that whatever the Bible, according to its obvious letter, may teach on this vitally important subject (of the influence of the Spirit on man's heart) cannot be consistent with soberness and truth.” The members of the Evangelical Union, the members who are members indeed, desire to learn and embrace whatever the Bible really teaches. They bow to the entire Word of God with deferential reciprocity and reverence. They delight in the law of the Lord, and it is their joy to meditate on it by day and night. They have ever, moreover, avowed their willingness and their wish to have all their doctrines tested and examined by a strict and bona fide exegesis of “what saith the Lord.” We are sorry that any “minister of the Church of Scotland” should be capable, in consequence either of culpable carelessness, or of moral recklessness, or of an ungenerous wish to find everything bad, and to turn everything, however sweet, into gall, of making misrepresentation so gross. It is true, of course, that we cannot have the same ideas of free grace, or of the special operation of the Spirit, or of the teaching of the Bible, as our reviewer has. Such ideas as his, we earnestly say, be far, far, from us! But this is no reason why he should assume that conscious opposition to his notions, is conscious opposition to “the obvious letter” of what prophets and apostles have written, when moved by the Holy Spirit of God.

We need not detain ourselves much longer by the reviewer's additional observations on the will. They are rambling and irrelevant, and, so far as concerns the introduction of Dr. Whitby's views, inaccurate. They contain doctrinal insinuations too, which are entirely gratuitous, and by much too nearly akin to the misrepresentations on which we have been remarking. He says,—

“Wicked as they (the fallen angels) are, they are free agents now, and had it pleased



the Source of all holiness to determine to render them again angels of light, giving them a bias to what is good, instead of to what is evil, he would be indeed a bold speculator who would venture to assert, on the ground of any philosophical theory, that the change is impossible. If, again, on inquiry, it be found that the imagination of the heart of man is evil, and only evil continually—if it be further found, on a careful examination of the Bible, that the Blessed and the only Potentate has formed a scheme for the transformation of such a sinner, that man must have more daring than becomes either a good philosopher, or a good theologian, who presumes to assert that the thing cannot be.”—p. 13.

It is insinuated, apparently, that the members of the Evangelical Union maintain that God could not impart to fallen angels “a bias to what is good.” It is also insinuated that they hold that the scheme of the blessed and only Potentate for the transformation of man’s character is impracticable. Such insinuations, we cannot refrain from saying, are “more daring than becomes either a good philosopher, or a good theologian,” or, we may add, a good controvertist, or indeed a good Christian. They are baseless. And yet, in his eagerness to throw them out, the reviewer has forgotten that something objective, as well as something subjective, is governmentally necessary in order to the conversion of the sinful heart, whether human or angelic. And it is because of the necessity of this that is objective, that scope is left for man, as a free-willer, either to choose or to refuse.

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### CHAPTER III.

#### DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

The section of the Doctrinal Declaration which has reference to the divine sovereignty, is as follows:—

“By the sovereignty of God, we, in common with all our fellow Christians, understand his supreme and absolute prerogative to do what it pleases him. Any controversies we may have had, that bear on this point, have to do, not with the question, Is God in this sense sovereign? but with the ulterior question, What, in the exercise of this sovereignty, has it pleased and does it please him to do? These controversies are to be determined by an appeal partly to fact, but mainly to his own testimony in the volume of inspiration.”—p. 6.

The reviewer can find no fault with this statement. And yet he contrives to draw in under the heading, as it were by hook and crook, a multitude of observations, which he supposes, we doubt not, to be more or less relevant to the subject. He has apparently met with representations by some adherent or adherents of the Union, which have reminded him that the Scripture meaning of the word “mystery” is different from the acceptance which the term now conventionally bears. And he says,—

“But, when this is yielded to the adherents of the Union, what follows? It certainly does not follow as a *necessary* inference, that in the New Testament, there are no *mysteries*, in the common acceptance of the phrase. They must themselves concede that, were they to attempt an explanation of some of the doctrines mentioned in the Introduction of the Declaration as implicitly believed by themselves and other denominations, they would feel as helpless as do the Calvinists.”—p. 17.

We know not the writings to which he refers. But we have simply

to say, for ourselves, that we find everything in us and around us running up into mystery. Our faith, therefore, embraces millions of mysteries. But a mystery is one thing, and a contradictory mystery is another. Contradictory mysteries are contradictions; and these we cannot receive: more especially when we find them, not in the Bible, but in the books of mere men, who have no more authority to dictate to us what shall be our creed, than we have to dictate to them what shall be theirs. We believe that all Protestants are right when they disallow the doctrine of transubstantiation, on the ground of contradictory mystery. And we believe that all Christians are right, when they reject the Indian myth that a giant once inhabited the island of Ceylon, whose bed was 12,000 miles long. When the Indians are asked how the giant's bed could be so much longer than the island itself, in which it was contained, they say, it is a *mystery*. And there they stand still. But it is more than a mere mystery. It is a contradictory mystery,—a contradiction, like transubstantiation, or like necessitated acts of will. And because it is such, it is justly tossed out of the mind by every Christian who hears of it, as being really unworthy of sober diplomatic investigation.

The reviewer proceeds with the application of his doctrine concerning mystery to the members of the Evangelical Union:—

“They cannot remove the objections of the Unitarians, they cannot repel the sophistries of the Deist and the Atheist, without taking refuge in the plea, ‘Thus saith the Lord.’ Calvinists think that the adherents of the Union should follow the same rule in the adjustment of the momentous questions now agitated.”—p. 17.

As for ourselves, we have not any difficulty, in the direction of mystery, with the objections of Unitarians. There is not one particle more of mystery to us in Trinitarianism, than in Unitarianism; and certainly we find no contradictory mysteries in the Trinitarianism of the Bible. We are equally unencumbered in our controversies with Deists and Atheists. We need not to take refuge in any contradictory mysteries. And yet, in arguing on these subjects, we do not make an exclusive appeal to the “thus saith the Lord” of the Bible. For such reasonings would be circular, and a mere begging of the questions in dispute. God, we presume, has spoken in other tones besides those of words. He has revealed himself elsewhere, as well as in the volume of the Book. And we point Atheists to the unwritten revelations of His glorious existence and attributes and will. With Theists, again, we take a wider range, and join human testimony and human wants with the words of the lively oracles. But with none do we insist on the reception of contradictory mysteries. And whatever Calvinists may think, we must just “follow the same rule in the momentous questions now agitated.” Contradictory mysteries we never can receive. But “thus saith the Lord,” whether the voice emanate from the pages of the grand Old Book, which our hands can handle and our eyes can see, or from the pages of that other and inner book, also written by the finger of God, but which consciousness alone can peruse, will always secure our assent and settle our belief. And we need scarcely remark that, if psychology be a legitimate science at all, it must be a right thing to search within the inner book, for the true nature of will.

## FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

The Reviewer says that Isai. v. 3, "Judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard," is "often quoted as a proof that every thing connected with the divine administration and character is submitted to human judgment."—p. 17. It is not thus that we have been accustomed to quote the passage; although it is certainly adduced, legitimately, to prove that men are able to form an enlightened judgment regarding some of God's ways, and more especially regarding his ways of dealing with those who persist in their opposition to his will. "What could have been done more," the High and Holy One asks, "to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?" Suppose it could be answered that the only thing that could, without Pelagianism, have had any effect at all, had been divinely left undone,—what would be the effect upon the minds of the divinely-constituted judges?

The reviewer says that he makes a reference to these modes of reasoning "simply in the way of illustrating the danger of proceeding to the study of the word of God, with the steadfast conviction that the doctrines of Calvinism CANNOT be the doctrines of that blessed volume." (p. 16.) We acknowledge that it would be a pity if any should proceed to the examination of the only book, whose testimony can be decisive on the great questions in dispute, with a fixed foregone adjudication of the case. The book would then be examined, not in the spirit of the bench, but in the spirit of the bar. Judicial impartiality and wisdom would be wanting. But as for most in Scotland the counsel is not required. Most go to the Book, as we went ourselves, convinced that it contained, even to every jot and tittle, "the doctrines of Calvinism." And great was our astonishment, and deep was our disappointment, when we did not find what we expected to obtain. Our reviewer should rather, we presume, have counselled his readers not to betake themselves to the Book with the settled pre-judgment in their mind that it must be opposed to the doctrines of the freeness of the grace of God to all.

As for his own opinion of the divine sovereignty, we are glad that he repudiates the idea that there can be anything "arbitrary or capricious"—"in the exercise of this attribute." (p. 15.) And yet we rather wonder that he does not bear in mind that his Shorter Catechism teaches him, that God, "out of his *mere* good pleasure, from all eternity, elected some to everlasting life." (q. 20.) What is the warrant, we would ask, for this word "mere"? and where is the consistency, if it be retained, of disowning arbitrariness and caprice?

## CHAPTER IV.

## DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FOREORDINATION.

On the subject of the divine foreknowledge, the Evangelical Union holds that it is "absolute and universal, embracing all events, actual or possible, fixed or contingent, just as they are,—necessitated events as

necessitated, free events as free, without making them either the one or the other." But as regards the divine foreordination, it is said,—“His foreordination, on the one hand, is neither absolute nor universal.” “In contrast to the doctrine of the Westminster Standards, we hold that God's foreordination is not universally absolute, but is conditioned by his wisdom, as often inclusive of his foreknowledge; and that though his foreordination has relations to everything that comes to pass, he has not foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, but only whatsoever he himself brings to pass.”—*Doctrinal Declaration*, pp. 6, 7.

Such is the sum of the views of the Evangelical Union on these august topics. They do not please the Reviewer. And, seemingly with mock humility, he says, “We do not lay claim to the intimate acquaintance with those high subjects apparently possessed by the Conference of the Evangelical Union.” He adds,—

“A number of the statements made under this head, are purely gratuitous. They are necessarily beyond the reach of the human mind, and the Spirit speaking in the Scriptures has not seen it meet to supply the defect to the extent desiderated.”—p. 18.

But surely it is not the “statements,” that are “necessarily beyond the reach of the human mind.” It was human minds that made them. It must be the things concerning which the statements are made, to which our critic refers. And yet, even in reference to these, he is certainly not warranted to say that, because they are incomprehensible to him, they are “necessarily beyond the reach of the human mind.” We would remind him of the remark, which his favourite Leibnitz made, in reference to a similar statement of Des Cartes concerning the conciliation of human freedom with divine providence. “It has always appeared strange to me,” says Leibnitz, “that Des Cartes, not contenting himself with saying that he himself did not see the way of reconciling the two doctrines, puts the whole human race in the same predicament.” (*Theod. Discours.* § 68, 69.)

Our critic proceeds to quote a sentence from the Doctrinal Declaration, and to make a remark upon it. The sentence is the following,—

“The doctrine of the Westminster Confession, that God hath eternally, unchangeably, and unconditionally, foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, we take to be a principle subversive of all morality and of all religion.”—p. 18.

The remark upon it is the following:—

“Of course, in the face of such wholesale condemnation, we can have little heart to quote the word of God in support of a tenet so very offensive. The reader, however, would do well carefully to study the following passages, as specimens of the clear proofs of a doctrine so decried:—2 Sam. xvii. 14; Ps. xxxix. 9; exv. 3; Prov. xix. 21; Isaiah xiv. 26-27; xlv. 10-11; Lament. iii. 37; Romans xi. 36; Phil. ii. 13.”—pp. 18, 19.

The reviewer not only thinks that it is God who has planned all the wickedness that has ever been perpetrated; and who has determined, moreover, that he shall bring it all to pass: he is convinced, in addition, that in Scripture there are “clear proofs” of such a doctrine. And he gives specimens, which he commends to the consideration of his readers.

As the specimen-passages referred to, will, doubtless, be the likeliest he could find, we shall look at them.

## ALLEGED PROOFS OF UNIVERSAL FOREORDINATION.

## 2 SAM. XVII. 14.

The first is 2 Sam. xvii. 14,—“And Absalom and all the men of Israel said, The counsel of Hushai the Archite is better than the counsel of Ahithophel: for the Lord had appointed to defeat the good counsel of Ahithophel, to the intent that the Lord might bring evil upon Absalom.” But the “good counsel” referred to, was good only for promoting the wicked usurpation of Absalom. It was not absolutely good. It was not morally good. It was merely good in a Machiavelian acceptation. It was, in all higher acceptations, evil and evil only. And as God, the Magistrate of magistrates, is the High Patron of good, and the everlasting Enemy and Avenger of evil, it became him to overrule the diplomacy of Hushai, for the purpose of bringing condign punishment upon the usurper. What it became him to do, he had determined to do. He “had appointed to defeat the counsel of Ahithophel.” There is nothing here of appointing to do evil.

## PSALM XXXIX. 9, APPEALED TO.

The second passage appealed to, is Psalm xxxix. 9;—“I was dumb, I opened not my mouth; because thou didst it.” But what was it that God did? Was it some moral evil, of which man seemed, but yet only seemed, to be the subordinate agent? Very far from it, in our opinion. It was obviously some physical evil to which the Psalmist refers; some affliction, under which, as a righteous chastisement, he was labouring. It was a “stroke,” a “blow of God’s hand,” (ver. 10), which shewed him “how frail he was,” and that his “days were an hand-breadth.” (ver. 4, 5.) It was a “correction for iniquity.” (ver. 11.) It was this which the Lord had done. And because the Lord had done it, the Psalmist opened not his mouth. But certainly the fact that the Lord “corrects for iniquity,” is wonderfully slender proof that he has foreordained everything that comes to pass.

## PSALM CXV. 8, APPEALED TO.

The third passage is Psalm cxv. 3:—“But our God is in the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased.” Most assuredly. The Lord always does whatsoever he pleases. But the question is, Does he please to do, though it should be by means of the instrumentality of men, the sins that come to pass? That is the question? And so far as affording ground for an answer in the affirmative is concerned, the reviewer might certainly have quoted, as legitimately, the very first words of the whole Bible,—“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”

## PROVERBS XIX. 21, APPEALED TO.

The fourth passage is Prov. xix. 21:—“There are many devices in a man’s heart; nevertheless, the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand.” Manifestly. What the Lord hath in infinite wisdom purposed to do, that he will do, let the devices of man’s heart be as numerous as they may. His plan is laid in infinite wisdom. It is a counsel. And his

counsel is so comprehensive, that it, doubtless, will have reference to every possible contingency. But the text by no means says, or implies, that it is according to God's counsel that all the devices of men's hearts should be precisely what they are, whether they be good or evil. And as it does not say or imply this, but implies something that is the contrary of such an idea, the adduction of the passage is as irrelevant, in order to prove that God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, as would be the quotation of the words, "God is good unto all, and his tender mercies are over all his works."

## ISAIAH XIV. 26, 27, APPEALED TO.

Isaiah xiv. 26, 27, is the next passage quoted:—"This is the purpose that is purposed, upon the whole earth; and this is the hand that is stretched out upon all the nations. For the Lord of Hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? and his hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it back?" The passage admirably proves that there is a purpose of retribution in reference to all the persistently wicked, such as the Assyrians of old. (ver. 25). And this purpose of retribution, no mortals shall ever succeed in disannulling. The hand that executes it, is Omnipotence. "Who shall turn it back?" But when Gill, Alexander, and our critic, suppose that the prophet means, "There's nothing comes to pass, but God has purposed; and everything he has purposed does come to pass," (Gill), they stretch the statement on the one side till it rends, and on the other they patch their own unsightly notion on its already perfect symmetry.

## ISAIAH XLVI. 10, 11, APPEALED TO.

The next passage referred to is Isai. xlvi. 10, 11;—"Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure: calling a ravenous bird from the east, the man that executeth my counsel from a far country: yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass: I have purposed it, I will also do it." We really cannot perceive what connection the passage has with the question in dispute. It teaches us the foreknowledge of God. That is not disputed. It teaches us also that God has a counsel or all-wise plan. That too is undisputed. It teaches us that this plan shall be carried out; his counsel shall stand. That too is undisputed. It teaches us that God will do all which it is his pleasure to do. That too is undisputed. It teaches us that God gave a commission to Cyrus, "the eagle from the east,"—"the man of his counsel"; and what he had spoken, that he would bring to pass; what he had purposed, that he would do. And all this is undisputed. But it is not said or implied that God had purposed everything and will do everything.

## LAMENTATIONS III. 37, APPEALED TO.

Then Lamentations iii. 37, is quoted,— "Who is he *that* saith, and it cometh to pass, *when* the Lord commanded it not?" It will be noticed that the word "when" is a supplement. The verse is translated thus in the Septuagint,— "Who hath spoken thus, and it hath come to pass?"

The Lord hath not commanded it." And if the preceding verse be correctly rendered in our version, the Septuagint version is undoubtedly correct. Verses 34-36 form one sentence;—"To crush under his feet all the prisoners of the earth, to turn aside the right of a man before the face of the most High, to subvert a man in his cause,"—all this "the Lord approveth not." Then follows ver. 37, "Who is he that hath said, and it hath come to pass?"—*Who is he that hath threatened to do what is referred to in verses 34-36, and hath done it? Whosoever he be, "the Lord hath not commanded it."* The prophet continues in ver. 38, "Out of the mouth of the most High, proceedeth not evil and good." No, but good only. His mouth, unlike the mouth referred to by the apostle James, is not a fountain that sends forth, incongruously, both sweet waters and bitter. In all things moral, evil proceeds not from God. It is far away from God. Such undoubtedly is the import of the passage, if the 36th verse be correctly rendered in our version. But the utmost diversity prevails among critics, apart altogether from questions of theological issue, as to how the passage should be construed and translated. The 38th verse is unhappily rendered interrogatively in our English version. It was not so understood by Jonathan the Targumist, and by the Septuagint translator. The reviewer should either have passed over such a passage,—the import of which, on critical grounds alone, is so exceedingly uncertain,—or he should have given reasons for the interpretation, which he imposes upon it. As we understand it, there is contained in it an express condemnation of the doctrine of the reviewer, the doctrine, namely, that whosoever "turns aside the right of a man before the face of the most High, and subverts a man in his cause—the Lord hath commanded it." That, however, we say most solemnly and earnestly, be far from God! That be far from the merciful One, who is as holy as he is merciful, and "of purer eyes than to look upon iniquity"!

ROMANS XI. 36, APPEALED TO.

The next passage quoted is Romans xi. 36,—“For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory, for ever, amen.” It is the expression “all things,” to which, of course, the reviewer would wish to direct attention. For however solicitous he may be to limit the word “all” when it is used in reference to the objects of the divine propitiation and mercy, he is, for some reason or other, very far from being equally solicitous to have it limited, when it is employed in reference to the objects of the divine foreordination and operation. But in this case, certainly, the word does denote some grand totality. Yea, it denotes the grandest and greatest of all totalities, infinity apart. It has the article in the original,—*the all things, the universe of things, creation as a whole*. It is thus that Calvin and Baxter understood the expression,—“all creatures.” And so Alford, “the whole creation.” So Thomas Aquinas, “*all things* are to be understood, absolutely, for *all things that have true being*.” But, as Elnathan Parr remarks, “sin is not a thing separate, having a being and existence by itself, as the creature has,” and therefore it is not referred to. “Though the creature,” he adds, “who is evil, is from God, as from the cause,

yet the evilness and sin of the creature is not." Such is the judgment of Calvinists, and Calvinists of no mean repute. And yet, it would appear, it does not satisfy our reviewer. He would stretch the expression farther out, so as to cover, not only all creatures, but also all the wickedness of all wicked creatures. He forgets apparently that the same expression occurs in 1 Cor. viii. 6;—"but to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are *all things*, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are *all things*, and we by him." Was "the Lord Jesus Christ" needed, we would ask, in order that sins might be originated by him? The reviewer forgets, too, that the same expression occurs again in Col. i. 16,—“For by him (Christ) were *all things* created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; *all things* were created by him and for him: and he is before *all things*, and by him *all things* consist.” Understand the expression of *the universe of creatures*, and the whole passage is luminous as with radiance from heaven. Understand it as embracing *sins*, and a blackness of darkness, that may, and must, be most oppressively felt, instantaneously overspreads it; for it would then contain the blasphemy that sins were “created” by Christ, and that by him they “consist.” Will the reviewer, however, cling to his first love? And will he then take refuge in “mystery”? If he do, we must just leave him there, to the dearth, and dreariness, and darkness, of his own meditations; while we proceed. As for us, we really cannot think that Christ first created sins, and then came to atone for them. Neither can we believe, though we should be tempted for our belief with a bishoprick, that a glory-haloed mind like that of Paul the apostle, could put into his doxology, that rises up from his soul like the seraphic tones of an anthem, that “from God, and through God, and to God, are all the sins of the universe.”

## PHILIPPIANS II. 13, APPEALED TO.

The last of our critic's cluster of passages, is Phil. ii. 13;—"for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." It would appear that the reviewer understands the passage as either explicitly or implicitly teaching that it is God who works in every man, and in every angel and demon, whatever they will and do; for it is quoted to prove that "God hath eternally, unchangeably, and unconditionally, foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." We are sorry that we are constrained to have an exceedingly unfavourable opinion of the idea. It is to us, as regards its psychological aspect, a pantheistic outrage upon the principle of individual personality; and, as regards its moral aspect, it is a pantheistic outrage upon the principle of essential contrariety that distinguishes right from wrong. It is, moreover, as regards its exegetical aspect, out of joint with the context. The apostle had said in the preceding verse, "work out your salvation with fear and trembling;" that is, *work out what is needed in the way of meekness for your ultimate salvation; and work it out with fear and trembling*, "for," he adds, "it is God who, for his good pleasure, worketh in you both to will and to do," that is, *it is God who is graciously enabling you both to will and to do what is needed as meetness for your ultimate salvation. It*



*will well become you, therefore, to work; and to work with fear and trembling, lest you fail to improve the exceeding riches of the divine grace.* The passage has no more bearing upon the establishment of the notion of universal foreordination, than has the Saviour's antithesis, "I would, but ye would not." (Mat. xxiii. 37.)

Such are the reviewer's "clear proofs" of the doctrine that "God hath eternally, unchangeably, and unconditionally, foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." We leave our readers to judge of their relevancy.

#### FOREKNOWLEDGE IN PARTICULAR: DOES IT INFER NECESSITATION?

It has often been alleged by such as hold the principles of our reviewer, that nothing is gained by denying the universality of foreordination, if the universality of foreknowledge is maintained. But the Evangelical Union maintains the universality of the divine foreknowledge; and the Declaration says,—

"Nor can we admit the justice of the retort that God's universal foreknowledge, which we hold, necessitates all events, sin included, as truly as universal foreordination. Not by any means. To *know* is an act or state of the *intelligence*, and never necessitates its object; and for God to know a crime, say the crucifixion of Christ, before it comes to pass, no more identifies him with it, than our knowledge of it after it has come to pass makes us sharers in its criminality."—p. 6.

#### THE REVIEWER HOLDS THAT IT DOES. HIS REASONS.

The reviewer differs from these views, and thus attempts to reason them into refutation:—

"We cannot possibly have a better example than the crucifixion of Christ for trying the principles so confidently asserted in these quotations. It cannot be denied that this solemn event, with all the circumstances connected with it, was predicted many ages before it happened. It is true that these predictions arose from the Divine intelligence. But the event, when foreknown and predicted, could be no longer contingent. Thus it must be, and not otherwise. If the event was not necessitated by the foreknowledge, it was necessitated by some means; for, after it was foreknown, it was no longer a casualty. It must, from some cause, necessarily have happened. It was fixed before the parties concerned in it came into existence, and the certainty of the event must, in its connection with the guilty perpetrators, partake of all the consequences of a Divine decree."—p. 19.

We admit and contend that the death of Christ, as a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world, was not only foreknown and predicted, but pre-determined. God's hand and counsel determined before that it should be done. (Acts iv. 28.) But we distinguish between the sacrificial death, which was necessary if sins were to be forgiven, and certain mere circumstantialities or adjuncts which actually accompanied it, but which might have been different without detriment to the great end our Saviour had in view, and which indeed could be of no moral significance, as regards the sufficiency and value of the propitiatory decease. In so far as these circumstantialities or adjuncts were the products of the free volitions of men, and especially in so far as they were human sins or crimes, we cannot, for a moment, suppose that they had the slightest atoning value attaching to them, or that they were divinely planned and foreordained. The reasoning of our critic, by which he attempts to establish

the necessity of these circumstantialities or adjuncts, on the ground that they were objects of the divine foreknowledge, appears to us to be anything but satisfactory.

FIRSTLY,—*It is rather strong assertion than reasoning.* He says, "The event, when foreknown and predicted, could be no longer contingent." Why could it not? we ask. His favourite Leibnitz held that the foreknowledge and prediction of events were not at all inconsistent with their contingency. But our author says, "Thus it must be, and not otherwise." Why so? we ask again. The assertion is strong enough; but where is the proof? "If the event was not necessitated by the foreknowledge, it was necessitated by some means; for, after it was foreknown, it was no longer a casualty." "A casualty"! Who says it? What does our critic mean by the word? Does he mean "a thing of chance"? If he do, he is stepping out of the arena into which he has spontaneously entered, for the Conference of the Evangelical Union "does not hold the heathen doctrine of chance." (*Doct. Dec. 5*) But if he means "a contingency," why not use the proper word? His favourite Leibnitz is sufficiently careful to impress and re-impress upon him that it is "contingency" which is the proper opposite of "necessity." But apart from that abuse of a word, the statement is a mere re-iterated assertion,—an unsupported asseveration for the third time. He continues,—"It must, from some cause, necessarily have happened." Why must it? we ask again. A re-re-repetition of an assertion does not prove that it must. "It was fixed before the parties concerned in it came into existence, and the certainty of the event must, in its connection with the guilty perpetrators, partake of all the consequences of a divine decree." But why must it? we ask for the fifth time, in answer to a re-re-re-repetition of the assertion. If this be reasoning, then a man may reason admirably without ever adducing a single reason.

SECONDLY,—*The reasoning, if indeed such a string of repeated assertions may by courtesy receive such a worthy name, is, in its moral issue, mere Spinozism and Owenism.* It appends its seal to the moral hemisphere of the system of Spinoza, and to the psychological hemisphere of the system of Owen. For when our critic argues that the crucifixion was necessitated, because it was foreknown and predicted, his argument is, of course, applicable to every event that is predicted or foreknown. It is applicable, consequently, to every event, inner or outer, that has ever transpired, or that is still transpiring, or that ever will transpire, in heaven, earth, and hell. All events were from everlasting foreknown. And consequently, if our reviewer's argument or asseveration be legitimate, and logical, and sound, "Every event, as being foreknown, can no longer be contingent. Thus it must be, and not otherwise. If the event is not necessitated by the foreknowledge, it is necessitated by some other means; for after it was foreknown, it was no longer a contingency. It must, from some cause, necessarily happen. It was fixed before the parties concerned in it came into existence, and the certainty of its occurrence, even when there is guilt connected with it, must partake of all the consequences of a divine decree." It is hence impossible, according to the reasoning of our critic, that any one event that has ever

happened could have been other than it has actually been. This, as we have seen, is just the doctrine of Spinoza. It is also, in its psychological aspect, the consummation of the doctrine of Robert Owen; the doctrine, namely, that "All men everywhere are the creatures of their circumstances." They must be, according to our critic, if we only run up their circumstances far enough into eternity, and find among them the everlasting foreknowledge of God. Dr. John Maccovius, then, Calvinistic Professor of Theology in the University of Franeker, was after all correct when he said, "a man can never do more good than he does, nor commit less sin than he commits." (*Theologia Polemica*, cap. xviii. § 6.) This is what the doctrine of our reviewer ends in. And he certainly deserves for it either the thanks, or at all events the hearty hurrahs, of all the atheists and infidels in the world.

But **THIRDLY**, *His reasoning, such as it is, amounts to a total denial of the real foreknowledge of God.* For as foreknowledge is a mode of knowledge, it cannot, if it be real foreknowledge, necessitate its object. No knowledge does so. Our critic knows that Adam sinned; but his knowledge does not necessitate Adam's sin. The necessitation, then, of the objects of foreknowledge, if indeed these objects be necessitated, does not spring from the foreknowledge of them. It must spring from something else. Our author does not deny it. No author, we presume, ever denied it. Our author evidently looks in another direction for the necessitation which he maintains. "If," says he, "the event was not necessitated by the foreknowledge, it was necessitated by some means." In short, he evidently holds, and must, to be consistent, hold, with Calvin and Jonathan Edwards, that the universal divine foreknowledge needs a universal divine foreordination for its base. "It is in no other way," says Calvin, "that God foresees the things that are to happen, than because he hath decreed that they shall so happen." (*Instit.* iii. 23. 6.) But if this really be the case; if God cannot foreknow except what he himself has already foreordained, his foreknowledge is no longer one of the marvels of the divine glory, and, as it were, an open eye, looking directly forward into the future. It is a mere common-place looking in upon foreordination. It is a mere common-place perception of a present purpose;—a mere common-place consciousness, in short, of an existent decree. And when God predicts, he does nothing more, if this theory be correct, than what every man on earth is as perfectly able to do, and actually does, when he tells what he intends to do.

**FOURTHLY**,—*Our reviewer, however, meant more than he says; and his argument, we presume, if drawn out into a formal statement, would amount to this:—events divinely foreknown must take place, otherwise God's foreknowledge would be falsified, and would turn out to have been fore-ignorance.* But such a method of reasoning,—which is, however, the only method possible to our author, on the ground he has assumed,—merely leads the mind to play with itself, as at "blind man's buff." It bandages the eyes, and then leaves the thoughts to be beaten hither and thither at the mercy of imagination, with its antics. It is not true that events divinely foreknown, *must*, as such,—that is, *must*, as events simply foreknown,—take place. The word "must" has no business here. The events *do* take

place; and if they did not, they would not have been foreknown. This is the whole matter. The knowledge of God is his eye,—the one eye of divinity,—an eye of infinite lustre and range. His foreknowledge is this eye—looking forward. The future is to its gaze, as the present. And hence every thing which it sees, *will be*. But it is by no means the case, as Calvin had the sagacity to perceive, that every thing *must be*, because it is divinely foreseen. "I would willingly concede," says Calvin, "that mere foreknowledge imposes no necessity upon creatures." (*Equidem præscentiam solam nullam inferre necessitatem creaturis, libenter concessero. Instit. iii. 23. 6.*) It is with foreknowledge as with afterknowledge. Afterknowledge is the mental eye looking backward and seeing into the past. Whatever it sees *was*. But it is not the case, because of this afterknowledge, that everything that was, *must have been*. Afterknowledge has no adaptation to impart necessitation to past events. Neither does it imply that they must have been. And foreknowledge, in like manner, does not imply, that what *will be*, *must be*.

#### FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FOREORDINATION IN RELATION TO THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

Our reviewer proceeds,—

"It is evident from the prophecies of the Old Testament that the method of our reconciliation with God was definitely fixed before the advent of the Saviour. The prophets delight to dwell on all the particulars of the wonderful story. In the writings of Isaiah the work is described with a minuteness that bespeaks absolute arrangement on the part of God. What is the meaning of such phrases as that Christ was 'sent' or 'given' by God? What is the meaning and what the object of the adorations rendered by angels and saints in heaven, and by God's people on earth, to the Source of all blessedness for the death of the Saviour, if mere foreknowledge constitute the substance of His concern in the momentous occurrences?"—pp. 19, 20.

We sit confounded, and scarcely able to believe our eyes. And yet the accumulation of previous misrepresentations, might have prepared us for the present climax. Who, on earth, we would ask our critic, ever dreamed, if he believed in a God and a Bible at all, that God had nothing to do with the death of Christ? Who on earth, ever supposed that because some things contingent, in connection with the great propitiatory death, were simply foreknown, and not foreordained, therefore the decease itself and everything connected with it, were divinely un-purposed? Who, on earth, ever dreamed that the words "sent" and "given" mean "foreknown"? Is it come to this of it, that we must be held to resolve everything into foreknowledge, because we maintain that somethings are un-foreordained?

Our reviewer proceeds, however, and does us the honour to make special reference to ourselves, though not in the most complimentary terms,—

"We do not wish to use unfairly any authority inferior to the Conference in the explanation of the doctrines of the Evangelical Unionists. But we may be allowed to quote a few sentences from a pamphlet written by one, who from his position, must have weight in the body:—'Small and narrow must be that man's conceptions of the significance and bearings of mere incidental circumstantialities, who should suppose that any peculiarity of acting on the part either of men or of devils was essential to the propitiatory decease. Had the decease occurred in Gethsemane, it would have been

as full an atonement as was realized by its occurrence on Calvary. And had no human hand touched Him, it would have mattered nothing, if only the sword of divine justice had awakened and smitten Him, either in the temple or in any other amphitheatre of observation. In short, God's hand and counsel had simply determined that our Lord should suffer and die a sacrifice for sins. They had not determined any of the free acts either of human or of diabolic agents.' Surely the man who penned these sentences must have read that all the particulars connected with the crucifixion of Christ were predicted hundreds of years before they happened. He must be aware, surely, that the fulfilment of prophecy in connection with Christ is one of the most valuable of all the evidences of His Messiahship and work. Surely he cannot mean to say, that if the facts had been in entire discrepancy with the prophecies, we could safely have rested on the atonement of Christ as the means of our salvation. We cannot, we must confess, admire the modesty of the man who can assert with so much confidence, even apart from prophecy altogether, that *any* method of putting Christ to death would have served the purpose of atonement equally well with the plan adopted."—pp. 20, 21.

The quotation is made from our pamphlet, entitled, *Wherein the Evangelical Unionists are not Wrong but Wronged*, written in reply to Mr. Gall of Edinburgh. And we are sincerely sorry that we cannot accommodate our present critic, by retracting our allegation of the "smallness and narrowness of the conceptions of the man" who entertains the notions for which he contends. We must repeat, and indeed intensify our allegation. We must now say, that superlatively small and narrow must be that man's conceptions of what it was that gave value to the work of Christ, who supposes that it could not have been accomplished without necessitated criminal assistance. Superlatively small and narrow must be his conceptions of the difference between essence and form, substance and circumstantialities, when he imagines that the atonement could not have been completed unless one disciple of our Lord should be necessitated to betray him, another to deny him, and all the rest to forsake him; unless the Jewish Sanhedrim should be necessitated to find the guiltless to be guilty; and unless a Roman procurator should be necessitated to violate his conscience, and surrender the innocent One to the doom of the most ignominious of malefactors. And something still more than small and narrow must be the conceptions of the man, who thinks that God was shut up, in his plan of mercy, to foreordain evil that good might come;—thus transgressing that very law, of whose transgressors he says, "their damnation is just," (Rom iii. 8), and virtually proclaiming to the universe that evil is really good,—good for the attainment of the highest glory. These ideas seem to us to be the quintessence of a most erroneous conception of things. And the reasoning by which they are supported is anything but satisfactory or demonstrative. It is as follows:—

"Surely," says the reviewer, "the man who penned these sentences must have read that all the particulars connected with the crucifixion of Christ were predicted hundreds of years before they happened." Yes: his reading had extended thus far. But what then? "He must be aware, surely, that the fulfilment of prophecy in connection with Christ, is one of the most valuable of all the evidences of his Messiahship and work." Yes: he is aware that it is. But what then? "Surely he cannot mean to say, that if the facts had been in entire discrepancy with the prophecies, we could safely have rested in the atonement of Christ as the means of our salvation." No; he does not mean to say this. But what then? Why simply this,—if the circumstantial facts had been different from what they were, the prophecies would have been different from

what they are. Does the reviewer see upside down? Does he think that the facts were rather made to fit the prophecies, than the prophecies to fit the facts? If such be his idea, he has already merged the notion of prediction in prescription, and abolished prophecy, properly so called. And if he has, we do not ask, neither indeed could we wish, his "admiration."

#### SPECIAL PASSAGES ADDUCED TO PROVE UNIVERSAL FOREORDINATION.

Our reviewer proceeds:—

"Judas was to betray Christ; that was a deed of shocking baseness; and how does the Saviour speak of that act of detestable meanness? 'The Son of man goeth as it is written of him: but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! it had been good for that man if he had not been born' (Matt xxvi. 24). If the Saviour had not meant to make known a divine purpose in connection with the event—if He had not known that the remembrance of the purpose might have been used by Judas and others as the excuse for his crime, there would have been no propriety in placing the prediction and the criminality of Judas, side by side. We maintain that, according to the creed of the Evangelical Union, these words of the Redeemer cannot be explained."—p. 21.

We maintain, on the contrary, that it is only on the principle of the Evangelical Union that the words can be explained. On our author's principles, the deed of Judas was planned for him. He could not get past it. He was the mere tool, so far as its execution was concerned, of eternal foreordination. But if he was, there should not have been any "woe" unto him. He was not the original deviser of his own "shocking baseness" and "detestable meanness." On the contrary, these had been archetypically contrived for him, and "fixed" to be characteristic of him, "before he came into existence." He was "the creature of his circumstances,"—more to be pitied than condemned.

#### JOHN XIX. 11, A GRAND APPEAL.

But our reviewer has another string to his bow, which he now fits on. He refers, as quite decisive in favour of his doctrine, to our Saviour's words to Pilate, in John xix. 11, "Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin." He says,—

"Calvinistic commentators have not in all cases been successful in presenting the full force of the Redeemer's inference. The words are indeed generally understood to mean, 'Therefore Judas, who betrayed me, has greater sin than thou (Pilate) now judging me.' There would be little propriety in such a statement, and indeed it can scarcely be discovered how the conclusion would arise from the Saviour's words. The natural interpretation obviously is, 'As neither you nor any other human being could have exercised over me any power, had I not been put into your hands by the ordination of God, and as Judas, from what he has seen and known of me, must have been convinced of my innocent and holy character, and, at the same time, ought to have been aware of my great power, his guilt in having betrayed me is peculiarly aggravated.'"—p. 22.

But, *in the first place*, it is not true that the words of the inference are "generally understood to mean, *Therefore Judas, who betrayed me, has greater sin than thou (Pilate) now judging me.*" Expositors, in general, whether Calvinists or others, have not supposed that the expression, "he that delivered me unto thee," refers to Judas. Still less have they supposed that the reference is to Judas alone. It is Caiaphas, who is

meant, says Bengel. It is, says Alford, "beyond question, Caiaphas." It is chiefly Caiaphas, says Lampe. Of course Caiaphas would be considered by these expositors, not so much in his individual, as in his representative capacity, as the president of the sanhedrim. And hence Baxter, Neander, Olshausen, etc., etc., suppose that the reference is to the Sanhedrim. Doddridge, coincidentally, explains the expression as meaning "the high-priest with his council." The council or sanhedrim, however, were, in this matter, but the representatives of the people. And hence, many of the most eminent Calvinistic expositors suppose that the reference is, collectively, to the Jews in general. This is the opinion of Calvin himself, and of Musculus, Beza, Piscator, Cocceius, as also of Tholuck, etc. It would have been marvellous, indeed, if Calvinistic commentators had generally interpreted the reference in the way that our critic says that they have done. For the expression is not, "he who delivered me *unto the council*," but "he that delivered me *unto thee*." And assuredly it was not Judas who delivered our Saviour unto Pilate.

But, *in the second place*, as our reviewer's interpretation of the passage hangs upon his assumption that it is Judas who is referred to, "Judas, who from what he had seen and known of Christ, must have been convinced of his innocent and holy character, and, at the same time, ought to have been aware of his great power,"—it cannot be correct.

*In the third place*, it is absolutely certain that the reviewer's interpretation must be altogether incorrect, on another account. It takes no notice of the inferential word "therefore." Indeed, it substitutes, in place of it, the simple conjunction "and,"—"and as Judas etc." It was exactly thus that the precursors of the Straussians tampered with the sacred text; as, for example, Kuinöl on this very passage. He says that the original expression "cannot be conveniently rendered *therefore*," and hence "it is here a mere formula of transition, and may be omitted in the translation altogether;"—just as is done by our reviewer. There is not, however, a single critic alive at this day, in Britain, Germany, Geneva, or elsewhere, and to whatever school he may belong, who would not laugh to scorn such a method of handling the language of Scripture. And yet our reviewer says of his exposition, "the natural interpretation obviously is"!

*In the fourth place*, as our critic supposes that the first clause of the verse "can mean nothing else than that Christ was placed in the power of Pilate by a divine arrangement"; and as the second clause is really an inference from the first, the import of the whole statement ought in consistency to be the following:—"Thou, Pilate, couldest have no power at all against me, if I had not been delivered to thee by God; therefore he that delivered me to thee (viz., God) hath the greater sin." This is the blasphemy which is the legitimate deduction from the premises of our reviewer. He overlooks, altogether, that the word "power" (*ἐξουσία*) properly means *authority*, and is, as Augustin of old, as well as Calvin, and indeed almost every other respectable critic, have noticed, employed to designate, more or less definitively, the magisterial office of the procurator. (Rectius meo judicio sentiunt, qui locum hunc restringunt ad magistratus officium. Calvin.) The Saviour reminds the procurator, that, as "the powers that be are

ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1), and as, therefore, there is an element of the will of the Supreme Magistrate of the Universe in every legitimate office, he was bound to exercise his authority under a solemn sense of the high and sacred trust that was divinely confided to him. Every legitimate magistrate is a divinely constituted trustee, and is bound to use his authority as in the sight of God. "The robber," as Calvin remarks, "who commits murder with his own hand, is justly detested; but much more guilty is he, who, under the pretext of administering justice, condemns the innocent to death." The Saviour, as it were, says to his Roman judge:—*Thy office is a sacred one; God hath made it so: for it is in his Providence that thou fillest thy present sphere, so as to have authority either to liberate me or to take my life. And because thy office is a sacred trust, which ought never to be prostituted to subserve the ends of injustice; therefore, they who delivered me to thee, in order that thou mightest so prostitute it, have the greater sin. They not merely abuse an "ordinance of man;" they desecrate an "ordinance of God."* Calvin, Baxter, Doddridge, explain the first clause as we have done; making it to refer to the Providence of God. But our critic says, "it would be trifling to speak respectfully of such a foolish interpretation"! Whether an interpretation of the passage, as "foolish" as his own, can be found within the compass of ancient or modern exegetical literature, we leave to curiosity-hunters to investigate.

#### EFFICACIOUS PERMISSION.

Altogether unconscious, however, of having said anything the least amiss, nay, manifestly elated with his exegetical success, as if it were positively triumphal, the reviewer proceeds to say,—

"The Conference of the Evangelical Union reject what they call the 'efficacious permission' of sin, as being the same with 'direct ordination.' We cannot find out whether in the Declaration they deny the permission of sin altogether—certainly an actual permission is not expressed. A *decrees* to permit they cannot receive, because such a decree would render God the author of sin."—p. 23.

Perversion and inversion for ever! Is there really upon our critic's spirit, a fatality for making mistakes? "The Conference of the Evangelical Union reject what *they call* the 'efficacious permission' of sin"! Is it come to this of it? One who undertakes to review theological subjects, one who professes acquaintance with Calvinistic literature, to speak of "efficacious permission," as something *so called by the Evangelical Union!* Does he really need to be informed that it is Calvinists, and Calvinists only, who invented, who sanction, and who currently use the phrase; and that the Union speaks of it, only to reprobate it as a phraseological absurdity? The phrase is found "as thick as blackberries" in Calvinistic literature on the Providence of God; and every student, who has turned over a few leaves of such a common book as Turretin's *Institutes* is familiar with it. Calvin, indeed, scouted, as a sort of milk-and-water weakness, the use of the expression, "divine permission of sin." God foreordained sin, he said. But Turretin, and almost all his successors, admit that the phrase is unexceptionable, provided it be understood that the permission is not *otiose* but *efficacious* (non otiosa, sed efficax).



But one mistake will not suffice for our critic. He must needs give it a companion; and of a still less excusable description. He invents for us a part—though indeed a negative part—of our creed, and then boldly charges home upon us his own invention, as if it were our veritable belief. He says of us,—“A decree to permit they cannot receive, because such a decree would render God the author of sin.” It is a pure invention. We do not like, indeed, the phraseology—“a decree to permit.” There is, we conceive, an impropriety in employing, in such a connection, the word “decree,” in as much as the permission is as really subjective as the decree; and the word “decree” is more appropriately used in reference to what is objective. But if the kindred word “purpose” were substituted in its place, we have not the slightest hesitation in saying, at least for ourselves, that we acknowledge, and have all along held, that “God purposed to permit sin.” We see that He does actually permit it. He “suffered,” says the apostle, that is, he “permitted (*ἐῴασεν*) all nations to walk in their own ways” (Acts xiv. 16). He did not indeed, and he does not, give his moral permission for sinning. He does not sanction sin. But nevertheless he does not hinder its perpetration. He allows men to exercise their free-agency both in choosing and in refusing; although he invariably uses what moral influence he wisely can to induce them to choose only what is good, and to refuse evil and only what is evil. God then does, in time, permit sin. And as whatsoever He does in time, he purposed from eternity to do, it must be the case that he purposed to permit, what he actually permits. It is really too bad in our reviewer to invent our creed for us, and then to run on, as he does, throughout a couple of pages, refuting his own invention, as if he were reviewing the Doctrinal Declaration.

But although he runs on refuting his own invention, he does not confine himself to that one primary blunder. In the course of his refutation, he piles blunder upon blunder. And his blunders exert upon our spirit an almost irresistible temptation to gibbet them for inspection. But we shall, in the exercise of “the freedom of our will,” deny ourselves, and have mercy, and pass on.

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## CHAPTER V.

### ORIGINAL SIN.

The section of the Doctrinal Declaration that has reference to original sin is the following:—

“On this topic it may suffice to state, in order to prevent or correct misconception, that we hold as strongly as any the doctrine of the depravity of man and his utter helplessness and hopelessness in the matter of salvation till he comes under the gracious provisions of the plan of mercy. We believe the divine constitution with Adam to have been federal in its character, and that his sin in consequence is, to the extent of the primeval curse, imputed to his posterity. We believe that the imputation of Adam’s sin extends to the whole race, and thus embraces infants; but as infants were in no respect morally implicated in that transgression, we reject with abhorrence the dogma that any who die in infancy are subject, on the ground of Adam’s first sin, ‘to the pains of hell for ever.’”—p. 7.

This does not please our reviewer. For, first, it does not mention depravity and the imputation of Adam's sin, in the order he would choose.—

“The doctrine of human depravity and the imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin do not here appear in the order usually assigned to them in Calvinistic systems. According to the doctrine of Paul (Rom. v. 12-21), the imputation of guilt is the origin of the temporal and spiritual privations under which man labours. The remembrance of this order is necessary to explain the parallel drawn by the apostle between Christ and Adam, who is the figure of him that was to come. As certainly as justification precedes sanctification according to the Christian scheme, does condemnation, according to the covenant with Adam, precede, in the order of nature, the moral blight, vitiating our understandings and our hearts.”—pp. 25, 26.

A man less eager to discover faults would have considered that, in a Declaration which is not intended to be a systematic exhibition of the fulness of the truth, there were at least two ways, which were equally available for representing the salient points of the doctrine in hand. One might proceed, inductively, as Jonathan Edwards has done, from the more obvious element to the more hidden and ulterior. This is the ascending method. Or, secondly, one might proceed, deductively, as Francis Turretin has done, from the primary and more obscure to the secondary and phenomenal. This is the descending method. In a popular document, it is for many reasons better to take the ascending method; seizing first what meets the observation of all, namely depravity; and thence proceeding to what is equally certain indeed, but not so evident *prima facie*, the imputation of the sin of Adam. This is the method that the draftsman of the Doctrinal Declaration has taken. And when our reviewer remembers that the phrase “original sin” is commonly restricted to the first of the two elements specified, namely, depravity,—as his Catechisms, Larger and Shorter, as well as his Turretin, and a hundred other authorities may inform him, he will see that there was the greatest propriety in beginning with that, which is commonly meant by the phrase, which constitutes the heading of the section.

We agree with our reviewer, that, as certainly as the imputation of the second Adam's righteousness precedes sanctification, so does the imputation of the first Adam's sin precede depravity. But we do not agree with him, when, in the course of a few lines, he unconsciously contradicts himself, and maintains the opposite of what he has so emphatically declared. He says,—

“The cause of depravity is the guilt of Adam's first sin; so that to speak of the depravity as causing the guilt is to reverse the Bible statement; and to speak of the removal of guilt while the depravity reigns in all its virulence, is in terms a palpable contradiction.”—p. 26.

The whole of the phraseology which he here employs we regard as objectionable. But we refer, at present, to the idea that is intended in the concluding clause; “to speak of the removal of guilt,” which according to him is justification, “while the depravity reigns in all its virulence,” which according to him is the simple absence of sanctification, “is,” says he, “a palpable contradiction.” In other words, he here maintains that it is not true that justification must precede sanctification; while a few lines before he has maintained that it must. What is there to be expected from a critic, who, on such a subject, cannot maintain his consistency for five minutes?

## INFANT SALVATION.

He is not disposed to be very violently displeased with us for indicating our belief in the final bliss of all infants, who die in infancy. "Whether true or not," he says, "that is a pleasing view of the divine character, and we have no wish to controvert the sentiment." We are glad of it. For truly, the idea of Calvin, who holds that "the fall of Adam has involved many nations, *along with their infant children*, in eternal death without remedy" (Instit. iii. 23, 7.), presents a very dreadful aspect of the divine decrees. (*Decretum quidem horribile, fatosor.*) And yet the compilers of the Westminster Confession meant to endorse the great reformer's idea, when they spoke discriminatively of "elect infants." (*Conf. x. 3.*) We are glad, we say, that our reviewer is not greatly displeased with the doctrine of the Evangelical Union on this subject. Although, we trust, that he will not veer about with Dr. Candlish, and take advantage of an accidental vagueness in the phraseology of the Confession, to hold a tenet which is contrary to what the Confessionists *really meant by their phraseology*. It is worthy of consideration whether such procedure be consistent with the most sterling and straightforward integrity of character.

## ARE INFANTS GUILTY AND MORALLY DEPRAVED ?

But, passing this, we proceed to notice that our reviewer is very gravely suspicious of the grounds on which we "reject with abhorrence the dogma, that any who die in infancy are subject, on the ground of Adam's first sin, to the pains of hell for ever." "Infants," says the Declaration, "were in no respect morally implicated in Adam's transgression." The scent of heresy is here snuffed up by our reviewer's distended nostrils.—

"Why are they not morally implicated if there be an imputation of guilt to the whole race? Are other human beings morally implicated, and when do they become so? To say that they are not implicated until they arrive at years of discretion, and show by their own acts that they bear the image of apostate Adam, is to overlook entirely the distinction between original and actual sin; and, accordingly, the eighth of the charges brought against Morison, the founder of the Union, in the United Secession Synod, was, that he taught 'that men could not deserve eternal death on account of Adam's first sin.' And he says in one part of his Catechism, 'All infants who die in infancy, being innocent, die in safety.'"—p. 27.

These, we presume, the reviewer regards as very dreadful sentiments. They do not involve two of his favourite ideas:—Firstly, that infants are guilty of Adam's first sin; and, secondly, that their souls are morally depraved on account of it. We are truly sorry that we cannot accommodate our theology to his notions of things. But if we were to attempt the accommodation, we should be simply playing into the hands of all the infidels of the world, and doing violence at the same time to the ineradicable intuitions of our soul in reference to right and wrong on the one hand, and the respective spheres of divine and human activity on the other. If we could believe that human beings could be constituted guilty of sins, which they never committed, to which they never yielded their consent, and in the commission of which they had no hand whatsoever, and which indeed were perpetrated thousands of years before they were born, then we might and must believe that guilt is a thing of

which conscience is incapable of taking the slightest cognisance. And if, again, we could believe that the souls of infants are morally polluted or depraved before they choose evil or refuse good, we might and must believe either that they have not come from the hands of the infinitely pure Jehovah, or that He Himself has put into them their moral corruption. The whole system is, as we conceive, rank with germinant heresies of the most serious character,—indifferentism in things moral, materialism in things spiritual, and pantheism in things divine.

That the nature of man, viewed in its complexity, has undergone some great deterioration or depravation is, indeed, unquestionable. That this deterioration has to do with those elements of our being which surround the moral faculty with motives, and which must consequently exert a powerful influence in the direction either of good or of evil, is also beyond dispute. That, as a matter of fact, "the flesh lusteth against the spirit," so that the will is beset and besieged by inducements to inordinate self-indulgence, is obvious. That all this damage is traceable to the first sin of our first parent, is suggested at once by reason and by scripture. And that there is a most important sense in which that first sin is imputed to Adam's posterity, is evident from Rom. v. 12-19. But to suppose that men are really sinful before they sin, and that they are guilty of a sin which they never committed and to which they never gave their consent, is to land ourselves in a quagmire, in which the moral distinctions between right and wrong are merged, and in which, consequently, it is utterly impossible to lay any solid substructure, in order to support, in our thoughts, the superstructure of the moral government of God.

The reviewer seems to think that it is impossible to hold the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, if infants are not morally implicated in the paradisiacal transgression, so as to be guilty of it. "Why," asks he, "are they not morally implicated, if there be an imputation of guilt to the whole race?" Why, we would ask in return, is not Jesus morally implicated in all the sins of the elect,—to speak at present of no others,—so as to be guilty of them, or on account of them, since all the elect's sins were imputed to him? If in the one case there could be imputation of sin, without moral implication or guilt; in the other case too the same kind of imputation could take place, without involving, so far at least as the nature and bearing of imputation are concerned, the criminality of the representees.

Before leaving this subject, the reviewer says,—

"The origin of man's misery and sinfulness is to many a most revolting subject; and were not the means of relief provided, no one could bear the contemplation of a scene so melancholy."—p. 28.

We beg to remind him, that, according to his own principles, "the means of relief" are not provided for "man." They are provided only for a very limited, and that too, an unconditionally and immutably limited, company. What then is to become of the rest? How are they to "bear the contemplation of a scene so melancholy"? All, it seems, are made guilty without their consent, and morally depraved before they act morally wrong. Such is the scope of the dispensation of God in the

direction of evil. But when it comes to a dispensation in the direction of good, it would appear, if we may judge by our critic's theology, that the liberality which gave guilt and moral corruption to all, without waiting for the least concurrence of their own wills, becomes suddenly contracted, and refuses to dispense with equal bountifulness the opposite blessings. The bane is thrust in upon all. The antidote is reserved for a few. It is not with niggard hand, it seems, that the evil is scattered. But the good!—that must be more sparingly bestowed! Is it, we ask, like our God?—like that God, the holy, holy, holy One, who is of purer eyes than to look upon iniquity, and who is “good unto all,” encircling “all his works” within the lustrous rim of the immense circumference of his glorious tender mercies?

#### MISREPRESENTATION IN THE CLIMAX.

The reviewer, before proceeding to the 5th, 6th, and 7th sections of the Doctrinal Declaration, pauses for a moment, and looking gravely backward on the stretch of topics, which he has already overtaken, thus sums up the whole:—

“We have now gone over the four preliminary topics, intended, as we believe, to serve as the bulwark of those that are to follow. The great object of the compilers of the Declaration, is to have the minds of their readers fortified with those four elementary principles before proceeding to the statement of their views of what may be called the essential doctrines of Christianity. It is an axiom with them that God has no control over man's mind, unless as far as man is disposed to invite Him. Though not in this Declaration directly expressed, it is a first principle in this creed also, that man is a qualified judge of the whole character and proceedings of God, and that nothing of which man is inclined to disapprove can, by the Father of his spirit, ever be accomplished. The third principle is, that God exercises no moral government over wicked men—that He has no concern direct or indirect, with any part of their conduct as far as it is sinful—that if they do not repent of their own accord, He has reserved to Himself merely the right of punishment. The views stated as to the disease of human nature, when they are taken together, are very deficient, and very erroneous. But the topics are arranged with the art of a consummate tactician.”—pp. 28, 29.

Our reviewer must excuse us, if we cannot find it in our conscience, to accept the concluding compliment. For no particular strategy was intended. He must likewise excuse us if we decline accepting the theological axioms and first principles which, in the preceding sentences, he invents for us and palms upon us. He must, moreover, excuse us still farther, if we decline characterising these same inventions and impositions as they deserve. We must use moderate terms. And we would simply say, therefore, that they constitute the superlative degree of misrepresentation. Or, to come a little nearer to the reality, they are misrepresentation run mad. And, indeed, instead of saying—“It is an axiom with them that God has no control over man's mind, unless as far as man is disposed to invite him,” he might just at once have said that it is an axiom with us that God knows nothing at all, except so many lessons of things, as man is disposed to teach him. And instead of saying, that, “It is a first principle in this creed also, that a man is a qualified judge of the whole character and proceedings of God, and that nothing of which man is inclined to disapprove can, by the Father of his Spirit, ever be accomplished,” he might, when he was inventing at any rate, have added a little eighth or eightieth fraction of an inch to the already enormous

length of his hank, and have affirmed, that it is a first principle with us, that it is men who are the infinites, and that every man in particular, dwelling in the vastness of his own immensity, holds in the hollow of his hand the whole will and work of God. He says again,—“The third principle is, that God exercises no moral government over wicked men—that he has no concern, direct nor indirect, with any part of their conduct as far as it is sinful,—that if they do not repent of their own accord, He has reserved to himself merely the right of punishment.” But why, we would ask, does his inventive genius flag? Why did he not mount a still more dashing pegasus, and, rushing up sublimely beyond all ordinary superlatives, take his oath, and aver, that he has heard with his own ears every minister apart, and every member apart, of every one of our churches apart, and also every child apart, belonging to every family apart, connected with every one of our churches apart, solemnly declare that the Sovereign of the universe has his throne, not in heaven, as is generally supposed, but somewhere or other in, or over, that particular house on earth, called the “manse” of the parish of Dalton? Why not say this? *The one averment would have been, in every respect, as voracious and as credible as the other.* But when he adds, that “the views stated as to the disease of human nature, when they are taken together, are very deficient, and very erroneous,” he merely states an opinion,—and to that we have not the slightest objection. He is entitled to form any opinion he pleases regarding our views. But, “minister of the church of Scotland” though he be, we beg to tell him that he is not entitled to fancy for himself, as if his fancy were moon-stricken, monsters and hobgoblins of theological notions, that never existed but within the wildnesses of his own grotesque imagination, and then to assert that they are, not only our doctrines, but the very first principles of our creed. A little candour, now and then, is not the worst possible attribute of a controvertist; or of any man, indeed; especially if he profess to be a Christian, and a christian minister.

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#### CHAPTER VI.

#### UNITY OF THE GODHEAD IN THE REMEDIAL PLAN. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LOVE OF GOD THE FATHER. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT OF THE SON.

The reviewer agrees, as we understand him, with the Evangelical Union, in maintaining that there is unity in the Godhead as regards the Remedial Plan. He does not suppose that the love of the divine Father overlaps the atonement of the divine Son, or the influence of the divine Spirit. Neither does he suppose that the atonement of the Son covers a greater area, than that love of the Father, in which it originated, and that influence of the Holy Spirit, in which it issued. “In the formation and execution,” he says, “of the Covenant of Redemption, all the persons of the Godhead concur. They have their respective functions assigned to them, and they exert their powers harmoniously for the development of the principles of mercy and truth, on which the covenant

is based." (p. 29.) He differs entirely, however, from the Union, as to the objects of the divine Father's love, and consequently as to the compass of the atonement of the divine Son.

#### THE LOVE OF THE DIVINE FATHER.

The section of the Doctrinal Declaration on "the nature and extent of the love of God the Father," is as follows:—

"In its *nature* the love of the Father is free, sovereign, unbought; embracing us as sinners, guilty and ruined; so compassionating us as to contemplate not only our deliverance from hell, but also our elevation to heaven; and of such unparalleled intensity as to embody itself in the unspeakable gift and sacrifice of his own Divine and well-beloved Son. In its *extent*, this love of the Father embraces all mankind, of every age and land, without distinction, without exception, and without respect of persons. The dogma of a double contradictory will in God the Father,—a public will and a secret will, a will of command and a will of decree,—we reject as a libel alike on God's truth and love. Scripture expressly disowns and contradicts it. 'God is no respecter of persons.' 'The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works.' 'As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked.' 'God commandeth all men every where to repent.' He is 'not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.' He 'will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.'—pp. 7, 8.

The reviewer says that "there is no difference between Calvinists and the authors of the Declaration, as to the existence of a free and *uncaused* love *toward the human race* on the part of the Father, as the representative of the Godhead in the momentous transaction" of the covenant of redemption. We have no wish to be hypercritical; but there is a difference between us and our critic as to the propriety of the word "uncaused," which we have italicised. We do not believe that any love whatsoever can be uncaused, or even unoccasioned. And we have likewise italicised the expression "toward the human race," for the reviewer and the Unionists do differ, wide as the poles asunder, as to the objects of the divine love, in the momentous transaction of the propitiation. The Unionists hold that it is "the human race," strictly so designated, who are loved. The Reviewer, on the other hand, really maintains that it is not "the human race," but merely an unconditionally selected fraction of the family, who are embraced within the Father's compassion. And if his opinion be that of Lewis du Moulin, he will hold that the fraction is very small indeed, and "that not one in a hundred thousand, nay probably not one in a million, from Adam down to our times," belongs to it. (*Moral Reflections upon the Number of the Elect.* 1680.)

#### IS GOD A RESPECTER OF PERSONS?

Speaking in the name of Calvinists in general, he says,—

"They believe that 'God is no respecter of persons.' If a distinction is made between one man and another, it never enters their minds that the difference is caused by God's being a respecter of persons. They see in society marked distinctions in the bodies, minds, characters, and outward circumstances of the children of men—distinctions that can be fully accounted for only by a regard to the providence of Him who is wonderful in counsel and excellent in working. If no pious mind can fail to see that the hand of God is concerned in such arrangements—if no fault is found with them by those who love the Lord, Calvinists cannot see that a distinction made by divine ordination, as to the enjoyment of spiritual and everlasting good, would necessarily constitute the Most High a respecter of persons."—p. 30.

We have no wish to press, unduly, the expression "respector of persons." It is not used uniformly in the Scriptures. But the illustrations of our reviewer are certainly not to the point. For no man, possessed of the smallest degree of scientific attainment, supposes that the "marked distinctions in the bodies, minds, characters, and outward circumstances of the children of men" are unconditionally apportioned to men by the mere good pleasure of God. It is not by an unconditional decree of God that a poor man's children are born, not in a palace, but in a cottage, not in wealth, but in poverty. It is not by an unconditional decree that the posterity of the diseased are the heirs of special tendencies to disease, or that the children of the vicious are not so virtuously trained as the offspring of the holy. In the matter of these distinctions, we are in a different field altogether, from that of unconditionalism. And then, moreover, God does not command the poor to be rich; nor the diseased to be healthy. Neither does he hold the children of misfortune to be criminal, and deserving of everlasting woe, because they were not ushered into being within the circle of the virtuous. But in the things that are essential "to the enjoyment of spiritual and everlasting good," the case, according to the reviewer, is altogether different. In these things God acts, he maintains, unconditionally: paying no regard whatever to "any foresight of faith, or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving him" to what he does. (*Conf.* iii. 5.) And besides, He punishes the non-elect for not having the graces which adorn the elect, and which were purchased for the elect; but which, nevertheless, the non-elect are bound to lay hold of and possess. There is, truly, something like "respect of persons" here. At all events, the case is totally different from the ordinary distinctions which abound in society, as to the "body, mind, character, and outward circumstances of the children of men."

## IS GOD GOOD TO ALL?

Our reviewer continues:—

"Calvinists believe 'that the Lord is good to all, and that His tender mercies are over all His works.' Still, much temporal and spiritual misery do exist on the earth; and the inference, that such words prove all human beings to be on the same level as to their eternal interests, is at variance with the fact."—p. 30

Evangelical Unionists do not hold that "all human beings are on the same level as to their eternal interests." They do not think, for example, that their reviewer is in such favourable circumstances for impartially considering the things that concern the gospel of salvation, and consequently his own eternal weal, as multitudes who have not committed themselves, in their comparative immaturity, to the maintenance of an extremely elaborate creed, and suspended their position and comfort in society on their adherence to a vow. Neither do they think, on the other hand, that all others in all nations are equally privileged with their reviewer. But they believe, nevertheless, that God will graciously take all diversities of circumstances into account, and while requiring much of those to whom much is given, will deal with those who have had little, not according to what they had not, but according to what they had. They also believe that God is so "good to all," and that so "tender" are his "mercies" over "all his



works," that not a single soul on earth but may be saved, through Christ, if it only,—as it may,—repent and believe and live by faith. But, on the other hand, they cannot see that the reviewer is entitled, except on the ground of simple deference to an inexplicable averment of the Holy Spirit, to say that God is "good to all," and that his tender mercies over-canopy all. According to the current notions of goodness and tender mercy, men in general would not say that it is a good or a very tenderly merciful act, to kiss a man;—when the first and last aim is to get him stabbed to death under the fifth rib. And as little of real goodness and tender-mercy could we see in the dealings of God toward the non-elect, if we were shut up by our creed to believe that all the kindness which he manifests to them, is simply, as regards the first and last aim of his heart or will, that they may be "fitted, as vessels of wrath, for destruction." Surely it is not what is usually regarded as goodness and tender-mercy to preach the gospel to such: for, as Beza says, "God causeth them to hear, by preaching, the outward word of the gospel, but, because they are not of the number of the elect, being called, they hear not; and for as much as they are not able to receive the Spirit of truth, therefore they cannot believe, because it is not given unto them. Wherefore, when they are called to the feast, they refuse to come, so that the word of life is folly unto them and an offence, and finally the savour of death to their destruction." "There are yet others," he adds, "whose hearts God openeth to receive and believe the things that they hear; but this is with that general faith, whereby the devils believe and tremble." And there are others still, he continues, "the most miserable of all, who climb a higher degree, that their fall might be more grievous; for they are raised so high by some gift of grace, that they are a little moved with some taste of the heavenly gift, so that for the time they seem to have received the seed, and to be planted in the church of God." "But this is plain," he proceeds, "that the spirit of adoption is never communicated unto them. For if they were of the elect, they should remain still with the elect. All these, therefore," he adds, "because of necessity, and yet willingly, as they which are under the slavery of sin, return to their vomit, and fall away from faith, are plucked up by the roots, to be cast into the fire." (*Table of Predestination*, chap. v.) Is this, we would ask, the divine style of goodness and tender-mercy? Is this to be good unto all, and be very tenderly merciful even to the non-elect?

#### HAS GOD PLEASURE IN THE DEATH OF THE WICKED?

The reviewer proceeds:—

"'God hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked;' and His memorial throughout all generations has been, 'The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious.' His ambassadors have been instructed to urge upon every man the message of everlasting life, to address unqualified offers of mercy to the very chief of sinners. In persecuting such a work, Calvinists believe that they obey the command of one whose nature is the embodiment of perfect sincerity and the fondest love."—p. 30, 31.

We should have preferred that the fondling expression with which the quotation concludes,—an expression certainly which Calvin never employed, and which the *Westminster Confession of Faith* does not sanction,—should have been omitted. It is particularly offensive when

it is used by one who expressly approves of Calvin's views of election and reprobation, and of foreordination in general; and who is doubtless, therefore, prepared to add his amen, to what the reformer confesses, when he says,—“ I confess, indeed, that it is *by the will of God* that all the posterity of Adam have fallen into this miserable condition, in which they are involved.” (*Instit.* iii. 23. 4.) God, according to Calvin and the Westminster Confession of Faith, unconditionally willed the fall; and he thus willed it, that he might unconditionally choose only some of the race to the enjoyment of bliss, and unconditionally “ pass by the rest,” that they might be ultimately condemned “ to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.” This might indeed be “ the fondest love ” to a part of the great family. But if it be the fondest love to all, we should like to know what, according to our author's lexicography, is the meaning of the words “ love ” and “ fondness.” Are they to be explained, as the antiquated etymologists used to explain the Latin word *lucus*, by the rule of contraries, a *non lucendo*?

If the system of our author be in accordance with the Scriptures, the words “ God hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked ” ought surely to have been omitted from the second page. For if God, as the Confession maintains, “ freely and unchangeably ordained,” and “ worketh ” too, “ whatsoever comes to pass,” (*Chap.* iii. 1.) it must have been, according to our author's theory of the will, his pleasure and inclination thus to ordain and to work. The will is free, says our author, when “ a rational being possesses liberty to follow, without external violence, the bent of his own inclination.” (p. 10.) God has this liberty; for he is a “ rational being,” and does “ follow without external violence, the bent of his inclination,” in all that he does. When, therefore, the death of the wicked comes to pass, it was, with all its antecedents, worked and willed and wished by God. And the mere fact that the preachers of the gospel are “ instructed to urge upon every man the message of everlasting life, and to address unqualified offers of mercy to the very chief of sinners,” is, according to our author's system, of no significance whatsoever, in the way of disproving that “ the Lord hath pleasure in the death of the wicked.” The instructions are intended, after all, not for the benefit of the unconditionally reprobated, but for the exclusive benefit of the elect. As preachers are not omniscient, and do not know the elect, they must needs, it seems, exhort all to accept the great salvation, lest any of the chosen should be passed by. Is this the love of God to man, as man? —to every man, as a man? Is it thus that God has “ so loved the world ”? If it be, then either “ love ” means no-love, or “ man ” means only elected-man, while “ world ” means only that fraction of the world,—the elect.

#### GOD COMMANDETH ALL MEN TO REPENT.

Our critic proceeds;—

“ Calvinists do not doubt that repentance is a prescribed duty; for God ‘ commandeth all men everywhere to repent.’ *Unwillingness* to discharge an appointed work cannot divest any of God's creatures of responsibility.”—p. 31.

Very true, we reply;—if you understand *unwillingness* according to

the doctrine of the will, which is maintained by the Evangelical Union, and opposed by our reviewer. Unwillingness, when a man is free to form his volitions, does not discharge from responsibility. But it does, and it must, if it be inevitable and necessitated: and this is what our author, along with Calvin and Jonathan Edwards, maintains. This inevitable, and divinely necessitated unwillingness, is, according to these theologians, characteristic of all the non-elect. And being so, how can it, we ask, be out of kindness, or from a desire for their everlasting weal, that they are "everywhere commanded to repent"? If the theology, on which we are animadverting, were scriptural, the universal commandment of God might, in its relation to the non-elect, be a development and embodiment of unconditional hatred, but it could not possibly be a demonstration of "unbought and sovereign love."

#### GOD NOT WILLING THAT ANY SHOULD PERISH.

Our critic, however, continues; though, apparently, with a little more difficulty. He says of Calvinists,—

"They believe, further, that God 'is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance'; still they cannot see that the *will* of God so expressed, necessarily proves that the will must be carried into accomplishment, or that, if not carried into accomplishment, the failure must be accounted for by the impossibility of God controlling the free will of man. 'God does not afflict *willingly*, nor grieve the children of men;' still he does afflict them; to speak with reverence, other considerations overcome His unwillingness, and they are often exposed to many sorrows."—p. 31.

Precisely so. Higher and wider considerations, than those which terminate on the bliss of single individuals, afford to the loving God a good and sufficient reason for giving his behests to afflictions, or even for dismissing, and "in hot displeasure" too, the persistently impenitent from the grace and glory of his presence. Many are afflicted; though God does not "afflict willingly." And many perish; though "God is not willing that any should perish." There is nothing strange in all this, when we take our stand-point on the doctrine of the will, as maintained by the Evangelical Union. But, if descending from Gerizzim, we go up to Mount Ebal, and take our position by the side of our critic, the whole procedure of the Almighty becomes instantly shrouded in clouds of thick darkness. For, according to what is seen from his stand-point of curses, the non-elected *must* perish, and *cannot will* to come to repentance. And God, besides, has unconditionally willed that they should be brought into such a state that their repentance shall be an impossibility, and their everlasting destruction an inevitability. Hence, He connected them federally with the first Adam, that their fall might be secured. But He did not, it seems, connect them federally with the second Adam that their rising again might be a possibility. And they could hardly be expected to repent of themselves. According to our author's system, then, God never had any other bona-fide will in reference to the non-elect, than that they should remain impenitent and perish.

#### THE ATONEMENT.

The reviewer proceeds now to the consideration of the extent of the atonement, a doctrine, which is the vitalising heart and lungs of the

entire Doctrinal Declaration. Some of his introductory words seem to give promise of something pleasant to contemplate. He says,—

“Christ, as far as sincere offer is concerned, is the gift of God to the whole world. Sinners in every country and in every clime have a warrant to believe. They are honestly invited to lay hold on eternal life (John xvii. 2).”—p. 31.

We do not like, indeed, the somewhat ungenial and ungenerous word “offer.” It has often an idea of distance and reluctance, and perhaps even niggardliness, associated with it. Or it suggests too strongly the notion of exacted conditions, and perhaps even of barter:—“I offer you this, and it shall be yours, if you do this, or if you give me that.” This does not seem to us to be the magnificent munificence of the Monarch of the universe. Still, we should not be disposed to be over-scrupulous about the term; if there be indeed a bona-fide reality behind it, which is veritably brought within the reach of the parties to whom the offer is made. Well; is there this bona-fide reality, according to our author's theology? His words would seem to intimate that there is. “Christ, as far as sincere offer is concerned, is the gift of God to the whole world.” The words look well to the eye, upon the whole, and, with the one exception of the stintedness of the term “offer,” they sound well to the ear. And then they are well backed up. “Sinners in every country and in every clime have a warrant to believe. They are honestly invited to lay hold on eternal life.” The word “warrant,” indeed, is as strange to us, as the word “offer.” For we cannot see that there should be any great difficulty in the matter of believing an infinitely truthful Being. Still, if men without distinction are “honestly invited to lay hold on eternal life,” there must surely be something good for men without exception, behind all that repulsive array of ideas which is apt to start up, when one hears of a mere “offer” of something, and a bare “warrant” to believe on it. But is there, according to our critic's theology? Is there a propitiation for their sins? He tells us;—no. Is there any provision for their deliverance from the curse and guilt and depravity of original sin? He tells us;—no. Is there any scheme of mercy for including them within the number of the elect, for whom alone Christ died, and in whose hearts alone the Spirit works to will and to do that which is good? He tells us;—no. What then is it that is really brought within their reach? What is the bona-fide reality? Why, it is nothing whatsoever, but mere words about unattainabilities and impossibilities! And yet, in reference to these very things, our critic speaks of a “sincere offer,” and “a gift to the whole world,” and a “warrant to believe,” and an “honest invitation to lay hold on eternal life!” Emptiness, in other words, is fulness. Mockery is mercy.

He proceeds;—

“The Jews were a very narrow-minded people. Much of the same hateful quality has been prevalent even in the Church of Christ, and we have great cause of thankfulness that the expressions applied in Scripture to the atonement are of such a kind as to banish all exclusiveness.”—p. 31.

What!—“all exclusiveness”? Are the non-elect, then, included? No! Or is it within their power to be included? No! For the atonement is already completed, and not one drop of blood, according to our author, was shed for their sins. In what way, then, is it that “all exclusiveness is banished”? Why, who sees not?—in the words

employed, and in nothing else besides! For all that follows in our author's review, to the extent of fourteen consecutive pages, is a laboured attempt to prove that the non-elect are in reality excluded.

THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT, IN RELATION TO ITS EXTENT

Like many others, who find it easier to spin out a theory of things, than to travel laboriously, in the Baconian way, from testimony to testimony in the Record, our author asks, in the first place, "what is the nature of the atonement?" And he declares that "this question must be satisfactorily answered before an inquiry into the extent of the atonement is competent." (p. 32.) He only issues his declaration, however, as if his simple affidavit were abundance of evidence. We entirely question his right of affirmation. And we maintain, on the other side of the subject, that he, who, in forming his theory of the nature of the atonement, does not take into consideration, the express Scripture declarations regarding its extent, is not taking with him all the evidence which it is possible to collect. For this is precisely one of these important cases in which the question of extent reacts upon the question of nature, just as truly as the question of nature influences the question of extent. And in whichever direction we find explicit Scripture evidence, we are bound, if we would reverence the authority of the Spirit on the one hand, and preserve the Baconian method of induction on the other, to take the testimony into account. No theory on the extent of the atonement can be correct, which contradicts any express testimony by the Spirit concerning its nature. And, reversely, no theory of the nature of the atonement can be in harmony with the archetypal idea of God, if it be at variance with any express declarations in the Record regarding its extent.

If this be the case, the question is conclusively settled; for in the Scripture there is a remarkable luxuriance of explicit declarations to the effect that Christ is the "Saviour of the world"; that he is "the propitiation for the sins of the whole world"; that he died "for all"; that he "tasted death for every man"; and that he "bought even those who deny him and bring upon themselves swift destruction." (See 1 Jo. iv. 14; ii. 1, 2; 1 Tim. ii. 1-6; Heb. ii. 9; 2 Pet. ii. 1; &c.) And on the other hand there is not one passage from Genesis to Revelation, in which it is said that Christ did *not* die for all, or in which reference is made to any one, as an individual, for whom Christ did *not* die.

Dr. Candlish of Edinburgh has lately written a large volume to prove that the atonement was wrought out for the elect alone. (*The Atonement; its reality, completeness, and extent.*) And to every argument in that volume, one after another, from beginning to ending of the work, we have replied in our *Vindication of the Universality of the Atonement*. We might be excused, therefore, for passing over this part of our critic's review; and all the more readily, as it is not likely, judging from what we have already seen of his reasoning qualifications, that he will handle his subject with greater ability or subtlety than the Free Church champion. But as it is not improbable that this *Apology* will fall into the hands of readers who have not seen our *Vindication*; and as, besides, every man has a stand-point of his own, from which he views his subjects, and sees them in a peculiarity of light, we shall proceed to pass our critic's arguments under review.

## THE ATONEMENT IN RELATION TO OLD TESTAMENT SACRIFICES.

In the Doctrinal Declaration, it is said,—

“As respects the Nature of the Atonement, we believe the Saviour's ‘obedience unto death’ to have been strictly vicarious or substitutionary, and to have constituted a propitiation, or sacrificial satisfaction for the sins of men.”—p. 8.

“We reject the teaching of those who would strip Christ's work of its piasular or expiatory character, and make it efficacious merely in the way of moral influence upon men, as the grandest moral act ever performed in our world. That it was indeed the grandest moral act ever performed in our world, and that its moral influence, as such, is mighty, through God, to promote our sanctification, we admit and have all along held. But we also hold, that it was an expedient introduced into the moral government of God, in which, to the extent required, Christ was treated as we deserved, that we might be treated as he deserved; in which his obedience until death so fills the place of the sinner's punishment as to render the remission of sin's penalty morally possible and safe, and thus remove all legal barriers to the salvation of man; and on the ground of which, accordingly, God can be at once ‘the just God and the Saviour,’—at once ‘just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.’”—pp. 8, 9.

Our critic grasps at the observations regarding the “strictly vicarious or substitutionary” nature of the atonement. And he says,—

“To what quarter are we to repair in order to obtain an explanation of such language? Undoubtedly to the Old Testament, where ample means are furnished of understanding the nature and object of vicarious sacrifice.”—p. 34.

We regard his decision as one-sided. And we think, moreover, that the side which he has actually chosen, is by far the more obscure of the two. He seems to have forgotten that the Old Testament sacrifices were merely adumbrative, and that, as shadows, they were necessarily exceedingly imperfect. They were rude rudiments. They were rough sketches. They were simply elementary hieroglyphs, which derived all their value from the fact that they were nevertheless, and notwithstanding their dimness and indistinctness, outlines of a surpassing glory that was to come. They pointed, like fingers, forward. They drew before the imagination a sensuous picture of what was to be. But the substance and reality and perfection of all that was thus obscurely signified, belong to the new Testament, and are embodied in Christ Jesus. To go, then, to the Old Testament sacrifices, the mere umbratile prefigurations of the one only true atonement for sins, rather than to the New Testament atonement itself, in order to learn the nature of the New Testament atonement, is to go backward when one might proceed forward. It is to go down when one might mount up. It is to prefer starlight to sunlight. It is to be contented to dwell amid types and shadows, when the Antitype Himself, and the Substance, might be found hard by. Now that the glorious Object, which was faintly pictured in the old dispensation, is Himself revealed in the new, it would be wonderful indeed if we should find it wisest and best rather to judge of him by the imperfect pictures, than by the immediate inspection of his own perfect glory, fully unveiled. The New Testament, indeed, is *in* the Old; as the man is in the child, and as the oak is in the acorn. But the Old Testament, again, is also *in* the New, as is the child in the man, and as is the acorn in the oak. The New Testament is more emphatically a key to the Old, than is the Old to the New. The questions, then, of the nature and of the extent of the atonement must be decided, still more emphatically by an appeal to the completion, than by an appeal to the incipiency, of revelation.

## THE ATONEMENT, THE REMOVAL OF LEGAL BARRIERS.

We have no objection, however, to follow our author to the Old Testament. He says,—

“The authors of the Declaration admit, that in sin-offerings, a symbolical transference of guilt from the offerer to the victim took place. The death of the animal stood, in law, as the *punishment* due to the transgressor. Sometimes the sacrifice was offered for one individual, sometimes for one family, and sometimes for the whole congregation of Israel; but in all cases there was the imputation of guilt, the efficacy of the sacrifice being believed to be proportioned to the extent of the imputation. But the question arises, after the guilt had been imputed and the animal slain, What was the position of the offerer? Did it depend on circumstances whether he did or did not escape from the evil, for the removal of which the sacrifice has been appointed? Is there in the Old Testament a single passage which implies that sacrifices contemplated no further object than the removal of ‘legal barriers’ to the individual or public welfare of the Jewish people? In all cases they are described as efficacious for the object for which they were presented.”—pp. 34, 35.

If the reviewer would only deliberately consider what “legal barriers” are, he would see that it was not possible, in the nature of things, that there could be anything else contemplated in the Old Testament peculiar sacrifices, than their removal. “Legal barriers” are, of course, just the barriers to the enjoyment of privileges, which arise from the nature of moral government. They are governmental barriers,—the barriers that lie on the side of the government as distinguished from the side of the governed. They are the barriers, that are objective in relation to the governed, as distinguished from the barriers—actual or potential—that are, on their part, subjective. In God’s moral government, whether of the Jews, or of the world at large, the legal barriers that prevented the governed enjoying any privileges which it was within the scope of the divine government to bestow, were simply those constitutional claims of the divinely administered commonwealth, which demanded that the laws of the realm should not be violated with impunity. Nothing but the punishment of the transgressors themselves, or what would, vicariously, have an equal governmental effect, could satisfy these claims. Either, then, the transgressors themselves must be punished, or a substitute must be found, whose relations both to the government and the governed were such, that his mediation could be safely admitted. Such a substitute has been found. And the moral necessities of the empire demand that he should suffer in the room of the guilty. He was willing. He was wishful. He was able, without ultimate injury to himself. He was able to endure all that was requisite, and then to rise triumphantly, an everlasting conqueror. But as he was only to appear in “the fulness of the time,” there was a grand propaedeutic preparation for his advent, and more especially among the people, with whom he was to be, by birth, allied. And, as part and parcel of that preparation, many of the spiritual privileges, which were to be the fruits of his mediation, were sensuously hieroglyphed in typical rites, and in outward political acts and relations. The outward and hieroglyphical privileges enjoyed by the Jews, in virtue of their typical sacrifices, were brought within their reach, only when the legal or governmental barriers were outwardly and hieroglyphically removed. In short, nothing more was secured by the Old Testament sacrifices than what was objective to the governed: that is to say, nothing more than legal barriers were removed. And it

is, we apprehend, beyond the power of man, if he really think, instead of disporting himself with the mere symbols of thought, to conceive of anything else as secured by the Old Testament sacrifices than the removal of those legal or governmental barriers, that stood up between the transgressing people, and the everlasting realities of blessing which emanated from the throne of the Governor. If, however, any subjective barriers remained in the persons of the people themselves, the blessings objectively thrown open could not be enjoyed: and "he that despised Moses' law died without mercy under two or three witnesses," notwithstanding the sacrifice of atonement. (Heb. x. 28.)

#### AN OVERLOOKED PECULIARITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SACRIFICES.

The reviewer overlooks another peculiar characteristic of the Old Testament sacrifices. *They were furnished, and brought to the altar, by the individuals in whose behalf they were offered.* And, if the atonement was made for the whole congregation, as on the great annual day of atonement, *the victims were furnished by the congregation.* "And Aaron," saith the Lord, "shall take of (or from) the congregation of the children of Israel, two kids of the goats for a sin-offering, and one ram for a burnt-offering." (Lev. xvi. 5.) The parties, therefore, who are typically and hieroglyphically represented by "the congregation of the children of Israel" are not so much the component members of the great commonwealth of men, embracing multitudes of future believers, as the much smaller commonwealth of those who have already believed, who are subject to the constitutional laws of the City of God, and who voluntarily approach their Sovereign through the mediation of the great Atoner. In short, it is the relation of actual believers to the Atoner, which is, under a dim yet sublime hieroglyph, emphatically exhibited in the circumstances of the Old Testament sacrifices. And hence, when the legal barriers were removed, the blessings, for the attainment of which the offerings were presented, became actually enjoyed. When the reviewer, then, appeals to these sacrifices, to prove, that the sacrifice of Christ must be followed by the pardon and ultimate salvation of all those for whom it was presented, he commits the very great mistake of supposing that the hieroglyph of the relationship of actual believers is exhaustive, in its significance, of all the relationships in which man can stand to the great antitypical Atoner.

#### THE REVIEWER'S APPEAL TO PAUL.

But our reviewer prosecutes his argument:—

"When the apostle Paul, who was so well acquainted with the principles of the Jewish faith, is correcting the erroneous impressions prevalent in the Jewish mind in his day—while he claims for the sacrifice of Christ exclusive influence in bringing about our reconciliation with God, he uniformly preserves the great analogy in respect of real substitution between the ancient offerings and the sacrifice of Christ. On all occasions he most carefully excludes the idea that atonement was intended merely to open the door of mercy—merely to remove legal bars—merely to render it compatible with the divine character to save—merely to secure man's happiness, if man should, in the exercise of his free will, sue for such a blessing. 2 Cor. v. 18, 18; Eph. ii. 14, 16; v. 2; Heb. ix. 28; x. 12."—pp. 36, 36.

We acknowledge that, as for ourselves, we should not be disposed to



represent the atonement as "merely opening the door of mercy," or as "merely rendering it compatible with the divine character to save," or as "merely securing man's happiness, if man should, in the exercise of his free-will, sue for such a blessing." It is not thus that we are accustomed either to exhibit, or to view, the atonement. But certainly we do believe that it was the design of that great propitiatory offering to remove "legal bars." And we believe, moreover, that its design,—so far as distinctive and proximate aim is concerned,—was exhausted in the removal of these bars. We cannot see how any one can doubt this, if his notions concerning the nature of moral government in general, and what it is that constitutes legal or governmental bars in particular,—bars to the enjoyment of the privileges, which it is within the scope or province of any government to bestow,—we cannot see, we say, how any one can doubt this, if his notions only rise sufficiently above the superficial in thought, or if they deepen to any perceptible degree at all beneath the shallow. Our author himself, as we imagine, if he could only master to the full the theory of atonement for which he contends, and could also couple with it any tolerable theory of what is comprehended in moral government, would not object to our representation.

But not to dwell on this, it suffices for the present to note, that our critic believes that the apostle Paul is "on all occasions" most careful to inculcate the idea that the atoning sacrifice of our Lord secured the faith and ultimate salvation of all for whom it was presented. And he refers to five passages in support of his belief.

#### FIVE NEW TESTAMENT PASSAGES APPEALED TO BY THE REVIEWER.

The first is 2 Cor. v. 18, 19,—“And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation.” But it seems evident at a glance, that our critic must, so far as this passage is concerned, have misunderstood the apostle. For, *in the first place*, there is express mention made of “the world,” as constituting the great collective object, toward which God’s conciliatory aim was directed in the work of Christ Jesus. And yet it is not the case that the world’s faith and pardon and purity and everlasting bliss have been secured. *In the second place*, the apostle mentions in the following verse the way in which he exercised his ministry of reconciliation. He “prayed men in Christ’s stead, and said, Be ye reconciled to God.” He dealt with them as beings who were free in the matter of their inner choices. He appealed to their free-will; and called upon them to use it in a way harmonious with the propitious relationship of God. And, *in the third place*, the very fact that the apostle thus entreated others to use their free-agency in being reconciled to God, is a proof that when he himself was reconciled, and that too by the gracious agency of God, it must have been through the intervention of faith and his own free will. There is nothing, then, in this passage, to shew that Paul held our author’s notion of the essential nature of the atonement. Let us look at the next passage.

It is Eph. ii. 14-16;—"For Christ is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us; having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances; for to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace; and that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby." The passage contains nothing which can be construed either into an assertion or into a denial of the idea, that the reconciliation of both Jewish and Gentile Christians to God, and to one another in God, was conditioned on the intervenience of faith. But we know from other passages, as for example from the eighth verse of this very chapter, that the reconciliation was invariably thus conditioned. And if the condition, faith, was not merely a privilege, but also a duty, then there must have been, in addition, the intervenience of free-will. For nothing can be a duty to man, which he is not free to choose or to refuse.

The third passage appealed to is Eph. v. 2,—“Walk in love, as Christ hath loved us, and hath given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet smelling savour.” But what sort of bearing the passage can have upon the reviewer's argument, we cannot divine. Does he imagine that the mere word “sacrifice” is a sufficient demonstration that all his notions regarding it are correct?

The fourth passage, which he adduces, is from the epistle to the Hebrews;—which epistle, by the by, our author decides, in the assumptive way, to be the production of Paul. It is Chapter ix. 28, to which he appeals;—“So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin, unto salvation.” But we are again at a loss to divine why such a passage should be referred to. It certainly does not teach that all for whom Christ was once offered, as a sacrifice, shall be saved. It says, indeed, that it was to bear the sins of “many” that Christ was once offered. But the word “many” is used, qualitatively, to denote a certain aspect of the numerical proportion of the *all* for whom he died. The *all*, for whom he died, unlike many other totalities, were many. Even Calvin remarks that the sacred writer here “uses the word *many* for *all*, as in Romans chap. v. 15.” (*Multos dicit pro omnibus, sicuti ad Romanos, cap. v. 15.*) He adds, “it is true indeed, that it is not all, who shall derive benefit from the death of Christ; but this happens, because their own unbelief prevents it.” When the inspired writer proceeds, in the second clause of the verse, to say that “unto them that look for him, Christ shall appear the second time, without sin, unto salvation,” he uses an expression which seems to indicate that, from among the vast multitude, or the “many,” for whom he died, there are only some “who look for his second coming,” and “love his appearing.” And all this presents a view of things, which is exceedingly unlike our critic's ideas regarding the limitation of the atonement.

The last passage to which he appeals, is Heb. x. 12,—“But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever, sat down on the right hand of God.” Once more we are at a loss to divine the relevancy of

the quotation. The passage makes no reference whatsoever to the number of the persons for whom the sacrifice was presented, or to the number of the blessings which it infallibly and unconditionally secured.

When our critic had the epistle to the Hebrews before him, and was even engaged in scanning its tenth chapter, we rather marvel that his eyes should have been remarkably unobservant of several other verses within its limits, which bear momentously upon his argument. They bear in a peculiar way indeed. They bear down upon it. They demolish it altogether. And this, perhaps, would be the reason why his eyes did not choose to take notice of them. There are, for instance, verses 26, 27,—“for if we sin wilfully *after that we have received the knowledge of the truth*, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins; but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries.” It is here supposed that some who have made use of the sacrifice of Christ, having “received the knowledge of the truth,” may yet “sin wilfully,” and finally apostatize from christianity. (Comp. verses 29–31, and chap. vi. 4–8.) But since the inspired writer makes such a supposition, his idea of the sacrifice of Christ must have been totally different from that of our critic. He cannot have regarded faith, and perseverance in faith, and final salvation, as absolutely secured by the sacrifice. The other verses immediately succeed;—“He that despised Moses’ law, died without mercy under two or three witnesses: Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, *wherewith he was sanctified*, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?” The inspired writer manifestly refers to apostates, “who draw back unto perdition,” and whose “latter end is worse with them than the beginning.” (2 Pet. ii. 20–22.) But if it be possible that there should be such apostates, who have been actually “sanctified by the blood of the covenant,” it cannot be the case that the sacrifice of our Lord secures the faith, the perseverance in faith, the pardon, the purity, and the final glorification, of all for whom it has been presented. And if, on the other hand, it be impossible that there should be such apostates, the inspired writer would be dealing in mere horrific chimeras of supposition; and he would not be harmonious in sentiment with Paul, who tells us expressly of Hymeneus and Alexander, that “having put away a good conscience; concerning faith, they made shipwreck.” (1 Tim. i. 19, 20.)

Hitherto, then, our author has made little progress, indeed, in the way of demonstrating that the atonement has been wrought out for the elect alone. Every tittle of evidence, on which he tries to lay his hand, recoils. It is either against him altogether; or, if not absolutely against him, it is most decidedly not for him. And it is to be borne in mind, that on all the counter-evidence, he is careful to say not a single word. He proceeds, however, to call more witnesses for his own view;—hopeful, perhaps, that quantity will make up for quality. And we must proceed, we presume, to cross-examine them, as they appear.

## ROMANS V. 12-19, APPEALED TO.

"There is a parallel drawn, as we have said, in Rom. v. 12-19, between Adam and Christ. If the passage has any distinct object, it is to represent the federal headship or suretyship of Christ Jesus. There is, according to Paul's reasoning, the same connection between him and those who are to be saved by him, as between Adam and his apostate descendants. Through Adam's guilt the curse was entailed on his offspring without any choice on their part, and there is no doubt, from the language of the apostle, that the blessings flowing from the death of Christ are equally determinate, 'For if by one man's offence death reigned by one: much more they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by one Jesus Christ.' 'For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.' There is a contrast expressed between the many who are made 'sinners' by Adam, and the many who are made 'righteous' by the work of Christ. Their being made sinners, as the argument implies, refers to the imputation of Adam's guilt to the many. Death, in all the senses in which it is used in Scripture, was the consequence of that imputation. In the same way the removal of the effects of the curse, resting on the many for whom Christ died, is the certain effect of the righteousness produced by His obedience."—pp. 36, 37.

We are astonished that our critic should imagine that he had done justice to the apostle's idea. For, *in the first place*, that idea, certainly, cannot be, barely and baldly "to represent the federal headship or suretyship of Christ Jesus." The apostle was not writing, in what goes before, of "the federal headship or suretyship of Christ"; and Rom. v. 12-19 is evidently an illustration of what has been taught in the preceding part of the epistle. We admit, however, that Christ is exhibited, in the paragraph, as a second Adam, a second and more glorious Head of the human race. But, *in the second place*, our author imports too much of his own theoretical system of theology into his exegesis of the paragraph, when he says,—“There is, according to Paul's reasoning, the same connection between Christ and those who are to be saved by him, as between Adam and his apostate descendants.” The expression “those who are to be saved by him” is not warranted by the hermeneutics of the passage. It has too much of the fore-fixed, and the “cut and dry,” about it. And the intromission, again, of the word “apostate,” is significant. It is not warranted by the exegesis of the passage. For many of the descendants of Adam who are spoken of, are those “who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression:”—that is, they have not apostatized. We admit, however, that the apostle does teach, by what he says in the passage, that in some momentous respects those who are connected with Christ by faith are treated, as regards “life,” in the highest acceptance of the term, on the same principle on which those who are connected with Adam by birth, are treated as regards “death,” in one of the lower significations of the word. *In the third place*, it cannot be the case that the idea of the apostle has been seized in the following sentence:—“Through Adam's guilt the curse was entailed on his offspring without any choice on their part; and there is no doubt, from the language of the apostle, that the blessings flowing from the death of Christ are equally determinate.” It would appear that our critic thinks that the blessings flowing from the death of Christ, are entailed on “those who are to be saved by him,” “without any choice on their part.” The blessings referred to, he would say, we presume, involve within them, as an integral part of themselves, all the right choices which

may be requisite for the present pardon and peace, and for the final and everlasting salvation, of the elected few. But the relation of the entire paragraph to the scope of the preceding chapters,—in which the necessity of faith, on the part of sinners, is insisted on,—leads us to the conclusion that when the apostle says, “they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness,” he uses the word “receive” in its psychologically active signification, as denoting the forth-putting of the vital activity and receptivity of the soul. This is the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas; and also of Wiclif, who renders the word, “taking,”—“Myche more men that *takyngs* plente of grace, etc.” It is Calvin’s interpretation too. He explains the expression “who receive” as meaning “the believing” (*fideles*); and he says, “It is necessary that you be a believer, if you would enjoy the righteousness of Christ; for it is by faith that union with him is attained,” (in eum inseri nos per fidem oportet). Melancthon gives the same interpretation. So does Beza. His note is emphatically to the point:—“*who receive*, that is, who accept the proffered (gift), namely by the hand of faith,” (id est, oblatam *δεχόμενοι*, fidei videlicet manu). Our great Scottish critic, Andrew Melville, takes the same view of the case. He explains the word thus, “laying hold by the hand of faith” (*prehendentes fidei manu*). Musculus is of the same opinion. He asks “who are they who receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness?” And he answers his question thus,—“They are those who apprehend it by faith.” It is, then, unwarrantably assumptive on the part of our critic, to take quietly, we might almost say magisterially, for granted that the word “receive” is used by the apostle, in such a sense as his peculiar theology may happen to require, or, in what Bengel calls its “neuter-passive” signification. If he be determined to understand the verb in this manner, he is bound to give reasons for his interpretation. And it would, we think, have been of more moment for him to have noticed, with de Wette, Krehl, Mehring, and others of the best modern critics, that the present tense of the verb brings into view, “the continuousness of the appropriation of the grace,” (*das Fortgehende der Aneignung der Gnade*;—*De Wette*). Or, as Krehl remarks,—“the taking of the gift, the grasping of the grace, is viewed as a continuous act,” (*das Nehmen des Geschenkes, das Ergreifen der Gnadengabe, als eine fortdauernde Handlung, gedacht wird*). It is not the case, then, that the blessings of the atonement are secured to the elect “without any choice on their part.” They receive; they accept; they apprehend; they take; they choose:—and thus they enjoy. There is, as Calvin himself notices, some difference between Adam and Christ in relation to their respective representatives. And one element of the difference, as is also pointed out by him, is the link of union between the two representatives. In the one case, it is birth. In the other, it is faith. This, we conceive, is at once a scriptural, and a rational view of the passage. And it is certainly to be infinitely preferred to that which is merely assumed by our critic. But, in the fourth place, his interpretation of the passage cannot be correct, for he says,—“Death, in all the senses in which it is used in Scripture, was the consequence of that imputation.” In other words, he holds that when it is said of the multitude of Adam’s representatives, that they “be dead” on account of the one primary “offence” of

the first father, the reference is to the fulness of what is currently represented as "death temporal, spiritual, and eternal." But this cannot be. For the apostle speaks of a death actually suffered. And if all Adam's representees did actually die, in the fulness of the sense contended for by our critic, then, not only do infants die spiritually, but, along with all the rest of the human race, whether believers or not, they die eternally! We almost begin to get impatient! The longing rises up within us, to get away from under the reign of nonsense!

## ISAIAH LIII. APPEALED TO.

Our reviewer proceeds, however, to supplement the imperfections of all his previous testimonies by appealing to Isaiah liii.

"The 53d chapter of Isaiah expresses very clearly the idea of vicarious substitution, and with equal explicitness unfolds the definite results arising from the atonement. It is scarcely possible for a Christian to read that chapter and believe that any one for whom, in the strict sense, Christ died, shall ever perish. 'He was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was laid upon him; and with his stripes we are healed' (ver. 5). 'All we, like sheep, have gone astray: we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all' (ver. 6). There is unfolded, also, the closest connection between the purchase and the application of the blessings of salvation. 'When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand' (ver. 10). It cannot be denied that the past humiliation and present exaltation of Christ are connected as cause and effect (Phil. ii. 8, 10). 'His seeing his seed,' is connected with His sufferings with equal stringency. 'He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities' (ver. 11)—words which imply, not only that the atonement of Christ would enable Almighty God consistently to justify any sinner who might be led from any cause to seek such a blessing, but they teach also that such is the effect of His death—such the effect of his bearing their iniquity, that they *must* be brought to know Him so as to be justified by His blood. The success of the gospel is, throughout the whole chapter, entirely based on the efficacy of the atonement; but, according to the views of the Evangelical Union, the atonement gives rise to a mere possibility of the cause prospering; it provides no security."—pp. 37, 38.

But our author, we presume, has simply forgotten to look to the beginning of the chapter. If he had looked there, he would have found that the inspired preachers of the gospel were not contented with the actual results of what was proclaimed by them. They thought that still more, than were actually converted, might have been "brought to know the Saviour, so as to be justified by his blood." And hence they exclaim, at once in sorrow and in surprise, "who hath believed our report? and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?" If they had had our critic's opinions, they would have been thoroughly satisfied with the results, as embracing all that was actually intended; and therefore all that was, without pelagianism, possible; and thus all that was really willed and wished, by the Divine Father and the Saviour. When our critic says, that "it is scarcely possible for a Christian to read this chapter and believe that any one for whom, in the strict sense, Christ died, shall ever perish," he furnishes a singular example of the blinding effect of prepossessions. Does he not know that, our little Scotland apart, almost all the Christians in the world, who read the chapter, believe that Christ died for the whole human race without distinction or exception? Does he think that Wesleyan Methodists never read the chapter? Does he think that the ministers

and members of the Church of England never read the chapter, or that, in reading it, they think they see in it a contradiction to their 31st Article? Does he think that the English Independents never read the chapter, or, when reading it, find in it a refutation of the belief of Payne, and Wardlaw, and Angell James? Does he think that the American Independents and the American New School Presbyterians never read the chapter, or only read in it the condemnation of their own creed? Does he think that the Lutherans never read the chapter, or that, when they read it, they find that, from Luther and Melancthon, downward, they have all been in error as to the extent of the atonement?

JOHN X. 15, 16, 26, 28, APPEALED TO.

Our author has a palmary argument, however, to prove that the atonement is for the elect alone: and he now proceeds to produce it:—

“In John x. 15, 16, 26, 28, the Saviour himself says: ‘As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father: and I lay down my life for the sheep. And other sheep I have which are not of this fold, them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice: and there shall be one fold and one shepherd. But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. My sheep hear my voice and I know them, and they follow me. And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. My Father which gave them me is greater than all, and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father’s hands.’ (Compare John xvii. 9, 19, 24.)

“No doubt the Conference of the Union have a method of their own by which to interpret these verses, though we cannot confidently conjecture what their interpretation will be, as they are not in the habit of quoting such passages; but if their mode of solving the difficulty arising from these words is to consider those as the sheep of Christ, who believe on Him, the explanation will not suffice. Christ, it will be observed, does not say, ye are not of my sheep because ye believe not. His statement is different altogether. Ye ‘believe not because ye are not of my sheep’—words which, when united with the second clause of verse 15, connect inseparably the production of faith with the efficacy and the intention of atonement. (See also John xiv. 6; Eph. v. 29.)”—pp. 38, 39.

But if our critic’s interpretation of the passage were the correct one, our Saviour would have been furnishing an excuse for the unbelief of the Pharisees, instead of administering to them a rebuke. For certainly they could not be reasonably or righteously blamed for not exercising faith, if it had not been provided for them, but, on the contrary, was utterly unattainable by them. It cannot, then, be the case that our critic’s view of the passage is in accordance with the mind of the Saviour.

It is the isolation of the verses from their context that lends any plausibility, that it possesses, to the interpretation of our critic. When the verses are read in their full connection, and without violent prepossession, their import becomes manifest. In the expression, “ye believe not,” the reference is not to the gospel, as distinctively understood, or as unfolding, alike for all ages, the way of salvation. The reference is simply to the Messiahship of Christ. This is rendered manifest, when the two preceding verses are read,—

“Then came the Jews round about Him, and said unto Him, how long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.

“Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not: the works that I do in my Father’s name, they bear witness of me.”—John x. 24, 25.

When our Saviour, then, says to the captious and malignant questioners, (see ver. 31, 39,) who no doubt were seeking occasion to en-

tangle him in his words, that they might accuse him to the Romans as a rival to Cæsar,—when he says to them, “ye believe not,” he simply means “ye believe not that I am the promised Messiah.” And when he adds, “because ye are not of my sheep,” the meaning is, at bottom, really this,—“because ye are not believers of the Gospel.” *If they had been true believers of the Gospel, they would have had no difficulty in believing that Jesus was the true Messiah.* He had told them, though not in express terms, that he was. He had told them the full truth so far as the times would permit him to utter it. He had said, “before Abraham was, I am”; and that implied that he was the true Messiah. He had said, that “Abraham rejoiced to see his day afar off”; and that implied that he was the true Messiah. He had said that “if the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed”; and that implied that he was the true Messiah. He had said that he was “the Good Shepherd”; and that implied that he was the good and true Messiah. If, then, they had been genuine believers of the Gospel, as they professed to be; if they had been genuine members, by faith, of the church of God, as they professed to be; they would have easily penetrated into the import of the veiled utterances of the Saviour, and have believed that he was the Gracious One, on whom, as exhibited in the law and the prophets, they had been heretofore believing for the salvation of the soul. *The sheep would have known the voice of the Shepherd.* But they did not believe that he was the Messiah, because they did not truly believe in the Messiah as exhibited in the law and the prophets. They did not know his voice, for they were not his sheep. Or, as he elsewhere expresses it, they did not come to him; because they had not learned of the Father, so as to be drawn toward Him. (John vi. 44 and 45.) They were “of their father the devil,” and not “of God.” If they had been “of God,” if they had been “the sons and daughters of God,” by true faith in the gospel of God, they would have readily recognized their elder brother, God’s peculiar Son, and known the Father’s words, which he spake. (John viii. 42–47.)

The passage quoted, then, is very far indeed from being a proof that “the production of saving faith is inseparably connected with the efficacy and the intention of the atonement.” And as for the 15th verse, “I lay down my life for the sheep,” it is not intended, as we have shown in our *Vindication of the Universality of the Atonement*, to define the exclusive objects of the atoning death. The Saviour is not contrasting the sheep and the goats. He is contrasting himself as the true Shepherd, with false messiahs as only hireling shepherds. These hireling shepherds were selfish; and when danger came, as, for example, when the wolf sprang into the fold, they fled, so that “the wolf caught the sheep and scattered them.” But as for Jesus, he was “the good Shepherd, who laid down his life for the sheep.” There is no more intentional reference to the entire circumference of the intended objects of the atonement, than there is in that other passage which contains the words of the apostle Paul,—“he loved *me*, and gave Himself for *me*.” (Gal. ii. 20.)

#### THE REVIEWER'S CONFIDENT CONCLUSION.

Whatever others, however, may think of the validity of the evidence adduced, and of the conclusiveness of the argumentation attempted, the



reviewer himself has no misgivings. On the contrary, he proceeds to say,—

“If these passages can be explained consistently with the doctrine of the Evangelical Union, we will abandon the argument. It is very little to the purpose to say that all men would be saved by Christ's atonement would they but believe. There is now no other obstacle to the salvation of any man. But what is unbelief? Unbelief is a part of the curse of Adam's apostasy cleaving to our nature, and if provision is not made for its removal, the effects of the atonement on the sinner's happiness are purely visionary. But is the removal of that obstacle, under the Christian dispensation, left to the free-will of any sinner for whom Christ died? Is it from a regard to the willingness of immense multitudes, of their own accord, or by the urgency of their fellow-men, to embrace Christ, that the Almighty speaks so confidently regarding the result of the travail of Christ's soul? If so, why, in so many passages, connect their willingness with the death of Christ in their special stead? If Christ died for all equally, what is the explanation of the special efficacy of His death in bringing into a state of knowledge and faith those that are saved? There is no explanation but that *condemned* in the Declaration. There must be a special and efficacious reference to the elect in the work of atonement.”—p. 39.

But there must not, we maintain. There must not, unless the conclusion of an argument may be established without the slightest reference to the validity of the premises. We have gone over all the details of evidence, every item apart, on which our critic attempts to find a foundation for his conclusion. And every part in particular, has been found wanting. Every atom has recoiled; and has struck, indeed, against the object for which the sum-total has been adduced. Every passage adduced has, on the strictest laws of exegesis, been “explained consistently with the doctrine of the Evangelical Union”; and we therefore call upon our author to redeem his pledge, and “abandon his argument.”

It is not the case, as we have seen, that there is any passage which teaches the “efficacy of Christ's death, in bringing into a state of knowledge and faith,” all for whom he died. Neither is it the case, on the other hand, that the Evangelical Union holds that it is “from a regard to the willingness of immense multitudes, of their own accord, or by the agency of their fellow-men, to embrace Christ, that the Almighty speaks so confidently regarding the result of the travail of Christ's soul.” Evangelical Unionists believe in the agency of the Holy Spirit. And if our reviewer would himself put into requisition some of the “acumen,” which he recognises in Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards, he would not fail to see that it is something verging on the ridiculous to represent “unbelief,” as “a part of the curse of Adam's apostasy cleaving to our nature,” which cannot be removed but by a necessitating influence emanating from the atonement. Unbelief, in relation to the gospel, presupposes indeed the fall; but not the fall only. It also presupposes the remedial scheme which is intended to counteract the fall. And it therefore cannot be itself included in the fall. Unbelief is the rejection of Christ: but Christ was not given,—or offered,” if our author will have that phrase,—before the fall, or in the fall, but only after the fall. The io triumph strain of our critic has, we suspect, been rather premature.

#### WHAT COMES AFTER THE CONCLUSION.

Our reviewer, however, though his argument is concluded, has not quite done with his observations. We shall classify them, and make such remarks upon them as may be requisite.

(1.) He says,—

"It appears from 2 Cor. v. 19, 20, that the heralds of the cross are commanded to beseech all men to be reconciled to God. No one who has ever read the New Testament can deny that it is the duty of every man invested with the office of a minister of the Word, most solemnly and most affectionately to invite all sinners to believe the Gospel and be reconciled to God. He is not in his ministrations to proceed on any unknown distinction between the elect and the non-elect among his hearers. Every preacher is chargeable with the awful guilt of handling the word of the Lord deceitfully who attaches any limit to the freeness and the universality of the Gospel call."—pp. 39, 40.

But if a preacher who holds our author's views were to be thoroughly honest with his people, and to proclaim to them what he regards as the whole truth, he would address them in some such manner as the following:—"Be it known to you that Christ died for the elect only. No others can be saved. No others can believe: for faith is part of the purchase of Christ's death; and God, indeed, does not really wish any others either to believe or to be saved. Nevertheless, out of his great compassion for all, he commands all without exception to believe and be saved—whether Christ died for them or not. And I tell you that if you don't believe, though you can't, it will be far worse with you throughout eternity, than if you had never enjoyed the high privilege of hearing this glorious gospel from my lips."

(2.) He says again,—

"We presume the charge is, that we cannot do so *consistently* with our principles. As to the practice there can be no dispute."—p. 40.

We dispute it, however. And we maintain that if a man is not prepared to say to every company to whom he preaches, "Christ died for our sins," "ours," that is "yours and mine," he does not preach the gospel fully and freely. We say not that he does not preach the gospel; for the gospel may be exhibited in many aspects, and it may be proclaimed more or less adequately or inadequately and imperfectly. But we cannot hesitate to say that the proclamation of it is neither full nor free. Surely, moreover, our critic is aware that a full and free invitation to believe the gospel,—which is in general what is meant by "preaching the gospel freely,"—is something altogether different from a full and free gospel to be believed. We would not be greatly surprised, on second thoughts, though our reviewer should find, and though his more intelligent parishioners should know, that he has been confounding these things that differ.

(3.) Our reviewer says again;—

"The practice adopted by the ministers of the Evangelical Union, of encouraging their people to believe that the atonement is not deserving of any attention, unless it can be shown to be absolutely universal, does not, we maintain, rest on a principle adopted by human beings in any other enterprise."—"When a father commits one of his children to the charge of a well-qualified instructor, he hopes for the best. He cannot tell whether the child will prosper in his studies—whether he will ever possess the moral principle necessary for causing his acquirements to prove a blessing—or whether the child will live to reduce to practice the lessons he is receiving; but those doubts have not the slightest effect in rendering him indifferent to the work of education. The farmer, in the season of spring, cheerfully commits his seed to the ground, without demanding and without expecting the assurance—which cannot be given—that he, or those who are dear to him, will ever reap the bounties of the coming harvest. When an individual is anxious to prosecute his interests in a foreign land, he does not, before leaving the country of his birth, require certain information that he will not meet a watery grave in the wide ocean, that he will not fall a victim to the pestilences of an unwholesome clime, or die by the hands of savages, still more danger-

ous. Absolute certainty is not necessary for calling forth the greatest activity and ardour in any human pursuit; and why should the members of the Evangelical Union conjure up a principle as essential for *religion* that has never once been thought of in any other of the interests of mankind? Men are stimulated in their ordinary concerns by the mere desirableness of the objects on which their hearts are set. They do not, in those instances, seek to pry into unknown futurity. They will never allow their spirits to sink until they find by *experience* that their efforts are hopeless. Why, then, adopt a different law in the concerns of our immortality?—pp. 41, 42.

We do not adopt a different law in these concerns. And hence the entire pile of our critic's illustrations is a mere harmless battery, which may be fired off indeed at something or other, but not one single shot of which can ever reach "the practice adopted by the ministers of the Evangelical Union." It is not the case that its ministers encourage their people to believe that the atonement would not be deserving of any attention, unless it could be shown to be absolutely universal. At least this has never been the practice of any of those ministers of the Union with whom we are acquainted. And it is really too bad in our critic to exercise his ingenuity in inventing not only our doctrines for us, but our practice too.

But his pile of illustrations is not only a gratuitous superfluity. It contains within itself an explosive element, which threatens to blow up into atoms more, we apprehend, than he himself would, after all, be very willing to part with. The whole pile is constructed on the principle that it is the duty of the sinner to work laboriously for salvation. He should add work to work, it seems, service to service, and toil to toil, in the hope that thus he may perchance reach salvation in the end. We scarcely expected that a minister of the Church of Scotland would have vented, so very obtrusively, such a doctrine. Does he really need to be informed that it is the duty of the sinner, instead of himself working for salvation, to believe in the work of Another, in the atoning work of the Saviour, that he may be saved. Whether or not he needs to be informed of this, we know not; for the most manifest incongruities are found in abundance within his creed. But this we do know, that in erecting his pile of illustrations, he forgot that *faith has to do with certainties and not mere probabilities, when it has to do with the word of the living God, who is a faithful and true Witness.* For assuredly it is more than probable that what God says is true.

A father, indeed, may have his doubts as to whether or not his child will make a shining scholar or a shining man. And, notwithstanding these doubts, he may put his child under the charge of a well-qualified instructor. But if he knew that only a limited number of pupils was received by the well-qualified instructor, we presume that he would like to have certainty as to whether his boy would be admissible or not, before he should actually send him. The farmer, doubtless, commits his seed hopefully to the prepared soil, without being absolutely certain that he shall reap the bounties of the coming harvest. He is thus contented with a probability in that particular matter. But suppose that there was only a limited amount of territory that could be divided into farms, would not a farmer wish certainty as to whether there was really a farm for him, before he would begin to purchase stock and to make his preparations for obtaining harvest-returns? Merchants too, in prosecuting their pursuits in foreign lands, must content themselves

with many mere probabilities. But they need certainties likewise. They would need to be certain, for example, before embarking for the voyage, that there were bona-fide berths for them in the vessel; and that the ship was really bound for the desired destination, and not for some other quarter of the globe at the opposite pole. And then, besides, if they had a supernatural testimony from heaven that assured them, that provided they embarked in a certain specified ship, they would reach their-hoped for haven in safety, and find all well, and well to perpetuity, would they, in such altered circumstances, be likely to content themselves with mere perhapses and peradventures? Throughout the whole of our critic's illustrations, he forgets that it is faith in the express revelation of the unerring and infallible Jehovah, that is the duty of the sinner. He forgets that illustrations should not only illustrate something or other at random, but should also be to the point in hand

(4.) Our reviewer says again,—

"It is said, in some of the Tracts published by those connected with the Union that, according to Calvinistic teaching, a man may desire salvation and not obtain it, because it has not been provided. We would hope, for the honour of human nature, that such an allegation never has proceeded from the lips or the pen of any of the abler men connected with the body, for a statement more at variance with truth never was uttered."—p. 42

"When, again, a Calvinistic minister is asked by a hearer, Can you assure me that Christ died for me? If the hearer have no other motive than the gratification of idle curiosity, the minister may be puzzled to return a satisfactory answer, and there is nothing sacrificed by his not being able to indulge such frivolity; but, if the hearer is in earnest—if the man knows what salvation means, and desires the enjoyment of its blessings—the Calvinist occupies the highest possible vantage-ground; he can not merely offer a full and certain salvation, which a minister of the Evangelical Union cannot do, but, believing that the divine intentions towards the man are discovered by the production of a *desire*, in his heart, to be saved, he can proclaim the word and the oath of God—everything dear to the Divine nature—as pledged, on the sinner's resting on Christ, for his present security and his everlasting peace."—p. 46.

Another evidence, we suspect, that our reviewer is handling implements, of the nature of which he is not adequately informed; and which he may be consequently apt to use in a somewhat dangerous manner. He thinks, it seems, that a *desire to be saved*, on the part of sinners, affords the advocate of an atonement for the elect alone sufficient warrant to tender them the assurance that Christ died for their sins. He thinks, in other words, that a *desire to be saved* on the part of sinners, is an infallible evidence of unconditional and immutable election! We had not expected to find one single minister of the church of Scotland led captive by such an imagination. Has he had so very little intercourse with men in reference to their spiritual relations, as not to have known many, who once were awakened to concern about their souls, and ardently desired salvation, but who by and by became cool, cold, indifferent, careless? Is he so little versant in theological literature, as not to know that almost every practical theologian warns the awakened,—who all, of course, desire salvation,—that conviction is not conversion; and that it by no means invariably culminates in salvation? Has he forgotten that our Saviour himself teaches us that some with joy receive the word of salvation,—and receive it, of course, because they desire what it proclaims,—and yet, having no root in themselves, they by and by, more

especially if hot persecution arise, wither away? Has he forgotten that others receive the same word,—also, of course, because they desire what it proclaims,—who yet by and by allow it to be choked by the deceitfulness of riches or the cares of this world? Has he forgotten that the Apostle Peter tells us of some who have forgotten that they were purged from their “old sins,” and who hence become “barren and unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ”? Has he forgotten that some, after having risen far above mere desires for salvation, “after they have escaped the pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,” are “again entangled therein and overcome, so that their latter end is worse with them than their beginning”? (2 Pet. i. 8, 9; ii. 20.) Has he never heard of the unrelieved remorse of awakened apostates? Or has he never attempted to expound Heb. vi. 4-8, or Heb. x. 25-39? Or has he never thought of those who have “a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge,” and who “obtain not *that which they seek*”? (Rom. xi. 7) In reference to these latter persons, one of the noblest of the Puritan divines, and a very high Calvinist, Elnathan Parr, remarks,—“There is “in every man a natural desire of salvation. The veriest reprobate, “when he dies, had rather go to heaven than to hell. Content not thyself with a bare desire of salvation. Thou must desire and seek it by “the means, and in the way that God hath appointed. *Many ask and have not, because they ask amiss. And Every one that strives for mastery is not crowned, except he strive lawfully.* So, many seek salvation, and “are not saved; not because they seek, but because they seek amiss.” (*Expos. of Romans*, xi. 7.) This is good sense, indeed. And Jonathan Edwards, one of our author’s great oracles, goes a great deal farther. He not only holds that a man may be “affected” in reference to the things of the salvation of the soul, and yet never be saved,—he maintains that “a man’s having *much affection* does not prove that he has any true religion.” And he says that “it is the concurring view of all orthodox divines, that there may be religious affections *raised to a very high degree*, and yet nothing of true religion.” (*The Religious Affections*. Part I. § 3; Part II. § 1.)

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## CHAPTER VII.

### JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

The strength of our critic is now exhausted. And the back-bone of his argument is shivered, beyond the possibility of cure.

Our work for the remainder of our *Apology* will thus be comparatively light, and may well afford to be comparatively brief. We shall just need to touch, as it were, by jottings, the salient points of his review, that strike out here and there into some kind of prominence and pre-eminence.

Under the title “Justification by faith,” for example, he finds nothing to object to the real teaching of the Evangelical Union. He admits, indeed,—though apparently much to his own chagrin, and perhaps even

a little to ours,—that “the language of the whole section is Calvinistic.” (p. 46.) We can sincerely say, that we did not intend it to be so. We only meant it to be Scriptural. And yet we cannot but be glad that although, no doubt, “with desire he desired” to find faults and flaws, he has failed to succeed. We need not then defend what is not impugned. We would merely refer our readers to the Doctrinal Declaration itself.

We would, however, have had a higher idea of the controversial magnanimity of our critic, if, having nothing to object, he had simply said nothing at all on this part of our Declaration. But he could not, apparently, deny himself the gratification of venting some of his personal suspicions in reference to the Unionists. “We do not happen to know,” he says, “any of those who are *avowed* members of the Evangelical Union; but we should not be astonished to find, if we did know them, that humility is not one of the most prominent of their virtues.” (p. 48.) What would he think of us, if we should say, in like manner, that, though we do not happen to have the honour of his personal acquaintance, we should not be astonished to find, if we should be admitted to that distinction, that assumption and pride, both of intellect and of ecclesiastical position,—*assumption and pride too, for which there is, to say the least, exceedingly little ground*,—are prominent features in his character? Of what use to the public would such surmises be? It is disgraceful to introduce them into controversy.

Then, again, he takes the opportunity of saying, that although the ministers of the Union maintain and proclaim the necessity and fulness of the influence of the Divine Spirit, “he cannot think that the privilege enters into the calculation of any of their hearers.” (p. 48.) Such a thought would, it seems, be too generous; more especially as, with his views of things, he would set but little store by such an influence. We beg to tell him, however, that it is one of the elements of our exceeding great joy, as it is certainly our only hope for spiritual victory and purity, that we are ever, with all our receptivities, surrounded and urged, laved and flooded, with the presence and the power of the Almighty Helper,—the great Instructor, Sanctifier, and Comforter.

He represents us again as “naturally believing that it is our own right arm that has certainly not the smallest share in securing to us our spiritual victory.” (p. 48.) But why persist in such vile and unhallowed surmises as to our character? If he cannot understand how it is that we “can do all things,” only “through Christ, which strengtheneth us,” yet why suppose that we too must be equally dull of apprehension? And, especially, why please a morbid moral feeling by indulging in disparaging imaginations as to what our spiritual character must be? We beg to tell our accuser, that “this,” and this only, “is the victory that overcometh the world” in our experience, “even our faith,” which goes out, forgetful of itself, and fastens on our Saviour. It is when we keep, by means of faith, close by the side of our Saviour; it is when we walk by that side, putting, as it were, our hand into his, and feeling ourselves divinely led; it is then, and then alone, that we triumph. It is ever the presence of our Saviour that discomfits for us all our spiritual enemies.

Passing from these painful personalities, we may mention, before proceeding to the remaining topics of the Declaration, that while our critic finds nothing to find fault with in our section on *justification by faith*, we find something to find fault with in his views on the subject. He cannot touch on any doctrinal topic, no more than on any historical, or philosophical, or exegetical, or personal matter, without committing mistakes. It almost seems, as we have hinted before, that there is resting on his spirit a Calvinistic fatality for making blunders.

He thinks, when taking into account the views of the Evangelical Union in reference to the atonement, that the righteousness, which is admitted in the Doctrinal Declaration to be the only ground of justification, "can have no existence." (p. 46.) There is, he says, "no purchase of righteousness," in the system of the Union. And he adds, that "the sinner cannot have righteousness imputed, unless it has been purchased." (p. 46.) He thinks, then, that Christ needed to purchase righteousness for the elect, as their ground of justification. But if our Saviour did purchase this righteousness, wherein, we would ask, consisted the purchase? and what was the price which was paid? Was it something different from the righteousness? or was it the righteousness itself? If our critic shall say that it was something different, we ask him what it was, for as for ourselves, we know nothing that Christ did that was not part and parcel of his righteousness. But if he shall say that it was the righteousness itself, then he introduces into the nature of things an entirely new kind of purchasing, hitherto unknown by any mortals, and unimagined, we presume, by immortals; and in virtue of which an article purchased may be purchased by the payment of itself. This is another kind of invention. And for once the world finds itself returning to its good old-fashioned condition: and fiction is again stranger than fact. How comes it to pass that he could not see that all the Scripture representations of the work of Christ,—propitiation, obedience until death, ransom, putting away sin (in so far as it is a bar), sacrifice, righteousness, are but partial aspects of one and the same grand reality? and that it is impossible to ride any one of the aspects to extremity, without riding one's whole theological system to death?

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## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

In the Doctrinal Declaration, it is maintained that the indispensable influence of the Holy Spirit is moral and resistible as regards its nature, and universal as regards its extent.

Our critic allows that this doctrine regarding the work of the Spirit is in "perfect consistency" with the other articles of our belief; and that these other articles are consequently in perfect reciprocal consistency with it. "It must be allowed," he says, "that there is a perfect consistency in the different articles of the belief of the Evangelical Union."—"The whole system is harmonious." (pp. 49, 50.) The fact

of this testimony is a noteworthy phenomenon. For if any one of the items of our theology, such as our doctrine regarding the will, or our doctrine regarding foreordination, or our doctrine regarding predestination, or, above all, our doctrine regarding the atonement, be the genuine reflection of the archetypal ideas which form the intuitions of the divine mind, all the other component parts of the great whole are likely to be emanations from the same eternal source of verity. There must be consistency and brotherhood in the divine ideas. And if some of the ideas of the Evangelical Union are manifestly images of the divine,—if, in other words, they are manifestly Scriptural, it is likely that in virtue of the fact of their “perfect consistency” and “harmony,” all the rest of them, that are really distinctive, will be divinely “orthodox.”

#### § I. THE COMMON INFLUENCES OF THE SPIRIT.

Our reviewer is unable to deny that the Holy Spirit does use influence with some who are ultimately unsaved. He maintains that there are “common operations of the Spirit,” which may not only be temporarily, but also finally, resisted and quenched. These operations are vouchsafed to the non-elect: while all the elect, he holds, are the subjects of a special operation, which is insuperable or invincible. But we should like to ask him, what, on his principles, he conceives the divine intent to be in granting these common influences to the non-elect? Surely it cannot be to remove them out of the number of the unconditionally reprobated. No. For the number of the unconditionally elected is complete, and cannot, as his Confession determines, be “increased.” (*Chap.* iii. 4.) It cannot be to enable them to be saved without being included within the number of the elected. For his Confession binds him to hold that “no others are redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.” (*Chap.* iii. 6.) It cannot be, then, to enable them to get advantage of the atonement, on the one hand, or to get to heaven, on the other, without it. For the atonement, he holds, was wrought out definitely and exclusively for the elect; and he admits, we presume, that the Bible speaks the truth when it declares that “without the shedding of blood there is no remission” of sins. For what purpose it is, then, we would ask, that the common influences of the Spirit are vouchsafed to the non-elected? We would press the question: for it will be noticed that the bestowment of these influences is something altogether different from the universal call of the gospel. Man makes the call, or at least echoes it. And the excuse, which Calvinists plead for its universality, is, that the preacher does not know who the elect are, and that he is therefore obliged to exhort and urge all. But it is not man who dispenses the influence of the Holy Spirit. It is God himself. And we presume that our critic will allow that He is omniscient and knows his own elect. Why then, we ask, does He vouchsafe the common influences of the Spirit to the non-elect? Is it to do them good? or is it to do them evil?

Our critic seems to be willing to answer the question so far. He maintains the following idea:—

“Resistance to the voice of conscience is held by Calvinists to be a very grievous



iniquity, not so much because it is an invaluable faculty of man's nature, as because, when it speaks soundly, it is to be regarded as a light from heaven, as one of the instruments employed by the Holy Ghost to urge sinners into the path of safety."—p. 51.

It is, then, our reviewer maintains, the aim of the divine Spirit, in his common operations, "to urge sinners into the path of safety." But why, we would ask farther, is it his aim to urge non-elect sinners into the path of safety? Does he really wish the non-elect sinners to enter that path? Or is there a path of safety for the non-elect? Christ has not died for them. This our reviewer not only admits, but strenuously maintains. Christ, then, is not, for them, a "path of safety," a "way" to the Father, and to the Father's right hand, and to the everlasting glory that is there. Is there, then, some other way of safety besides Christ? Surely that cannot be: for "there is no other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved, but the name of Christ." When the Spirit urges, then, the non-elect "into the path of safety," what is it that he wishes them to do? Does he wish them to make a Saviour for themselves? Or does he wish them to get safety without a Saviour? Or what else does he wish?—especially, what else that is "goodness" and "tender-mercy"? We would press our questions: and we should like extremely well that they should be answered.

#### § 2.—WHY THE OCCASIONAL LAPSES OF THE ELECT?

Our critic holds that even the elect "may occasionally fail to act in accordance with the holy impressions produced in their heart." (p. 52.) He says that "A Christian may, according to the Calvinistic system, *grieve the Spirit*; he may even for a time *quench the Spirit*." (p. 53.) But why is this, we ask? And how is such a tenet consistent with Calvinistic principles? According to these principles, as expounded by our critic, God's will is always fulfilled. Both Augustin and Calvin maintain, again and again, that "the will of God is the necessity of things." The Shorter Catechism alleges that every thing "which comes to pass" is "foreordained by God." The Confession declares that "God hath not decreed anything, because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon any supposed conditions." (chap. iii. 2.) Why, then, is it that the elect "occasionally fail to act according to the holy impressions produced" by the Spirit in the heart? Why do they sometimes "grieve," yea even "quench," the Holy Ghost? Why has God foreordained that they should? and unconditionally foreordained it? Why does His will, which is "the necessity of things," necessitate it? Is it for their good? If it be, then does he not seem to will and necessitate evil that good may come; although he himself has legislatively announced of all those who thus act, that "their damnation is just"? (Rom. iii. 8.) Or, in other words, does he not seem to confound the most fundamental of all moral distinctions? But if it be for their evil, is he kind? is he Love?

#### § 3.—SHIPWRECK OF FAITH.

In the Doctrinal Declaration it is said, that "every instance in which a believer makes shipwreck of his faith, is a proof of the moral and

resistible nature of the Holy Spirit's influences." But our critic remarks:—

"The question in dispute is, whether such a case ever occurs. The expression 'making shipwreck' is undoubtedly used in the New Testament as an affecting figure of the issue of apostasy. But certainly, in such cases the language of the apostle John is worthy of consideration. 'They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us; but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us.'"—p. 54.

But there is more, we must remind our reviewer, than the bare expression "making shipwreck." The full expression, as we have already had occasion to note, is, "*concerning faith* have made shipwreck." (1 Tim. i. 19.) What mean the words "concerning faith"? Or will our critic inform us how a man can make "shipwreck concerning faith,"—who never has had any faith to make shipwreck of? Need we remind him, moreover, that in the very passage where the "affecting figure" occurs, the apostle actually specifies two cases of the kind of shipwreck mentioned;—not imaginary cases, but cases of actual occurrence? They were those of Hymeneus and Alexander. Why then is it that our reviewer says, that "the question in dispute is, whether such a case ever occurs"? The apostle has settled the question. As to 1 John ii. 19, again, the passage which our reviewer quotes in order to show that no man can make shipwreck of faith;—it is perfectly consistent with the idea that the anti-christian secessionists had made shipwreck of a previously possessed faith, and had thus ceased to be parcels of the christian community. They had become apostates in heart, so that the apostle could no longer say of them, "they are of us." And hence they "went out." "After having escaped," as Peter says, "the pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, they were again entangled therein and overcome." (2 Pet. ii. 20.) And it was therefore well that they went out, instead of continuing in, to be "as spots in the feasts of charity." (Jude 12.)

#### § 4. — IS MAN AN AUTOMATON ?

The reviewer makes reference to that portion of the Doctrinal Declaration, in which it is alleged that "every warning, entreaty, remonstrance, promise, and threatening of the Book of God, is a proof of the moral and resistible nature of the Holy Spirit's influences." And he says,—“The authors seem to be convinced that Calvinists treat man as if he were an automaton.” (p. 53.) And does our reviewer, we would ask, really object to the idea that man is an automaton? Does he think that such an idea is inconsistent with the dignity of a spiritual being? Would he be ashamed to avow and proclaim such a view of human nature? We beg to press our question. Does he answer that he would not? Then why, we ask again, find fault with us for being apparently convinced that “Calvinists treat men as if they were automata”? Does he answer that he would? Then we beg to remind him that he should keep a longer memory. For he says, in an earlier part of his Review, that “Calvinists have no reason to be ashamed of *any doctrine regarding human nature*, that received the deliberate support of men of such acumen as Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards.” Does he remember the averment? Will he abide by it? Then we beg to inform him that

it was one of the favourite notions of Leibnitz "regarding human nature," that man's soul is "a spiritual automaton." (*L'âme humaine est une espèce d'automate spirituel. Théod. i. 52. Compare also his Reliquie aux Reflexions.*) Why then be ashamed? we ask.

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## CHAPTER IX.

### THE REMAINING DOCTRINES.

We must put spurs into our steed, and hasten still more swiftly along the remainder of our course. Neither, we are sure, will our readers think it necessary that we should stop to pluck up, and then pull to pieces, every thistle that is growing by the way. They are somewhat numerous, and sometimes rather jagged; but the hoofs of an ordinary war-horse need scarcely be expected to smart very severely, when brushed by their prickles.

#### § 1. CONCURRENCE OF THE DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCIES IN THE MATTER OF SALVATION.

On this subject, the Doctrinal Declaration of the Evangelical Union says,—

"It will be seen that we believe in a synergism or concurrence of the Divine agency and the human, in the matter of salvation. Instead of running away with the Divine element, as Calvinism does, to the virtual exclusion of the human, and to the stultification of the innumerable statements of Scripture that teach us our responsibility and urge us to action; and instead of running away with the human element, as Pelagianism does, to the virtual ignorement of the Divine, and the contradiction of every text that sets forth the free grace and sovereignty of God; we believe in the indispensable necessity and harmonious concurrence of both, and are thus enabled to reconcile all the varieties of Scripture phraseology, otherwise irreconcilable, on the agencies and instrumentalities connected with salvation."—p. 13.

It was the maturer views of Melancthon which gave rise to the "synergistic" controversy. And with that illustrious reformer's ideas of synergism,—which were indeed a simple restoration of the views entertained by the Fathers of the first three centuries,—the Evangelical Unionists substantially agree. He strenuously maintained, along with the early Fathers, that the will is not "otiose" in the matter of conversion, and in subsequent good works. "The free will," he says, "does something"; although he admits, with the Union, prevenient grace. (See his *Loci Com., de libero arbitrio, &c., &c.*) He held, in other words, that God is always first with the sinner. But he at the same time maintained, that the sinner must, in the second place, respond to the call of God, and concur with the gracious influence which is divinely energising in the soul. Such are the views of the Evangelical Union. And it is in virtue of these views that they can account for the fact that man is called upon, again and again and again, *to convert himself, or turn himself to the Lord*, (see, in the original, Acts iii. 19; Matt. xiii. 15; Mark iv. 12; Acts xxviii. 27; and Ezek. iv. 6; xviii. 30; xxxii. 11; Jas. ii. 12; &c.); while, at the same time, he is also, in other passages, represented as being divinely *converted or turned*,

namely, by the agency of the Spirit of God. (See Matt. xviii. 3; Is. xii. 40; Jer. xxxi. 18; Jo. vi. 44; &c.)

Our critic, however, seems to marvel that the Union should say, as it does, "We trace faith, in every instance, with all its antecedents and consequents, to God's free, sovereign, anticipating grace." And he says,—

"If the 'free, sovereign, anticipating grace' of God is exercised in predisposing the sinner to act faith, the word *Synergism* cannot be used in the sense in which it is usually employed."—p. 55.

But we maintain that it can. And it is thus employed. And to say that it "cannot," is simply another instance of our reviewer's proclivity toward historical inaccuracies. He adds, however, as if he had made a great discovery,—

"We are disposed, however, to think, on a careful perusal of the whole document, that 'anticipating grace' is not used to express grace previously in operation, and disposing the sinner to receive what Christ offers, but grace previously *existing* in the sinner's mind when he believes—grace existing even when he is in a state of utmost carelessness as to the matter of salvation—in short, grace in readiness for exercise as soon as the sinner is inclined to call it forth."—p. 55.

His supposition is an invention, which will run extremely little risk of being pirated. We shall never dispute his undivided claim to its honours. It is alike opposed to the whole of our philosophy, and the whole of our theology. We believe that the Spirit of God is ever active and acting; although, of course, we also believe that He never necessitates the human will, and thus never supersedes that vital self-determining activity in the heart of our being, without which we would be automaton indeed, or mere Conscious Balances, the scales of which must needs turn hither or thither, according to the weights which may, from without, be put into them. Our critic continues,—

"We are disposed to consider it as certain that, according to the system of the Evangelical Union, grace can accomplish nothing until it be rendered active by the sinner's own exertions."—p. 55.

He is disposed, in other words, to hold it for a certainty that, in the estimation of the Evangelical Unionists, a torpedo rests on the activity of God, until man comes to the rescue, and lifts it up, and flings it away. A most generous supposition, in sooth; and with an immensity of verisimilitude attaching to it! There is no torpedo, however, resting on his own imagination; and as his subject expands in his warm and plastic hands, he says, by way of exhibiting, in a kind of appalling climax, the errors of the Unionists,—“but according to the Evangelical Union, whatever the work of the Spirit means, the sinner's power exists as an entirely distinct agency”! (p. 55.) A formidable heresy! Be it so. Hurrah! Our reviewer has hit the nail for once. He represents, for once, without misrepresenting. And the man, we would add, is either a pantheist in thought, or he is utterly impotent in his capacity to think, who does not believe “that the sinner's power exists as an entirely distinct agency.” We are wearied of impotency! Do our readers wonder?

He reverts to the subject of the Spirit's work, and quotes John xiv. 16, 17, as a proof that his influence is not universal. The verses run thus,—

“And I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he

may abide with you for ever; Even the spirit of truth; whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him; but ye know him for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you."—John xiv. 16, 17.

But why did he not see that the Spirit might, by one kind of influence, act *on* a man, although he might not, in another element of his influence, be welcomed *into* a man. Surely there are steps and stages in the divine grace, and in man's relation to it. And if there be, then nothing can be simpler to conceive, than that a man "cannot" take the second or the twenty-second step, who has not taken the first. He who yields not to the Spirit as a Convincer, "cannot" receive him as a Comforter. And "the world" at large is composed of such persons.

Our critic refers to John xvi. 8,—one of the passages on which Unionists rely, to prove the Universality of the Spirit's influence.

"And when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment."

He says that as this passage "refers to the exercise, and not to the possession, of the Spirit's power," it cannot, whatever may be its meaning, "prove the doctrine of the Evangelical Union." p. 57. A specimen of most cogent argumentation! Did he not see that it is far more likely that the Spirit should universally exercise his influence, than that man should universally receive and possess it?

He says that "the adherents of the Evangelical Union feel themselves particularly puzzled to explain Paul's words in Rom. viii. 7, 'the carnal mind is enmity against God.'" p. 58. But he only dreams of our perplexity; or if not, he only wishes it. We feel none. The words mean, as every man who can read the simplest passage in Greek, might in a moment perceive,—“to be carnally minded is enmity against God,”—to give oneself up to the things to which the flesh solicits and tends, instead of giving oneself up to the things to which the Holy Spirit prompts and leads and draws, is enmity against God.

## § 2. HUMAN ABILITY AND INABILITY.

On the subject of human ability and inability, the doctrine of the Evangelical Union is the following:—

"Man as a sinner under condemnation, and hopelessly depraved, is wholly unable by his own resources to save himself. He cannot make atonement: for this he is entirely dependent on God the Son. Nor can he, after atonement has been made, bring himself, by his own unaided strength, under its saving influence: for this he is entirely dependent on God the Holy Ghost. In these respects, we are truly described as 'without strength.' (Rom. v. 6) But when the atonement has been made, and the Holy Spirit has not only embodied the record of it in the inspired gospel, but is himself present to persuade and guide the sinner to the faith of it, the sinner is able to surrender himself to this divine influence, and believe, and be saved. Surely if we can 'believe the witness of man,' the witness of God, being greater and infallible, may be more easily believed. (1 John v. 9.) Else on what ground is man responsible for his belief?"—*Doct. Dec.*, p. 14.

Our reviewer does not like, it would appear, to dispense with the idea of man's responsibility. He says,—

"Whatever differences may exist between Calvinists and the authors of the Declaration, it cannot be said that the former ascribe to human nature such an inability as destroys responsibility. It is evident from the whole dealings of the Almighty with man, whether in providence or grace, that he is ever treated as responsible, and any system calculated to weaken the sense of responsibility must be erroneous and dangerous."—p. 60.

We are glad to find something, in which we can agree with our critic. And this we find when he says that "any system calculated to weaken the sense of responsibility, must be erroneous and dangerous." But what then? We would simply request him to consider, what was the system that not only weakened but annihilated Robert Owen's sense of responsibility. It was the system of philosophical necessity. What was the system that not only weakened but annihilated Diderot's sense of responsibility? It was the system of philosophical necessity. What was the system that weakened and annihilated Spinoza's sense of responsibility? Philosophical necessity. What was the system that tremendously weakened, if it did not altogether annihilate, the sense of responsibility in Hobbes and Hobbists in general? It was philosophical necessity. What was the system that annihilated Shelley's sense of responsibility? "Necessity, thou mother of the world!" What was the system that swept out entirely, for a season, the idea of responsibility from the mind of France, and that still wipes it out from the minds of vast masses of English infidels in our great manufacturing districts? Necessity. The doctrine of necessity, then, as opposed to the doctrine of free-will, must, our author himself being judge, "be erroneous and dangerous." For that doctrine,—our critic's to wit,—really "ascribes to human nature such an inability as destroys responsibility."

It is manifest that it does. Our critic holds that, in their morals men are only free to do what they will; and that they are not free to will what they do. He maintains that they cannot will freely. He contends that they cannot freely choose whether they shall do good or do evil. They are only free to do outwardly the one kind of thing or the other, after they have been inwardly necessitated to choose the one in preference to the other. Whether this is not "such an inability as destroys responsibility," we leave to the judicial consideration of our critic himself.

He says, indeed, and says truly, that some Calvinistic writers make a "distinction between natural or physical inability and moral inability,"—and ascribe the latter only to men. And hence, as they think, the responsibility of man is sufficiently salved, guarded, and maintained. But the distinction, so far as the bearings of the subject on responsibility are concerned, is mere illusion. Moral inability, according to the speculatists referred to, is want of will, not want of power to do as one wills. And hence, as they argue, since man has power to do good, if he should actually will to do it, he is justly held responsible for not doing it; although it is true, they at the same time admit and contend, that, without the special influence of the Spirit, which is given to the elect alone, he has no power to put forth a single volition in the direction of spiritual good. Man, it seems, is unable to will to do good. And yet, in the midst of this utter inability, there is, it is alleged, a sufficient foundation for responsibility!

But our author continues,—

"It is a fixed article in the creed of all sound ethical writers, that whatever action of evil quality is done *voluntarily* by a reasonable being, is criminal."—p. 61.

Yes. This is admitted by all sound ethical writers, because they proceed, consciously or unconsciously, on the supposition that the voluntary outward act has its origin in inward free-will. It is "the will," says

Sir George Mackenzie, "that is the only fountain of wickedness." (*Crimes in general*, § 4.) And it is capable of being the only fountain of wickedness, just because it is free.

Our author continues;—

"Sure we are that all the ingenuity possessed by the Evangelical Union Conference, or by any body of men, however distinguished, never will prove that we occupy a false position when we say that a sinner may be reasonably called to any service, and punished for not rendering any service from which he refrains, from no other cause than disinclination produced by the love of wickedness."—pp. 61, 62.

But, most assuredly, a false position is occupied, when it is held that the sinner's disinclination is inevitable and necessitated.—We weary.

### § 3. REPENTANCE, FAITH, REGENERATION.

On the affiliated topics of "repentance" and "faith," the Doctrinal Declaration says,—

"In harmony with the usage of the original terms, we understand repentance to mean simply a change of mind, and faith to mean simply 'the belief of the truth.' When both terms are employed in connection with the gospel, they denote a change of mind that issues in the reception of the truth. When only one term is used, the other is implied. Each is to be distinguished from its consequents—such as peace, love, godly sorrow, or godly joy. As respects faith, there is but one term in the original for the two English words which are indiscriminately used to represent it, namely, faith and belief; and this denotes simply what is understood by belief in every-day life, the difference between saving and common faith consisting not in the manner of believing, but in the saving and sanctifying virtue of the gospel-truth believed."—p. 15.

On "regeneration," again, it speaks thus:—

"With all evangelical Christians, we understand this to denote a vital change of disposition and character; but considering the Jewish usage from which the term was borrowed, it may be a question whether the prior change of relationship implied ought not also to be included. If so, regeneration will embrace adoption, or the restored relation of sonship, and the initial stage of sanctification, or the restored filial disposition."

"The agencies concerned in regeneration are, First in the order both of nature and of time, and transcendentally so in the order of importance, that of the Holy Spirit; concurrent with which are, Secondly, that of the sinner himself, in the way of voluntarily attending to and taking in the regenerating truth of the gospel; and Thirdly, that of the preacher, or other Christian agent, by whom, through voice or pen, that gospel-truth has been exhibited and enforced. Hence regeneration, while the result of free sovereign grace, is at the same time the sinner's duty: who accordingly is expressly commanded to 'make himself a new heart, and a new spirit.' (Ezek. xviii. 31.)"

"Regeneration, then, is not to faith, but *through* faith—not *before* it, and *in order* to it, but *after* it, and *by means* of it. The notion that regeneration is an immediate, mysterious, and in fact miraculous renewal of the human faculties, before believing, and to enable them to believe, we reject as unscriptural, as subversive of free-agency and moral government, and as of pernicious tendency in the way of leading the sinner to postpone the immediate duty of believing the gospel, under the fatal and delusive expectation of a so-called 'day of power.'"—*Doct. Dec.*, pp. 19, 20.

Our critic does not like these views. He holds, on the contrary, that "the exercise both of saving faith and repentance is an act of a regenerated nature, that is, regeneration must precede both repentance and faith." (p. 63.) "Regeneration," he says again "is understood, according to the Calvinistic system, to imply a communication of divine

light and holiness to the mind of man, for the purpose of enabling him to repent and believe." (p. 63.) Such are our critic's views. And if we could now be astonished at any amount of incongruity, or of contradiction at once to the express letter of Scripture, and to his own express utterances of his belief, we should marvel in the extreme. For, *in the first place*, the Scripture determines, explicitly, that men are regenerated instrumentally, by or through, the Word of God. Men, says Peter, are "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by (or through) the Word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." (1 Pet. i. 23). They are "begotten," says James, "of the Father's own will, with the word of truth." (Chap. i. 18.) But they could not be thus begotten and born again by means of the instrumentality of the word of truth, if that word of truth were not received or believed. The instrument would otherwise have no point of contact with the soul, and could not possibly be put into operation within the soul. John, moreover, expressly says, in his Gospel, "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (Chap. i. 12, 13.) It is they who receive Christ, or believe in his name, who get the power or prerogative of becoming the sons of God;—by being, of course, "born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." It is not said that they must first be born into the divine family, and then, after having become sons or daughters of God, believe on Christ.

And, *in the second place*, when our critic thus reverses the words of the Holy Spirit,—putting the last first, and the first last, he reverses his own previously maintained opinions; and thus most strenuously does battle with himself,—battle to the very death. He commits controversial suicide: not consciously, of course, but really; and most mercifully too. In his eagerness to refute the doctrine of the Evangelical Union he maintains, as we have seen, that "regeneration implies a communication of divine light and holiness to the mind of man, for the purpose of enabling him to repent and believe." (p. 63.) He repeats and re-repeats the same idea. Faith, he says, "may be, strictly speaking, an exercise of the understanding; but he must have read the Bible to very little purpose who does not perceive that it is the exercise of an understanding in most intimate alliance with a sanctified heart." (p. 69.) He thus maintains stoutly that a regenerated heart, "a sanctified heart," "a communication of holiness to the mind," is necessary "for the purpose of enabling a man to believe." Such is, at this stage of things, the doctrine of our critic. And yet; when he was discussing the doctrine of "original sin," and oblivious of this subject of regeneration and faith, he said, "*as certainly as justification precedes sanctification*, according to the christian scheme; does condemnation, according to the covenant with Adam, precede in the order of nature, the moral blight vitiating our understandings and our hearts." (pp. 25, 26.) Justification, as he and every other Calvinist, and we too, admit, succeeds faith, and never precedes it. The apostle, again, and again, and again, and yet again, teaches us that a man is "justified *by faith*." The order of things, then, while our critic was discussing original sin, was the following:—*Firstly*, faith; *secondly*, justification; *thirdly*,



sanctification. But, at present, when he is discussing regeneration, and finding it necessary to institute an effective polemic against the views of the Union on that subject, the order of things must do duty, it seems, inversely, and as if with heels over head. For at this stage of the review, it would appear, it is necessary that there be, *firstly*, sanctification or holiness, and then *secondly*, faith, and *thirdly*, justification. It is really too hard on the order of things to turn it upside down in so unceremonious a manner. And then to be so positive, at each time, successively, when the ends are alternately uppermost, that the order specified is the only one that is possible! Admirable reasoner! Prodigy of consistency!

He proceeds to say,—“We have always been very suspicious of the reality of those alleged conversions, in which the abettors of Evangelical Union doctrine have been concerned, directly or indirectly.” (p. 63.) What wonder? It is the invariable attribute of littleness of soul to be large in everything that really needs no largeness of soul, such as ungenerous suspicion. To be unsuspected by minds of that description, is almost ground sufficient for suspecting that suspicion is deserved.

But he returns to doctrines. And, touching on repentance, he says,—

“Now, we would seriously ask the authors of the Declaration, and all accustomed to preach such doctrines, what authority they have for calling ‘godly sorrow’ a *consequent* of repentance?”—p. 64.

We beg to inform him, in answer to his question, that the repentance spoken of in the Declaration, is expressly defined to be that which “issues in the reception of the truth.” It is, in other words, the repentance which is spoken of, in such passages as Mark i. 15, “Repent ye, and believe the gospel.” And the reason why “godly sorrow” must be “a consequent” of this repentance is simply this, that godliness is holiness or sanctification, and holiness or sanctification succeeds justification; and consequently must succeed the faith which precedes justification. If, nevertheless, our critic will insist on contradicting himself, and controversially slaying himself a second time with his own hands, by holding that the godly sorrow of the soul must go before its godliness, we really cannot help it.

He quotes the 51st Psalm to prove that godly sorrow is a main ingredient in repentance. But we beg, *in the first place*, to remind him that the 51st Psalm is the experience of a penitent believer. We beg, *in the second place*, to inform him that we distinguish between penitence and repentance. We beg, *in the third place*, to state to him that the term repentance does not occur in the Psalm; and the question in dispute is a question about the meaning of a term. And, *in the fourth place*, we beg to assure him that we do most sincerely hold that there can be no penitence without sorrow, and no godly penitence without godly sorrow; and, if he will, there can be no evangelical repentance without sorrow, and a sorrow that will culminate in “godly sorrow.”

He touches on the subject of faith; and refers to the second chapter of the Epistle of James, to prove that there are different kinds of it, as

regards the nature of the act, as well as regards the nature of the object. We need not enter into argument on the subject, though nothing could be easier. As he quotes in another part of his Review, "the late very distinguished Dr. Wardlaw," who "departed from the strict doctrines of Calvinism" only, he says, on the subject of the extent of the atonement, we would quote a paragraph from his Exposition, recently published, of the Epistle of James. He says, in reference to the passage appealed to,—

"There is nothing in the passage of different kinds of faith. There is simply *faith*: and of this faith, the apostle affirms, that without works it is dead! In such a connection, I am at a loss to conceive what else he can mean, than its being in profession only; shown to have no reality by the absence of its only unequivocal indication."—p. 169.

#### § 4. RELATIONS OF PRAYER AND FAITH.

Our critic says, "Calvinists maintain, as the Bible teaches, that where there is no real faith, there can be no genuine prayer." (p. 78.) This is almost all, so far as the relations of prayer and faith are concerned, that Evangelical Unionists plead for. It is perhaps even a little more than all. We would by no means stifle the earnest aspiration of the inquiring unbeliever. But we do hold that the man who is able to pray to the Father, is also able, if he is really satisfied that the Bible is the Book of God, to believe on the Son. And we deprecate with all our energy the substitution of circuitous prayer to the Father in the place of direct faith in the Son, as the subjective way whereby the sinner is to enter into "peace with God." We commend to our readers' perusal the section of the Doctrinal Declaration on this subject.

#### § 5. PEACE WITH GOD.

"We had always," says our critic, "understood that the adherents of the Evangelical Union expressed the blessing immediately following pardon, by a much stronger phrase than 'peace with God.'" (p. 82.) Then he had always misunderstood the teaching of those who are the proper representatives of the Union. Of course, however, neither on this subject, nor on the subject of prayer, and perhaps scarcely on any of the subjects, which constitute the details of theology, do Unionists hold anything like the notions of the reviewer.

#### § 6. ELECTION AND REPROBATION.

The views of the Evangelical Union on election and reprobation, are substantially those of Melancthon, in his maturity; and of the Fathers of the first three centuries. We believe, with the Fathers and the illustrious German reformer, that election, "like justification," is conditioned on faith; and that the demeritorious cause of reprobation is man's own sin. We also believe that both election and reprobation are, strictly speaking, events that occur in time, although of course they run up, as regards the element of purpose, into eternity.

Our reviewer holds that the purpose of election was strictly unconditional. But he surrenders the unconditionality of the decree of repro-

bation. And he maintains, moreover, "after a careful perusal of nearly all the theology that Calvin ever published," that the Genevan reformer took the same view of the subject, and "applied to the doctrine of reprobation the same exercise of free will, on the part of the sinner, as regulates the decisions of the Evangelical Union regarding the decree of election." (p. 94.) This will be news to the other Calvinists of the world! And indeed it is a new thing, at last, under the sun! But, alas, like some other new-fangled things, although it is new, or rather, just because it is new, it is not true! It is merely one invention more, added to the long, long list that has already emanated from the inventive genius of our critic! He has misunderstood the controversy that has been waged among Calvinists, as to the position of Calvin in relation to the supra- and sub-lapsarian question. And because some have maintained that Calvin was sublapsarian, he has leaped to the conclusion that the reformer held that reprobation is conditioned on the sinner's "exercise of free-will"! He has simply leaped into an abyss of historical nonentity. And he is consequently lost. And what marvel? For why should he have meddled with subjects that he knows nothing about? Every other theologian that knows anything of Calvin's *Institutes*, *Commentaries*, and other writings, knows that it would be utterly subversive of Calvin's whole theory to suppose that he could represent reprobation as conditioned on the sinner's "exercise of free-will"; and he knows, moreover, that, as a matter of fact, Calvin everywhere opposed that theory. Witness, for example, what he says in his *Institutes* :—

"Turn now to the reprobate, to whom the apostle simultaneously refers (in Rom. ix. 13.) For as Jacob, while meriting nothing by good works, is assumed into favour; so Esau, while as yet undefiled by iniquity, is held in hatred. If we take works, in either case, into account, we do injustice to the apostle, as if he did not see that which is obvious to us. But it is perfectly evident that he did not see it; for he expressly urges this, that, while as yet they had done nothing of good or evil, the one was elected, the other rejected; in order that he might prove that the ground of the divine predestination is not in works."—"Therefore if we cannot assign any reason why he honours his own with mercy, except that it so pleases him; neither have we any other reason, but his own will, why he reprobates others. For when God is said either to harden or to compassionate, whom he will, we are thereby admonished not to look for any cause thereof beyond his will."—(*Lib. iii. 22, 11.*)

"Those whom God passes by, he reprobates, and that for no other cause except that he wills to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his children."—(*Ditto, iii. 23. 1.*)

Witness also what he says in his *Commentaries* :

"Although the corruption which is diffused through the whole human race is of itself, and that too before it emerges into actual sin, sufficient for condemnation, so that it follows that Esau was deservedly rejected because he was by nature a child of wrath; nevertheless, lest the least doubt should remain, as if his condition was made worse by reason of any fault or vice, it was expedient for the apostle to exclude from view sins as well as virtues. It is true, indeed, that the proximate cause of reprobation is because we were all cursed in Adam: nevertheless, that we may learn to acquiesce in the bare and simple will of God, Paul withdraws us meanwhile from the view of this, until he has established that God has a sufficient and good cause of electing and reprobating in his own will." (*Rom. ix. 13.*)

"When God elects some, and reprobates others, the cause is not to be sought anywhere else than in his own purpose."—*Ditto. v. 14.*

It is, then, not only false, but ridiculously false, in the matter of historical theology, to assert that Calvin "applied to the doctrine of

reprobation the same exercise of free will, on the part of the sinner, as regulates the decisions of the Evangelical Union regarding the decree of election." Calvin admitted two causes; the ultimate, the will of God; the proximate, the fall of Adam. But he expressly excludes "the exercise of the sinner's free-will." If our critic has read, as he alleges, the greater part of Calvin's writings, he has either read them with a bandage on his eyes, or he shows that it is one thing to read, and another thing altogether to understand what one reads.

And even though it should have been the case that Calvin suspends reprobation, subter-sublapsarianly, on the acts of the sinner's will, our critic would be a heretic, by the laws of the church to which he belongs, if he were to hold the same opinion. And by these laws he is a heretic. In holding that reprobation is not unconditional, he withdraws it "from the unsearchable counsel of God's own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, and passes the non-elect by for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures;" and he thus renounces the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, which he has sworn to maintain inviolate and intact. He renounces, moreover, every vestige of consistency as a thinker.

He holds, however, by the unconditionality of election, and supposes that this unconditionality is emphatically taught in Rom. viii. 28-30. He does not notice the word "foreknow," which precedes the word "predestinate," and which brings into view a foreseen condition of the predestination referred to. (See *Repository*, 1st Series, vol i. p. 241.)

He says that "it is not possible to explain the 9th chapter of Romans in consistency with the creed of the Evangelical Union." p. 87. We invite him to try his hand at answering our *Exposition of the Ninth Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans*.

His sheet-anchor, however, is Eph. i. 4, "According as he hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world," which is explained in the Doctrinal Declaration as meaning "according as he hath purposed to choose us in Christ, before the foundation of the world." He does not seem to know that the highest Calvinistic authorities take precisely the same view of the expression, as for example Beza;—(elegit, id est eligere proposuit.)

#### CONCLUSION.

We dismiss our critic's review,—sincerely sorry that it should have to carry on its broken and shattered back, such an overwhelming load of philosophical, logical, historical, theological, and exegetical blunders. If the author had only manifested, in the matter of the animating spirit that pervades his review, a little less of cool supercilious assumption, we can assure him that it would have been with a more sparing hand that we should have piled the toppling and unsightly burden, under which his book will now have to stagger along.

The day is surely on the wing when the land of our nativity, noble old Scotland, will be blessed with a spirit of more expansive theological liberality and unbogoted inquiry. The members of the Evangelical

Union have been ruthlessly treated for trying to do good in ways that are approved of by many of the most enlightened in England. And, while ruthlessly persecuted, they may, at times, have been driven into immature deliverances on some odds and ends of doctrines. But they are now more developed in their views. And they cannot repress the hope that, in spite of all the defamation to which they are subjected, on the part of the smaller spirits around them, they may be used by the Great and Good Spirit of God to effect some change upon the repellent necessarianism and unconditionalism of the theology of their country.

It has hitherto, however, been their aim, not so much to construct a theology, as to win souls. And their hearts have been sustained by witnessing the mighty power of the God of the Gospel, working victoriously in connection with the belief of the glad tidings of universal propitiation. A respectable physician in the neighbourhood of our reviewer has assured us that the only triumphant decease which has ever yet come under his professional cognizance, was that of a member of an Evangelical Union church. Such scenes are not rare in the experience of Evangelical Union ministers. And it is the recurrence of them which constitutes one of the elements of the encouragement which upholds them. It must be so still. By the grace of the Infinite Father, it will continue to be the chief aim of all true Evangelical Unionists, to win souls to Christ, and thus to win men to goodness and to bliss. It is, we may add, our especial joy, in prosecuting this, our first and our dearest mission, to know that Christ fulfils his own promise, "lo, I am *with you* alway." Ever may all, who live and labour for Christ, responsively say to their gracious Lord, in the sublime language of the Psalmist of old, "we are continually *with thee*." He that is ever with Christ, "joined to the Lord," indissolubly linked to the Saviour, is indissolubly linked at once to bliss and to goodness and to glory.

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THE GOSPEL, WHAT IS IT?

It must be of the greatest moment to know precisely what "the gospel" is. Ministers of churches are often designated "ministers of the gospel." It is universally believed that it is their business and duty to "preach the gospel." In the official position which they occupy, they are set at once for the proclamation, and for the defence, of the gospel.

From the fact that ministers of churches are called "ministers of the gospel," we may conclude that the members of churches stand in a peculiar relation to "the gospel." If they be what they ought to be, they will be "believers of the gospel." They will have unfeignedly "received the gospel." They will be "obeying the gospel." They will be living under the influence of the gospel, getting peace out of it, and joy unspeakable, and the hope of heavenly glory, and holiness too.

"Beautiful are the feet" of those who truly "preach the gospel," and beautiful, doubtless, are the souls of those who truly and abidingly "believe the gospel." For the *Gospel* is *God's spell*. It is God's story,—God's good story,—the good and glorious story which the great kind Father of the prodigal sons and daughters of men has to tell them, that he may win them back from their wayward ways, and from the woes into which their wayward ways have led them and are still leading them.

"The gospel," thus, is not a story of man's inventing. It is not a theory of man's imagination. It is not an ingenious human speculation. It originated in the mind of God. It is a sublime communication to us of the thoughts of God.

And being good news from God, the gospel is true news. It is no cunningly devised fiction or fable. It is "the word of the truth of the gospel." It is truth. It is altogether truth. It is more. It is "the truth." It is the all-important truth for

men, as sinners. The gospel is true news from God regarding the way by which sinners may be saved,—all sinners without distinction or exception. The gospel is “good news to every creature,”—good news about the grace, or kindness, and mercy, of God. It is “the gospel of the grace of God.” Hence, it is good news regarding Christ as the Saviour. It is “the gospel of Christ,”—“the glorious gospel of Christ.” By it hath Christ “brought life and immortality to light.” And hence it is “the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth,” whether he be Jew or Gentile, free or bond, white or black, high or low, learned or illiterate. And as the way of salvation is one and the same in all ages and dispensations, the gospel is like Christ, “the same yesterday, to day, and forever.” It is the “everlasting gospel.” And “if any man or angel preach any other gospel,” than the one which God has revealed, “let him,” says the loving and tender-hearted Apostle Paul, “be accursed.”

It must, then, be a matter of transcendent moment to know precisely what “the gospel” is. Howsoever much we may be in ignorance in other subjects, howsoever far we may be in error regarding other truths, it is of vital moment that we be chargeable neither with error nor with ignorance as regards this one thing needful for the salvation and sanctification of the immortal soul. It is well, then, that on this subject we should not rest contented with vague and indefinite and dream-like notions, or with mere guesses and suppositions. It is well that we do not receive on mere trust the ideas of our fellow-men in such a momentous matter. But, taking in our hand the book of God himself, we should be able to point to his own inspired words, and to say,—“There God tells us what the gospel is. And “though all the doctors and philosophers and preachers in the “universe should come and say to us ‘that is not the true “gospel,’ it would matter nothing to us. We should believe it still, “and believe it with a faith as firm and as unwavering as the “most fixed and fast of the everlasting hills. Just as the wisdom “of one man outweighs the wisdom of ten thousand ants and flies, “so the word of God is more to be depended on than the word of “tens of thousands of our fellow-men.”

What then is it which is “the gospel”? How has God defined it? Let us see. “Brethren,” says a man who was inspired by God, “I declare unto you **THE GOSPEL**, which I preached “unto you; which also ye received; and wherein ye stand; by “which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached “unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. For I delivered “unto you first of all, that which I also received, how that Christ

“died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures.”—1 Cor. xv. 1-4.

Such is the inspired definition of “the gospel.” And that we may be sure that the apostle is not using the term vaguely or loosely or inexactly, see with what solemn circumstantiality and pomp he ushers in his definition. “Brethren,” says he, “I declare unto you the gospel.” The words are loving. But they have an unwonted dignity and stateliness about them. And there is also something of the nature of rebuke in them. It is as if he said to them, “Brethren, I should not need to go back in my instructions to the A B C, and mere elements of christianity. I should not need at this time of day to begin with you at the beginning. And yet I hear that there are some among you who are broaching notions about the resurrection—which, if intelligently carried out, would infallibly lead to the utter subversion and indeed annihilation of the gospel. Brethren, how can it be that any among you can give one moment’s heed to these notions? Whatsoever is utterly at variance with *the gospel*, must be untrue. But since it seems to be needed, —*Brethren, I declare unto you the gospel.*”

And this is still what is needed in this our time and in this our country. It is “the gospel” that is needed. And there is need of an inspired declaration of what it is. For there are millions who are in the mist on the subject. And when the question is asked, What is the gospel? there is either lamentable silence, or lamentable uncertainty, or still more lamentable misconception and positive error.

But the apostle is not contented with the simple though stately preface, “I declare unto you the gospel.” He adds the important words, “which I preached unto you.” It is as if he said:—“There is no gospel but one. And what I preached unto you before, is all that I have to declare unto you now. The gospel is unalterable, and cannot be moulded to suit the fine-spun theories of speculative men. You may alter. I may alter. The world may alter. The stars may lapse, and the sun may burn out, But the gospel is unalterable. And therefore what I preached to you before is exactly that which I now declare unto you as “the gospel.” Such seems to be the import of the apostle’s statement. And when we remember that this same apostle elsewhere says, as we have remarked,—“though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed;” and when we also bear in mind, that, as an inspired preacher of the gospel, he



was warranted in making this tremendously solemn declaration; surely, we should be most anxious to know precisely, to receive unhesitatingly, and to maintain tenaciously, what he declares to be "the gospel."

But the apostle is not contented simply to say to his Corinthians, "Brethren, I declare unto you the gospel, which I preached unto you." He adds something farther in the form of preface, which gives it additional power and importance;—"which also ye have received," or rather, "which also ye received." He thus recalls the thoughts of the Corinthian brethren to the time of their first-love. It was a glad time with them. It was a sunny spot in their existence. It was the turning point of their inward history. Before they received the gospel, they were groping in darkness after a resting place, and could find none. But when they received the gospel, they entered calmly and sublimely into rest. Before they received it, they could not get abiding happiness, real bliss. They tried to get it by innumerable methods. Some tried eating. It did not do. Some tried drinking. It did not do. Some tried money making. It did not do. Some tried painting. It would not do. Some tried poetry. It would not do. Some tried traveling. It would not do. Some tried music. No. It would not do. Some tried obscenity. Ah, no. It could not, would not, and did not do. Some tried study and philosophy. But it was in vain. They would not do. Whatever they tried failed. Every expedient proved to be a broken reed. Every fire which they attempted to kindle, turned out to be but a smoking flax. Until they received "the gospel," they were neither happy nor holy. It was moral night-time with them; and though they had often had the apparent prospect and promise of a dawn, yet the sun never rose. But, when they "received the gospel," all things became new to them: for they themselves became renewed in the midst of all things. They got peace. They got joy. They got hope. They got holiness. As regards their inner man, they were in an entirely new world. Now that which thus revolutionized them must be good. It must be from God. And no notion that is at variance with it can either be beneficial or divine. Hence the wisdom of the apostle's appeal to the fact that the gospel, which he was about once more to declare to them, was the identical gospel which they received at that epoch in their history which was the bright turning-point of their souls' condition. What, then, is this gospel?

We cannot, even yet, leap into a face-to-face contemplation and realization of it. For the apostle adds in his preface, "and wherein ye stand." The gospel which he was about to declare to

them, was not merely the gospel which they had formerly received. It was the gospel in which they still stood. It was the gospel on which they had been arrested, by which they had been satisfied, to which they were still clinging, and away from which they could find no standing room for their guilty souls in all the world. It was a gospel which was a rock of ages to their shipwrecked spirits, and all was sea besides.—Such was the gospel which the apostle was about to declare. And such certainly is the very gospel which all sinners are still requiring—a gospel which will prove, through life, through death, and on entering eternity, and at the judgment-seat, a secure stand-place for the immortal soul. What, then, is this gospel ? What says the apostle ?

“Brethren, I declare unto you the gospel, which I preached unto you, which also ye received, and wherein ye stand: *by which also ye are saved.*” There is thus more preface still. But it sounds sweetly. Let us hear it out. “By which also ye are saved, *if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye believed in vain.*” Ah! there is something of hesitancy too,—something which is fitted, till explained, to throw doubt into the delightful asseveration,—“by which also ye are saved.” The gospel, it seems, which the apostle was about to declare to his Corinthians, and which he had long ago preached to them, which they had received, and in which they were still standing, was the means by which they were, at the very time he was writing to them, in a state of salvation—in a state in which their souls were safe for eternity. And yet he says—“*if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you.*” There is thus a condition on which the continuous salvation or safety of the soul depends. There is an “if” to be attended to. “Ye are saved by the gospel,” says the apostle, “*if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you.*” It is as if he had said, “It is not enough that you once believed: you must continue believing. It is not enough that you once had the gospel in your mind. You must keep it in memory. It is not enough that ye once turned your thoughts to the glorious object exhibited in the good news from heaven. You must continue to keep the same object, and to keep it for ever, in your thoughts. The faith of the day of your conversion sufficed for the day of your conversion; but it will not suffice for to-day. The faith of yesterday sufficed for yesterday; but it will not suffice for to-day. The faith of to-day suffices for to-day; but it will not suffice for to-morrow. And the faith of to-morrow will not suffice for the day following. *The life must be a life of faith.* And from day to day, from month to month, from year to year, ye who have believed the gospel will be in a state of salvation, and you will be safe, if from day to day, and

“from month to month, and from year to year, you keep in “memory that which has been divinely preached unto you.”

“Unless,” adds the apostle, “ye believed in vain.” What mean the words? Is it possible, after all, to receive the gospel, and to keep it in mind and memory, and have the life a life of faith in it, and yet “believe it in vain”? Is this possible? No. It is an absolute impossibility. “He that believeth *hath everlasting life.*” “He that believeth shall be saved.” The Lord God Almighty gives his own word as security.

Why then does the apostle say “unless ye believed in vain”? He said it with the view of for ever extinguishing the error which had been preached among his Corinthians, and which the 15th chapter is intended to expose. The error was,—that there is no resurrection of the dead. The apostle says in the 12th and following verses,—

“Now, if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ, whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised: and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins.”

But there is a resurrection. Christ is risen. And therefore the apostle’s preaching was not vain, and the Corinthians’ believing was not in vain. No. *It is impossible to believe in Christ in vain.* And all therefore who have received the gospel, which Paul preached and here declares, and stand in it, are saved by it, if they keep it in memory. *They cannot believe it in vain.*

What then, O what is this gospel?—this only gospel?—this soul-saving gospel?—this gospel which cannot be believed in vain? Let us hear it from the lips of the inspired man;—“FOR I DELIVERED UNTO YOU FIRST OF ALL THAT WHICH I ALSO RECEIVED, HOW THAT CHRIST DIED FOR OUR SINS ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES; AND THAT HE WAS BURIED, AND THAT HE ROSE AGAIN THE THIRD DAY ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES.” This is “the gospel” briefly and precisely defined, the one and only gospel by which souls are saved; and all that is at variance with it is false to the core. When the apostle went to Corinth, and opened up his message to the inhabitants of that luxurious and sinful city, he put first and foremost in what he delivered to them “the gospel,” and it was this,—“Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and he was buried, and he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures.” Such was the proclamation which he made

in heathen Corinth to the heathen Corinthians. "First of all," he delivered unto them this,—“Christ died for *our* sins, ye Corinthians, for mine and yours, yours and mine; Christ died for *our* sins; not for mine only, but for yours also; not for yours only, but for mine also: Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and he was buried, and he rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures. Aye, he rose again. Remember that. He was raised from the dead by the power of the Great Father. And now he liveth, and ever liveth, and sitteth at the right hand of the Majesty on high, to make intercession for all who come unto God by Him. He rose again:—and his resurrection was predicted in the Scriptures. For David said of him, ‘Thou wilt not suffer thine Holy One to see corruption.’ And it was according to the Scriptures too that he died. Witness the testimony of the 22nd Psalm. But it was not, O ye Corinthians, under the burden of his own sins: it was *for our sins* that he died, according to the Scriptures. Witness the testimony of the 53rd chapter of Isaiah,—‘he was wounded for *our* transgressions, he was bruised for *our* iniquities; the chastisement of *our* peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed.’ ‘All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of *us all*.’ Christ died then for our sins, and was buried, and rose again for our salvation. The work which he finished when he died, and of which the Father signified his acceptance, when, by his mighty power, he raised up the successful worker,—this work is an atonement *for our sins*. In it God is well pleased, and ready to forgive the very chief of sinners. O ye Corinthians, believe and live.” Such we may conceive to have been the purport of the apostle’s preaching in Corinth. And such must be the purport of preaching, wherever, and by whomsoever, the gospel,—the real, the true, the only, the glorious, the everlasting gospel,—is proclaimed.

We see then what the gospel is. It is not the Bible. It is in the Bible. It is not religion. It is the ground of religion to those who have been irreligious. It is not theology. But it is the heart of theology, when theology is christianized. It is not the promises. It is that in which the promises are all “yea and amen.” It is not the free and universal call to believe. It is the thing to be believed.

It is not enough, therefore, for preaching the gospel, that a man speak of something or other within the boards of the Bible. It is not enough that he speak of something that is religious. It is not enough that he speak of something theological. It is not enough that he speak of peace, and joy, and hope, and heavenly glory, and holiness. None of these things is “the gospel,” though

all of them are grandly connected with it. It is not enough that he proclaim that all are free to believe and be saved. That is the gospel-call, not "the gospel." It is not enough that he echo and re-echo the divine proclamation—"Ho every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money, come ye, buy, and eat; yea, buy wine and milk without money and without price." For that too is not "the gospel," but the gospel-call. Nothing, nothing, is "the gospel," that does not include this,—  
**"CHRIST DIED FOR OUR SINS ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES, AND WAS BURIED, AND ROSE AGAIN THE THIRD DAY ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES."** Yes, "Christ died for our sins." So must every true and faithful preacher speak. "Our sins,"—"yours and mine, my hearers, whatsoever you may hitherto have been, whatsoever you still are, whatsoever you may continue to be."

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#### THE WILLING OF MAN AND THE WORKING OF GOD.

To many minds there seems to be an inconsistency between the freedom of man's will and the sovereignty of God. But this arises from regarding the one or the other as absolute, and as therefore exclusive of the other. The truth is, that human freedom and divine sovereignty are correlative parts of one whole. They are the constituents of moral government, in which there must be a sphere for voluntary action on the part of man, even while under the sovereign laws, arrangements, and procedure of God. This correlative harmony between the free action of man and the sovereign working of God is remarkably expressed by Jesus when he says, "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will and it shall be done unto you." In these words we have the fact broadly stated, that the will of man, regarding certain things, becomes a rule to God's operations. The words of Christ seem to us to contain a law, rule, or principle of God's procedure towards man. It may be thus stated: Whatever man wills, or chooses, in respect to moral character and final destiny, it shall be done unto him by God. It is God's sovereign determination to treat man as regards character and destiny according to man's own will or choice. The sovereign arrangement of God is, that his treatment of man shall be conditioned, and in its nature be determined, by man's choice. In proof of this let us consider the following things:—

I. *God has been sovereignly pleased to create man with the power of will,—a power to choose his own course of life. A will free to*

choose or to refuse, a will exempt from necessitation, is an indestructible constituent of man's nature. This is a fact of which every sane man is conscious. It cannot be successfully disputed that man has a will strictly his own, and that he exercises it in choosing his course of life. We know this as one of the most certain things in our daily experience. Every day we choose some things and refuse others; we will to do, or not to do, certain actions. No one could convince us of the contrary, except by first proving that our conscious experience is a lie, and our very souls themselves constituted by God to deceive us.

Not only do we choose and refuse, resolve and act; but, in so doing, we know, and are conscious, that these are our own proper acts, that they spring out of our self-activity, and that we are their sole authors and proper causes. In choosing, we are conscious of having the power of refusing; and in refusing, we are conscious of having the power of choosing. As a direct consequence, and as a fact inseparable from this consciousness of a free self-activity, we feel, and cannot but feel, responsible for our choices. If we choose as we ought, and do what is right, we feel delight and self-approbation; but if we choose what is wrong, and do what we ought not, we feel self-condemned. The foundation on which the whole of this experience rests is our conscious freedom of will, in virtue of which we are the proper causes of our own choices, and for all that we do are held responsible by ourselves, our fellow-men, and our Creator. This freedom of will is part of our divinely given nature, and cannot be taken from us except by the ruin of our moral constitution, the destruction of our moral agency, and the annihilation of our responsibility.

II. *It would be inconsistent were God to treat men in a way that is not in harmony with the nature which he has sovereignly conferred upon them.* Having sovereignly chosen to constitute men free agents, God cannot wisely rule over them, or treat them, inconsistently with their free agency. His sovereign arrangements concerning the governmental treatment to which they should be subjected, must be in perfect harmony with their moral nature. The reasons why God in sovereignty gave them a free moral nature, must be unchangeably and eternally valid as reasons why that nature should be respected and held inviolable. For to create a being with certain attributes, and then to treat it so as to crush its original nature, would be for God to contradict himself, and to introduce anarchy into his works by setting one part in hostility to another. Moreover, to treat, govern, or rule any creature contrary to its original nature, would really be tantamount to its annihilation. Why should the all-wise, all-powerful Creator call any creature into existence, the attributes of whose

nature require to be contradicted by any law or arrangement or course of conduct on the part of the Creator? Assuredly the wisest thing, in such a case, would have been never to create at all, and thus to prevent the anomaly of first creating and then fighting against and crushing the thing created. But such a self-stultification can never be found in the works of Him who is perfect, and whose conduct, from first to last, is the sublime evolution of the harmonies of his infinite perfection. We, therefore, conclude that God, in his treatment of man, will consistently carry out the principle of free-agency as originally conferred. In the presence of the fact of conscious freedom, and of conscious responsibility in every man's breast, the theories of universal fore-ordination, unconditional predestination of some to glory and some to woe, and irresistible, will-necessitating, influence, fall to the ground. For all of these theories are direct and absolute contradictions to the indestructible consciousness of freedom of will in every soul.

III. *In treating man according to his free nature as sovereignly bestowed, God carries out man's will or choice in things pertaining to character and destiny.* What man wills or chooses respecting character and destiny,—that God does. We take this to be a great law in the moral government of God. It is a law based upon the moral nature of man, and apart from which man's nature as a free agent would be an impertinent intrusion in the universe.

It must be kept in mind, however, that it is only in things moral that the law holds good. What we will, or choose, concerning our health, our life, our worldly circumstances, may or may not be done for us by God. We may will or choose to have health, and yet suffer from disease; or to possess long life, and yet die young; or to be rich, and yet continue poor. God may treat us quite contrary to what we will, or choose, in such matters as these, for they are outside the region of morals. In all such cases, it is our duty meekly to accept God's will in the allotments of his providence. But in the things of moral character and destiny, God ever works out for us what we will or choose.

This is solemnly true in the case of the unconverted, or godless, or Christless. In holding them under the power of evil habits, and their own depravity, in leaving them under condemnation, in excluding them from heaven, and at last consigning them to the place of woe;—in all these dark experiences, and in that final doom, God deals with them in strict accordance with their own will and choice. He does what he does, because they choose what they choose, and by their choice require him, as Moral Governor, to act as he does. Some one may say, indeed, "I do not see how that can be; no man wills or chooses to be sent into the

place of woe." That is quite true so far as final woe is concerned, considered as an object of direct choice. But, then, we must remember that unconverted men will or choose to live in sin, to live without God, and without Christ. Sin in one form or another is what they choose; and in choosing sin, they get its consequences. Every unsaved man chooses as his supreme good something else than God and Christ, and as he chooses, God treats him, and works out his choice in its moral and spiritual results both as to character and destiny. The man does not choose to read his Bible, or to attend the house of God, or to turn from his evil ways; and God deals with him according to his choice. God does not give him the full knowledge of the truth, or the blissful influences of public worship, or the blessing which rests on him who turns from the evil of his way. God leaves him blighted and woe-stricken in his soul. God gives him to eat of the fruit of his own ways. The man sows to the flesh, and of the flesh God causes him to reap corruption. The man chooses, but God carries out his choices into their legitimate, intellectual, emotional, and physical results, of habit, character, and destiny. The drunkard chooses to drink the intoxicating cup; and since that is his will, he gets all the intoxication,—the exhilaration, as well as the subsequent horrors of his chosen course. The liar chooses to utter falsehood, the swearer to blaspheme, the licentious to be unchaste, and the murderer to slay his victim; and in each of these cases God connects the proper sequents with the respective choices, and by his divine agency carries out the choice to its natural results. It is theirs to choose, but it is God's to carry out their choice in the darkening of the intellect, the hardening of the heart, the searing of the conscience, the formation of habits, the general fixing of character, and the assigning of their final destiny. In all these respects, those who choose evil shall find that whatever they choose, God shall carry it out into its legitimate consequences. As they choose the pleasures of sin, without God and without Christ, God will give them all that properly belongs to sin now and forever.

The principle that God acts according to what man chooses, is delightfully true in the case of the converted,—the saved by faith in Christ Jesus. Whenever a man wills or chooses to turn from his evil ways, and come to God for pardon and salvation through the merits of Christ, that moment God does what the man desires,—forgives and accepts him through Christ. For thus it is written, "Let the wicked forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him, and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon." As soon as a man wills or chooses to be saved by faith alone in the precious blood of Christ, God does it. For it is said, "He



that believeth in the Son hath everlasting life." As soon as a man chooses to become the child of God by faith in Jesus, God at once does what he wills, and adopts him into the family of God; even as we are told, "He came unto his own, but his own received him not; but to as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." When a man wills or chooses to have grace to fit him for daily duty and trial, God gives it; for thus saith God, "My grace is sufficient for thee, I will perfect my strength in thy weakness." The gracious attitude of God in Christ towards all who choose to come to him in faith is that of one saying, "What will ye that I should do unto you?"—"Ask what ye will and it shall be done unto you." Thus it is manifest that God does, as regards character and final destiny, what the converted will or choose. He takes up and carries out their choice in washing them from all sin in the blood of the Lamb, in sanctifying them by the Holy Spirit through the truth, in enlightening the understanding, quickening the sensibilities and conscience to all that is pure and right, making them "meet for the inheritance of the saints in light."

We have now said enough in illustration of the principle that God does what man wills or chooses in respect to moral character and final destiny. To that melancholy multitude on his left hand, the righteous Judge shall be able in truth to say, "I have done unto you the very thing which you chose. Ye willed and chose to live in sin, without God and without Christ. Now you have your choice,—Depart from me, ye workers of iniquity, to the abode of sin and its eternal consequences." This will be the keenest pang of the lost. They shall know and feel for ever that they are just getting their choice sternly and righteously carried out by the righteous Judge. Likewise those who stand on the right hand of the Judge, justified and accepted through Christ, shall rejoice that God has done unto them according as they chose. As lost undeserving sinners, they chose to be justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, and they shall find that God has done it in love and mercy.

V. *Prayer is, with peculiar fitness, enjoined by God, as a condition of his bestowment of certain blessings.* Prayer is a special form of choice. It is our willing and choosing that God should do something for us and our fellow-men. It is, in fact, our going to him and saying, "Father, I will that thou shouldst do this for me, and that for others." In this attitude, it becomes a necessity of moral government that God should do something. There is choice or will on the part of the subjects of moral government. And God must either exclude all such choices as are embodied

in prayer, as conditions of his procedure, or he must recognise them. That he must recognise them in some way, is proved by our foregoing observations. In recognising them, he must either refuse them or accept them, fulfil them or refuse to fulfil them. That he must fulfil them is evident, because when our willings or choices in prayer are coincident with his will, then all that is in God himself, as well as all that constitutes our will or choice, require that it should be done unto us even as we will. Hence the remarkable words of Christ, "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." In such a case, under the guidance of his word, they will or choose things consistent with God's will, and since God always does, in things moral, what men really will, let them ask what they will, and it shall be done unto them. Thus prayer is only the special or particular application of the great law of moral government—that God does as man chooses. It follows, that the ordinance of prayer, by which the bestowment of certain blessings is conditioned on our choosing, is a necessity in the system of moral government; for without it there would have been no express provision for dealing with a large and important class of the choices of moral agents. If then we are asked, why God has conditioned the bestowment of certain blessings on prayer, we answer, that the necessities of moral government require it.

VI. *God having, for good reasons, sovereignly determined to constitute man a moral agent, and, consequently, to treat him in character and destiny according to his own choice, it is necessary, antecedently to the choice being made, to present the objects, to furnish the reasons, motives, and inducements, requisite to the right choice being made.* Prior to choice, God must work in man to will and to do what is right, and not to do what is wrong. The will of man, considered in itself, is simply the faculty of free choice. In order to its actual exercise in things moral, it requires the following conditions:—(1) the presentation of objects to be chosen; (2) sufficient reasons to the intelligence, and adequate inducements to the heart, why the objects should be chosen; (3) the objects of choice, with their reasons and inducements, must present to conscience the moral quality of right or wrong. Apart from these conditions, a choice possessing a moral character is impossible. It belongs to God, as the Creator and Moral Governor of man, to supply these antecedent conditions of choice, and then it belongs to man to make the choice, and then, again, it belongs to God to carry out, in character and destiny, the choice which has been made.

Accordingly we find that in the works of nature, providence,

the Bible, the personal mission of Christ, the ministrations of the Church, and the personal work of the Holy Spirit, God has supplied, and is still furnishing, the conditions of right choice to man. He has "poured out his Spirit upon all flesh," and has sent the Spirit to "convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." That divine agent is ever working through the constitutional laws of thought and feeling and conscience, in order that all men may choose what is right, and refuse what is wrong. When the choice is made, God must carry it out. But before it is made, God is at work to secure, as far as possible, that it shall be a right one. Should the man, however, choose what is wrong, for the time being, God still works upon him and within him that he may repent, and thus reverse his choices. This is conversion in the case of the sinner, and restoration to the paths of holiness in the case of the erring saint. Hence when the final choice of any man is wrong, and he has that choice carried out in a destiny of eternal woe, it shall be found that the fatal choice of death was made in the presence of life, presented by God through the merits of Christ. On the other hand, when the final choice is right and is carried out in a destiny of eternal glory, it shall be found that the man chose the right objects under the influence of those soul-swaying reasons and inducements which God caused to gather round and possess his intelligence, heart, and conscience. For this he will praise God for ever. For it was God who wrought in him to will and to do what was right in believing on, in loving, and in serving, the Lord Jesus Christ.

W. T.—K.

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#### OUR ATTITUDE, WHAT SHOULD IT BE?

OUR attitude should be that of earnest and humble labourers in the field of christian beneficence.

(1.) *We are constrained, indeed, to be theological.* And we must never forget our theology. It supplies us with the principles that stimulate and guide our practical activities. It furnishes us with the thoughts, which are the grand animating motives to all "labours of love." And in so far as our theology is the reflection of God's own theology, it unites us, in thought, with God. It enables us to think the thoughts of God on some of the greatest of realities. And, as thought is the true fountain of satisfactory emotion, and of permanently blissful social effort, it qualifies us

for being sharers in the divine love and joy, and for being co-workers in the great divine enterprise of reclaiming a runaway world. We must not, then, descend from our platform of theology.

(2.) Neither would we be warranted to *surrender ourselves to inaction in matters of theological controversy*. That which we conceive to be, in its main features at least, the reflection of God's own theology, happens to come into collision with certain theological tenets, which were part and parcel of the thinkings of the illustrious Reformer, John Calvin, and which were stereotyped by a most respectable body of theologians, the Westminster Assembly of Divines. These stereotyped theological tenets are accepted, in all their amplitude and minute details, by the great religious denominations of Scotland, as the Confession of their faith, and the bond of their ecclesiastical communion and integrity. And hence there is an exceedingly vehement opposition to our evangelical views of the world-wide features of the love of the divine Father, of the atonement of the divine Son, and of the convincing and converting influence of the divine Spirit. In the presence of this opposition, it would be at once treachery to truth and a relapse in all the elements that go to constitute heroism, were we to shrink from "contending earnestly" for that which we conceive to be "the faith once delivered to the saints" (as a trust to be safely kept). We have no alternative. We must be zealous in maintaining,—and controversially if need be,—the truth which is assailed.

(3.) It is *wise and right, moreover, that we inscribe upon our distinctive banners, not a profession of superiority in the matter of personal consistency and character, but a testimony in reference to momentous theological truths*. It is of little moment for the weal of the world that attention should be turned to what, by the grace of God, *we ourselves* are as churches or as individuals. It is of little moment that attention should be directed to *us*. The matter of moment is that the world's attention should be drawn to Christ, and to God as he is revealed through the work of Christ. It is such truth as terminates, not upon ourselves, but upon our Saviour and the three-one God, that is to bless mankind. And hence there should be everything the reverse of an obtrusion upon the observation of men, of any real or supposed superiority, characteristic of our individual churches or our individual selves. In such circumstances as ours, it will often happen that very much that is imperfect and unworthy will be very easily discerned, when we are narrowly inspected. And even though the opposite were invariably the case, still it would be of extremely subordinate importance for the good of mankind to say,—Behold *us*, behold

us, how good we have become! The watch-word of our activities in relation to our fellow-men around us should ever be, "Look unto *Jesus*,"—"Look unto *Jesus* ;—"behold *Him*, and you will be blessed, saved, sanctified, and glorified." It is of immense consequence for the ultimate success of any religious movement, in the present state of society, that the prominent motto inscribed upon its banners be doctrinal rather than experimental. It is divine doctrine that is the fountain of all right human experience. And it too often happens, alas, that, in consequence of wilful neglect, and of one-sidedness in zeal, the human experience is far inferior to what it ought to be, and to what indeed it would be were the full congenial influence of the doctrine freely imbibed.

(4.) Nevertheless, our chosen attitude should be, *that of humble and earnest workers for the present and everlasting weal of our fellow-men*. There is no occasion, indeed, for any flaunting profession that this is our attitude. But there is very great occasion for the reality that might be thus imprudently professed. In the matter of argument we meet with no serious opposition. In this direction, we have no formidable difficulty to anticipate. Our theology, in all its important features at least, is easily defended. And let "whosoever will" descend into the arena of controversy, we need not fear for it. Errors in details of views, or in details of arguments, or in details of exposition, or as to details of facts, may be discovered and exposed; and our individual weaknesses and ignorance may thus be demonstrated. But there is no need for the slightest anxiety in reference to that which constitutes the great back-bone, and indeed the full compact bulk, of our theology. Our anxiety should be turned into an entirely different direction. We should "rejoice with trembling" lest we be found undevout, unamiable, ungenial, ungentle, ungenerous, uncharitable, or otherwise inconsistent, advocates of very glorious divine truths. If we were to be selfish in our feelings, selfish in our conversations, selfish in our worldly avocations, it would matter little, so far as our individual influence is concerned, how gloriously benign our theology can be proved to be. O for goodness! O for godliness! O for disinterestedness! O for devotedness!—devotedness not to ourselves, but to Christ, and to the weal of immortal men! O for this devotedness, without any retrospective glances toward selfish interests circuitously involved! Brethern in evangelical theology, let us live IN THE REALIZED PRESENCE OF THE CROSS OF CHRIST, and all will be well. It will then be "the love of Christ," that will constrain us; and never yet was any mortal man constrained by that love to do an unholy thing. It will constrain us to labour humbly and self-sacrificingly for the salvation and sanctification of souls.

## TO BE SAVED, WHAT IS IT?

THERE never was a more important question asked by man, than that which was proposed by the awakened Philippian jailor,—“What must I do to be saved?” It is in some respects the question of questions. It never can be right with a man, until he has proposed it,—right with him in his highest relations, in his spiritual relations, in his relations to eternity and to the eternal God against whom he has sinned. And when a man has once, in all earnestness, asked the question, and not only asked it, but also got it answered intelligibly, satisfactorily, scripturally, and thus correctly, it is likely that he will find, in his blessed experience, that all things begin to be right with him,—at least all those things that go deepest down in the direction of his conscience, and that go farthest out and up in the direction of eternity and of eternal glory. He who can answer the question “What must I do to be saved?”—he who can answer it rightly, he who has answered it, and does answer it, to himself, intelligently and realizingly, thinking the very thoughts of God on the subject, and going, in his mind, into the presence of the august realities referred to,—he who has thus answered the question will undoubtedly find that all other things with which he was formerly familiar are seen by him from a new, and a more elevated, and a much more satisfactory, standpoint. They will all appear different. The light of Calvary, the light of heaven, the light of eternity, will be thrown upon them, and show them somewhat as they are. The illusory dimness, in which many of them were formerly beheld, will be, in a measure, dispelled. The gaities of society, for example, will stand out to view, stripped of their fascination. Money will no longer appear as the one thing needful for happiness. The honours of the world, the honours which men confer upon men, will no longer appear to be so superlatively honourable. Everything that is peculiar to the earth, and that must be left behind us when we depart, will dwindle into comparative insignificance. The things of time will shrink into their own exceeding littleness, when compared with the things of eternity. And all that is really good in time and on earth,—all that is really good in human nature, and in cosmical nature around, all that is grand in what is above us,—in the glorious sky, will be seen to bear such finger-prints of divinity as constrain to exclaim, “My Father made them all, and owns them all.” To the man, who has got his mind satisfied in reference to the question, “what must I do to be saved?” all “old things will have passed away; and behold all things will have become new.” The man

will find himself to be, in some wonderful sense, "in Christ." In some wonderful sense he will be joined to Christ, crucified with Christ, alive with Christ. He will be "a new creature." He will feel as if his whole being, in the sum total of its thoughts and feelings and choices and aims, had been taken to pieces, and constructed anew. The question, then, "what must I do to be saved?" must, in every aspect of it, be truly momentous.

The particular aspect of the subject to which we purpose at present to refer, is indicated in the title of our article,—“To be saved, what is it?” And we would remark, in the first place, that *salvation is not sanctification*. It is one thing to be saved; it is another thing to be sanctified. The two realities are never indeed far separated. They are allied. They are linked. But still they are essentially distinct. And yet they are too often more or less confounded. But when they are, the confusion is apt to lead to serious practical consequences. It is not one thing *to be saved*, and another thing *to be saved from our sins*. It is one and the same thing *to be saved from our sins*, and *to be saved*: and it is a different thing altogether, though never, as we have said, far separated, *to be sanctified*. To be sanctified is to become good. To be saved is to become safe. The two blessings are the two ends of a concrete unity. And we might just as well expect to find a pillar with one end only, as to find a man with salvation only without sanctification, or with sanctification only without salvation. Every one who receives salvation, experiences sanctification too. And every one who is sanctified, is saved. Nevertheless, just as the one end of a pillar is not the other; just as the under end of an erect pillar is not the upper end, and as the upper end is not the under end, so salvation is not sanctification, and sanctification is not salvation. Salvation is a certain state of safety in relation to the desert of sin. Sanctification is a certain kind of character, which is realized in goodness, in godliness, in purity of heart and character.

If this distinction between salvation and sanctification be correct, it will follow that sanctification is more important than salvation. It is a higher blessing. It has to do with the innermost and sublimest element of our nature,—the moral. It assimilates to God, in that which is the special glory of God,—his moral excellency. It renders the finite being in some little degree “glorious in holiness,” even as God, within the vastness of his own infinity, is infinitely glorious in the infinite beauty of his infinite holiness. Sanctification must thus be a higher blessing than mere salvation. It is the upper end, the higher and more ornamental end, of the pillar of God’s mercy. And it must con-

sequently, as the higher of the two inseparable blessings, bear the relation of an end to a means.

Is it the case, then, that the Scriptures distinguish in the manner we have indicated, between salvation and sanctification ? It undoubtedly is. As regards the nature of sanctification, on the one hand, that is not disputed. It is admitted on all hands that it has reference to moral character, and is realized in moral goodness or godlikeness. And as regards salvation on the other, it suffices to quote a single passage to show that it cannot possibly be identical with sanctification. When our Saviour gave his apostles their commission to go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature, he added, "he that believeth and is baptized *shall be saved*, but he that believeth not *shall be damned*," (or, shall be finally condemned.) Salvation is thus the opposite of final condemnation. And it follows consequently that if salvation meant sanctification, final condemnation would denote demoralization. If to enjoy salvation meant to be made morally good, then to suffer condemnation would denote to be made morally bad. And as it is God himself who condemns, it would be God himself who is represented as producing wickedness in the wicked : which cannot be. In John iii. 16, 17, we find a precisely similar representation, by contrast, of salvation :—"For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish (*i.e.* should not be finally condemned,) but have everlasting life (*i.e.* but have everlasting salvation) ; for God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, (*i.e.* to adjudge the world to final condemnation as it deserved), but that the world through him *might be saved*." Salvation therefore is the opposite of condemnation ; and if, consequently, salvation were sanctification, condemnation would be, as we have said, demoralization. And, as it is God who saves all who are saved, and who condemns all who are condemned ; if to be saved were to be sanctified, then when he condemns, *He* would be rendering unholy ;—an idea which it would be blasphemy to utter, and a total inversion of the most blessed realities to conceive. It cannot be the case, then, that to be saved is to be sanctified. It is something totally distinct, though gloriously allied.

There are two passages, which are frequently quoted to prove that the word "salvation" sometimes at least means "sanctification." The one is Mat i. 21, in which it is said of the virgin Mary, "and she shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call his name Jesus, *for he shall save his people from their sins*." And the other is Phil. ii. 12, "Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now much more



in my absence, *work out your own salvation with fear and trembling*; for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." But in neither of these passages, as we apprehend, is the word "saved" or "salvation" used with a reference to sanctification. It is used, we believe, exactly as in the other passages which we have already quoted, and refers to the ultimate salvation, as to state, of those who are believers in Christ Jesus. Christ shall ultimately save his believing people from all the penal consequences of their sins. This is what is meant when it is said, "he shall save his people from their sins." He shall save them everlastingly from the penalty of their sins. And while his believing people are on earth, it is their duty to prosecute the work of faith and labour of love, and to follow holiness, so that they may be meet for that ultimate stage of their salvation, which consists of final and everlasting glorification. It is in this sense, we conceive, that they are to "work out their own salvation," and with holy "fear and trembling," lest they come short of their duty, seeing that God himself is graciously "working in them of his good pleasure," that they may both will and do what is needed that they may become perfect in love.

The passages, then, which are quoted to support the idea that salvation is wholly or partly of the nature of sanctification, are not to the point. And their true import shines, as by its own light, when it is borne in mind that the fulness of the salvation, which is obtained by faith in the Saviour, is realized not in time, but in eternity. It is true indeed that salvation belongs to the believer in Jesus before he reaches eternity. It belongs to him the moment that he believes in Jesus. He is saved whenever he believes. Hence it is that we read in Eph. ii. 8, "by grace are ye saved (or, more literally, by grace have ye been saved) through faith." We read again in the epistle to Titus, iii. 5, "Not by works of righteousness, which we have done, but according to his mercy *he saved us*." And in 1 Cor. i. 18, we read,—“for the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness, but unto us *which are saved* it is the power of God.” And hence too we should read in Acts ii. 47, “and the Lord added to the church daily such as were saved.” The expression “such as were saved” is improperly rendered in our version “such as should be saved.” It is correctly rendered by Luther in his version, and by Wicliff in his. And again we read in 1 Cor. xv. 1, 2, “Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel, which I preached unto you; which also ye received; and wherein ye stand; *by which also ye are saved*, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you.” It is true, then, that believers in Jesus “*are saved*.” They are saved, while they are on earth.

They are saved whenever they believe in Jesus. The moment they look to Jesus as their saviour, they are saved. "Now is the accepted time ; now is the day of salvation." "Whosoever believeth *hath life*,"—hath everlasting life. He hath it now. The gift of God, the gift which he gives in the Gospel, is everlasting life. It is salvation. And whosoever believes the Gospel, accepts the gift, and has everlasting life, and is saved.

And yet the fulness of salvation cannot be enjoyed on earth. It can be realized only in heaven. It is only there that the believer can be freed from all the evil consequences of his sins, and find paradise perfectly restored. Hence, it is the case, that while there are some precious passages, in which believers in Jesus are said to be already saved, there are far more in which their salvation is spoken of as a thing of the future. Again and again did the Saviour himself say, "he that endureth to the end *shall be saved*." It is not said "he that is saved shall endure to the end." Hence, too, the language of the commission already quoted, "he that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned." As the damnation of the unbeliever is future, so is the fulness of the believer's salvation. He "shall be saved." Hence every believer has for his helmet "the hope of salvation," not so much salvation itself, as the hope of it. "We are saved by hope," says the apostle Paul in Rom. viii. 24,—that is, it is in the way of hope that we are saved. The fulness of our salvation is an object hoped for. And hence it is that the same apostle says, in 1 Cor. xv. 19, "if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." Our reward is on high. Our life is everlasting. It is "the glory and honour which are coupled with immortality" that we seek. It is from "the wrath to come" that we flee. It is heaven that is our home: and it is not till we reach that home, that we shall see our royal Father, our God, in the fulness of his glory. Hence it is that the same apostle says of advanced believers, in Rom. xiii. 11, "for now is our salvation nearer than when we believed." And Peter says of them, in his 1st Epist. i. 5, that they "are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, *ready to be revealed in the last time*." We are "now justified," says Paul, in Rom. v. 9. But he says more: he says, "much more then, being now justified by the blood of Christ, *we shall be saved* (viz. by and by) from wrath through him; for if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, *we shall be saved* by his life."

It is abundantly manifest, then, that the fulness of salvation is in the future. It is in heaven. Salvation on earth consists of

pardon and justification. Salvation in heaven consists of glorification. The moment that a sinner believes in Jesus, he is saved, in the sense of being pardoned and justified. But his pardon and justification stream forward and upward, and culminate in glorification : and this glorification is the completion of salvation. Pardon would be an incomplete blessing without justification ; and justification would be an incomplete blessing without pardon ; and both would be incomplete blessings without glorification. Glorification is needed as the complement and consummation of pardon and justification combined. And hence it is that it is both true that the believer in Jesus is saved, and also true that he is to be saved. He is saved incipiently. He is to be saved completely. While on earth he is already saved, in the sense of being safe,—safe as regards the desert of his own unrighteousness, and safe too as regards the reward of the righteousness of his Saviour. But in heaven his safety will become sublimed into that fulness of salvation, which is absolute glorification. All tears shall be wiped away. Everlasting joy shall be around the head like a perpetual halo, and within the heart, like a perpetual summer of the soul. There will be fulness of pleasures for evermore.

Salvation, on earth, then, consists of pardon and justification combined. Salvation in heaven consists of the culmination of pardon and justification in glorification, when the man shall become all glorious without as well as all glorious within. Pardon has reference, as we have intimated, to the desert of our own righteousness. We deserve the wrath of God for ever on account of our unrighteousness. We deserve for it everlasting woe. But when we are pardoned, we are freed from exposedness to this penalty. We are no longer hanging by the thread of life over the abyss of perdition. Justification, again, has reference to the desert of Christ's righteousness, his perfect propitiatory righteousness. The moment that we believe on Christ, that righteousness is placed to our account. And as it is a righteousness that is spotless and most glorious, it deserves everlasting glory and honour in heaven. And hence it is that every one who believes in Jesus as his Saviour is not only pardoned, or delivered from exposedness to the penalty that is due to him on account of his own unrighteousness ; he is also, and at the same moment, justified, or made an heir of the celestial glory and honour which are the reward of the righteousness of Jesus. He is thus safe in a twofold sense. He is safe in relation to the desert of his own unrighteousness : he is pardoned. And he is also safe in relation to the reward of his Saviour's righteousness : he is justified. Not only is he no longer hanging by the thread of life over the abyss of woe ;—his feet are on a rock—the rock of ages, and his

face is set heavenward, where is his reward—the desert of his Saviour's righteousness. This is his present salvation. And if he endure to the end of his probationary career, he shall be still more emphatically saved,—saved in the fullest acceptance of the term. He shall have “salvation with eternal glory.” All his sorrows shall be ended for ever; and the river of the fulness of joy—“the river of God”—shall roll to everlasting, widening, and deepening as it flows on, through the interminable length of the duration of his being.

Such is salvation. In its culmination and completion, it is glory, glory, glory. And even in the earnest of it, which are experienced here, it is like a deliciously refreshing well of water springing up within the soul unto everlasting life.

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#### THE GROUND WITHOUT, AND THE CONDITION WITHIN, OF SALVATION.

WE have an exhibition both of the ground without, and the condition within, of salvation, in the words addressed to the Philippian jailor:—“Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.” (Acts xvi. 31.) It is a saying in many respects wonderful. It is wonderful as regards the divine generosity, which it indicates. It is wonderful as regards the simplicity of the divine plan of salvation, which it reveals. It is wonderfully sublime. It is wonderfully adapted to the weakness and the wants of poor human nature. But the wonder of wonders is this,—it is true. If we do believe on the Lord Jesus Christ; and if we refuse to do anything else than thus believe, in order that we may be saved; we shall be saved. The direction is divine; and it is every way worthy of that infinite and infinitely wise and loving Mind, whence it has emanated.

When men, instead of listening to this divine instruction, exert their own ingenuity to contrive what they themselves might imagine to be the way of salvation, they in general work out for themselves an exceedingly different plan. Every man, indeed, naturally thinks that the great difficulty is to produce what shall be to the divine mind a sufficient reason to grant salvation. It is universally perceived that it must be God alone who can save. It is He only who can forgive and justify and glorify. It is he only who can deliver from hell and exalt to heaven. “Salvation belongeth to Jehovah.” It is the Lord's prerogative to save.

But then God is infinitely wise, and infinitely just, as well as infinitely powerful. He is the infinitely perfect sovereign of the universe, as well as the infinitely good Father of the spirits of all flesh. And it is therefore to be expected that he will not save the sinful, unless he can find a sufficient reason for conferring such a blessing on the undeserving and the ill-deserving. And a sufficient reason, we may well suppose, will never be found by him unless there be something done, which will as adequately express his hatred of our sins, his love for the law of which these sins are the transgressions, and his determination to uphold the authority of the law, as would his righteous infliction upon us of the everlasting wrath which is our due. It is more or less definitely or indefinitely apprehended by all, that, without some such atonement, the divine mind will never recognise a sufficient reason for granting salvation. And hence it is that there have been so much difficulty and distress experienced by souls, when fully waked up to perceive and feel their need of salvation.

Multitudes of these souls have tried to produce before God what might be to his infinite mind a sufficient reason for granting them salvation. Hundreds of thousands, for example, have subjected themselves to physical tortures, by way of punishing themselves for their sins, in the hope that their self-imposed punishment in time will be accepted by God, in lieu of the everlasting punishment which is their due. They imagine that their self-inflicted punishment will be an atonement, in which God may find a sufficient reason to pardon and justify and glorify them. Hence the torments which the Indian devotees inflict upon themselves,—some travelling for hundreds of miles to sacred places, with spikes in their shoes; some standing for years upon pillars, till their limbs become inflexibly rigid; some holding up their arms in the attitude of supplication, till the arms grow stiff, and cannot be bent down; some swinging themselves round and round in the air, by hooks fastened in their flesh; some casting themselves, to be crushed to death, before the wheels of the shrines of their deities.

It is from the same conviction of the necessity of an atonement, and from the same imagination that man must produce it to God, that hundreds of thousands of papists, in olden times more particularly, and especially in the darker places of the earth, subjected themselves to every conceivable species of penance. Luther, in his early years, was a specimen. He fasted. He deprived himself of every luxury and comfort. He submitted to the most menial services and drudgery. He took the lash in his hand, and lacerated his own flesh, till he felt faint from loss of blood. He did all that general custom and his own particular ingenuity could contrive, to get himself so adequately punished

in time for his sins, that God might behold in that self-inflicted mortification an adequate reason for remitting to him the everlasting penalty of his sins, and conferring upon him, in eternity, that glory which is the reward of righteousness. He tried, in other words, to produce an atonement for his sins. He gave every thing that he had in time as a ransom for his soul; and he hoped that he would reach a point in his penance when his deeds would constitute such a righteousness in his soul, that in consideration of it, the reward of eternal life would be granted to him as his due.

There have been many Luthers within the vast circumference of the papacy, so far as regards his early struggles to make expiation for his sins, and to work out for himself, in that atonement, a kind of saving righteousness. And probably there are many such Luthers still, not in the papacy only, but within the circle of professed Protestantism too. There are many persons in Great Britain, we imagine, who are no sooner awakened out of their sleep of spiritual unconsciousness, than they commence to inflict inward penances upon themselves, and to prescribe for themselves multiplied outward and inward forms of self-denying observances, in order that they may effect something which may induce God to grant them forgiveness and justification and everlasting glorification. Perhaps, indeed, they may have been so instructed that they do not walk upon their knees to shrines; neither do they fill their shoes with spikes; neither do they lacerate their frames; neither do they seek to enter into monasteries, that they may mortify unnaturally the desires of the flesh, and subject themselves to unsocial austerities. Nevertheless they do other things with the same ultimate intent. They deny themselves to what they had formerly regarded as innocent amusements and enjoyments. They give themselves up to much self-denying inward mortification. Perhaps they renounce with determined courage the society and confidence of former companions. Perhaps they surrender themselves to self-sacrificing labours, in the way of visiting the sick, or of instructing the young, or of reclaiming the profligate. Perhaps they become exceedingly earnest in their reading of the Scriptures, in the offering up of prayers, in self-examination and self-condemnation, in observing the holy Sabbath, and in frequenting the amiable tabernacle of divine worship. Perhaps they do all these things, and many others besides,—some of them, things which are in themselves good, very good; some of them, things which are in themselves evil; and some of them, things which are in themselves indifferent,—perhaps, we say, they do all these things, just as Hindoos inflict their self-tortures, and as Luther performed his penances, and as conscience-convicted Greeks and Romans offered their sacrifices

of bullocks or of lambs, and as Canaanites of old offered up in awful ritual their sons and their daughters,—to produce what will be satisfying to God for their sins, to work out what will afford a sufficient reason to the divine mind to forgive and to justify and to glorify,—to pay, in other words, a ransom for their soul, to create a propitiation for their sins, to bring in for themselves a righteousness which will merit everlasting life. It is, we fear, undoubtedly the case that great numbers in Great Britain thus seek salvation,—fancying that the careful and zealous performance, for the present and for the future, of common and uncommon duties will constitute by and by a “rock of ages” on which they may stand with security and abide the scrutiny and decision of the Judge of all the earth.

But all such ideas, as to the way of salvation, are “vanity,” and are fitted in the end to lead to “vexation of spirit.” The Bible was written for the express purpose of dissipating them, and of substituting in their place that truth of truths, which is the glad tidings of salvation. The joyful sound is this,—“*Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.*” The ground of salvation is without us. It is in the Lord Jesus Christ. And the one connecting thing within us, by means of which we rest upon the outward ground or sure foundation which was “laid” by God himself “in Zion,” is, believing the good news that the atoning work is finished, and was finished more than eighteen hundred years ago, and that it, and it alone, is the rock of everlasting salvation—“the Rock of ages,” on which shipwrecked sinners may take refuge and find perfect security amid the beating billows of the indignation which is due to their sins.

Away, then, with all human attempts at making atonement for sins! They are all utter impracticabilities, and are themselves so sinful, that they need atonement for their sinfulness. They are all, moreover, disownments of the one perfect atonement provided for us by God himself. For God “so loved the world (of fallen mankind) that he sent his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish but have everlasting life.” (Jo. iii. 16.) “Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.” (1 Jo. iv. 10.) The divine voice hath gone forth—“Deliver from going down to the pit:—I have found a ransom.” “For there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all.” (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6.) It is what Christ did and suffered that is the propitiation for our sins. God is propitiated by it; that is, He has found in it a sufficient reason for granting to all who

are contented with it, the pardon of their sins, the justification of their soul, and by and by everlasting glorification. And in nothing else does he, or can he, find a sufficient reason. That which Christ has done and suffered, is "righteousness" for us,—such righteousness as merits everlasting life. It is "everlasting righteousness," and the only perfect and everlasting righteousness ever wrought out in human nature. All the unrighteous sons and daughters of men are invited to say of Him who wrought it out,—“we are his sin, and he is our righteousness,”—“for the Lord made Him who knew no sin to become sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.” (2 Cor. v. 21.)

It is the work of Christ, then, which is the only saving righteousness. And the language of every one should be this,—“all other Saviours I renounce; all other things within me or without me that were gain to me, these I count loss for Christ. Yea, “doubtless, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the “knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord, for whom *I have* suffered, or “*will* henceforth suffer, the loss of all things, that I may win Him, “and be found in Him, not having mine own righteousness, which “is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the “righteousness which is of God by faith.” (Phil. iii. 8, 9.) Happy is the man who *can*, who *does*, thus speak. He is, in the inward condition of his soul, resting on the outward ground of everlasting salvation. He is “standing *barefoot* on the Rock of ages.” He is believing in the Lord Jesus Christ. He is believing that all his salvation is in Christ, and that Christ, with all the fulness of salvation that is in him, is the gift of God to his soul. His language is—“None but Christ.” Happy spirit! Rest where thou art resting. Abide there. Abide for ever, and all is well, and will end well.

This simple believing on the Lord Jesus Christ will not indeed supersede the performance, as far as in us lies, of the whole circle of our duties. Far from it. Just as truly as salvation, though not sanctification, is something most intimately allied to it; just so truly is faith in Christ, though entirely distinct from prayer and praise and love and zeal, yet most intimately and delightfully connected with them all, and promotive of them. It is our thoughts that ultimately mould our characters. And it is according to what we think or believe concerning the soul and the Saviour, that we are ultimately right or wrong in all our inner feelings, and choices, and in all the outward acts of our life. He who believes in Christ for the salvation of his soul is one whose mind is in contact with Christ. His beliefs and thoughts are, at one end of them, in his own mind: but at the other end of them,



they are on and in Christ. And thus there is union established, in the immortal element of the being, between the soul and the Saviour. And the result of this union is sanctification, as well as salvation. He finds, that Christ is made of God unto him "wisdom and sanctification," as well as "righteousness and redemption." "The life which he lives in the flesh, he lives by the faith of the Son of God, who loved him, and who gave himself for him;" and it has something in it that reflects the light and lustre of the glorious Companion of the soul.

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#### THE SERVICE OF GOD.

THE questions,—Why was I made? Why am I here? What is to become of me hereafter? can scarcely have altogether escaped the minds even of the most careless. Yet many, alas, in their breathless pursuit of secular things, and with all their thoughts and feelings, vibrating earthward,—true to the objects of sense as the magnetic needle is to the pole,—will not be persuaded to pause and search, in sober earnest, for the true answers to these queries. Yet the most wonderful being on earth is this same infatuated man. His mind is a reflection in miniature of the Infinite. It has intellectual powers by which he can investigate and in some measure know objects, the most distant and diversified. His thoughts and imagination, refusing to be confined, transcend terrestrial boundaries. Swift as lightning they dart from sun to sun, from system to system, exploring the illimitable universe. He has also emotional susceptibilities of great variety and strength. He is capable of joy and grief, hope and fear, desire and aversion, love and hatred, according to the qualities which his intellect perceives in objects. And in the very heart of the soul is the will,—the helm of the mind's entire emanations. When we look at all these capacities and powers, in their variety, and various phases of development and influence, is it not evident that our Divine Maker intended that we should pursue some higher and nobler end than the mere gratification of our sensuous desires? Reason itself tells us that the ultimate end of our being must stand closely connected with voluntary obedience to the will of the Infinite One.

We have indeed earthward tendencies and sympathies. Our senses are so many mysterious links that bind us to the material, and which enable us to draw from matter innumerable pleasures. But we are also conscious of sympathies and desires of a super-sensuous nature, which draw us in the direction of the

Divine and the Eternal. The history of the nations of the earth proves that man, from his very nature, is conscious of dependence on some Being without and beyond himself. All the religious temples and groves of heathen nations—all the hecatombs of victims which they sacrificed on their altars—all their self-inflicted penalties and tortures—all the endless variety and revolting phases of their idolatrous worship;—are the offspring and outworking of the instinctive feeling that man needs, and is closely related to, a Being greater than himself. Take the man's mind in whom sensuousness holds the reins—enslaving all the powers of the soul to fulfil unhallowed ends; even there something may be detected which whispers to the devotee of sense and self, that some higher Being ought to be served and loved. Take the very individual who has drilled himself into utter scepticism—whose mental and moral powers are by that monstrous aberration, so perverted and blighted, so cramped and crushed, that he views it as still an open question whether or not there be a God;—even in the mind of this individual, deep down in the phenomena of consciousness, are to be found elements which often disturb the tranquillity of scepticism with their annoying intimations that there is a Supreme Being who ought to be acknowledged and served. The conscience of the most careless sinner speaks at times, and speaks loudly, chiding him for his sins, and pointing him in the direction of his Divine Creator as deserving his supreme homage and love. The law written on the heart—although, by the practice of sin, its traces may be blurred, still retains such a lingering impression on the living fibre as to forbid the experience of entire satisfaction, while the supreme affection of the soul is withheld from God. Ask any one who has not devoted himself to God, who has never yielded supreme love to the Supreme, never thought of aiming at the divine glory in all things, or in any thing;—ask such a one if he is entirely satisfied with himself, while he is thus, in all his actions and ends, leaving out God. If he speaks candidly he will confess that he has misgivings, that he feels that he is far from right, and is consequently often unhappy. Were it not, indeed, for this feeling of dependence on God, and obligation to him, which arises from the very structure of the mind, we should have no avenue by which to reach it when we attempt to influence it by the truth of God. God would be entirely and necessarily shut out from his own temple.

The very admission that there is a God, involves the admission that he deserves and claims our highest service. If there is a God, he must be the Creator and Sustainer of all other beings. And if he is their Creator and Sustainer, he must be Supreme Ruler over them all. Since there is no higher being than himself, he

must have made them all for himself. The revelation of his will must be the law of all rational creatures. Reason feels itself shut up to these conclusions. It can no more escape from them, than a stone thrown into the air can escape from the law of gravitation. So that the man who admits that there is a God, and yet does not serve him, stands self-condemned ; since he must admit that the greatest Being deserves the greatest homage.

But reason never conducts us to conclusions which, when acted upon, bring us into collision with our true interests. And in the case before us, there is a sublime and glorious and fascinating harmony between the divine requirements on the one hand, and the constitution of the human mind on the other. The former beautifully fit on to the latter ; and there is not a shade of discrepancy. The revelation within us tells us that we ought to serve God supremely. The revelation without us reiterates the same asseveration. And yet the cravings of our soul ever tend toward enjoyment. There is no discrepancy. For when we comply with the leading requirement of the twofold revelation, and love God supremely, the cravings of our inner nature are satisfied, and we realize the import of the sweet and magic word happiness. This happiness consists of the harmony of our nature with itself and all its relations. And when God is served, when his requirements are revered and complied with, such is the benevolence of his arrangements that intense happiness is ours. The mind is in its natural element. It lives and moves and has its being in that which is the source of bliss.

It must be obvious, now, what the service of God is. It is the free exercise of all those powers and energies he has given us, in the manner he directs.

*I. This service has its origin and progress in love.* It involves in its very essence, as a service that is to be distinguished from slavery, the voluntary exercise of power ; and therefore, before a man will freely engage in it, he must doubtless see motives connected with it and arising from it or leading to it, which are adequate to enlist the supreme affections and sympathies of his nature, and to give them entire satisfaction. Unless he were to see such motives, he never would consecrate his whole heart to the doing of the divine will. The sinner must see love in God, and love in God to himself, ere he can be expected to love him in return and serve him devotedly. How delightful, then, and gladdening, that the very love that is needed exists. The Gospel of God's grace unveils the divine heart to man, and exhibits to the sinner love so great and so disinterested that it is eminently fitted to win him over to obedience, as also to happi-

ness and heaven. It is this love that is the soul of all God's addresses to men in the sacred page. It gleams in every invitation. It is the basis of every argument. It overflows in every promise. It burns in every remonstrance and warning. The Holy Spirit points to it as most gloriously displayed in the great sacrifice of Calvary; and when there the sinner's eye beholds it, he realizes that his mind is within the attraction of a mighty moral magnet. Every chord in his soul is touched, and vibrates in willing and joyful response to that fascinating and overwhelming love. His experience may be expressed in the inspired words, "The love of Christ constraineth us."—"We love him because he first loved us." It is at this point that the service of God begins.

II. *But, as this service proceeds from the impulse of love, it is productive of true pleasure.* Offices performed to those we love must, from the very fact that we love, be pleasant. And surely service done to God, because we love him supremely, must yield pleasure in an ineffable degree. The pleasure is proportionate to the love. Yea, such is the power of love, that it turns even sacrifices and sufferings for its object into occasions of joy. We have the highest example of this in Jesus. Such was the intensity of his love to God and to the world of mankind, that he rejoiced and delighted to do the divine will, although it involved the greatest sufferings and self-sacrifice. "To do thy will," said he, "I take delight." On the same principle, Christians glory in the tribulations which they have to endure for the truth's sake.

But not only is it evident from the nature of the case that there must be true pleasure in the service of God; the same idea is directly asserted in Scripture. "My yoke is easy, and my burden is light." "Wisdom's ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace." "Rejoice in the Lord always, and again I say rejoice." "Serve the Lord with fear; rejoice with trembling." "Serve the Lord with gladness; come into his presence with singing." If religion had derived its origin and progress from the fear of future punishment, it would not have been pleasure. It would have been associated with gloom and misery. But since it springs from the perception and appreciation of God's love, our own love is responsively touched, and thus the mind is brought back to its natural state, and enjoys the divine objects for which it was made. Looking at man as a depraved being, it is correct to say that, while unconverted, he is in his *natural* state. But, strictly and philosophically speaking, the expression is not correct. For a state of sin is of all states the most *unnatural* for the soul. A rational being is in his natural state, only when he is and does what his Maker desires him to be and to do. Under the influence

of sin, the mind is like a complicated machine out of order. Its wheels are off the balance; part grates against part. It is not in its natural state. But when all its wheels and axles and pulleys and belts run freely and smoothly, then it is pleasant to behold it, because it is as it was intended to be. The mind was never made for sin. Its entrance has reversed its motions, destroyed its balance, and reduced its fine order to chaos. It was made for the service of God. It was made to solace itself in God as its highest Portion and chiefest Joy. And when, by the attractive power of the divine love, it is brought back to enjoy its original portion, and to do the work for which it was constructed, then its powers and emanations flow in their native channels, and in the directions of their proper objects, gliding on smoothly without jars or breaks or perversions, and all things are natural.

III. *This service of God is also truly profitable.* Profit is one grand object of pursuit among men. The world-wide cry is, "who will show us any good?"—"what will be profitable to us?" What is the goal which the worldling has set up, and to which, in the midst of his numerous and perplexing schemes and speculations, he is ever pressing on? It is profit. The man of pleasure too, and the man who thirsts for fame, are in their various spheres and modes of life, seeking profit. But they seek it in vain. For suppose a man should obtain all the riches and pleasures and honours he could desire; if these were all his portion, where, when the drama of this world is receding from his vision, when his eyes are closing on those fleeting objects that have been so dear to him, and when his spirit is shivering with dread at the idea of meeting his God,—where would his profit be?

Reader, how is it with you? Are you a servant of God? If so, you have such profit from it as will abide. Satan for once spoke truly when he said that Job did not serve God for nought. No one does. No one needs. In keeping the divine commandments there is great reward. "Godliness is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." It yields true, full, and solid happiness here below; and it gives the certain prospect of never-ending and ever-increasing bliss in the world above.

G. W.—B.

There are persons who get familiar with the symbolical exercises which introduce into the presence of God, who yet never use them to get into the divine presence. Ah, what folly!

PRACTICAL EXPOSITION OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE  
TO THE HEBREWS.

VERSES 1, 2.

“God, who, at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath, in these last days, spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds.”

THE first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews treats delightfully of the transcendent greatness of Christ Jesus. It will doubtless be profitable to us, to try to occupy the inspired writer's standpoints, and to take, as precisely as possible, the very views of our Saviour, with which his mind was obviously ravished.

We need not make many preliminary remarks regarding the Epistle in general. It is anonymous. And yet it is commonly supposed to have been the composition of Paul. It is, in general, imagined by those who hold this opinion, that, contrary to his otherwise invariable custom, the apostle suppressed his name, in this case, as there were very many, even of the converted Hebrews, who were deeply prejudiced against him, in as much as, in their opinion, he paid too little regard to the peculiar prerogatives of the Jews. But it is difficult to feel persuaded that this could be the reason for omitting from the epistle the name of the writer. For, whoever he was, he assumed, while writing his fervid and eloquent missive, that the parties, for whose confirmation in the christian faith he specially intended it, would know who was their correspondent. Hence he says in the 10th chapter, 34th verse, “For ye had compassion of *me*, in my bonds, and took joyfully the spoiling of your goods.” He says again, in the 13th chapter, 18th and 19th verses, “Pray for *us*, for we trust we have a good conscience, in all things willing to live becomingly and beautifully. But I beseech you the rather to do this, *that I may be restored to you the sooner.*” He adds in the 23rd verse, “Know ye not that our brother Timothy is set at liberty; with whom, if he come shortly, I will see you.” It is evident, then, that the writer himself did not intend the receivers of the epistle to be in doubt as to who he was. It seems to be manifest that the bearer of the letter would be instructed to inform them that it was a communication from some definite Christian teacher, who was perfectly well known to them, and who was very highly esteemed by them.

It was supposed in Alexandria, and in the eastern churches in general, from the second century downward, that the Epistle was Paul's; only, there were some who imagined that, while he supplied the materials of thought, he had employed Luke, “the

beloved physician," or Clement, "whose name was in the book of life," to compose it for him. In Africa, again, we find Tertullian, in the commencement of the third century, asserting that Barnabas, the original companion of Paul, and who is once and again expressly numbered with the apostles, was the author of the Epistle. In the churches of the west of Europe, on the other hand, and especially in the church of Rome, at least during the earlier centuries, the strictly anonymous character of the epistle seems to have been contentedly maintained; only it seems to have been very generally assumed that it was not to be ascribed to Paul, who was regarded as the author of thirteen only of the New Testament letters. By and by, however, the Pauline origin of the epistle came to be assumed almost all the world over. Jerome and Augustin, however, doubted. And at the time of the Reformation, Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin, supposed that it could not have been the composition of Paul. Luther conjectured that it may have been written by Apollos,—a conjecture that has since been advocated by many of the most distinguished critics.

It is needless, at least for the present, to recount the reasons which have led to such diversity of opinion regarding the writer of this most precious epistle. They are not reasons that affect the full canonical authority of the writing. And it may be well, therefore, that we rest contented with the anonymity of the epistle, and refer to its author, not as Paul, or as Apollos, or as Barnabas, but simply as the inspired writer to the Hebrews. It is our own opinion that the Apostle Paul was not the penman. We cannot but think that the style of composition, both in its inner and in its outer spheres, is altogether different from that which was characteristic of Paul.

We shall not stir the question, who were the particular Hebrews to whom the letter was sent. It is of little moment to us, whether they were the Hebrews who were living in Jerusalem and Palestine in general, or the Hebrews who were residing in some one or other of the great centres of Gentiledom. Our opinion is, that they were Hebrews who were living in some Gentile city. But since it did not please the inspiring Spirit to lead the writer to express his name, and to intimate definitely the local designation of the church or churches to whom he wrote, we wish not to dogmatise on such subjects; neither would we encourage solicitude in ourselves or in others to come to extremely determinate decisions regarding them. It is enough for us to know that the chief Author of the contents of this most interesting, and in many respects magnificent, epistolary oration, is the Divine Spirit, and that the parties to whom it was originally addressed were Hebrews, who needed confirmation in the christian faith, and whose temptations and other trials had so much in common with our own, that what

was written for their teaching, and reproof, and correction, and instruction in righteousness, is admirably adapted to our necessities, that we too may, in this age of the world, become evangelically "perfect,—thoroughly furnished unto all good works." We shall proceed, then, to the practical exposition of the first chapter,—but confining ourselves at present to the first two verses:—"God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds."

We shall, in the first place, make a few expository remarks upon some particular words and clauses, and then we shall proceed to unfold some of the riches of the doctrinal ideas that are involved.

When it is said that "God spake in time past *unto the fathers*," the reference manifestly is to the ancestral sires of the Jews, the many generations of the Hebrews who sprang out of the loins of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and lived and died before the ministry of our Lord began. The expression which is rendered "at sundry times," (πολυμερῶς), properly means "in many portions." God gave to the fathers "line upon line, precept upon precept, here a little and there a little." He did not all at once complete the Old Testament revelation of himself. He divided it into "many portions." And he communicated it "in divers manners," or "in many modes," (πολυτρόπως). Some portions he communicated "face to face," as to Moses. Some portions he communicated by extatic visions, some in dreams, some by angels. Some portions were of the nature of histories, some of predictions, some of didactic observations and proverbs, some of psalms, some of outward ceremonial symbols. It was thus "in many modes," as well as "in many portions," that "God spake unto the fathers,—*by the prophets*." The expression "by the prophets" is literally "in the prophets." God spake "in" them and thus "by" them. He illuminated them from within, and thus lighted them up as luminaries amid the surrounding darkness. They were luminaries to dispense his light. And hence they were called "prophets," not so much because they predicted things to come, as because they spake for God. Their fulness sprang out of the fulness of God; and what they uttered under divine inspiration came from a far deeper fount than the depth of their own spirit.

The same "God who spake formerly in the prophets unto the fathers, in many portions and in many modes," "hath in these last days," says the inspired writer, "spoken unto us by his Son." The expression, "hath in these last days spoken" (ἐπ' ἰσχύατος τῶν ἡμερῶν τούτων ἐλάλησεν) would be more literally rendered "spoke at



the end of these days." One of the great cycles of time was regarded as drawing to a close, and a new and more blessed era was about to begin its course. But before the inauguration of this brighter era, and at the end of the preceding age, God "spoke to us by (or rather, *in*) his Son,"—"whom he hath appointed" (or rather, whom he constituted) heir of all things,"—Lord by inheritance of the whole universe; "by whom also he made the worlds," (*τῶν αἰώνων*)—all those successive cosmical systems, which from the beginning until now have been moving onward along the highway of time.

Such is the purport of the words, with which the inspired writer begins his sublime epistolary communication to the Hebrews. They are pregnant with high and holy doctrinal instruction.

In the first place, they remind us that God hath "spoken" to men. He has not coiled himself up in everlasting silence. He has not acted as if he were either naturally or voluntarily a being who is dumb,—as if he were either unable, on the one hand, or unwilling, on the other, to speak. He who enables man to speak,—shall not He himself speak? He has spoken, once and again, and again, and frequently. He has revealed himself. He has revealed his will. He has put himself into communication with man. The idea is delightful, and delightfully true. All the world over, indeed, God is revealing himself. He is revealing his will. He hath not left himself without witness at any time or in any place. He is everywhere witnessing concerning Himself. He makes use of the heavens to declare his glory, and of the firmament to shew his handiwork. He makes use of day after day, and night after night, to impart knowledge concerning himself. He moulds the events of Providence into a divine kind of discourse concerning what he feels for us in his heart, and what he desires us to be and to do. And in the innermost recess of every soul he lets a still small voice of conscience be heard, which is the echo of the utterance of his own sublimely authoritative will.

But the words of these first two verses remind us, in the second place, that God spoke specially, "in the prophets," to the Jews. He took to himself human words, and made to the Jewish people a special revelation of his will. He shewed distinctly what is the duty of man, as man; and what is the only hope of man, as sinful man. He showed that it is our duty "to love the Lord our God with all our heart, with all our soul, with all our strength, and with all our mind, and to love our neighbour as we love ourselves."

And he shewed, that having failed to do this our duty, and having thus incurred the divine displeasure, as being transgressors of the divine law, our only refuge is in a substituted victim,—some Lamb of God that might bear the sin of the world. It is our high privilege that we possess in the volume of the book this peculiar revelation which God made of himself to the Jews of old. He made it not for their exclusive benefit, but for the weal of the whole world; and we at this day, are made partakers of the privileges which it was fitted and intended to impart.

But, in the third place, we learn that at the end of one of the great cycles in the world's history, God spoke in a still more special and emphatic way "unto us, in and by his Son." He spoke, not in human words merely or chiefly,—human words which laboured to express divine ideas. It was in a still grander way that he spoke or communicated his mind. He spoke in actions which had something in them, which was both marvellously human and marvellously divine. The works that his Son did, and more especially the great work of bearing our sins, bearing them to the cross, bearing them while on the cross, and bearing them away from between us and the attainability of salvation, or, in other words, bearing the awful curse which was due to them, and exhausting that curse,—this work, which was indeed the consummation of all his other works, testified the mind of the Father. God "spoke" by means of it. He spoke out his abhorrence of our sins. He spoke out too his compassion for our souls. And he spoke out also his satisfaction for the sins of our sinful souls. He spoke propitiously; and the voice indeed which emanated from all that Christ did and suffered in our nature and room, was substantially this—"Come unto Me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest;—come unto Me, come in spirit, and live;—come and be saved with everlasting salvation." That is the voice that issues from the work of Jesus. Do you not hear it? "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear,"—hear, and understand, and believe, and live!

It is worthy of special note that it is "unto us," that God spake in his Son. It was not unto those merely who saw the Son with their corporeal eyes, and who heard his voice with their corporeal ears. The writer of this epistle was apparently not one of those. He says in the 3rd verse of the 2nd chapter that "the great salvation began to be spoken by the Lord, *and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him.*" But still he could also say,—"God at the end of these days spake unto us in his Son." And we too, are warranted to employ the same words, "God at the end of those days spake unto us in his Son." His voice was *to us*, his voice of mercy. It has reached us. How delightful! We hear it!

Hark! Do you hear it? O man, whosoever thou art, it is addressed to you.

But, in the fourth place, we learn from the inspired words before us, that God's Son our Saviour, has been constituted by God "heir of all things,"—"whom he constituted heir of the universe." It is as being the Son of God, that our divine Saviour has been constituted heir of the universe. It is natural for sons to become heirs. But there is something peculiar in our Saviour's relation as a Son, and something peculiar in his relation as an heir. In other sons, who are not merely adopted but begotten, there is nothing voluntary in the constitution of the filial relation. It exists before the voluntary element can come into play. But it was not so in the case of Christ's sonship. He was from everlasting God, but he *became* a son. He became a son in the "day" when he was "begotten," the day when his divinity was wondrously united to our humanity. (See Acts xiii. 33.) And the divine Father had such boundless complacency in the new relationship, and in the propitiatory work contemplated, that he said, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee; *ask of me, and I shall give thee the nations for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.*" (Ps. ii. 7, 8.) Yea he put into his hands "all power in heaven and on earth." He constituted him, in his new relation of sonship, "heir of the universe." In other cases, sons actually enter upon the possession of their inheritance, when their fathers become deceased, or voluntarily abdicate their former position. But this arises from human imperfection. Father and son cannot both together have full power and possession in the same terrestrial estates. But no such imperfection cleaves to the divine Father—*our* Father, and the divine Son, *our* Saviour. Their unity is complete. And the power, possession, and enjoyment of the one, does not in the smallest degree diminish or disarrange the fulness of the power, possession, and enjoyment of the other. And hence it is that the Father, in token of his satisfaction with the incarnate Son as our Saviour, has constituted him "heir of the universe." O how blessed! The heir of the universe is our Saviour! our friend! our brother! And thou, the poorest of all believers and the most down-trodden, art the "joint heir of Christ Jesus." "All things are yours." Do you believe it? Then you are not poor, but rich; not low, however lowly; you are high and exalted. You are the son or the daughter of a King, the brother or the sister of a Prince, who is "the heir of all things."

The inspired writer adds, in the fifth place, "by whom also he made the worlds." Having looked forward in the preceding

clause to the far future, he looks backward in this to the far past ; and shews that there is a wonderful congruity in God constituting his incarnate Son the "heir of all things." There was an economy of creation, before there was an economy of propitiation. And in that prior economy, he who became our Saviour, was, by voluntary arrangement in the divine Trinity, the creator of the worlds. It was meet that the same divine person should be the great worker in the new creation. And he said, "Lo I come, in the volume of the book it is written of me." Then the Father said, "Deliver from going down to the pit ; I have found a ransom." The Creator is our Saviour. And therefore when we walk abroad by night, and consider the moon and the stars, we may say, "My Saviour made them all." When we go out by day, and observe the sun travelling from horizon to horizon, dispensing everywhere its genial light and heat, and notice, in its light, the whole world set out in order, as in a gorgeous "Exhibition" of the arts and manufactures of divinity, we may say, "that sun, and all the glories which it reveals, are the creatures of my Saviour, who is the Sun of my Righteousness." Everlasting thanks be unto God for so great a Saviour !

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#### HERESY.

IF we were to call everything heresy which men have called heresy, our *index expurgatorius* would consist of everything that can bless and purify and save the immortal spirit. We must condemn the sayings, doings, and teachings, of our Lord himself ; for the Jews condemned him for heresy. We must condemn the dying address of Stephen ; for he was stoned for heresy. We must not read the Epistles of Paul ; for "he worshipped the God of his fathers after the way which men called heresy." We must condemn the doctrine of justification by faith alone ; for Luther preached that, and was therefore accounted a dangerous heretic. In short, we must condemn every sermon that was preached, and every book that was written, by the long list of martyrs who sealed their testimony with their blood ; for they were all considered heretics. We must condemn Scotch Established Church, Free Church of Scotland, Church of England, Independent Church, Baptist Church, Wesleyan Methodist Church, and Evangelical Union Church ; for every one of these is considered heretical by that other church whose head quarters are in the eternal city. Yea, we must condemn that Roman Church too ; for it, in its turn, despite its Bulls, and Popes, and Cardinals, has also been called heretical.

Where then shall we go to find out what heresy is? Must our search for it be abandoned? Is it a mere *ignis fatuus*,—a figment of the imagination of men? Can it not be defined? Are there not certain and infallible marks by which it may be known? Is it a thing that has not, and never had, an existence? Quite the contrary. If we are to believe the Bible, there are such things as heresies. Paul tells us, Gal. v. 20, that among “the works of the flesh” there are “idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, *heresies*.” But he does not define them, or give us any distinguishing characteristics by which they may be known. And it might be dangerous in us to define what the apostle has left undefined. But although Paul has not told us what heresies are, Peter has given us an “inkling” of the subject, and that, too, in a very explicit and determinate manner. We find the important passage in 2 Peter ii. 1. It runs thus:—“But there were false prophets also among the people, even as “there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring “in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, “and bring upon themselves swift destruction. And many shall “follow their pernicious ways; by reason of whom the way of “truth shall be evil spoken of.” Here the apostle tells us, in language not to be misunderstood, what certain heresies are,—heresies of the very worst description. He does not, indeed, define all heresies. But he takes one which, in his eye, appeared to be either the sum-total of the whole, or the most impious and daring of them all, and that is,—for a man to “deny the Lord that bought him.” It may be that Peter remembered that dread night, when, after vowing to his Lord that “though all men should be offended because of him, yet would he never be offended”;—when, after watching with the patient and agonized sufferer in the garden of Gethsemane;—and when, after following afar off, he at last ventured into the High Priest’s palace, to see the end of the impious shew of trial, by which his Lord was condemned;—it may be that Peter remembered, that, while there, he denied, and that, not once, but three times, and that to a silly damsel, and that, too, with an oath, his loving Lord and master. It may be that, while writing the words we have quoted, he remembered the crowing of the cock on that eventful morn, and that he still saw with his mind’s eye that look which the calm and majestic, though suffering, Jesus gave him. It was one which he never could forget. It was one which touched the most tender chord that vibrated in his heart. It was one which opened the fountains of the great depths in his soul. And the deep conviction of the magnitude of his own base ingratitude may have led him to speak so strongly of this greatest of all heresies.

But whether this be the case or not, it will be becoming in us, when we speak of heresy, to take heed that we do not brand with the name, every one or any one who may happen to differ from us on certain subordinate views of divine truth, or whose creed does not exactly square with our own. But it will, on the other hand, be right to regard as very dangerous heresy indeed, the denial of the Lord of glory who bought us. And it may be one element of this dangerous heresy to deny that the Lord of glory has actually bought us, or that there are any of our immortal fellow-men anywhere whom he has not bought.

T. O.—G.

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WOULD YOU FOLLOW JESUS?

THE blessed Jesus once uttered the words, "IF ANY MAN WILL COME AFTER ME, LET HIM DENY HIMSELF, AND TAKE UP HIS CROSS, AND FOLLOW ME." (Matt. xvi. 24.)

The words are evidence that Jesus knew his own greatness. He knew that though in our world, he was not of it. Though he was clothed with our humanity, and was really a man, he knew that he was something more. He delighted, indeed, to proclaim, wherever he went, that he was "the Son of man"; but he also claimed on every suitable occasion to be the "Son of God,"—of the same nature with the heavenly Father, and thus truly divine. He knew that he was "God with man"; and he "thought it no robbery to be equal with God." Though on the one—the lower—side of his being, he was man; on the other—the upper—side of his personality, he was God. And in his two natures combined he was the only "Mediator between God and men." It is not wonderful, therefore, that he should be fully conscious of his own peerless elevation, at once in person and in office, and of his perfect fitness to fulfil the unexampled mission which he had undertaken. He did not need to blush to say, "Come unto *me*, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and *I* will give you rest;"—"I am the way;—no one cometh unto the Father, but by *me*:"—"I am in the Father and the Father is in *me*:"—"He that hath seen *me*, hath seen the Father also:"—and, "if any man will come after *me*, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me." There was not in all this the slightest tinge of unseemly egotism. Jesus knew that he was the Great Leader of men, the one captain of salvation, the only Shepherd of the lost sheep of the whole house of Adam. And hence

it was that he lifted up his voice again and again and again, and said "follow *me*."

"Follow me"! The echo of the words hangs upon the ear. "Follow me"! Every man on earth must be a follower. It is not in the power of any man living to be an absolute leader. There are, indeed, little leaders, in a comparative and subordinate sense of the term, here and there among men. Generals of armies are little leaders in their way. Kings and queens are little leaders in their way. Princes and noblemen are little leaders in their way. Millionaires and opulent manufacturers and merchantmen are little leaders in their way. Teachers and preachers are little leaders in their way. Men of literary genius, and the conductors of the press in the various countries of the world, are little leaders in their way. And every dining-room, and every drawing-room, and indeed every gathering of every description, every circle of every class of society, every clique, every coterie, has its own peculiar little leader or leaders. And the world could not get on without such little leaderships. Every circumference must have a centre. Every planetary system, material or moral, must have in its centre a sun or suns. If there were no subordinate leaderships among men, our very children would be unled: and if there were none to lead them, what would become of them, and what would by and by become of the whole of mankind ?

But still all the little leaders to whom we have referred, are followers far more truly than leaders. And thus their followers are only followers of followers. The little leaders of the present day are in general the mere followers of those who have gone before them in the same tracks. And those who have gone before them were in like manner followers of their precursors. It is only here and there that a veritable original is found. And when we come to things fundamental,—the moral principles on which life is mapped out and pursued, and made either a thing of goodness and gladness and glory, or a thing of evil and infamy and woe, we find no originals at all among men. In these things all men are followers. God only is original in what is morally good and glorious. And none but Satan is original in what is morally bad and bitter. All others are actors at second hand. They are followers. And thus the whole world of mankind may be divided into two great companies or "followings." There is first,—alas, that we should need to mention it first,—the "following" of Satan. It is as yet by far the larger of the two. But there is also the "following" of Jesus, which, though as yet in the minority, is destined to be by and by the overwhelming majority. When the enemy had come in, all over our earth, like a flood, Jesus said, "Lo I come." He flew to our rescue. He alighted

in the midst of men, and erected a standard for God, and for goodness, and for glory. And he cried "follow me,"—"follow me."

But he added, in all faithfulness, "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me." We cannot sufficiently admire the openness and candour of Jesus, as a leader. He unfurls no false colours. He holds out no unrealizable prospects. He does not even allure by the concealment of impending difficulties. Far be from Jesus—the blessed, the heavenly—the perfect—Jesus, such tricks of little leaderships. So far was he from using any such unworthy lures, that he puts into the very foreground of his appeals to erring men, the indispensable moral trial which all would require to submit to, who should determine to follow him, whithersoever he should lead.

He speaks of the "cross," and says that it must be taken up. The word has by this time of day become consecrated and dear to our thoughts and affections. It is consecrated and dear, just because of its connection with Jesus. He, by hanging on it, has hallowed it. "Christ the crucified"—the crucified for the weal of the world,—has crowned the cross. The word has thus gathered around it a halo of glorious associations; and

In the cross of Christ we glory,  
Towering o'er the wrecks of time,

for

All the light of sacred glory  
Gathers round its head sublime.

We say, without hesitancy, and feeling no extraordinary tax laid upon our moral magnanimity, "God forbid that we should glory, save in the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ." But at the time that the Saviour uttered the words, "if any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me," the term had no such grand associations. It had no associations whatsoever but those of a peculiar ignominy, a peculiar infamy, and a peculiar agony. The cross was not even a Jewish implement of punishment. It had been introduced by the Romans. And for this very reason, among others, as being a foreign thing, a thing that was thrust upon the Jews by a people who had overcome them, and fastened on their necks the yoke of political subjugation and subjection,—for this very reason it was an object of peculiarly intensified abhorrence. In the estimation of all the Jews who would be hearing the words of the Saviour, no greater calamity could befall a man, no greater indignity could be put upon him, than to compel him to take up his cross, and drag it to the place of crucifixion. To die by the sword, or by stoning, would be as nothing in comparison. Many who could fearlessly face such a death, because inflicted upon them in the



way which had been for ages the use and wont of their country, would shrink with the utmost horror from the bitterly intensified ignominy of incurring their decease on the cross.

Such was the state of feeling in reference to the "cross," at the time that our Saviour, as the chieftain of salvation, exclaimed, "if any man will follow me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me." When he uttered the unwelcome words, and especially the one peculiarly unwelcome word, there would be fainting of heart, we fear; and the shaking of the head; and some, we fancy, when they heard what was requisite in order to have a place in the "following" of the Lamb, would turn back, and "walk no more with Jesus."

But what is the effect of the Lord's words upon us? They really mean this:—if any man would be of Christ's "following," and go whithersoever he leadeth, go, as he leads, through life, and through death, and on and up to everlasting glory, he must have within him *the spirit of a martyr*. Nothing less than this is meant. The man who would be one of Christ's following, must have such a spirit within him, that he would be willing, *if need be*, to go, not only to the endurance of a violent death, but to the endurance of a death of the utmost possible ignominy, infamy, and agony.

*If need be*, we say. For well may we lift up our hearts to our heavenly Father, in adoring gratitude, that our lot is cast in an age, and in a country, in which no such fiery trial will, in all probability, require to be endured. Thanks to the noble army of martyrs who have preceded us, who, by dying nobly, have helped to win for us the liberty to live. We do not need, as was the case with thousands upon thousands who have gone before us, to seal our testimony with our blood. That awful baptism is not now required for new-born faith. Our "lines are fallen to us in pleasant places. And we can sit, each under his own quiet roof-tree, none making us afraid. Nevertheless, this is the mere accident of our country and our age. And though we do not need to resist the enemies of God and goodness and glory "unto blood," we do require to have that spirit within us, which would resist them unto blood, were it needful. We require to have that spirit within us which could stand, were it needful, amid fagots on fire, or which could be hung on the gallows, or stretched out in yet more awful agony and shame upon the cross. In other words, we require that spirit within us that prefers Christ to all on earth and to life itself,—that spirit that puts Christ upon the throne of the soul, and is prepared to endure any and every sacrifice that mortals could exact from us, or fiends devise for us, rather than have him dethroned and ousted from the heart.

All this, at least, is meant by our Saviour's words; for, after uttering them, he immediately added,—“for whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it: for what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?” He that is not prepared, if need be, to part with friends, and substance, and fame, and honour, and life, for Christ, must make up his mind to lose the everlasting life of the soul. But can you, O reader, submit to such a fearful alternative? Surely never; until, at least, you can learn such an amount of arithmetic, that you will be able to sit down and calculate the sum-total of the gain that you will get, when you lose your soul.

But while actual martyrdom is to all appearance far away from us, let us remember that there is something that lies on the same line with it, which is not so very far away. “If any man will come after me,” says Jesus, “let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me.” “Let him deny himself.” If he do not, he will never reach the crown. If *we* do not, *we* shall never reach the crown. It will be impossible for us to follow Jesus, whithersoever he would lead, into duty after duty all through life, into victory at death, and up into glory for eternity, unless we deny ourselves. We must deny ourselves to many an indulgence for which something within us is craving,—to many a gratification for which multitudes around us are willing to hazard their eternal all,—aye even, it is not unlikely, to many an innocent enjoyment.

Self-denial lies at the basis of all true heroism. None but a self-denying man can be a hero. None but a self-denying woman can be a heroine. None but the self-denying can be martyrs. None others can have the spirit of martyrs within them. None others can be really noble. Yea, none others can be spiritually beautiful. None others can be permanently well-off. None others will be for ever rich. None others can be kings and queens unto God. Self-denial is one of the first lessons that a mother or father has to teach the little child. And ten thousand chances of having life a failure and a moral wreck, hang over the head of the child who is not trained in infancy, and early boyhood or girlhood, to self-denial. Self-denial is the condition of purity in youth; and without it, as a stern spirit within the castle of the soul, no bolts and bars of learning, art, and science, will be of the smallest avail to keep ruin outside the full-grown man. It is for want of self-denial that there is such a being as a drunkard under the sun. It is for want of self-denial that foulness, in the dusk of the evening, is encouraged to parade itself on our streets. It is for want of self-denial that our young men in great cities are mowed down

as by the scythe. It is for want of self-denial that there are wars between nations, and feuds between families, and quarrels between even the nearest of earthly relations. It is for want of self-denial that discipline is needed in churches, and that some of the young in the most flourishing congregations are, through levity, bordering on the brink of what it is painful to think of or to conceive. It is for want of self-denial that men sin. It is for want of self-denial that men continue in sin. It is for want of self-denial that men go down to woe. We need scarcely formally add that it is for want of self-denial that so few seek to follow conscience, and to follow Jesus; and that so many follow the multitude, just because it is the multitude, to do evil.

Does any one ask, where he might get the spirit of self-denial. The question can be answered. The spirit of self-denial may be got. It is one of the blessings which are stored up for men in "the fulness of the Godhead," as that fulness is in Jesus. It is in the cornucopia of good and perfect gifts, which is held out to us in the hand of our Saviour. And whosoever will "come to Jesus," will get it. Before any can follow Jesus, as among his "followers,"—before they can follow him whithersoever he leadeth, and up into everlasting glory, they must "come" to him. And whosoever really comes to him,—comes, we mean, in spirit,—and stands beside him and looks up to him, and exclaims, "my Lord, my God, my Saviour,"—whosoever thus comes, will feel himself instantly inspired, not with peace only, and with joy unspeakable, and with hope of glory, but also with the spirit of self-denial,—that spirit which will nerve him to take up his cross and follow the Lamb "whithersoever he leadeth." O come to Jesus then. Come now! That is our closing word.

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#### REVIVAL REACTION.

SOONER or later, we apprehend, will there be a reaction from the Revival fervour, which has been so extensively experienced. And we should not be greatly surprised though some prominent individuals, who have very ultroneously given the movement their *patronage*, should by and by come forth and assure the public that they have been thoroughly disappointed, and have found the whole spiritual excitement resulting, not in good, but in a hot-bed of evils.

We do not, indeed, anticipate any such violent reaction within Evangelical Union circles. For the older ministers and members

of the Evangelical Union have brought with them experience from prior movements, which will have enabled them to guide the recent spirit of earnest feeling and inquiry, and which will have qualified them for dealing wisely with any undesirable eruptions, which are incidental to religious excitements.

But in other circles, we should imagine, there will be some lamentable consequences of imprudence, which will leave on a certain class of onlookers and approvers and patrons a most unhappy effect. Excitement of feeling, instead of being restrained and guided by instruction, has, in not a few cases, been stimulated and lashed into unnatural tension and straining. Meetings at unseasonable hours have been held. Promiscuous assemblies of the young by themselves, and of the young of both sexes, have been extensively encouraged. Zeal, without experience, and even zeal divorced from knowledge and prudence, has been unduly honoured, and has had indeed the reins of direction put into its hands. Intensity of feeling has been more regarded and deferentially treated than stedfastness of principle. Other mistakes have been committed. And the consequences will, in many cases, be exceedingly undesirable. Profession will be found to have been premature. Fancies of spiritual superiority will have been engendered in minds, in which there is little of the sublime reality. Boldness in throwing out uncharitable reflections on others, will be regarded as something almost tantamount to demonstration, that the censurers are possessed of very high personal attainments in the divine life. And, in cases not a few, amid other circles, immoralities, that lie on the line of intensely heated affections, will be perpetrated.

When these things not only begin to happen, but become numerous, involved, and perplexing, reaction will set in. And the cause of revivals will be blamed for the consequences of the imprudences of those who were, perhaps, almost inclined to assert, for themselves, a semi-monopoly of the reviving influences of the divine Spirit.

But let the brethren and friends of the Evangelical Union continue "of good courage," and be "stedfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord." Tempering zeal with knowledge, they will be able to hold on the even tenor of their way, amid the ebbings as well as the flowings of public opinion, "through good report and through bad." After the reaction has spent itself for a season, action will again set in. And if we handle prudently "the truth" which we possess, we shall reap harvests of souls to the glory of our gracious Lord, and avoid the chief of the annoyances and excrescences which are the natural effects of imperfectly enlightened excitement in the things of religion.

## WAS THE APOSTLE PAUL SINLESS IN HIS OWN ESTIMATION?

“We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal.” Rom. vii. 14.

IN these words the apostle makes reference at once to the law of God, and to his own character. He makes reference to the law of God in the words,—“We know that the law is spiritual.” He makes reference to his own character in these, “but I am carnal.”

As both references are exceedingly suggestive and instructive, let us consider them.

I. The “law” referred to is manifestly the moral law—the great law which sums up its precepts in supreme love to God, and such love to our neighbour-men as we bear to ourselves. It is to this moral law that the apostle has been referring, in the immediately preceding context. Indeed, that entire paragraph of the epistle, which extends from 7th verse of the 7th chapter to the 25th inclusive, is a digression concerning the moral law. It is a paragraph intended to vindicate the purity and perfection of the moral law.

The apostle was led to introduce such a paragraph into his epistle, in consequence of a certain statement which he had made in the 14th verse of the preceding chapter, and which he had expanded and expounded in the first six verses of this. The statement is the following—“for sin shall not have dominion over you; *for ye are not under the law, but under grace.*” It is a statement which implies that the sanctification of the sinner is dependent on his deliverance from the law. But if this be the case, it might be supposed by those who had not mastered the apostle’s theology, that the law must be evil. Such an idea, however, is utterly at variance with the apostle’s ideas. None maintained more strenuously than he that “the law is holy, just, and good,” and that obedience to its precepts constitutes all the holiness of which creatures are susceptible.

What then is the explanation of the apostle’s statement,—a statement which really amounts to this,—that deliverance from the law is indispensable to holiness? Its explanation could not be reached unless it were borne in mind that the law comprises two distinct elements, which consequently enable us to look at it in two distinct aspects. One of its elements is precept; the other is penalty. Now it was, when the apostle was looking at the law in its element of penalty, that he said, “sin shall not have dominion over you; *for ye are not under the law, but under grace.*” He means that as believers are delivered, by the grace of God, from

the penalty of the law, they feel themselves constrained by the extraordinary love of God, to live, not to themselves, but unto him. The goodness that is found on the part of God overcomes, in the case of believers of the gospel, the evil that is found on the part of men.

Such is the simple and sublime doctrine of the apostle in reference to sanctification. The language employed by him, however, was peculiar. It was fitted, indeed, to suggest to certain ignorant minds erroneous ideas concerning the law. And hence, in order to prevent the entrance, or at least, the retention of such ideas, there is interposed the long digression in the 7th chapter, vindicatory of the law.

In that part of the digression that commences with the 14th verse and extends to the close of the chapter, the apostle is engaged in shewing, that notwithstanding the purity of the law, believers, who are such as himself, are so *imperfect*, that were they not delivered from its penalty, they could not possibly be saved: "We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal."

It will be noticed that the apostle speaks both of himself and of the moral law as objects of *knowledge*: "*we know* that the law is spiritual; but *I* am carnal," that is, "but *I know* that I am carnal." Though knowledge is the grand aliment of the intellectual part of our nature, it is only some departments of it that are open to all men. Other departments are shut up from the knowledge of all men but one. Of some departments, it may be said "*we know*;" while of others, it is only one individual who can say "*I know*."

The apostle makes reference to both of these departments of knowledge. He makes reference to a subject, concerning which it could be said, on the one hand, "*we know*,"—"we know that the law is spiritual;" and he makes reference to another subject, concerning which it could be said, on the other, "*but I know*,"—"I know that I am carnal." That which is within the soul of each man can be known, properly speaking, to no man but himself. It may be matter of opinion, or matter of belief, to other men; but it is matter of knowledge, only to himself. No man, probably, but the apostle himself, really knew that "he was carnal;" though, now that the apostle has revealed it, we may all believe it. But all who are enlightened by the gospel really know, and all others might know, that "the law is spiritual." Hence, while the apostle says, in his own person, "*but I am carnal*," (that is, but *I know* that I am carnal), he says, in the plural, "*we know* (that is, we all know,—who does not know?) that the law is spiritual."

We must notice particularly what it is which all christians know, and which all men may know, concerning the moral law. It is, that it is "spiritual."

What does the apostle mean by the expression ?

There are two senses in which the law may be said to be "spiritual." It may be so designated because of its end, or, because of its origin.

(1.) The moral law may be designated "spiritual" because of its end. Its aim is to regulate the spiritual part of man. True, it is also within its aim to regulate the corporeal part of our nature; so that every member of the body may be used in harmony with the will of God. Nevertheless, the law aims to regulate our corporeal part by first of all regulating our spiritual part. It seeks to regulate our thoughts and our feelings; and when our thoughts and our feelings are—through the mediation of our will—brought into harmony with the mind of God, then will our bodies be presented unto God "a living sacrifice, holy, and acceptable, our reasonable service."

The law, then, is spiritual in its aim. The spirit of man is its end. And, so far as the mere expression is concerned, it might be with a view to the exhibition of this great and important truth, that the apostle says, "we know that the law is spiritual."

(2.) The word "spiritual" may, however, be used to denote, not the end, but the origin, of the law.

As the end of the law is the spirit of man, so its origin is the Spirit of God. The law comes to the spirit of man; but it came from the Spirit of God. This may be the idea which the apostle intended to suggest, by using the word *spiritual*. Indeed, the word "spiritual" is often used in the New Testament with reference to the Holy Spirit: and, all things considered, it is perhaps most probable that such is its reference in the case before us.

The moral law comes from the Holy Spirit of God. It is the Holy Spirit of God who is the grand Revealer at once of our duties and of our privileges. It is he who has taken both of the things of God in general, and of the things of Jesus in particular, to show them unto us. He knows all things, yea the deep things of God and of Jesus. And he reveals whatever is needed for our present and everlasting weal. It was, then, a befitting thing that he should specially act in propounding to men the grand law of morals.

The Holy Spirit, in propounding to men the grand law of morals, doubtless acted willingly and cordially. The law is in harmony with his own mind and heart. It expresses his own thoughts and wishes. It expresses more indeed. It expresses the thoughts and wishes of the divine Father and of the divine Son. It expresses the thoughts and wishes of the undivided

Godhead. But as there is perfect harmony in the Godhead, the thoughts and wishes of the divine Father and of the divine Son are the thoughts and wishes of the divine Spirit himself. Hence the moral law may be most appropriately represented as "spiritual"—because it emanates from the holy divine Spirit—the Revealer of the whole Godhead.

But while the expression "spiritual" may be thus intended to indicate the *origin*, rather than the nature or essential character, of the moral law, it, at the same time, folds up within itself the implication that the law, which has come to man from the Spirit, is "holy, just, and good." The law bears the impress of its origin. As it is only the expressed will of the Holy Spirit of God, it must, like that holy will of which it is the expression, be "holy, just, and good." The law then is never to be blamed for the sins of those who are under it, or for the necessity of deliverance from its penalty which is laid upon those that would be emancipated at once from the practice and from the love of sin.

II. But we proceed now to notice what it was about himself which the apostle knew, and which, on the credit of his testimony, we may believe. "But I," says he, "am carnal." What does the apostle mean?

We would remark, at the outset, that the expression "carnal," used of such a being as man, cannot be understood absolutely. It must be understood relatively. It is not the case that any man, viewed either physically or morally, is wholly carnal. He is only partly, and hence relatively, carnal. The degree in which he is carnal must be determined according to the standard by which he is estimated.

As man may be estimated by various standards, or viewed from various standpoints,—there are various relative senses in which carnality may be affirmed or denied of him. It is because this is the case, that some have objected to the idea that the apostle is speaking of himself as a converted man, when he said "I am carnal"; and it is only when we forget that this is the case, that we shall feel difficulty on the subject.

Let us try, then, to determine in what relative sense it is true that the apostle was carnal, even at the very time that he wrote this epistle.

(1.) There is a physical sense in which all men, of all shades of moral character, may be said to be *carnal*. There are some beings who are pure spirits. God, for example. He is entirely without bodily parts. Now man too is a spirit. But he is a spirit incarnate. He is a spirit in flesh. Man, therefore, as dis-



tinguished from purely spiritual beings, may be appropriately said to be carnal. He is a flesh-clothed being.

But when the word "carnal" is used in this acceptation, it is used physically, not morally. It is used to designate something which distinguishes the nature, not anything which distinguishes the moral character, of man. In this sense of the term, Adam in Paradise was carnal; and all men whatsoever would have been carnal, even although there had been no sin in the world.

But it is manifest that the apostle does not employ the term in this acceptation. He employs it in a moral sense, as is abundantly evident from the succeeding expression which is associated with it—" (having been) sold under sin."

(2.) The word "carnal," when used in a moral sense, is applicable, in one of its relative acceptations, to that low class of men who are supremely devoted to the gratification of the appetites of the flesh. There are such men in the world. They are to be found, in greater or less proportions, in all countries. They live for the gratification of the appetites of the flesh. "What shall we eat"? or "what shall we drink"? or "where-withal shall we enjoy ourselves"?—these are with them, and day after day, the question of questions. They care nothing about the rise or fall of nations, about the progression of humanity, about the progress of art or science, about the flights of genius, or about the glory of God, except in so far as the enjoyment of their lusts may be interfered with or promoted. Such persons as these are most appropriately designated "carnal," in contradistinction to all the nobler classes of society, whether unconverted or converted.

Now could it be in this sense that the apostle says of himself "I am carnal"? Did he, on comparing himself with the masses around him, find that he belonged to those with whom the flesh is everything, and the intellect and the heart nothing, except in so far as they miserably minister to the pampering of the flesh? By no means. He could say to his fellow-believers, "Brethren, be followers together of *me*, and mark them which walk so, as ye have *us* for an ensample; (for many walk, of whom I have told you often, and now tell you even weeping, that they are the enemies of the cross of Christ, whose end is destruction, whose God is their belly, and whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things), for *our* conversation is in heaven, from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ." He says again, "I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my God."

(3.) The word "carnal," when used in a moral sense, is capable of another relative application :—it may be applied to all the un-

converted. It is far from being the case that all the unconverted are carnal, in the gross moral acceptation of the term. Many of the unconverted are distinguished for their elevation above whatsoever is sensual and grovelling. They shine with intellect. They are full of heart. They are characterised by nobility of soul. There is, however, an important moral sense in which they must all be catalogued among the class of the "carnal." They live under the predominating influence of those desires which terminate upon that scene of things with which we are connected by means of our flesh. Our flesh is related to earth and time; and its desires,—the desires which it originates within us, or which, when otherwise originated, are more or less controlled by it,—are bounded by the conditions of earth and time.

Now it is not wrong to have regard to earth and time. Far from it. We have to do with earth and time. It is not wrong to have desires, and strong desires, in reference to earth and time. Far from it. We must have desires in reference to all objects with which we see that we have to do; and we must have strong desires in reference to all the objects with which we have evidently much to do. It is wrong, however, very wrong, that beings who are capable of knowing that they are the creatures of God, that they are accountable to their Creator, and that they are destined for immortality, should have their desires bounded by earth and time, and repressed from aspiring and soaring to things unseen, eternal, and divine. It is wrong, very far wrong, to be "carnal" in the sense in which all unconverted men are carnal.

We do not mean, indeed, that no unconverted men have thoughts and aspirations and soarings of spirit after things unseen, eternal, and divine. We delight to think that there are many of them who are conscious of such soarings and aspirations, and who, in those soarings and aspirations, have the witness within themselves that a mightier than their own spirit has been striving within them,—that the Holy Spirit has been poured out upon them, and has been drawing their hearts heavenward and Godward and Christward. Nevertheless, so long as they remain unconverted, they continue to be *predominatingly* influenced by the things with which their flesh connects them; and those other and higher objects, which should engage their supreme affections, receive, at best, but a secondary place in their regards. Hence it is that in consideration of the predominating element in their character, they may be appropriately designated "carnal." They are, in the venerable language of the Bible, "carnally-minded"; they "walk after the flesh;" and when "the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh," the flesh prevails.

Was it then in this acceptation that the apostle used the term, when he said, "I am carnal"? No. The apostle had "obtained

like precious faith" with those to whom he was writing. "By grace he was what he was," and he was not what he had once been. Once, indeed, he had been "a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious," though "he did it ignorantly, in unbelief"; "but he had been washed; but he had been sanctified; but he had been justified." The apostle did obtain the victory over the flesh. He was "spiritual," and no longer thus "carnal." The apostle then was not carnal in that relative sense in which all unconverted men are carnal. The apostle was not an unconverted man. Neither does he refer to what he was while he was unconverted. Such an idea seems to be irreconcilable with the fact that the apostle, both in this verse and all that follows to the end of the chapter, employs verbs which refer us, not to time past, but to time present. He does not say "I *was* carnal." He says "I *am* carnal." In describing his past character in the preceding verses, he says, "sin *wrought* in me (not, *works* in me) all manner of concupiscence":—"I *was* alive without the law once":—"I *died*":—"I *found* to be unto death":—"sin taking occasion, by the commandment, *deceived* me, and by it *slew* me." But in this, and the following verses, he says, "I *am* carnal":—"I *allow* not":—"that *do* I not":—"that *do* I":—"I *consent* unto the law":—"in me *dwelleth* no good thing":—"the good that I would, I *do* not; the evil which I would not, that I *do*":—"O wretched man that I *am*": &c. The apostle then is not speaking of himself as he had formerly been. He is speaking of himself as he now was. And therefore the term "carnal" cannot be employed by him in that sense in which it is specifically appropriate to the unbelieving and unconverted.

(4.) But the word "carnal," in addition to the acceptation already specified, may, when morally understood, be used, and is actually used, to characterise such of the converted as are, relatively to other believers, much under the influence of things seen and temporal, and but little under the influence of things unseen, eternal, and divine. There is a diversity of attainment among the converted, just as there is among the unconverted. Some of the converted are far on in the career of holiness; others are lagging far behind. Some are mature Christians, fathers and mothers in Christ, who have reached the stature of perfect men and women in the family of God; while others are as yet only babes in Christianity, both as regards their views and as regards their feelings and conduct. Hence, while all converted persons are brought "under the powers of the world to come," and are, when compared with persons of their own class among the unconverted, "spiritual" persons, persons who are "led by the Spirit," the good and Holy Spirit of God; there are many of

them, who, relatively to their more advanced fellows, are "carnal." Compared with others in the heavenly kingdom, they are greatly swayed by the things with which the flesh connects them, and they are correspondingly but little swayed by the things which are revealed by the Spirit of God. Hence the apostle says to the Corinthians, 1st Epistle, 3rd chapter,—“And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal, even as unto babes in Christ.”

Might it then be in this relative acceptation of the word that the apostle says of himself, in the passage before us, “I am carnal”? No, not in this. The apostle knew and realized “that he ran, not as uncertainly; that he fought, not as one that beateth the air.” He could say, “I have fought a good fight; I have kept the faith.” He could say, “to me to live is Christ,—and the life which I live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.” Compared with most other believers, he was spiritual, very spiritual, and by no means carnal. Even to the most advanced in Christianity he could impart some spiritual gift; and to almost all, if not to all, he could without presumption say, as he said to the Corinthians, “Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ.”

(5.) But as certain converted persons may, in comparison with other and more advanced believers, be designated “carnal,” so the most advanced believers, perchance, may, when viewed in comparison with what they might have been, and should have been, feel constrained to say, “we are carnal.” Just as the lower class of unconverted persons, when estimated by the standard of the higher classes, may be relatively designated carnal, and as all the unconverted when estimated according to their several ranks, by the standard of the corresponding ranks of the converted, may be relatively designated carnal, and as some of the least matured of the converted may, when estimated by the standard of the more matured, be relatively designated carnal, so the most matured may, perchance, when estimated by the standard of what they might be, and should be, be also relatively designated carnal. There is a standard according to which they are still defective.

Now we conceive that it was in this relative sense that the apostle said of himself, “I am carnal.” He was not comparing himself with the moral offscourings of men. If he had been making such a comparison, he would never have called himself carnal; he would not have deemed it presumption or arrogance to have said, “I am spiritual.” Neither was he measuring himself with the mass of the unconverted. If he had been doing this, he must needs have felt constrained to adore the grace of God within him, and to say, “I am spiritual.” Neither was he contrasting him-

self with the little-grown or the ill-grown children of the family of faith. Amid these he was a perfect man, with all his senses duly exercised to discern both good and evil ;—amid these he was spiritual, pre-eminently spiritual, and not carnal. But he was contrasting himself as he was, with himself as he should have been ; he was comparing Paul the actual, with Paul the possible ; and he felt himself constrained to lay his hand upon his mouth, and to bemoan himself, and say, “ I am carnal.”

In all things relative, it is possible for opposite terms to be employed in reference to the same objects, when viewed in different relations. That which is correctly called long when viewed in one relation, may be correctly called short when viewed in another. That which is correctly called large when viewed in one relation, may be correctly called little when viewed in another. That which is correctly called near when viewed in one relation, may as appropriately be designated far off when viewed in another. That which is properly called high when viewed in one relation, may as properly be called low when viewed in another. That which is legitimately said to be excellent when considered in one relation, may be as legitimately represented as despicable when viewed in another. And so he who may be fittingly denominated “ spiritual ” when viewed in one relation, may be as fittingly denominated “ carnal ” when viewed in another.

Viewed in relation to the masses of his fellow-men, unconverted or converted, the apostle might be rightly called spiritual ; but when viewed in relation to what he himself might have been, and should have been,—when viewed in relation to what the “ holy, just and good ” law of God required him to be,—it was right, and not wrong, in him to say, “ I am carnal.”

It is worthy, however, of our observation, that the apostle takes upon himself to speak only of himself in this matter, and he does not associate, as is too often done, all his fellow-believers with himself. It is possible that some followers of Christ may have out-stripped the apostle Paul. We have probably no good reason to believe that Paul really excelled in practical christianity all the Christians who ever lived, or who may yet adorn the christian profession. It may be the case, then, that some have reached, or may yet reach, a stage of experience in which they will no longer need to say, “ we are carnal.” But Paul had not reached that stage. As he says to the Philippians, he was not “ already perfect.” (Phil. ii. 12, 13.) And it is painfully evident that there are, at least, very few indeed in the kingdom of heaven upon earth who have so far outstripped the great apostle, as to

make his language utterly inapplicable to them. Most of the holiest, we apprehend, will be prepared to take up the apostle's language, and, considering what they should have been, and what the law of God requires them to be, they will penitently say, "we know that the law is spiritual, but we are carnal, (having been sold under sin)."

## DOCTRINAL QUERIES.

## QUERY 1. IS PARADISE A MIDDLE STATE?

"In Luke xxiii. 43, Jesus says to the dying thief, 'To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise.' In John xx. we are told that on the first day of the week Mary came to the sepulchre and found not the body of her Lord. Upon his revealing himself and calling her by name, she recognised him; upon which he said (17th verse) 'Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father.'

"According to his own statement, our Lord had gone to paradise with the repentant thief three days previously. As he had not then ascended to his Father, does not this necessarily imply the existence of a middle state?" W. B. R.—E.

ANSWER. Whether there be "a middle state" or not, we scarcely think that the passages adduced afford a demonstration of its existence. For when Christ said to the thief "to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise," he referred to his disembodied condition. In saying again to Mary, "I am not yet ascended to my Father," he referred to his embodied state. In that element of him which could be "touched," he had not ascended to his Father.

## QUERY 2. CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE AS SON.

"Referring to the coming of the Son of Man with great power and glory, Jesus says, in Mark xiii. 32, 'But of that day, and that hour, knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.'—"How is this lack of knowledge on Christ's part reconcileable with the doctrine that the Son is equal with the Father in power and glory?" W. B. R.—E.

ANSWER. The passage referred to was perplexing to some of the ancients. It gave rise to a sect who were called the "Not-knowings" (*ἀγνοηταί*). Ambrose thought that the Arians had tampered with the text, and thrust the clause, apocryphally, into it. Augustin thought that it simply meant that our Saviour's mission had nothing to do with making known the time of his glorious appearing. But it is certainly far more natural to interpret the statement from the standpoint of our Lord's humanity, which was limited in knowledge, as in everything else. On the human side of his being, our Lord was not omniscient. He "increased in wisdom" (Luke ii. 52); and he must

thus have grown in knowledge, which is a part of wisdom. The statement is a beautiful incidental proof that the humanity of our Lord was not merged in his divinity. It did not become divine.

#### QUERY 3. PRAYER FOR FURY.

"How is the prayer of Jeremiah, when he asked God to pour out his fury upon the heathen, in harmony with the teaching of Jesus, when he enjoined His disciples to pray for their enemies?" A. W.—H.

ANSWER. The injunction to "pray for them who despitefully use us and persecute us" (Matt. v. 44, &c.) is no more intended to be absolutely unlimited in its application, than is the injunction, "resist not evil," or those other injunctions, "children, obey your parents in all things," and "wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord." When our enemies are God's enemies, and the enemies of the race,—when they have become pests in the world, there is a point at which the conditional desire may rise up to God in the purest benevolence,—"Lord, sweep away the moral nuisances!" We say the *conditional* desire, for it will always be implied, if not expressed, in the up-rising of a holy desire for the out-pouring of coming indignation, that the peoples or persons, who have become moral pestilences, are regarded as being, in their moral state, irrecoverable or irreclaimable. There are limits to God's forbearance with such; and it is not inconsistent for holy men to concur with God in His feelings of retributive indignation and opposition, when those limits are overpassed. The imprecation in Jeremiah, x. 25, occurs also in Ps. lxxix. 6; and the context in both passages shows that the parties referred to were the persistent enemies of godliness and God, as well as of the people of God.

#### QUERY 4. SIN OF UNBELIEF.

"Did Christ die for the sin of unbelief?" A. W.—H.

ANSWER. Assuredly. Otherwise, who could be saved? Who has not been guilty of unbelief? Christ did not, however, die for *final* unbelief, *the unbelief which a man carries with him out of time into eternity.*

#### QUERY 5. GOD NOT A GOD OF THE DEAD.

"I am in a difficulty about the passage which says, *for he is not a God of the dead, but of the living.* The question is, how is it that *all live unto Him?*" A. W.—H.

ANSWER. The passage occurs in Luke xx. 38. Compare Mat. xxii. 32. "All men live unto God," not in a moral but in a metaphysical sense. It is not the case, that is to say, that all men, as regards the voluntary activities of their being, "live unto God." They do not dedicate their life-energies to his service. It is only the converted, who thus, "live unto the Lord." (Rom. xiv. 8.) But it is the case that all men, as regards the involuntary essence of their being, "live unto God;"—that is, *they are alive in relation to God, even though they may be dead in relation to us.* The patriarchs were dead in relation to the Jews of our Lord's day, and in relation to Moses himself. In body they were non-existing. But they were alive in relation to God. In

spirit they were existing. And when God said, "I am—(not, I was)—the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," it was implied that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob still existed. And if they still existed, there was good reason for believing that the full complement of their being would be realized in the resurrection. Our Lord's argument assumes that the Sadducees would make no difficulty about the reanimation of the body, if they could obtain sufficient evidence of the immortality of the soul.

QUERY 6. GAL. III. 19.

"How was the law 'ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator?'"  
T. B.

ANSWER. The law was ordained "through angels," or "through the instrumentality of angels," and "in the hand," or, "by means of the ministry," "of a mediator." The mediator referred to was supposed by Origen, Chrysostom, Augustin, and most of the fathers, and by Calvin also, to be Christ. But the general opinion of modern expositors is undoubtedly the correct one, that the reference is to Moses. It was through his agency, on the human side of the transaction, that the law was ordained. And, on the divine side of the transaction, the agency of angels was employed. So the apostle here asserts, and no doubt in perfect accordance with fact. For although angels are not specifically referred to in the narrative contained in the Pentateuch, they are referred to by Stephen in Acts vii. 53, when he speaks of the law being "received by the disposition of angels." The writer to the Hebrews also refers to them in chap ii. 2, where he speaks of "the word spoken by angels," that is, "the law." It is noticeable, too, that in the Septuagint version of Deut. xxxiii. 2, the expression, which is rendered in our version, "from his right hand went a fiery law for them," is translated, "On his right hand angels (were) with him." Josephus understood that the ministry of angels had been employed on the occasion referred to, for in his Antiquities, xv. 5. 3, he speaks of "the best part of the doctrines and laws (of the Jews) as having been learned by them from God *through angels*." See also Psalm lxxviii. 17, "the chariots of God are twenty thousand, *even thousands of angels*; the Lord is among them *as in Sinai*, in the holy place." And when we consider what is said in Ps. ciii. 20, Heb. i. 14, etc., it is intrinsically exceedingly probable that their ministry would be employed in Mount Sinai, although Moses himself does not expressly mention the fact.

QUERY 7. HEB. IV. 3.

"What are the works which we read of as being finished from the foundation of the world?" T. B.

ANSWER. Not *man's works*, as Ebrard supposes; but, we presume, those *works of God*, which are specified in Genesis i.

QUERY 8. ROM. VI. 4.

"How are Christians 'buried with Christ by baptism into death'?"  
T. B.

ANSWER. We learn from Rom. vi. 3, that Christians are "baptized



into Christ," that is, they are united to Christ by means of baptism,—the baptism, to wit, of the Holy Spirit. (See 1 Cor. xii. 13, and compare 1 Pet. iii. 21; Mat. iii. 11.) But, being "baptized into Christ," they are "baptized into his death," that is, they are united to him in his death. Their union, however, extends farther. It extends to his burial and resurrection. They are not only "crucified with Christ," they are also "buried with him," and "raised again" into "newness of life." Believers, in other words, are treated by God, in their relation to eternal things, as if they had been crucified and buried and raised again with Christ Jesus. If they had been actually parts of his person, when he was actually crucified and buried and raised again, they would now be "in heavenly places." (Eph. ii. 6.) But their celestial inheritance is as certain to them, as if they had already entered upon its possession.

QUERY 9. MAT. XV. 24.

"What did Jesus mean by saying that he was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel?" T. B.

ANSWER. He referred to the limits of his personal ministry, while he continued on the earth. A beginning required to be made somewhere: and it was naturally made among the Messianic people. Missionaries of the cross required to be trained somewhere; and it was natural to train them among the Jews.

QUERY 10. THE OBJECT OF SAVING FAITH.

"Does 'believing that Jesus is the Christ' comprehend the whole Gospel? Or can a sinner believe 'that Jesus is the Christ' and yet be unsaved?" T. B.

ANSWER. One may certainly believe the simple verbal proposition that "Jesus is the Christ," and yet be both unsanctified and unsaved. But if one believe in the great spiritual realities which are involved in the Christship of Jesus, he is in the presence and under the interpenetrating and renovating influence of the mightiest moral motives in the universe. Abiding there he will be sanctified; and because he will be sanctified, he is saved.

QUERY 11. BAPTISM AND THE LORD'S SUPPER—SHOULD THEY NOT BE ADMINISTERED TO ALL?

"If baptism and the Lord's supper in every case symbolize a *truth*; if their testimony is ever veracious; if the Lord's supper signify that provision which God has made in the atonement for human sinners without distinction; if baptism signify the purity-imparting influence of the Holy Spirit, which God has provided for human souls without exception (see *Repository*, vol. iv. pp. 273-4); ought not the two ordinances (like the gospel) to be administered to 'all people' indiscriminately?" A. J.—K.

ANSWER. While the Lord's supper, on the divine side of it, is an Exhibition, and an Exhibition of a Reality, which must remain a Reality whatever be the character of the communicant; yet, when it is observed, a human side is added. Besides the symbolical exhibition of a reality

on the divine side, there is, on the human side, the symbolical appropriation of the reality symbolically exhibited. But if there were no actual appropriation of the reality, the symbolical appropriation would be a falsehood in action. The communicant who partakes of the symbolical bread and wine, symbolically professes to have appropriated to his soul the things wherewith the atonement was accomplished. The same principle applies to baptism, whether as administered to adults, or as administered to infants. Whoever submits to baptism professes to recognise, realise, and prize the purity-imparting influence of the Holy Spirit. Whoever presents his child to receive baptism, makes the same profession. He professes his faith in the work of the Divine Spirit, as the grand means whereby the human spirit is to become pure. But faith in the work of the Divine Spirit presupposes faith in the work of the Divine Son.

#### QUERY 12. CONSCIOUSNESS.

“Is it proper to say that we are conscious of the entity, which is the subject of our thinkings, feelings, and volitions? Or, is it more correct to regard ourselves as conscious only of mental acts and experiences, and as having the idea of the entity that thinks and feels and wills given us by the reason, that faculty by which we have first truths?”  
A.—H.

ANSWER. The question runs up into the legitimate acceptance of the terms “consciousness” and “reason.” And psychologists are not agreed as to the extent of the area of import which should be assigned to them. As regards consciousness, the composition of the term seems to us to indicate that it properly denotes that special and very limited sphere of knowledge, which is realized, when *the subject knowing is the object immediately known*. If this be accepted as a proper definition of consciousness, then we think that it would be wrong to say, with Sir William Hamilton, that we are not only conscious of perceiving, say, a book, but are also “conscious of the book perceived.” We would also object to the expression, so common among the German theological philosophers, “our God-consciousness.” We would confine the application of the term to what is within the sphere of the subject knowing. The objective comes under the cognisance of consciousness, only when the objective is also subjective. We see no reason, however, for limiting the reference of the term to “mental acts and experiences.” Indeed, as there are no such things in reality as abstract “mental acts and experiences,” so, there are no such things in consciousness as mental acts and experiences abstracted from the mind acting and experiencing. When I am conscious of “mental acts,” I am conscious of “*my* mental acts.” When I am conscious of “mental experiences,” I am conscious of “*my* mental experiences.” My consciousness, in other words, covers such an area of reality as is represented by the word “*my*” in addition to the words “mental acts and experiences.” In other words still, consciousness always involves self-consciousness. And of course self is something more than self’s acts and experiences.

As to reason, again, if it be defined as “the faculty by which we have first truths,” then we must understand what is intended by the

expression "first truths." If it designate truths, which are characterized by universality and necessity, then the affirmation "I am," as made by a self-conscious creature, is not an intuition of reason. The intuition of reason would be thus expressed,—“I must be.”

**QUERY 13. ARE WE CONSCIOUS OF FACULTIES?**

“Are we conscious of the faculties of our minds, as faculties, or only of their exercises? And, is it from these exercises that we reach a knowledge of the faculties, as faculties?” A.—H.

**ANSWER.** This question is virtually answered in our reply to the preceding one. The exercises of faculties are not entities abstracted from the faculties. They are just the faculties-in-exercise. And the faculties-in-exercise are not entities abstracted from the mind. They are just the mind itself in a given phase or state. And if the mind be self-conscious at all, it will assuredly be conscious of itself as existing in a variety of phases or states.

**QUERY 14. ARE WE CONSCIOUS OF FREE-WILL?**

“Are we conscious of free-will, as a faculty of mind? Or are we conscious that our volitions have the characteristic of freedom? and do we intuitively ascribe them to free-will, as the faculty of which they are the exercise?” A.—H.

**ANSWER.** If we be “conscious that our volitions have the characteristic of freedom,” we must, we presume, be conscious of the characteristic of freedom, that is, we must be conscious of freedom. When we really choose, we freely choose. And in being conscious that we freely choose, we must be conscious that we have power to choose, and by consequence, in virtue of the law of opposites, that we have power to refuse. It is thus that we are disposed to view the matter.

**QUERY 15. HEB. II. 14.**

“Is the death spoken of in Hebrews ii. 14, of which the devil, whom Jesus became incarnate to destroy, has the power, temporal death? Or is it ‘the second death?’ and is the devil said to have the power of it because he has power over those who live in sin, and decoys them down to the regions of despair?” A.—H.

**ANSWER.** We are disposed to agree with Calvin in regarding the death referred to as that which is the full and proper penalty of sin. When considered subjectively in relation to God, it is “wrath to the uttermost.” When considered objectively in relation to God, and subjectively in relation to sinners, it is that dreadful issue of the divine wrath, which is experienced in the destruction of the happiness of the soul. While this death stretches forward, far in advance of the death of the body; it is not, probably, with an exceedingly sharp line that we are to distinguish between them. When the penalty is looked at from the stand-point of life-in-time, the death of the body may appear to be a prominent part of the dread reality. When it is contemplated, again, from the stand-point of life-in-eternity, then the death of the body, being at the further extremity of the object viewed, may dwindle almost out of sight.

## QUERY 16. THE CRUCIFIXION.

“Was it really necessary that our Saviour, Jesus Christ, should be lifted up on the cross to complete the atonement? If so, then does it not follow that wicked men helped to make the atonement?” W. S.

ANSWER. We think that to suppose that the particular mode of putting to death, which was realized in the lifting up of our Saviour on the cross, was essential to the validity of the atonement, is to confound things incidental with things essential. It would, moreover, involve the consequence pointed out by our querist—that men helped to make the atonement.

## QUERY 17. CHRIST IN HEAVEN.

“It has perplexed many minds to understand how the Saviour, after his resurrection, could ascend to heaven and “appear in the presence of God for us” in a corporeally invested form. The difficulties of the subject, believed to be insuperable, have been somewhat defiantly urged by a certain school of anti-supernaturalists against the claims of the New Testament to divine inspiration. In what way are these difficulties either obviated or mitigated? Is the obviation or mitigation of the difficulties to be sought for, presumably, in the peculiar qualities of the resurrection-body which He ‘put on,’ and with which He ascended? Or where?” J. L.

ANSWER. If there be a spirit-world at all, and if there be spirits, with spiritual bodies, inhabiting that world, we cannot conceive any real difficulty attaching to our Lord’s translation to it. If those, who admit the existence of such a world, find any special difficulty in what is said of our Lord, it must, we should imagine, arise from some gross conception of what it is that constitutes a spiritual body.

## QUERY 18. DID CHRIST DIE IN VAIN?

“Again and again, in conversing with persons of Calvinistic predilections on the subject of the universality of the propitiation, it is, almost invariably, objected, that if the doctrine be true, *the propitiation will have been made in vain for a very large proportion of the race.* The reference is, of course, to the finally lost. Now, many answers have been devised to meet the point of this astute objection; but, in my opinion, they are only proximate in their aim, and do not go far enough. There is, however, I presume, an ultimate answer to it. What is it?” J. L.

ANSWER. The ultimate answer to the objection will no doubt be found in the ultimate aim of Christ in making the propitiation. That ultimate aim must have been, we presume, to glorify God. The next step down, in the spiral series of aims, might land us in the benevolent determination to bless the whole moral universe. Next to that might be the aim to bring salvation within the reach of every human being. If all these aims are realized, who can say, with reason, that the atonement was in vain?

## QUERY 19. JESUS THE WAY TO BE HAPPY.

“When it was said in a recent number of the *Repository* (No. 15, p. 189), that “*Jesus is the way to be happy*,” what is it that is specifically meant? The motto-like remark is intended to inculcate a rule of life, and it is just because it is such that I wish to understand it. What, then, are the ideas of which it is componently made up?” J. L.

ANSWER. We should require to write a book, if we were to unfold all the component ideas. But if Jesus is “the way to the Father,” so that no one can get to the Father but by him; doubtless he is “the way” to the pleasures for evermore that are to be found in the presence of the Father. The great idea is this,—that all men will fail to obtain full, satisfying, enduring happiness, who do not consciously make use of Christ, or of the work of Christ, to guide them how to act in all their relationships. The question of questions for every-day life is this, *what am I bound to do in virtue of the work of Christ?* or, more simply, *what is it that Christ would have me to do?*

## QUERY 20. COVENANT.

“The obsolescent word, ‘covenant,’ is used with striking frequency in both divisions of the Scriptures. Is it, may I ask, the aptest word possible to reproduce the divine idea or ideas of the original? If the English word means an agreement between two or more persons with a mutuality of conditions, and, therefore, a mutuality of obligation, can this, in every instance of the Biblical use of the word, be the idea that ought to be taken up?” J. L.

ANSWER. We desiderate a better word than “covenant.” And undoubtedly “covenant,” if the term be squeezed till every particle of juice that is in it come out,—is a very inadequate word to express the realities often designated by it. A mutuality of conditions is generally implied. But it is not so generally implied that there was or is a mutual agreement. God’s arrangements in reference to men involve in general mutuality of conditions; but certainly God does not always ask our consent to his arrangements. It is his prerogative to make his arrangements, and then command our compliance.

## QUERY 21. COVENANT.

“Since the word ‘covenant’ is of such frequent employment in the English Scriptures, perhaps it is not to be wondered at that it should have been thence imported into theological literature, despite its assumed mal-appropriateness. But when, for example, the compilers of the Shorter Catechism speak of ‘the covenant made with Adam,’ and of ‘the covenant of grace’ into which God entered with the elect, and of ‘the benefits of the covenant of grace,’ do they not, in servilely copying an uninspired translation of inspired terms, misrepresent the divine reality? Did God ‘make a covenant with Adam?’” J. L.

ANSWER. God did not make a covenant with Adam, in the sense of asking Adam’s consent to the arrangement that he made in reference to the influence of Adam’s acting, on himself for example, or on his

posterity. In "the covenant of grace," again, the covenanting parties are theologically represented as being, in the first place, God and Christ. The elect are considered as parties in virtue of being "in Christ." The representation is an instance of running an imperfect word out of breath.

QUERY 22. THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD.

"If God is an infinite Father to humanity, must he not be free from all imperfection whatever; and if free from imperfection, and without limitation, may we not correctly say, that all other relations which God sustains to sinful man, are comprehended under his fatherly relation?" D. B. M.

ANSWER. We do not see that the fact of God's infinitely perfect fatherhood warrants the conclusion, that all his other relations to men are but modes of the fatherly. Men, for example, are in the midst of a great cosmical system, and are mightily influenced by it. But it is God who is the Great efficient cause of the operations of cosmical nature; and we cannot conceive that, as standing in that relation to us, he acts in no other way than as a Father. When he acts by earthquakes, for instance, and overthrows an entire city in a moment, or when he acts by thunder and lightning, we do not look upon his agency as being simply paternal. God's relationship to us is many-sided.

QUERY 23. SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST ACCIDENTAL OR ESSENTIAL?

"Would it be correct to describe the sufferings of our Saviour as accidental, rather than necessary, in the great work he accomplished for us? Could there have been an atonement without them? If they were necessary, who or what made them so?" D. B. M.

ANSWER. If the atonement be a sacrifice for sin, we cannot conceive of it being accomplished without suffering. If the atoner was a sacrificial Lamb, provided by God to bear the sin of the world, we cannot but think that the Lamb must be slain. The nature of the case involves the necessity of the suffering. But the nature of the case is complex. Man's sin has to do with it. Man's recovery has to do with it. The weal of other worlds of moral beings has to do with it. God has to do with it, at once in his legislative, executive, and judicial relationships. Angelic sinners have to do with it. &c., &c.

QUERY 24. THE INFLUENCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

"What essential difference, if there is any, subsists between the influence of the Holy Spirit in the Mosaic economy, and the influence of the Holy Spirit in the economy of redemption?" D. B. M.

ANSWER. There is no difference, we conceive, as regards essential nature, between the influence of the Holy Spirit under the old dispensations, and his influence under the new dispensation. The "economy of redemption" embraced, as an integral part of itself, the Mosaic economy. But it was then, so far as historical development is concerned, in a rudimentary phase. When the preparations for the accomplishment of the facts of the atonement became completed, and

when the facts of the atonement became accomplished, there were immensely wider channels opened up for the distribution of the convincing and converting and sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit.

QUERY 25. DEMONIAL POSSESSIONS.

“Are we to regard the demoniacal possessions, mentioned in the New Testament, in a literal sense?” J. L. N.

ANSWER. We are disposed to do so. There is a marvellous interrelation of the spiritual and the material worlds.

QUERY 26. DEMONIAL POSSESSIONS.

“Were such possessions confined to the days of Christ? If so, why?” J. L. N.

We do not think that the possessions were peculiar to that age; although we think that the modes of spirit-influences may have tides and ebbs,—arising from occult circumstances which affect the influence of great cosmical laws.

QUERY 27. DEMONIAL POSSESSIONS.

“Are we to regard such possessions as a criterion by which to judge of the moral state of those who were possessed? If not, were they objects of pity rather than blame?” J. L. N.

ANSWER. We would discriminate. Some cases we would regard as retributive; and some as involving irresponsibility, at least in the individuals directly affected.

QUERY 28. THE EARTH CREATED FOR CHRIST?

“Is it proper to speak of this world having been created for Christ; with *special reference to his propitiatory work*?” J. L. N.

ANSWER. We can conceive that some elements of the idiosyncrasy of the material world are due to the predetermination to send Christ. This predetermination, however, we would regard as founded on prevision,—the prevision of the fall of men. We cannot conceive that men were created to sin in order that Christ might be sent to save. This would be doing evil that good might come;—a thing, says the apostle Paul, which it is just to visit with damnation. (Rom. iii. 8.)

QUERY 29. WAS IT NECESSARY THAT CHRIST BE LIFTED UP?

“In John iii-14, it is written, ‘Even so must the Son of man be lifted up.’ Do these words imply that the *efficacy of his atoning death consists* in that particular *mode* of accomplishing it? Or how would you explain the passage?” J. L. N.

ANSWER. See Answer to No. 16. We must distinguish between the essential and the incidental. The propitiatory death was essential. But the form of “lifting up” was doubtless incidental, and referred to by the Saviour in virtue of his prevision.

## QUERY 30. DESTINY OF THE IGNORANT.

"What do you suppose will be the future destiny of those who, by being under the influence of false *teaching* and *Teachers*, are as ignorant of the way of salvation as the *heathen* who have no opportunity of knowing it?" J. L. N.

ANSWER. God himself, we conceive, is the teacher of all men; and all men are bound to learn of him. In the vital matter of salvation, no man is freed from obligation to search for himself, that he may know what is the mind of God. In that matter we must call no man on earth absolute master.

## QUERY 31. FAITH AND LOVE.

"If all grace is love, and if faith is a grace, does it not follow that faith is *love*?" W. R.—A.

ANSWER. There is a difference between "grace" and "a grace." Faith is not "grace," but "a grace." Considered as a divine gift, faith is not "favour," but "a favour." It is not subjective in relation to God, but objective. It is an emanation or development of divine favour, grace, or love.

## QUERY 32. FAITH AND PEACE.

"Can a man believe that Jesus died for him, and yet not have peace with God?" W. R.—A.

ANSWER. He cannot, if his faith go beyond mere words to the realities represented by them. If a man, pressed for money to pay a debt of nine hundred pounds, believes that a thousand pounds are lying for him underneath his hearth-stone; he will feel and act accordingly. He will lift the stone, or get it lifted.

## QUERY 33. CHRIST'S THANKFULNESS FOR THE HIDING OF "THESE THINGS."

"In Matthew xi. 25, we read, 'At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.' Does Jesus thank his Father for hiding the gospel from the wise and prudent?" W. R.—A.

ANSWER. Compare the context in Luke x. 21. It is somewhat difficult to determine the reference of "these things." But certainly we cannot suppose that the Saviour meant those things which constitute the essence of saving truth. It is not unlikely, however, that he refers to many of the glorious things connected with himself as men's Saviour, and which are hidden from all those who will not "consider and be wise," who will not "learn of the Father, that they may be drawn to the Son." (Jo. vi. 44, 45.) It is to be remarked that the real occasion of the thankfulness of the Saviour, is the revelation to the babes of the glorious things referred to. De Wette and others compare the expression in Rom. vi. 17, "God be thanked that ye were the servants of sin, but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine into which ye were delivered."



## QUERIES ON PERSONALITY.

*To the Editor of the Evangelical Repository.*

DEAR SIR,—I believe in the apophthegm that affirms that "truth's a torch, the more it's shook, it shines"; and believing it, I shake it often, and if often without any appreciable augmentation of illumination, sometimes it is otherwise, and at every shake it shines the more. Whether the subjects of the sequel of this inquiring epistle belong to the *intima philosophia*, and whether on that account I should not have "intermeddled" with them, I must leave for you to determine. They are subjects, however, which have, "for a time and times" forced themselves in upon my thoughts. Nor were they unwelcome visitors. I entertained and yet entertain them; but as in courting them for the inner secrets of their nature, I have not by any means succeeded, I have thought of recourse to you.

What is, or what is involved in, personality? Man is a person. I am a person. I distinguish myself, and I am distinguished by others, as a personal being. I am a person, I understand, because I am a man, and, correlatively, I am a man because I am a person. Personality and manhood are, as terms, interchangeable, and express but one indivisible unit of reality. Is this a true finding? [See Remark A.] If it is, what are the elements, if there be indeed a plurality, which constitutively make up man's personality?

Of this, at the outset, I certify myself, that whatever personality componently be, it is something that partakes of the nature of mind, not of the nature of matter. It must be a psychological, not a physiological, thing. [B.] It is a something, besides, that belongs to, and inheres in, the mind human, in opposition to the mind animal. It must, if the animals, which we deem inferior beings to ourselves, owe their inferiority to their want of that personality which we monopolizingly possess. A dog has no proper personality, however sagacious he may be, and never can have, however well-trained and "educated" he may be. Its possession, then, is the exclusive dignity of man. It differentiates him from the animals, and them from him. What then is human personality?

The answer to this question must of course be fetched from the regions of the mind within. I must descend, if I can, into the depths of my spiritual self. I must, in other words, introspect my own consciousness, and ascertain, if I can, what are its fundamental elements. Mind, however, is a unit, and if I be unable for myself, introspectively, to read off the phenomena which emerge on the surface of my own consciousness, I can have recourse to the general science of mind, and in its accredited facts find the reflections of my inner self. Psychology is that science; and to it I at once betake myself for materials wherewith to make answer to the question, what is personality?

Psychology, then, teaches me that it is one of the essential properties of all minds to think. The teaching is obviously true. It is of the very nature of mind to think. [C.] It cogitates. It conceives thoughts; and this is an inalienable property. And men, being minds, if minds enshrouded in corporeal bodies, do think. But if they do, they cannot claim a monopoly of the function, for the inferior animals, having minds, think also. [D.] If they do, then I may at once conclude that the mere possession of the psychological power of thinking does not necessarily imply the possession of personality. All personal beings think, but all thinking beings are not persons; otherwise animals are persons.

Again psychology informs me that feeling, as well as thinking, is an essential quality of mind. [E.] And men, therefore, feel, as well as think. But it is not any exclusive peculiarity of the human mind to feel, any more than it is one of its exclusive peculiarities to think. For animals feel, just as truly as they think. It is a mind-quality which they hold in common with their superior, man. As feeling then is a property common to the two species of minds, and as personality, the thing in quest, is not common to both, I may conclude, for the second time, that, in the element of mere feeling, personality does not of necessity inhere.

To will, that is, to form choices, the science of mind makes known to me, is a third psychological element. Man wills as truly as he both thinks and feels. He makes voluntary choices as often as he either voluntarily thinks or feels. But here, again, is a quality which is shared by the inferior animals: they have wills and they form

choices. [F.] If they do, then I may again for the third time conclude, that in the mere ability to will there is not necessarily a proper personality. Very well. But if the thing I seek be found neither in the capacity of thinking, considered simply as such, nor in the susceptibility of feeling simply as such, nor yet in the power of willing by itself, as such, where may it be found? After all, is personality in willing, feeling, and thinking? Or is it something else? It can hardly be anything specifically different from one or other of these triple energies, inasmuch as they exhaust the cardinal capacities of mind. It is another doctrine of psychological science, that every single phenomenon of mind is realised in the exercise of one or other of them, and that all that transpires on the field of consciousness is either a mode of thought, or a mode of feeling, or a mode of willing. And yet all these modes of mind are realized in minds where personality is not inherent. What then can it be? The darkness deepens in this direction. I turn round, and lo! I see, or fancy I see, light in the very direction I have already travelled.

Do I hallucinate or not? But is not personality discoverable in the nature of the objects, about which man can exercise his thinking, feeling, and willing? Is not, consequently, this all-important difference between man and the mere animal more objective than subjective? [G.] Is it not in his ability to think a certain class of thoughts and to feel and to will in consequent harmony with them? Is this the key to the secret? If it is, can the class of objects which he can thus exclusively apprehend be other than the moral class?

Man is a moral being, and herein, at last, I think is the peculiar element of his personality. He thinks; but it is the glory of his thinking faculty that it apprehends the indestructible distinctions which constitute the basis of all morality. He can think moral thoughts. He has the cognition of moral obligation. He has the idea of duty. His intelligence is constituted to recognise the morally right as essentially distinct from the morally wrong. He is a being with a conscience; and the principal function of conscience is to apprehend the *ought* and *ought not* of every intelligent act. Of all this the animal is utterly incapable. It is destitute of all moral ideas. It is wholly conscienceless. Of moral obligation, therefore, it does not, and cannot, know anything. It has no moral nature; [H.] and hence it is not a person. Moral beings, that is to say, beings capable of moral character, are the only persons. And man is thus a person.

Is this "sound doctrine that cannot be condemned?" If it is, I would henceforth glory in my personal nature as the jewel of my whole being. I would too, henceforth adore Him who is the glorious giver of it, and requite the goodness which prompted the ineffable gift by cherishing it with unremitting care. My moral personality is the innermost part of my nature, and it is the part which, because it fits me to eschew the morally bad and to ensue the morally good, is the part that, at the same time, guarantees to me the prospect of lasting moral progression. It is the part in which, above all, I can realize my utmost likeness to God himself. I magnify my personal nature.

If this excogitation be true, then must another view of the nature of personality, put forth by one in authority, be untrue. It is Müller, I think, who, in his book on sin, defines personality in man. His definition is, that it is made up of two moments, namely, self-consciousness and self-determination. But this specification of particulars appears to me to be decidedly incorrect. For if these be the elements of moral personality wherein is man made to differ from the animals below him? Have they not self-consciousness; which is the first? And have they not self-determination, in some sort, which is the second? If they have, where then is the differentiation? It is nowhere. And how then shall we verify our superiority, or how fortify ourselves against the Darwinian likelihood that by and by the animal will emerge in the human? [I.]

Involved in the determination of the nature of personality is this question:—are personalities necessarily immortal? I ask the question that I may express my opinion to you, that they are. They are, I think, because personal beings, from the very nature of their moral personality, can never arrive at a point in their history at which their existence could be complete. It must then always continue. The peculiarity, I think, of the life of a moral being is, that the existence of one conscious moment necessitates another. The first needs the second for its retributive complement: and

were the life to stop, therefore, at the end of the first, it would be incomplete. Such, it appears to me, is the relation of the units of duration in the case of personal moral beings. Their duration is consequently interminable. They have a beginning, but not an ending. If they had, it is not easy to see how the fitness of things, how the necessities of the harmony of the moral universe, could be satisfied. "The brutes perish;" but only because they are "brutes." There is, therefore, no inherent reason in their constitution for their immortality. But it is man's personal moral nature, as that is interpreted by me, and not its mere immateriality, that is the basis of his immortality.

But I would now, with becoming humility, ascend in my inquiring thoughts. Would that I had a stronger pinion and a more penetrating eye. I would ascend from the littleness of my own finity to the vastitude of the divine infinity. The idea of my own finite personality inevitably suggests the antithetic idea of the infinite personality of God. And it is suggested as the prior causative reality. I am, because God was as well as is, and ever will be. My personal being is an effect of the divine personal cause; and the idea of the one involves the idea of the other. The two ideas appear to me as the synchronous objects of the same intuition. [K.] Is personality in God, then, identical in nature with personality in man? Is He, the infinite Being, the infinite Archetype of all other persons? May I venture to anticipate, and say, He is?

How marvellously, and yet how gloriously, is the divine mirrored and miniaturized in the human! How strange it is, that in every act of knowing ourselves, there is necessarily involved an act of knowing the infinite; and that we have been constituted to realize intuitively this synthesis of the knowledge of the human and the divine. I apprehend my own personal nature, and I at the same time apprehend the divine personal nature. Mine is a moral nature. It apprehends and appreciates moral ideas and distinctions. And what it thus does according to the measure of its finite capacity, the infinite nature does according to the measure of its infinity. All moral ideas whatsoever are apprehended by the infinite intelligence. If they were not, how could any such ideas have ever entered the finite intelligence? And what are thus infinitely apprehended are also appreciated by the infinite heart. God not only knows them but he has complacency in them. He infinitely approves of them; and thus they become at once reasons in the infinite intelligence, and motives in the infinite heart, for the volitions of the infinite will. And thus again is the infinitely holy character of God formed. There is an infinite conscience within the depths of the infinite mind; and in the elements of the infinite conscience are the elements of the infinite personality. And the human reflects the divine. For the ideas of the morally right and the morally wrong, which dwell in the infinite understanding, are the archetypes of the same kinds of ideas in the finite intelligence, just as the feelings of approval of the former and disapproval of the latter in the infinite sensibility are also the patterns of those emotional elements in the heart of the finite. Man is wonderfully assimilated to God, as God is the infinite moral personality.

But now personalities, whether divine or human, are individualities. Are they not? They are individual persons who, because they are such, have a distinct identity. And their identity, as it is inwoven into their moral personality, is inextinguishable. Personalities, then, cannot interpenetrate one another. They cannot interblend. They cannot merge in one another as drops of water can merge. They are irresolvable essences. Their individual personality is indestructible in every possible sense. Very well. I am satisfied that this is. And yet, it is just at this point, where I have mental satisfaction, that my dissatisfaction also begins. Is it, or is it not, on this doctrine of imperishable individual personality, that I must view the ineffable and, to me, incomprehensible doctrine of the Trinity of personality in the Godhead? If it be not, I know not where to stand. And if it be, I stand and look into utter darkness, unable to construe to myself any consistent ideas whatever on these imperial themes.

For if moral personalities are always distinct irresolvable individualities, how or what can we think of the union of personalities in the divine Trinity in union? Is the biblical doctrine this, that there are three divine personal individuals? Say that it is. There is then a trinity of infinite personal subsistents who have from everlasting been individually distinct from one another. But is not this the rejected

doctrine of Tritheism? [L.] If it is, why is it branded as heresy? If it is not, wherein does the doctrine differ from this? And above all in what does the divine union of the Tri-personality consist? Does it consist of a oneness of the essence of the divine personalities? [M.] Would not such oneness be in contradiction to the distinct individuality of the personalities. [N.] In what then may we suppose the incomprehensible union to consist? If not a unity of essence, may it be a unity of thought, of feeling, of volition? Is moral character the unifying element? [O.]

Does this subject, let me ask in conclusion, transcend the sphere of the knowable as the knowable is here known? And can no consistent rational conception be formed regarding it? Is it a mystery indeed? And must I now, once for all, know that I cannot know it? And that therefore, the only possible exercise of my intelligence concerning it is the exercise of faith? [P.] If so; be it so. I would believe and adore.—I am, Rev. dear Sir, yours very truly,

INQUIRER.

REMARKS BY EDITOR.

A. We scarcely think that it is. In "manhood," there must be personality plus something else; otherwise personality would not be predicable of any other beings than man. It would not be predicable of angels, for example, or of God.

B. It is well, however, to bear in mind that the word person (Latin, *persona*) originally meant a *mask*, then *the character which a masked player personated*, then *character*, then *person*. The word has thus, etymologically, an intimate connection with what is material. We still, indeed, often speak of an individual as having "a good person,"—referring to a certain phase of the physiological element in our complex being.

C. So said Des Cartes. And yet may we not suppose that there is mind in the unborn babe?—mind which does not actually think? If there be, the nature of mind will be the substrate of its actual thinking.

D. And yet their thinking, though generically the same, may be specifically different. It may be merely rudimental thinking.

E. May it not rather be a certain and conditional state of that which is the essence of mind?

F. But do we know that their wills are situated, as men's often are, between reason and desire, as furnishing motives opposed to each other? If not, their wills must be merely of a rudimentary character, compared with ours.

G. We scarcely think so: though doubtless the subjective peculiarity, in which personality is involved, will be found to be the counterpart of an objective peculiarity.

H. And yet there seem to be the embryotic rudiments of some simple type or other of a moral nature, in some of the inferior animals.

I. But may not the differentiation resolve itself into peculiarly elevated kinds of the genera of self-consciousness and self-determination? If self-consciousness, for instance, be of a high species, it will be connected with such notions of self as resolves themselves into an idea of the finite as opposed to the infinite. And if self-determination be of an equally elevated species, it will involve the consciousness of the freedom of self to resist many of the most urgent appetencies that spring up within self, but which do not exhaust the entire contents of self.

K. They do not thus appear to us. Cause and effect, indeed, imply each other, and are synchronously realized. But "the divine personal being" does not imply "my personal being," unless it be assumed, that God, instead of being a free cause, was under the absolute necessity of creating me, so that his perfection would be incomplete unless I were created.

L. No. Tritheism involves the notion of a triplicity of substance, as well as the notion of a triplicity of personality.

M. Yes: if by essence is meant the one numerical substantive substrate of the three personalities.

N. We think not. The personalities are distinct. But the distinction of the personalities does not imply a corresponding distinction in their substantive substrate. In man we have unity of personality connected with plurality of substantive nature. Why may there not be in God unity of substantive nature connected with plurality of personality? The complexity in the one case seems to be no more unaccountable, than the complexity in the other; though the two complexities vary in kind.

O. This cannot be, for then there would be three Gods, though three Gods in harmony.

P. Undoubtedly the mode of the trinity-in-unity is unrevealed, and is therefore unknown. But the fact of the trinity-in-unity is revealed, and should therefore be believed. The fact involves multitudes of mysteries, but not one of them, so far as we can see, is a contradictory mystery. God is three in one respect, and one in another. There is not here, so far as we can see, the shadow of a shade of contradiction.

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BOOKS.

*The Truth in Love.* By James Frame. London: Ward & Co. 1862.

WE have had great enjoyment in perusing this volume. It is full, as we conceive, not only of "truth," but of "the truth"—the truth that has pre-eminence, the truth as it is in Jesus. And, while Mr. Frame freely and fearlessly unfolds, defends, and contends for, what he conceives to be "truth" and "the truth," he never writes a word under the influence of theological animosity. He speaks the truth "in love." Thus faith and charity, not without buoyant and bright-eyed hope, walk hand in hand throughout his volume, from the beginning to the ending, and their company, as we can testify, more especially when combined, as it is, with a peculiar perspicuity of composition, is very delightful.

*Realities: or the Manifestations of God in Past Ages considered as earnest of the Future.* By E. R. London: Tapp. 1862.

A DELIGHTFUL spirit pervades this volume. "A request was presented to the writer," as we learn from the preface, "to undertake the instruction of others in a Bible class. From inexperience in that mode of tuition, the proposal would have been declined; but long association with the Sunday-school, from whose ranks of past and present scholars the class was about to be formed, and other favouring circumstances, induced the conviction that the Lord was thus appointing new service for himself, and the request was complied with. Trusting in the Lord, and endeavouring to make his Word the teacher of the class, the Bible was opened at the book of Genesis. The first few chapters brought the correlations of sin, judgment, and mercy under consideration; and references to texts shewing their connection were noted down in three parallel columns. Some thoughtful utterances from an almost stranger on the prevailing unconsciousness concerning the guilt of sin in the sight of a holy God, reflected a new interest on this previously selected series of subjects; and within a very short period similar remarks were made by an entire stranger. 'What saith the Scripture' was more deeply impressed upon the mind of the writer; the skeleton references were then expanded into a consecutive narrative; and the three distinct subjects indicated by coloured inks:—the red, shewing the sin of man; the blue, the judgments of the Lord; and the purple, the mercies of the Lord."

The same optical arrangement has been carried into the printing of the volume. The book is printed in red, blue, purple, and black; and will make a handsome present to young sabbath-school teachers, or to advanced sabbath-school scholars.

*The City of the Great King.* London: Algar. 1862.

A POEM. It bespeaks abundant earnestness in the author's spirit. But the earnestness, we must add, is wanting in the genial element. It is severe throughout. The fire that is in it, instead of diffusing a vitalizing warmth, scathes, and does scarcely anything else than scathe. There is no benignity in the pervading fervour. And the theology, which gives the author his peculiar standpoint, is that of unmitigated and unconditional mercilessness, except to "God's own,"—

Jehovah's chosen family, whose names,  
Writ in celestial records ere the curse,  
No hand could blot, no enemy erase.—p. 73.

All these, and all the wicked too, are "to their deeds predestined."—p. 61. And the potter's power over the clay is a sufficient vindication of the difference.

Go to the potter's house, my friend, and learn  
A simple lesson there. Hath he not power  
To work as pleaseth him with his own clay?—p. 16.

The severity of the author's spirit is indicated by the opinion that—  
The Roman mass and English liturgy  
Are but the ancient and the modern words,  
For the expression of the self-same lie.—p. 21.

The indiscriminateness, into which his severity has led him, is betrayed by his notion that there may be persons, who,  
Howe'er sincere in their hypocrisy,  
Are hypocrites no less before the Lord.—p. 53.

And the narrowness, which is combined with his severity and indiscrimination, is sufficiently indicated by his opinion regarding the stars.  
No worlds are they! Their lustre is for man—  
For man created—in his cause they gleam,  
And like a scroll together rolled shall pass,  
When for man's services required no more.—p. 67.

Almost the only good thing that we have found in the whole volume is the description of the expectations that were currently entertained among the Jews regarding the coming Messiah :—

With fevered ears they listen for each sound  
That seems to herald His triumphant march.  
Oh, how they long to hail His coming grand,  
And bitterly they bite the Roman curb!  
"Give us the vengeance on our foes, O God,  
"Give us Messiah to destroy them all,  
"And fervently will we Thy altar spread,  
"With strict attention to Mosaic rites.  
"Remember all thy promises, O God,  
"Of earthly glory to our favoured race.  
"Rid us of Roman tyranny. Oh, grant  
"A conquering Messiah strong in arms!  
"No longer do we back to idols turn;  
"We loathe their superstitious gods of stone,  
"And hate the Gentiles with a holy zeal.  
"Revenge upon our foes is all we ask,  
"And triumph in the world for every Jew."  
Diligently their sacred scrolls they search,  
And synagogues on every hand arise,  
Led on by fervent preachers, who inflame  
Their auditors with zeal for Christ to come.—p. 51.

In such a subject, it would appear, the author found a congenial vein; and he worked it well.

*The Life of the Rev. Richard Knill of St. Petersburg.* By the Rev. C. M. Birrell. Sixth Edition. London: Nisbet. 1861.

WE must chide ourselves for allowing this book to lie so long unread upon our table. It should be on the table, and in the hands, and spread out before the eyes, of every minister, and of every student of divinity. It is admirably compiled,—evincing, in the selection, arrangement, and setting of the materials at hand, a sound judgment, and a heart that is steadily beating in the right way and in its proper place. The subject of the memoir was a man who seems to have been animated with a passion for winning souls to Christ, and who was successful in his work. Although not indicating the possession of high intellectual powers, or of high intellectual culture, he had, what is far better, love to Christ and love to souls. He thus carried about with him, at his girdle, the two keys of the human heart.

*The Papal Criminal History: preceded by De Romanorum Religionis Origine, Biography of Augustus Cæsar, The Origin of Christianity; also, new historical facts connected with the Apostles, John, Peter, Paul, and Jacobus, First Bishop of Jerusalem, and brother of our Lord Jesus Christ. Of Four Hebrew Pontifices omitted in Genesis; &c., &c.* By Dr. Beggi. London. 1862.

DR. BEGGI is a patriot Italian, a book-collector, a reader too, and an ardent Reformer. His heart seems to have impelled him, in the publication of his work, to do some good thing to his country and to the world. And we earnestly wish him all success in his benevolent enterprize. But his book is a chaos. We have quoted only about the half of the Title-page.

*Redeeming Love, and other Poems.* By Jane M'Gregor. Edinburgh: Collie. 1862.

THERE is, unmistakably, a genuine poetic vein, simple and sweet, in Jane M'Gregor. Both her heart and her lips have been touched with fire from the altar of God. We subjoin, as a fair specimen of her creations, the following piece, entitled "Alone with God."

Alone with God! O, I would be  
Alone, alone, my God, with thee;  
The powers of darkness take to flight  
Before thy radiant shining light.

Once on a dark and thorny road  
I sought to find my covenant God;  
He came and set my heart aflame;  
A Bethel then each stone became.

Once in the crowded city street,  
Where least I hoped my God to meet,  
He came; my heart with joy o'erflowed  
To feel such love on me bestowed.

Once o'er a bed of racking pain,  
His glorious face appeared again,  
And from that bed refreshed I rose,  
To fight a host of subtle foes.

Once all I loved was swept away;  
His arm was then my shield and stay;  
My riven heart with peace he filled,  
And every murmuring was stilled.

Alone with God! how sweet to be  
Full oft alone, my God, with thee!  
To leave the world's deceitful dreams,  
And drink of pure celestial streams!

We cordially commend this neat and sweet little volume.

*The Church and the Nation. The opening Address, delivered at the Autumnal assembly of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, in the Weigh-House Chapel, October, 7, 1862.* By Samuel Martin, Chairman for the year. London: Jackson & Co. 1862.

WE have read this address with great enjoyment. It breathes the right kind of spirit, and is radiant with spiritual gleams. How happy and how prosperous would all Independent churches be, if they were to embody, in their principles and perpetual procedure, the allegiance to the heavenly Master, which is so finely portrayed in the following paragraph:—

If rich men and noble rise up in our churches and strive for pre-eminence, or if worldly-wise men or scholars seek to be greatest, we will thrust them aside with "None but Christ!" If factions or majorities attempt to rule—except by furthering the execution of christian law—we will resist both few and many, saying, "None but Christ!" If custom, or precedent, or the practice of our sect try to be lord over us, we will refuse our homage, saying, "None but Christ!" If public opinion, like a chief magistrate, attempt to control us—although the mace, which is the symbol of its power, be the wondrous and mighty press—we will drive magistrate and mace out of our churches, shouting, "None but Christ!" If the commercial spirit—that bramble among the trees of the forest—say, "I will reign over you," the fire of our holy indignation shall burn this would-be king, and amid the crackling of the fire shall be heard the watch-word, "None but Christ!" If other churches advance to govern us, we will meet them with this sword of the Spirit, "One is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren;" and to every church, however ancient, or honoured, or numerous, we will say, "We honour you as fellow-subjects, but for our ruler 'None but Christ!'" Or if some spiritual father should come near us to exercise authority over us—though he have the piety of Wycliffe, the courage of Luther, the profundity of Calvin, the learning of Owen, the fervour of Baxter, and the spiritual might of Howe, we will refuse obedience, and will assign this reason, "None but Christ!" If enthusiastic and sectarian leaders seek to bind us to some of the illustrious Christian dead; or if some king should arise and offer to be our head—some king wiser than Solomon, and more pious than Josiah—the most religious and gracious that has ever worn a crown—we will decline his supremacy, and adhere to our watchword, "None but Christ!" We have much to care for—the adaptation of our church modes and forms to all classes and conditions of men; the admission of none but eligible applicants to our colleges, the soundness of the theological and biblical instruction afforded in our colleges, and the securing, to the extent of our ability, college tutors and professors who, so far as the acknowledging and teaching of the truth is concerned, shall be men of repute for soundness in the faith, and certainly men who are "above suspicion;" decent, orderly, and healthy appointments in our houses of worship; purity of communion, the ordination to the ministry, and the recognition as ministers of such only as are elect of God. But our chief care, next to the soundness of our belief, must be to work out our church principles; and as the embodiment and exhibition of true Christianity is more important than the continuance of our churches, let us be prepared, if it be ever necessary, to lose our churches and adhere to our principles. If in the advocacy of the sole rulership of our Redeemer it be inevitable that our churches for a time perish, let us be prepared calmly to meet their perdition; for when we stand at the grave's mouth of their



destruction, it can only be with a sure and certain hope of a glorious resurrection—the resurrection of churches whose new-birth cry shall be, “Jesus alone saves us, and Christ alone shall rule us—None but Christ!”—pp. 28, 29.

*A Saviour for you*; by T. M. Haughton:—*Heaven; and how to get there*; by T. M. Haughton:—*Faith, what it is, and what it does*; by T. M. Haughton:—*Christ at the Door*; by T. H. Gladstone, Ph.D.:—*Our Charlie*; or, *The Book with the Silver Clasp*; by Rev. F. J. Perry. London: T. M. Haughton, Clapham.

THESE Clapham tracts, published, and in part also written, by Mr. Haughton, are very neatly got up. We mean, externally. And, what is of far greater importance, they are imbued, from first to last, with a beautifully earnest spirit of Christian zeal to win souls. They are, hence, everything the reverse of being characterised by dull and prosy platitudes. There is fire in them, fire from heaven. And the fire gives light, as well as heat; and yet not all the light, we imagine, that might be dispensed. Mr. Haughton says, “we believe what is told us; and that is FAITH.” (*Faith*. p. 7.) This is admirable. He adds, “The faith that brings peace and joy to the soul is *just taking what God says in his word about his Son to be true*; simply trusting in it, believing it, and acting up to that belief.” (*Ditto*. p. 9.) The definition would have been perfect, had not the cause been mixed up with its effects at the conclusion. The author asks, concerning Christ, “How did he come?” And he answers his question thus: “In the lowliest form of humanity. He was born of poor parents, and cradled in a manger.” (*A Saviour*, p. 8.) But, when we remember that Jehovah was our Saviour’s Father, the expression, “of poor parents,” grates upon our ears. The author asks this other question, “Are you awfully depraved, and one of the chief of sinners?” And in answer to it he says: “Christ *can* and *will* save you.” (*Ditto*. p. 20.) He means, of course, that Christ is *able* and *willing* to save. But why not say so? and thus avoid, when speaking of an unbeliever, the unconditional affirmation—“Christ *will* save you.” He asks another question,—“Do you say, faith is the gift of God?” And he makes answer thus,—“True it is. But he will give that to you if you ask for it. You have the power to believe”—“God never gives a command that we cannot obey, or tells us to do that which we are unable to do. The very thought is impious.” (*Ditto*. p. 24.) The final answer is everything that could be desired; but the remark by which it is ushered in,—“he will give that to you if you ask for it”—belongs to a different theory of theology. Mr. Haughton brings out delightfully the relation of the atonement to every man. He says,—“For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life:—so loved *me*, that he gave his Son for *me*, the very person who now holds this paper, that *I*, even *I*, the chief of sinners, *I* who have deserved to be in hell years ago, *I* who have been all my life sinning against him,—that *I* might not perish, but have everlasting life. Everlasting life for *me*! Blessed truth. All this for me through Jesus, my Saviour! I do *love* him. I will trust in him.” (*Heaven*. p. 26.)

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THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

**THERE** is a difference between theology and religion.

And yet they both lie on one line of things. They both, for example, have reference to God. It is because there is a God, that theology is possible. And religion too is possible, just because there is a God. In this all-important respect there is a point of unity between the two.

And then again, and indeed in consequence of their united relation to God, there is an upward tendency in both. They are both of them elevating things. So far as they have influence at all, they do not depress poor human nature, and tread it down, as with an iron hoof, into the mire. They lift it up, and bear it aloft, and teach or prompt it to soar. There is something of an exalting nature in them both.

And hence, again, they are both indispensable for man. They are not indispensable, indeed, for his existence. He may eat, for instance, without them; and drink; and sleep; and wake; and fight; and perform other animal operations; and then die. But without them he would never rise into moral grandeur of character; and there would be no security for mutual benevolence; and no groundwork for mutual confidence; and no possibility of moral satisfaction and repose. A man, indeed, living in the midst of the society of his fellows,—a society that has been moulded by the influences of theology and religion, and that is still bound together, in its moral habits, by means of the same influences,—such a man may get on, and may even get relatively up, materially, æsthetically, intellectually, morally, although he himself abjure both theology and religion. But then he gets on and up, just because others around him differ from him, and have more or less regard to the elevating principles which he eschews. He is indebted for his advantages and progress to influences

which are reflected down upon him by others. And if all around him were equally with himself to cut the cords of theology and religion, then the bonds of morality would be altogether burst, and human nature would drift from its moorings into tempest and chaos and ruin. Theology and religion are both of them indispensable for man. And even although both should be exceedingly corrupt, they are unspeakably better than no theology and no religion at all.

But not only are theology and religion both indispensable for man; they are also indispensable to each other. Each is the indispensable complement of the other. Where the one is, the other must to some extent or other be. They act and react on each other. And, although it is possible to have a preponderance of the one, over against the other, yet the more that a man is under the influence of a genuine theology, the more likely is he to be characterized by a consistent religion. And, on the other hand, the more that a man is characterized by a consistent and sublime religion, the more is he fitted to ascend into a true and pure theology.

What then is the difference between theology and religion?

The difference is determined by a difference in the constituent elements of human nature. And it may be thus represented;—Theology is found within the sphere of the thinking element of our nature, whereas religion is realized within the sphere of the other elements of our being, more especially the emotional and the outwardly active or social. Theology is a thing of thought. It is thought. It is thought concerning the highest possible object of thought. It is thought concerning God. It is, thus, thought that ascends. It soars. And hence it exalts. It stretches away out from our little selves, and goes up to the infinite One. And the more of the glorious reality of this infinite One which it apprehends, and on which it gazes—the more of His multiform relations to the universe, to our own particular world, to our fellow men, and to our own little selves too, which it comprehends,—the more will it be characterised by truth; and the purer and sublimer in its influence will it be. Such is theology.

Religion, again, though beautifully allied, is a different thing. It has indeed, just as truly as theology, to do with God; and it has to do with him, not only as he dwells in his own infinity, but also as he stands related to his finite creation. And religion *in man*,—as distinguished from other moral creatures,—has to do with Him as he stands related to men. But it is not a thing of thought. It is a thing that is infiltrated from thought downward and inward into the subjacent elements of our nature. It is a thing of emotion, and of outgoing activity. It dwells in the heart; and

it works in the life. Religion is adoration. It is admiration. It is joy,—“joy unspeakable and full of glory.” It is fear,—“the fear of the Lord,” which is “the beginning of wisdom,” and is never absent from its end. It is love: pre-eminently and most emphatically, is it love. It is out-going and up-going desire. It is yearning. It is aspiration. It is the upward action toward God, and thence the outward action, for the sake of God, of the whole social nature of the soul. It enters sublimely into a loving social intercourse with God, and into a loving social intercourse with men. Such is religion. And being such, it is a worthy and beautiful concomitant, or rather consequent, of theology. Happy is the man who has the thought that constitutes the one, and the emotions and social activities which are characteristic of the other.

The difference of the two might, again, be thus represented:—Theology is a science,—the science of the things of God; religion is a mode of living,—that mode of living which lifts up the chief emotions of the soul towards God, and which seeks to regulate the whole social activities by the will of God.

Nothing, indeed, is more worthy of the name of science than theology. For not only is it a thing of thought. The objects of the thought which constitutes it, are the grandest of all realities. And it is possible to classify them into the most harmonious and magnificent of systems. But still it is only a science. It dwells for ever in the sphere of thought. And hence when we descend from that elevated plane of our being, and go down into the heart, the seat of our emotions and desires; and when we thence go out into the sphere of our social activities, at once in relation to God and in relation to our kindred fellow-creatures; it must be something else than theology that we find, if we find that we are right in our hearts and in our lives. It is religion. Religion is that mode of living which is realised, when the heart throbs for God, and when all the social activities of our nature are more or less respondent to His will.

The distinction between the two is manifest. It might be stated metaphorically thus:—Theology is the eye of our spiritual nature; the eye in action. It is the up-looking of the intelligence, as it contemplates God, and takes note of his wish and will. That is theology. But religion is the movement of the other parts of the whole harmonious body of our being, the movement of the emotions, and desires, and social activities of our nature, when they are moved aright at once in their upward relations toward God, and in their outward relations towards our fellows around us. In theology, we move and act indeed. But we move and act in the way of beholding, of looking, of seeing, of thinking. In

religion we act too. But we act in the other great elements of our being. We act in the uplifting of the heart, and in the voluntary out-welling of our social activities toward all in the great hierarchy of society, of which we form a part,—toward God the glorious Head of the social system, and toward our fellows in immortality, to whom, under God, we stand related, either as equals, or as inferiors, or as superiors.

The difference between theology and religion is thus thoroughly appreciable. And it is such as to suggest a most important relationship between the two. *Theology is a means to an end: religion is the end for which theology is the means.* Theology, as we have seen, is thought. But thought is not an ultimate thing in our nature. It is only a means to an end. It is a ministering thing. And it ought to be, to the other elements of our nature, a ministering angel. If it were to stop short with itself, it would belie its own nature. The element, which constitutes it, would be a spiritual fragment. We think, that we may feel and act. And it is important to think correctly, that we may feel and act aright. Science by itself is altogether incomplete. If it lead not to improvement in emotion, and desire, and social activity, it is an abortion of mental energy. And hence theology cannot terminate in itself. It has not within itself its end. It goes out from itself. It exists for something beyond. It exists for religion. And when it fulfils its vocation, it actually goes into religion. And thus a true theology is of no use whatever, unless it issue in a consistent and sublime mode of feeling and acting, in a consistent sublime mode of living, or, in other words, in a consistent and sublime religion. It is a consistent and sublime religion, which is the only legitimate end of all the doctrines which we learn from nature and from the scriptures, of all the truths centring in the gospel or clustering around it, which it is possible to apprehend, or for which it is possible to contend. It is all-important for us ever to bear in mind this inner relationship between religion and theology.

But while it should be borne in mind that theology is only a means and religion the end; it is not to be supposed that, because it is religion that is the end, we may safely dispense with theology, or be contented with very little of it, and devote ourselves exclusively, or almost exclusively, to religion. The means cannot be dispensed with; no more than the end. If we had no thought about God, we never should have any emotion in reference to him, or any desires rising up toward him, or any of our social activities directed to him or regulated by his will. We must have thought about God, about what he is, and is to us, and is to others, and about what he wills and wishes us to be and to do;

we must have such thought, if we would have love to him in our heart or fealty to him in our life. We must have some science in reference to God, if we would have God-ward aspirations in the heart and God-like character in the life. We must, in one word, have theology, if we would have religion. And we must have a true and pure theology, if we would have a consistent and sublime religion.

The truth is, that theology and religion act and react upon one another. Theology is needed to animate and guide religion. And religion is needed, in its turn, though in another way, to animate and guide theology. If theology be neglected, religion will either languish and die, or run riotous into the weaknesses of enthusiasm or the wildnesses of fanaticism. If religion be neglected, theology will exhaust its energies and resources in empty, and profitless, and probably erroneous, speculations. There is a kind of holy wedlock uniting theology and religion. God has joined the two together. And if either the one or the other be divorced, adulterations in both are the inevitable result.

In consequence, indeed, of a curious susceptibility of inconsistency in our nature, some men's religion will be better than what is the legitimate consequence of some illogical elements in their theology; and, on the other hand, some men's theology will be better than their religion, which is its offspring. In the plurality of our nature there is scope for internal antagonisms and counterworkings. But, nevertheless, there will always be a tendency to harmony between a man's theology and his religion; and there is no other way by which deficiencies in the latter can be voluntarily rectified, but by assiduous attention to the varied realities and claims which are the contents of the former. And hence the value of the Bible; and the value of biblical teaching by the pulpit and the press, and more especially of such biblical teaching as exhibits the glorious gospel of God's grace. In that gospel, the heart of God's own theology, the mightiest motives are folded up, that can constrain to "pure and undefiled religion."

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#### THE CHRISTIAN'S PRACTICAL PARADOX.

"I am crucified with Christ: AND IT IS NO LONGER I WHO LIVE, BUT CHRIST LIVETH IN ME: and the life, which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." Gal. ii. 20.

THIS verse is one of the gems of the Bible. It is a spiritual diamond. It sparkles like a star. Its rays are the purest, serenest, most intensified essence of vital Christianity. All Christendom is blessed in the possession of such a jewel. And,

indeed, it has contributed more for the enriching and beautifying of the life of mankind, than all the treasures of Greek and Roman lore, or of ancient, medieval, and modern art. The sublimest style of living is depicted in the words, and depicted from the actual, every-day, experience of a man of like passions and infirmities with ourselves. It is depicted for our example.

At present, our business is with the middle clause, the heart of the verse;—a clause, which ought to be the motto of every Christian under the sun; and which, if it were every Christian's motto, would revolutionize all christian society from its centre to its circumference, and render the church, as a moral force and bannered army in the world, all but absolutely irresistible to the ends of the earth.—“It is no longer I,” says the apostle, “who live, but Christ liveth in me.”

We have given the correct translation of the clause. Wiclif gave it of old, “and now live not I, but Christ liveth in me.” This translation, rather than that of our authorised version—“Nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me,”—is in accordance with the punctuation of the highest critical authorities, such as Lachmann and Tischendorf, Rückert and Meyer, as also Schott and Hahn. Count Zinzendorf gives the same interpretation,—“now, consequently, I myself live no longer, but Christ liveth in me,” (nun lebe also ich selber nicht mehr, sondern Christus lebt in mir.)

It is needless to say that the apostle is not speaking metaphysically. He could no doubt have been as good and as subtle a metaphysician, if he had liked, as either Aristotle or Plato. And had metaphysics been his vocation, he would have spoken of his mode of life in different phraseology. He would not have said, “It is no longer I who live.” Neither would he have added, as the explanation of his glorious paradox, “but Christ liveth in me.” If he had been speaking metaphysically, he would, indeed, have given expression to the very same substantive ideas; for metaphysics, in *his* hands, would not have succeeded in introducing heathenism either into his thoughts, or into his experience. But then he would have expressed them otherwise. He would have used the severely precise language of scientific analysis; and put a ban upon the imagery which his hallowed imagination and ravished heart suggested to him. He would have explained, in strict psychological phraseology, how the out-going activities of his moral being were changed,—changed as regards the great aims of his life,—the ends that he had in view in the ruling choices of his will; and how, consequently, there was a change

in the means that he employed for the attainment of his ends. He would thus have explained the whole system of his voluntary ends and means: and then he would have unlocked the mystery of the entire and marvellous change, by telling that it was effected by what he had come to believe regarding a Being who was crucified, like a malefactor, on Calvary, but who was, indeed, the most perfect "son of man" that ever was born, and also the only begotten "Son of God," and who submitted to his crucifixion because, by a wonderful divine arrangement, he had gathered up in himself the sins of the whole world, and was bearing them, and sinking under them, as a sacrifice of propitiation, pregnant with pardon full and free, because well-pleasing and honouring to the great moral Governor of the universe.

Had the apostle spoken thus, his language would still have been an invaluable study for all the sons and daughters of intellect on the face of the earth. It would have been the germ of a sublime philosophy of christianity. But it would not have suited the poor Josephs of the race. Neither would it have suited the boys and girls of mankind. Nor would it have been adapted to the great bulk of young men and maidens. It would have puzzled, moreover, the great majority of our rural patriarchs. It would have been unadapted to the mental development of the Galatians to whom he was writing. And it would not have come home to the hearts and bosoms of any of us, with that warmth, and up-stirring power, and vivid flashing, of which we are conscious, when we hear him saying,—“It is no longer I who live, but Christ liveth in me.”

Let us step forward, then, to the right angle of vision,—it is somewhere near the heart,—and look at the apostle's portraiture of himself.

“I no longer live,” says the apostle. And yet he was, in very deed, living; and that too in a most emphatic manner. If there be degrees in the essence of living; if there be varying intensities of living; if he lives most truly and most really, who feels most, who thinks most, who dares most, and who achieves most; if there be thus in living a kind of graduated climax of positive, comparative, and superlative degrees;—then, most assuredly, the apostle was a man with a vast amount of life within him. He not merely existed. The stones beneath his feet existed too. He not merely developed. The grass beneath his tread developed too. It grew. He was not merely conscious. Even idiots are that. He was much more. He energized. And mighty, and mightily concentrated, was the energy which welled up in, and gushed forth from, the heart of his being. Most emphatically



did he live. He was a power among his fellow-men. His life was a thing of the superlative degree. If ever man was entitled to say, "I not only exist; I not only develop; I live;" it was the apostle Paul.

But then he says, "It is no longer I who live." And we have the notion that it will never be right with any of us, until we be able to 'take up the same sort of language, and say, "It is no longer we who live: the life which we live is not properly our life at all; it is a far higher, and holier, and happier, thing than we could ever have devised or wrought out for ourselves: it is no longer we who live, *but Christ liveth in us.*"

When the apostle speaks as he does, he, as it were, comes out of himself for a moment, to stand and look at himself, to take his own measure, and to mark his own features. And when thus standing out of himself, and looking at himself, he thinks back upon his past career; and he thus, as it were, soliloquizes, or talks to himself:—

"Saul of Tarsus, stand out full to my view. Let me see you. What are you in yourself? What are you, in the real peculiarities of your being?"

"That question will be best answered," we may suppose Saul of Tarsus to reply, "by considering what I was, while I took my own way of things, and followed out my own bent, and inclination, and purposes."

"What were you then? Speak out, Saul of Tarsus: speak as on oath."

"I was a Pharisee, who thought that religion consisted in outside punctilios. I was a fiery bigot. I would have compassed sea and land, not to win souls to God, and to goodness, and to godlikeness, but to make a proselyte to my own formality. I wasted the Church of God. I was a blasphemer. I was a persecutor. I was injurious. I was selfish, and self-sufficient to the core, in all that I purposed and pursued. That is what I was. And to be all that is to be Saul of Tarsus. But now, all these my own things are passed away. They are all old things, and have vanished; and all things have become new within me. *It is no longer I who live.* I am not at all my former self. I am altogether different from the Saul of Tarsus whom I once knew, and who I once was. It is another kind of life from what I would ever have worked out for myself, that *I am now living.*"

There was thus something better and sublimer, in the apostle, than metaphysics. There was what the Bible calls "conversion." And whether we know anything about such a blessed kind of experience or not, the apostle had not far to search within himself ere he found the reality of "a new creation." A new man

had grown up inside of his old man. And this new man had so developed in dimensions, that he had filled up, bit by bit, nearly the whole house-room of his being; so that the old man was almost altogether, though with the utmost reluctance on his part, pushed out at the door. A new life had sprung up within the persecutor, or rather it had descended from above into him, so that the old life was either dead or on the point of dying. He was "born again." There was something in him greater and grander than himself. And indeed, in his own words, it was "no longer he himself that lived."

"But," says he, "Christ liveth in me." It is not, indeed, the language of a metaphysician, or of a psychologist. But it is the language of a genuine Christian. And it comes out warmly, glowingly, gloriously, upon us. It is worth our consideration. Let us think, then, of what it means.

What was now the grand aim of him who had been Saul of Tarsus, but who was now Paul the apostle? Was it to get self exalted in honour or in happiness, either for time or for eternity? Nay. His thoughts, instead of curving back upon himself as they went out from him, shot up toward God; and his feelings, instead of coiling themselves, like serpentine things, around his own heart, followed his thoughts, and went up to God. His whole heart rose, like an altar-flame, up toward God. The end of his being he sought and he found in its beginning—in God. But whence did he thus seek, and how came he thus to find, his end in God? What was it that originated within him the upward and God-ward aim of his life? Was it something that welled up from within himself? Far from it. Was it something that he learned at Gamaliel's feet? Far from it. Was it something that philosophy taught him? Far from it. Did he get it from metaphysics, or from science, or from history, or from poetry and literature? Far, far, from it. Where then did he get it? Where? From Christ. It was when he took Christ into his thoughts; it was when he took Christ into his heart; that he became a totally different man from what he had been before, and that his aim for life was turned upside down. And thus it was Christ in him that was now moulding his aim, and lifting him up toward the true end of his being. And therefore he could say,—  
"It is no longer I who live, *but Christ liveth in me.*"

Look at him from another point of view. As Saul of Tarsus, he cared nothing for man as man. He was a bigot of a Pharisee. He hated or scorned the Sadducees. He was a bigot of a Jew. He hated or despised the dogs of the Gentiles. He would sooner, indeed, have eaten with a dog, than with an uncircumcised fellow-

immortal. He had no love to man as man, or indeed to any man as a man. He had no appreciation of the priceless value of a human soul, and of the inestimable possibilities of goodness and of bliss that are folded up, bud-like, within every human being. He was a mere bigot for his own sectarian shibboleth; and his own sectarian shibboleth was a mere outside formality of creed, and conversation, and conduct.

Such was Saul of Tarsus. But how different, how entirely reversed, was Paul the apostle! He prayed for all. He went everywhere, preaching the gospel to every creature, as far as he had opportunity. He warned every man. He entreated every man. He prayed every man, in God's stead, to be reconciled to God. All outward formalities sank into comparative insignificance in his estimation. Circumcision profited nothing without a new inward creation. The observance of new moons, and other odds and ends of ritual things, were the merest trifles compared with "faith, hope, charity, these three." His great aim now, in reference to men, was to get them to be good and godlike. And he was willing, in order to compass this end, to spend his all, and to be spent or be sacrificed in body, in reputation, in social standing, in wealth, or indeed in every one of his relationships to time and earth. He was a sublimely devoted and disinterested philanthropist. And whence this change from fiery selfishness and bigotry? Did he himself create it within himself? Was he his own creator as regards all his new thoughts, and feelings, and aims, and purposes, in reference to his fellow-men? Were they his own original device and development? Far, far from it. Whence, then, did the great change come? If not from within him, was it from his fellow-men around him? Far, far from it. He "conferred not with flesh and blood" in reference to these things. Whence then? Whence did the change come? Who, with the Bible in his hands, knows not? *It came from Christ.* It was when he took Christ into his thoughts, and away down into his heart, that "all old things passed away within him, and, behold, all things became new." "It is no longer I that live," says he, "*but Christ liveth in me:*"—"It is he, he only, he altogether, who has made me, and who is still making me, to be all that I delight to be."

It may not be given to us to be like Paul, as regards intellect. It may not be given to us to be like Paul, as regards intensity of living. It is not, and it will not be, given to us, to be like Paul as regards inspiration. But it will be our own fault to all eternity, if we be not like Paul as regards genuine christian experience and the reality of a new life. Christ loved us as truly as he loved Paul. He gave himself for us, whosoever we are, as truly, and

as freely, as he gave himself for Paul. He became a propitiation for our sins as assuredly as he became a propitiation for Paul's. And if we take him into our thoughts, into our faith, and down into our hearts, he will be a new moral life within us, as truly as he was within Paul. He will animate us for every duty, arm us against every temptation, support us under every trial, and be "in us" to the last, and at the last, as "the hope of glory." Whatsoever we need to do christianly, we may do it, and do it all, and always, "through Christ which strengtheneth us."

It is thus Christ who is doing all the good that is being done in the world:—Christ in heaven and Christ in Christians.

Fellow-sinner, will you keep this Christ out of you, and forbid him to make you good? He is knocking at your heart that he may get into you, and be for ever in you, as your Life, as your true Life, as New Life to you, as Eternal Life. OPEN UP AND LET HIM IN.

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PRACTICAL EXPOSITION OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.—VERSES 3, 4.

VER. 3. "Who, being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high."

It is Jesus who is described in these words;—Jesus, the Son of God, the constituted heir of the universe, by whom also the worlds were made. The description is pregnant with instruction, and will amply repay the most deliberate and devout consideration.

In the first two clauses, there is a description of what our Saviour is, in his person:—He is "the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person." In the third clause, there is a description of what, ever since the worlds were made by him, he has been doing, is still doing, and will continue to do:—"upholding all things by the word of his power." In the fourth, there is a description of what he accomplished while he lived in a kind of lofty lowliness upon our earth:—"he, by himself, purged our sins." And in the fifth and last, there is a description of the exalted dignity and repose to which he ascended on the completion of his work on earth:—he "sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high."

(1.) Our Saviour is described as being "the brightness of his Father's glory, and the express image of his person." The word

which is rendered "brightness" means either *effulgence* or *reflection*. The form of the word (*ἀπαύγασμα* not *ἀπαύγασμος*) seems to indicate that it means *reflection*; so that our Saviour is, in his person, "the Reflection of his Father's glory." The reflection is, indeed, magnificently bright. It is "brightness." But it is reflected brightness. It is brightness which not only reveals itself, but which mirrors, to all who will behold it, another brightness,—the brightness of the Father, whose person "no man hath seen or can see." Our Saviour, thus, as the incarnate Son of God, leads the contemplating mind up beyond himself to the invisible Father, and warrants us to infer what are the character and heart of the Father, from what we see of the heart and character of the Son.

He is, says the inspired writer, "the Reflection of the Father's glory." Note the word "glory." Everything in the Father, which is reflected to us by the Son, is glorious. Indeed, every thing in the Father is glorious. There is nothing inglorious in God. His thoughts are glorious. His feelings are glorious. His will is glorious. All his purposes and plans are glorious. All that he is and does is glorious. But his peculiarly transcendent glory is his moral glory,—the glory of his moral character. He is "glorious in holiness," glorious in righteousness, glorious in goodness, glorious in love. And as his holiness and righteousness and goodness and love are infinite, they are infinitely glorious. Coupled with the natural infinity of his being, in all its other attributes, they constitute the true "glory of the Lord,"—that glory which he will not, and cannot, give to another, and which constitutes him intrinsically worthy of being the Supreme Governor of the universe, and the only object of unreserved adoration and obedience. Of all this glory, Jesus was and is the Reflection. We see in what he did and was, while he lived on our earth, and in what he does and is, now that he is in heaven, what the Father is,—how pure, how holy, how good, how loving, how infinitely worthy of our regard, our confidence, our loyalty, our devoted attachment and obedience.

It is said, reduplicatingly, that Jesus is the "Express-image of the Father's person." The word rendered "person" (*ὑπόστασις*) denotes the reality which is, as it were, "standing under" the various attributes of the Father. The Father, for instance, is characterised by infinity: but he is not mere infinity. He is something standing under infinity. And his real being constitutes infinity. Hence, too, he is not immensity. He is characterised by immensity. But he is more. His real being constitutes immensity. Neither is he eternity. He is characterised by eternity, and his real being constitutes eternity. In like manner, when viewed in the moral aspect of his nature, he is not mere righteousness, or holiness, or goodness, or abstract love. He is

the infinite Being who is standing under these attributes, as they stretch out gloriously into infinity. He is the infinitely righteous One, the infinitely holy One, the infinitely good One, the infinitely loving, and therefore the infinitely lovely, One. And, as such, he has represented himself to mankind and to all intelligences everywhere in Christ Jesus, who is "the *Express-image* of his person; or, as the word (*χαρακτῆρ*) still more literally imports, "the *Impressed-image* of his person." What the Father really is, he has stamped, as it were, on the Son. The Son is, in character, the counterpart of the real though invisible being of the Father; just as, when a seal is applied to wax, the impression made is the counterpart of the peculiar configuration of the seal. Jesus, as the apostle Paul expresses it in Col. i. 15, is "the image of the invisible God." He is "God manifest in the flesh":—"the Reflection of the Father's glory, and the *Impressed-image* of his person." How delightful! We can now, in a sublimer way than Moses, stand, as it were, "face to face" with God. In "looking unto Jesus," we "behold our God." (Isaiah xl. 9.) "He that hath seen me," says Jesus himself, "hath seen the Father." (Jo. xiv. 9.) And when we thus view the Father in the person of the Son, how lovely, how loving, how fatherly, how approachable, is he seen to be!

(2.) But the inspired writer, besides exhibiting what our Saviour is in his person, also portrays what he is always engaged in doing:—"and upholding all things (*τὰ πάντα*, the whole universe) by the word of his power." It is a sublime representation of his inherent omnipotence, and unceasing vigilance and care. The word rendered "upholding" (*φίρω*) literally means "bearing." Our Saviour is bearing the whole universe. He is bearing it up, as in the hollow of his hand. And he is bearing it along, as with the touch of his almighty finger. He is thus sustaining it in being. He is the true Atlas, not of the heavens only, but of the earth also. "By him all things consist." (Col. i. 17.) He is the prop of all worlds. And there is not a creature in existence, material or immaterial, in heaven or on earth, but would fall, in an instant, out of being, were it not for his upholding hand. And as he is upholding all his creatures, so he is controlling them all, and ruling over them all. And all this he does "by the word of his power." The expression graphically represents the infinite ease with which he performs his perpetual operations of upholding and guiding. He has but, as it were, to "speak and it is done; to command, and it stands fast." (Ps. xxxiv. 9.) It is by a word that he works his mighty providential wonders. It is by a simple exercise of his authoritative will; for the authority that is in his will, is the authority of omnipotence.

His word is "the word of his power,"—the word that is instinct with the infinity of his power.

Our Saviour, ever since the creation of the world, has thus been "bearing and bearing along, the whole universe by the word of his power." Before his incarnation he was thus sublimely engaged. And when he appeared in our nature, "God manifest in our flesh," he did not lay aside "the government" that was "upon his shoulder." While he was, as regards his flesh, a babe in Bethlehem, he was, as regards his divinity, working sustainingly and controllingly in every home and in every heart on the face of the whole earth, and in every world that was rolling throughout space. All along, throughout his earthly career, it was true of Him, that he was the Son of man, "who is in heaven," (John iii. 13,) and who was guiding, in their respective courses, suns, moons, and stars. And even when he hung on Calvary, bearing in his body the sins of universal man, there were hanging on the word of his power countless siderial firmaments, with all their hosts. Yea, he was sustaining in being, and keeping out of woe, the very men who condemned him, crucified him, mocked him, and exulted over him.

Such is our Saviour. He is working everywhere, working omnipotently, and working out, through immensely large circuits, the sublimest of problems. Well may we trust in his providence. Well may his disciples have unshaken confidence that he will make "all things to work together" for their ultimate good. Well may they rejoice to realize that they are by night and by day behind the shield of his omnipotence, and under the outspread wing of his protecting care.

(3.) But the inspired writer refers also to the great work of mercy which the Saviour, while he was living on our earth, as "God manifest in flesh," accomplished. "He by himself purged our sins,"—"He made by himself purification of our sins." The expression is a peculiar one; though it is easily enough understood. The purification did not literally terminate on our sins, so that the sins became cleansed from their impurity. Sins can never thus become cleansed. They are foul for ever. It is of their very essence to be unclean. But while it is impossible that our sins can be literally purified, it is most gloriously possible that purification can take place in relation to them. And Jesus, "the Express-image of the Father, and the Upholder and Governor of the universe," accomplished what achieves this purification. He sacrificially purified our sins. By his sacrifice of himself for our sins, he so acted in reference to them, that notwithstanding their impurity we can approach our God and receive everlasting life. So far as their impurity was a barrier that lay between us

and the attainability of everlasting bliss, it was purged away. So far as their uncleanness laid an absolute interdict upon our enjoyment of the everlasting loving-kindness of our God, it was removed out of them. And now all men are welcome, trusting to the cleansing efficacy of the blood of the Saviour's atonement, to come to God and be treated for eternity, as if their sins had not been unclean. It was thus that Jesus made purification of our sins. He so purged the whole sin of the whole world, that every man is welcome, trusting to the sacrificial purification, to come and receive the reward of perfect cleanness. And if he thus come, he will find that the work of Christ has another and higher element of purification in it. It has the power, when believed in, to purify the impure heart, to cleanse the uncleanness of the soul, and to make us "all glorious within." It is not only an objectively sacrificial, it is also a subjectively sanctifying, purification. It is a purification which not only takes the place of our own impure acts, as a ground on which we may be treated for eternity; but which also passes over into our acts, so that the believer "follows holiness," without which he never would be meet "to see the Lord" in glory. (Heb. xii. 14.)

This purification, says the inspired writer, Jesus made "by himself." Of the people, none were with him. And he alone of the adorable and divine Three was the sacrifice and the priest. He made atonement by presenting his own blood. He "gave HIMSELF a ransom for all." (1. Tim. ii. 6.) How beneficent! How gracious! "Scarcely for a righteous man will one die. Yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. But God commended his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners (and his enemies by wicked works) Christ died for us." (Rom. v. 7, 8.) When there was no other eye to pity, and no other hand to help, the eye of God pitied, and his right hand brought salvation. What the cattle on a thousand hills, offered up in sacrifice, could not achieve; what the collective doings and sufferings of angels and archangels could not effect, Jesus accomplished "by himself," when he became "a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." (1 John ii. 12.) "The blood of Jesus Christ, God's Son, cleanseth from all sin." (1 John i. 7.)

(4.) The inspired writer says, still further, that "when" our Saviour—the unsullied Reflection of the Father's glory, and the almighty Sustainer of the universe, had, by the sacrifice of himself, purged our sins, he "sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high." When he had finished the atoning "work which had been given him to do," when he had "put away sin" as an insurmountable barrier in the way of our attainment of



everlasting bliss, when he had brought in an "everlasting righteousness" as a ground on which the most unrighteous may stand and get the reward of righteousness, he ascended into the "glory which he had with the Father before the world began," and "sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high." In man's nature he ascended,—man's nature sublimed in its grosser elements. And in this, our sublimed nature, he took his position in the highest place of dignity, authority, and honour. "He sat down at the right hand of the Majesty in the heavens." No doubt the language is hieroglyphical. It is grandly pictorial. And yet, perchance, there may be, for ought that we know to the contrary, some central sphere in the mighty universe, where there is, though in a far sublimer form, some such symbol of the divine enthronement, as was exhibited above the mercy seat;—there, perchance, in the centre of a mighty circle, that always, in all its parts, feels the influence of the presence of Jesus, may he be seen in his ineffable glory, filled with "the pleasures which are for evermore," "ever living to make intercession for those who came unto God by him," and ruling with his sceptre over all things, and making all things to work out, in consonance with his own great work, the glory of the great Father, the subjugation of all rebellion, and the weal of all everywhere who are willing to be good. At all events, seeing "he made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, humbled himself, and became obedient until death, even the death of the cross; therefore God also highly exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth: and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. ii. 7-11.)

VER. 4. "Being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they."

THESE words hang, as an appendage, on the statement which goes immediately before; the statement, namely, that our Saviour, "who was the Reflection of the Father's glory, and the Express-image of his person, and the Sustainer of all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself made purificatory expiation of our sins, *sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high.*

When it is said that he has been "made much better than the angels," the reference, of course, is not to his essential character, but to his circumstantial condition. As to his essential character,

indeed, he was ever perfect, and glorious in holiness. And so, though in a lesser sphere, were the angels, with whom he is here brought into comparison. Like him, though in their smaller circles of existence, they were unfallen beings. They had never swerved from their integrity. They "knew no sin." They had ever fulfilled God's commandments, "hearkening unto the voice of his word." They ever "did his pleasure." There was thus, though in very different planes of being, a moral similarity between our Saviour and the holy angels. And yet our Saviour was "much better." He was "*made* much better" than they. The meaning is, that he was exalted, by the Father, to a far higher pinnacle of circumstantial honour and glory, than it is possible for any of the angels to attain. He was elevated, in his capacity as our Saviour, and in his possession of our humanity, to the throne of the universe. He "sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high." The holy angels, doubtless, or at all events some of them, such as the archangels, are blessed to get near the throne. They stand before the throne, veiling their faces with their wings. They are thus, in their relative position, all glorious without, as well as all glorious within. And we may suppose that those of them who had to do with the giving of the law on Mount Sinai, will be very highly exalted in dignity. Still they can never get higher than to be near the throne, surrounding it in adoring rapture, and with eager willingness to execute such high behests as may be committed to their charge. It is otherwise with our Saviour. Clothed in our glorified humanity, he has not only got up near the throne; he has taken his seat on it, "at the right hand of the Majesty on high;"—"being (thus) *made so much better* than (the most exalted of) the angels, *as* he hath inherited a more excellent name than they." According to the measure of the more excellent name, which he hath inherited, is the incalculably superior degree of the relative dignity and honour and glory to which he has been exalted.

What, then, is this "more excellent name," which our Saviour has "inherited"?

We are certainly not to regard it, with Beza, Lawson, Valckenaer, and others, as simply meaning *dignity* or *honour*; for this would make the inspired writer's statement tautological. Neither are we, on the other hand, to suppose that it is, or that it can be, fully expressed and exhausted in any sounds or symbols of our imperfect human languages. If our Saviour's "more excellent name" adequately represent what he really is in his various relations—God-ward, man-ward, and universe-ward—it will be a name of illimitable meaning. It will be a name which

can be fully articulated only by an infinite Being. "No man knows it but he himself." (Rev. xix. 12.) The utmost resources of human language will just enable us to lisp it in some partial way. And this lisp will, after all, merely represent some of its broken syllables. It will only be by combining the exceedingly various and partial representations which are embraced and exhibited in these fragments of the name, that we shall be able to reach anything like an approximation to the apprehension of the comprehensive fulness of the glorious reality.

One item or syllable of the glorious name is JESUS. For the angel, who made the annunciation of his birth, said, "thou shalt call his name JESUS, for he shall save his people (his believing people) from their sins." (Matt. i. 21.) It is a most delightful syllable of the many-syllabled name. And there is no wonder that, in our child-like lisp, we should have caught and detached the syllable, and should love to repeat and re-repeat it. It brings an all-important element of the office of our Saviour into view;—he grants all who believe on him deliverance from the penalty of their sins. It suggests, moreover, that, in his capacity as our Saviour, he is more than human. There is a fragment of the word *Jehovah* at the beginning of the word *Jesus*. And thus we are taught that Jesus is *Jehovah-our-Saviour*. The name was imposed on him at his birth into our world. But it was then imposed anticipatively,—in view of the work which he was to accomplish for our salvation. And hence we read that "being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. *Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, AND GIVEN HIM A NAME which is above every name: that at the name of JESUS every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth.*" (Phil. ii. 8-10.)

Another syllable of the Saviour's name is referred to in the passage to which we have already appealed, and which records the appearance to Joseph of the angel, who said, "Thou shalt call his name JESUS." It is there said, "Now all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name IMMANUEL; which, being interpreted, is, GOD-WITH-US." Jesus then is IMMANUEL. He is GOD-WITH-US. This is another syllable of his manifold name. For it is because he is GOD, and GOD-WITH-US, that he was fitted to make atonement for our sins and to be our Saviour. Our Atoner and Saviour must needs be GOD, and GOD-WITH-US. None other could be "sufficient for these things,"—the things needed for atonement and salvation. It is no wonder, then, that IMMANUEL should be a syllable in the many-syllabled name.

The same evangelical prophet, who announced our Saviour under the designation **IMMANUEL**, makes mention of some other items of his name. Or, in other words, he lets us hear some more of its many syllables. He says, (chap. ix. 6) "For unto us a child is born, and unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called **WONDERFUL, COUNSELLOR, THE MIGHTY GOD, THE EVERLASTING FATHER, (THE FATHER OF ETERNITY, or of eternal life to sinners dead in trespasses and sins), THE PRINCE OF PEACE.**" We cannot help seeing how inadequate human language is to express the name of our Saviour. The very utmost that that inspired prophet,—who, above all his fellows, was so remarkably affluent in eloquence,—the very utmost which he could accomplish, when attempting to utter the name of our Saviour, was to heap designation upon designation, without, however, attempting to run on exhaustively to the termination of the reality. He realised that it was illimitable; and, after repeating in our hearing some abrupt items or echoes of its glory, he simply stops short, and, as it were, says with Job of old, "Lo, these are parts of his ways; but how little a portion is heard of him!" It is part, then, of our Saviour's name, that he is **WONDERFUL**;—a wonder both in heaven and on earth. Angels in heaven desire to look into what he is, and to meditate the mighty problem of his work. Believing men on earth, the more that they think on what he was and is, and did and suffered, and what he yet continues to be and to do, find that the subject, however high they climb, still rises up majestically before their view, higher and higher, like Alps above Alps. Our Saviour, too, is **COUNSELLOR**. He is our **COUNSELLOR**. He is a **COUNSELLOR** for every one. In him, every one may find exhaustless treasures of wisdom for guidance in all duties, in all difficulties, in all perplexities, and amid all temptations. It is only needed that we consult him; that we go in spirit to him in order that we may learn of him. For he is the great Teacher, the great Advocate, the great Rabbi, who is made of God unto us **WISDOM**, and who alone has the words, for us, of everlasting life. Again, he is **THE MIGHTY GOD**. He is God mighty and almighty to save,—almighty to save the very chief of sinners, and to save them to the uttermost. It was by his might, indeed, that the creation of the universe was of old effected, when he spake and it was done, when he commanded and it stood fast. But it is by a stranger and still grander exertion of his might that a new creation springs up in the little world of the heart and character and conduct of every one who turns to him and accepts him as his Saviour. He is, too, **THE FATHER OF ETERNITY**. That is another syllable of his name. He is the loving author of eternal life to all who

believe in him; for they are his "seed," whom "he shall see," and who "shall prolong their days" in glory for ever and ever. He is also called **THE PRINCE OF PEACE**; for wherever he reigns, he stills the tumult of conflicting passions. And whether it be within the domain of individual hearts, or within the domain of collective households, or within the larger domain of nations and peoples, that his sceptre is recognised and revered, he invariably produces harmony and peace. And never shall "the mountains bring peace to the peoples of the earth, and the little hills by righteousness:" never shall there be peace in the valleys of our world, and by the banks of the great rivers: never shall cities and towns and hamlets, everywhere, be knit together in amity, and stretch out to each other the right hands of fellowship and friendship, until "HE shall have dominion from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth." But then, "shall the righteous flourish, and abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth."

Such, then, are some of the polysyllables of the excellent name of our Saviour. And yet they are only some, and a very small proportion, of the whole; and very imperfectly articulated, moreover, in our thoughts. Other syllables of his name are almost, if not altogether, as interesting and as instructive. We read, for example, both in John's gospel and in the book of Revelation, that "his name is called **THE WORD OF GOD**." (Rev. xix. 13.) "In the beginning was **THE WORD**, and **THE WORD** was with God, and **THE WORD** was God." "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made." "And **THE WORD** was made flesh, and dwelt among us (mortal men)."—John i. 1-14. A most delightful and appropriate syllable this, in the great name of our Saviour. He is the Revealer of God. What our words or utterances are to our own finite minds, that our Saviour is to the infinite mind of our God. He is *the Expression to us of the otherwise unuttered and unutterable thought and feeling of God*.

And then, besides, he is **THE CHRIST OF GOD**. He is **CHRIST**. That is another syllable of his name. He is, as it were, the divinely anointed, for he is the divinely appointed, Mediator between God and men. And he is more. "He hath," we read, "on his vesture and on his thigh, a name written, **KING OF KINGS, AND LORD OF LORDS**." (Rev. xix. 16.) He is **ALPHA** and **OMEGA**. He is **THE FIRST** and **THE LAST**. He is **THE MORNING STAR**—the beautiful promise of a bright and glorious day. He is **THE SUN OF RIGHTEOUSNESS**, "the **TRUE LIGHT THAT LIGHTETH EVERY MAN THAT COMETH INTO THE WORLD**." In him there are healing beams of light, and life, and joy for all of mankind. He is **THE WAY, THE TRUTH, and THE LIFE**.

He is the **WAY** to the Father, the **WAY** to heaven, the **WAY** to goodness and glory: the **WAY** for us all. He is the **TRUTH**; the **TRUTH** incarnated; the **TRUTH** of truths; the all-important **TRUTH** regarding what we may look for from God, for time and for eternity. He is **THE LIFE**, **LIFE ETERNAL**, in whom alone our souls can find the antidote to everlasting death.

There are many other syllables, besides, in this most excellent name. He is the **PROPITIATION** for our sins, the **RANSOM** for our souls, the **GREAT HIGH PRIEST** who gave himself a sacrifice in our stead. He is the **LAMB OF GOD**, who bore the sin of the world, when the Lord made to meet upon him the iniquity of us all. He is the **REDEEMER**, ours and every man's; he is the **HUSBAND** of the church, the **SHEPHERD** of the sheep, the **SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD**, the **FRIEND OF SINNERS**, the **ELDER BROTHER** of that holy brotherhood who constitute the new man-kind; and he is, too, the **SON OF MAN**, and thus a Brother for every man.

All these, and many other items in addition, are syllables of the excellent name of our Saviour. And they express, each in its own peculiar and partial way, some distinctive element in the glorious reality of what he was, of what he did, of what he is, of what he does, of what he ever will be, of what he may be expected still to do, of what he ever will do. But fundamental, in some respect, to all these syllables, so far as they are fitted to be expressions of the great reality which was comprehended in the fulness of his complex person, is another syllable, which we have not yet specified, and which was floating, representatively, before the mind of the inspired writer, when he said that our Lord has been "made so much better than the angels," as he hath inherited a more excellent name than they." He adds, in the next verse, "for unto which of the angels, said he at any time, thou art **MY SON**, this day have I begotten thee: and again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me **A SON**." Our Saviour is, in his complex personality, **THE SON OF GOD**, the begotten **SON OF GOD**,—being at once of the same nature with his heavenly Father, and of the same nature with his virgin-mother. Our Saviour is thus both God and Man. He is **GOD MANIFEST IN FLESH**. He is **GOD-MAN**. And hence, indeed, it is that he is **JESUS**, and **IMMANUEL**, and **WONDERFUL**, and **COUNSELLOR**, the **MIGHTY GOD**, the **FATHER OF ETERNITY**, the **PRINCE OF PEACE**, the **WORD** of God, the **KING OF KINGS**, the **LORD OF LORDS**, the **CHRIST**, the **ALPHA** and **OMEGA**, the **MORNING STAR**, the **SUN OF RIGHTEOUSNESS**, the **WAY**, the **TRUTH**, the **LIFE**, the only **PROPITIATION**, the only **RANSOM**, the **LAMB** of God, the **REDEEMER**, the **SHEPHERD** of the Sheep, the **HUSBAND** of the Church—that community of believers which constitutes his beautiful and holy

bride. Hence, too, he is the SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD, the FRIEND OF SINNERS, the elder BROTHER of the new mankind and of universal man. Our Saviour is emphatically THE SON OF MAN because he is emphatically and really THE SON OF GOD. His whole excellent name, wonderfully polysyllabic though it be, is appropriately represented by this one designation; and he that believes realisingly and comprehensively that he is the SON OF GOD shall be saved. (John xx. 31; 1 John iv. 15; v. 5, 13.) Hence it was that this name is spoken of by the inspired writer as "inherited." It was not arbitrarily imposed. It was "obtained by inheritance." It was got in virtue of his essential relation to the Father. And just as certainly as no man or angel or archangel is the begotten Son of God, so as to be of one divine nature with the Father, so certainly can no man or angel or archangel stand on one level with our Saviour, or be equal to him in glory. In the proportion in which he has inherited a more excellent name than all others on earth and in heaven,—a name which in its fulness is expressive of the fulness of what he is and was, and does and has done, and will be and do, as God manifest in flesh,—in the same proportion is he "made better" than they all, and is higher and more august, grander and more glorious. In the same proportion, too, are we blessed to have him as *our* Jesus, *our* Saviour, *our* Redeemer, *our* Prophet, *our* Priest, *our* King, *our* Brother, *our* Friend, *our* Advocate, *our* Propitiator, *our* Counsellor, *our* Portion, *our* All in All. "What a Saviour we have found!"

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#### THE PHILANTHROPY OF GOD.

THE most unselfish and God-like feature of human character is philanthropy. It is the love of universal man. It towers above friendship, rises beyond patriotism; for while the one embraces the individual, and the other the nation, itself encircles the entire race. A genuine philanthropist is a citizen of the world.

Philanthropy is not an element of character necessarily confined to agents in this world. There is nothing in its nature to prevent its stretching from man to angel and from angel to God. Its existence may be as wide as the universe; at any rate, as wide in the universe as human relations extend. We rejoice that amidst men themselves, and acting like the little leaven, there is a philanthropy of men; that near it, like a spirit of mystery ever waiting the golden moment when it may glide in upon the human

soul through the oft-opening leaves of imagination, suggestion, and association, lingers a yearning philanthropy of angels; but most of all do we glory, that over it, like the reviving sun over a bed of dying flowers, hangs an immeasurable philanthropy of God. The last of these is our theme.

Theology is our guide to it. Theology is the knowledge of God; and though to some its term may be the synonyme of all that is dry and abstruse, yet, like a guide of whose language we know but little, it leads us up the rugged mountain-path till we stand on the very peak of transfiguration, gazing on the inner glories of the divine heart. It leads us as our taste is. We wish to know of love. It lays before us, first, a universal truth—"God is love." This golden sentence is understood in all worlds. It is universal. But crossing the concentric rings of being, theology leads us in upon our own world, and now lays before us a particular truth, which in its turn becomes a universal, viz.,—"God is love to man." This is the sun of human theology. Theology discovers God, and reveals his philanthropy.

But this philanthropy has its *nature*. It has no substantial being, and yet it is something more than a mere logical existence. It is neither an abstraction, on the one hand, nor a substance, on the other, but an experience of the latter, as spirit. Not an idea of intellect, nor a choice of will, if the psychological trifold division of our mental powers be complete, philanthropy cannot be else than a feeling of the sensitivity. And as in man, so, we presume, in God. It is feeling, as love; and love (remembering man's condition) as compassion, and compassion as mercy manward. There might have been philanthropy, as complacency, had there been no human misery; but we speak according to knowledge. If the race be a colossal leper, as well as "a colossal man," then the philanthropy of God, true, like the melodious response of the harp to the measure of the wind, and divinely correspondent, according to the laws of the emotional economy, to the distress of mankind, is the compassionate feeling in God's tender heart produced by the perfect perception, or conception in the mind, of the pitiful condition of the entire humanity. It must be distinguished from friendship—an entirely individual relation; from patriotism, which is the emotional offspring of a national conception; from merciful compassion itself, since merciful compassion may be called forth, as the echo out of the hollow rock, from the sensitivity of God, by moral distress in any world; and exhibited as merciful compassion flooding out, like the tides of beams flooding from the hot sun all over the world, to the whole humanity without exception and distinction. In God, philan-



thropy is the sympathetic correlative to mankind's moral misery. In intensity, it excels all human and angelic love to man. A greater than Gabriel or Howard is here. As a sun is to a star and a dew-drop, so is the first of these to the latter and last. If we could see God becoming misanthropic, it would be as if the assembled floods of the universe were playing upon the wrestling flames of an expiring sun.

The *philosophy* of God's philanthropy we have somewhat anticipated in the preceding remarks; yet we may notice it more closely. In accounting, at this point, for the existence of the divine philanthropy, that is, if we wished the philosophy to be absolute and ultimate, we should be led to that very abstruse question—the nature, if not the reason of the nature, of God. But we think of God as the unreasoned or the unconditioned; and here, in the absolute, we should find the ultimate philosophy of a possible philanthropy, in finding in the emotional nature of God a possible relation to a possible mankind, and yet of an actually impossible philanthropy, while the mankind existed only in divine idea. But now, coming down from this transcendental summit,—now that the human race does actually exist, as well as the divine capacity of feeling perfectly,—now that the divine philanthropy is in actual exercise, the lower philosophy of the latter must lie in a doctrine of correlation, the correlatives being the perfect sympathetic capacity of God, and the condition of mankind. God feels: why, is the ultimate philosophy we cannot pierce. Man needs God's feeling: why, is an arena of daily debate. But these two poles, while we may not climb their higher philosophy, present us, in their correlation, with a lower philosophy of the divine philanthropy. The personal nature of God gives one condition; the voluntary wretched condition of mankind, with its incipient burden of eternal penalty, gives another; and thus, in the heart of God, is a burning and overflowing compassionate philanthropy, that weeps over a world and would take it under its shelter, as a hen her brood under her wing. It is not for a moment to be thought that, therefore, the divine philanthropy is in two things, though two things explain its existence. It is alone in the warm heart of God. Only, as the water in the rock did not come forth till Moses smote the latter with his rod, so neither does the compassion of God, as philanthropy, find vent, till some object of necessity touch it with the palm of want. Correlation is the philosophy of philanthropy.

Let us now glance at its *final cause*. It is the renovation of the race. God, ere he created us, had in his mind an ideal mankind. The moral law is a caligraph of it. Christ's perfect life

was a practical exposition of it. We have failed; yet God has not despaired of seeing that ideal mankind actually realised. Our condition seems to scorn the divine expectation. Nevertheless, the task proposed by the divine philanthropy is the complete restoration of man. For this, God's philanthropy turns practical. Schemes of moral elevation are launched into practice. True it is, that man while conscious of his misery, has had faint conceptions of the necessity of regeneration. The broken ideas of a possible better state of things, called by poetical philosophers the baffled memories of some prior golden existence; the murmurings of a despised conscience; the intuitional prophecy of a coming doom; have all frequently conspired to rouse some representative men to invent some Jacob's ladder to glory, and point the way. And though some faint glimmerings of a union of the divine and human, as the only solution of the human problem, shot across their gloomy path, like straggling forks of lightning on a wintry night, still, the vague conception was thoroughly selfish,—the deification of man, rather than the incarnation of God. How miserable is man without God; whether as philosopher or as savage! Hume, after his destructive philosophy had led him from the path of theology into a perfect spiritual Siberia, said,—“I am astonished and affrighted at the forlorn solitude in which I am placed by my philosophy. . . . I begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed in the deepest darkness.” What a wail! And yet, philosophy apart, it is the cry of the generic lost one. For what a poor world is this without the universal realisation of the restorative philanthropy of God's heart. And how poor would it ever be, even were some gifted angel, wielding the transforming wand of a magician, to touch its globe to a mass of gold or a monster Kohinoor! How to restore man to the divine ideal has been the question of ages, and the one to which God's love addresses itself. Says M'Cosh,—“Given a fallen race; to set them on a *career of active obedience*,—is a problem which all reformers and philanthropists, of the highest order, have been trying to solve, and with but very meagre success.” This problem to man, is to God a solution. And, as the result, his practical philanthropy deals with an element in man's nature which is the salient point for the restoring force. This element is moral elasticity. Pascal tells of the greatness of man as seen in his misery; and Howe and Bushnell dilate on the dignity of the soul as seen in its ruins. But with all veneration for sanctified lofty intellect and genius, we humbly think that man's greatness is most astonishingly evident in *his capacity to rise* from both his misery and his ruins. If we mistake not, it is in this that Milton has almost conferred divinity upon his Satan, and made us, when we have seen the proud archangel gathering

his energies together after his terrible fall, helplessly to admire while willingly we abhor. The flower, withered in the parched plot, is greater when showing its ability to rise when aided by the falling rain and the gentle sunshine that plays among the rain-drops, than when shrivelled up by the breath of the sirocco. So, man is greater in his capacity to rise when the voice of spiritual resurrection comes through the silver trumpet of divine philanthropy, than in his moral wreck. With this element in man, God's philanthropy deals intelligently, and will deal, until its final cause—the ideal man, the renovation of man by an intelligent apprehension of the propitiatory scheme, an abolishment of sin in self, an acquired superiority to temptation, and a habitual piety—be thoroughly attained.

We are next led to notice the *expression* of this restorative philanthropy. Here theology, our guide, turns Christian, and philanthropy is met as a weeping angel with an extended symbolical cross. The expression of divine philanthropy, as christian, is *real* and *formal*. We have fact and formula. Without the real there could not be the formal; without the facts of the philanthropic gospel there could be no gospel of the facts. There are many real expressions of God's philanthropy, yet there is one to which all the others, like the sun, moon, and eleven stars of Joseph's dream, make low obeisance. God's love to man is really expressed daily in the unchanging light and heat of the kindly sun; nightly, in the undiminished shoals of stars that minister to us in the absence of the solar king; hourly, in the beneficent domestic and social constitutions, the turnings of providence, and the achievements of science; and continually, in the unceasing beats of the pulse, the pleasure of being, the spread of knowledge, and the benefits of christian civilization. Yet, in all these marks of the divine love is still undetected *one* element, which has often made the miniature philanthropy of a man the wonder and admiration of men. Howard's philanthropy, as well as that of one or two more, whose names are the salt of our fame, was characterised by *sacrifice*: this is the glory of philanthropy. In all these features of the divine love we have mentioned, though there be divine *effort* or *energy*, with reverence we write it, there is no unmistakable evidence of *sacrifice*, deprivation or suffering, unless in the thought of rebel reciprocity. Therefore, there must be, and the gospel shows that there is, in the real expression of the divine love, a truly matchless element of sacrifice. The sacrifice of Abraham's son would have fallen before it. The sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter is lost beside it. The story of Damon and Pythias pales in its presence. Oceans of praise will never fill the vessel of its eulogy. The divine Father has a tender-hearted Son,

He is his "ewe lamb." No cause, however glorious, could effect separation between them without sacrifice. Giving up this Son would be the wrenching of the fatherly heart-strings. But philanthropy cries up from the rebel world for a propitiatory sacrifice, as the reason and symbol of honoured justice, for the restoration of man. Complacency towards Jesus and compassion towards mankind wrestle in the struggle of wisdom in the arena of the divine emotion. The cry still rises from the human abyss. Philanthropic angels press the wants of their unwitting clients. While the infinite conscience says,—“These are rebels, and cannot pass the gates of penalty without a passport of magnified right,” assenting affection says,—“They may not, they cannot; but is there no possible sacrificial expedient for those who are royal offspring while they are disloyal subjects?” Humanly speaking, the hour and the sacrifice come, and the sublimest decision that ever evoked the hallelujahs of the celestial throng, gives to the divine philanthropy a reality, lustre, power, and tenderness, that inform faith and assurance of forgiveness, alike in the jewelled bosom of the peer and the shaggy breast of the peasant. The propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus for every man, is the *real* expression of the philanthropy of God, and as it is matter of history now, a *formal* expression is also necessary, and exists in the glorious words which always touch the anxious sinner's heart with the sensation of an electric thrill:—“*God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son.*” He that believeth this gospel, as a *needy sinner*—seeing it true to fact, and true to his need—*shall* be saved; and then will he be able to exclaim with the wrapt poet;—

“O how omnipotence  
Is lost in love! Thou great PHILANTHROPIST  
Father of angels! but the friend of man!”

Ere closing our article, the *achievements* of this sublime philanthropy may be glanced at. The love of God, as philanthropy, has a *mission*, because, as we have seen, it has a *message*. This message is to all men; therefore, as many as receive the message to the saving of their souls, may, from their peculiarly grateful position, be expected to become missionaries; for there can be no philanthropic achievements, objectively speaking, without philanthropic instruments. Jesus as the real expression of divine philanthropy to all the world, could not, in his short public life of three years, have conversed with *all* men about God's love to their souls without working an inconceivable miracle. Besides, the “world” is a thing of generations upon generations of comparatively short lives, not admitting the possibility of *one* overtaking the work of the philanthropic mission. Christ's work was

the sacrifice—the gospel fact that there might be a gospel message for all willing to run to the perishing with it. Hence every Christian is “in Christ’s stead,” hearing the words “Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature,” and, if doing his duty, carrying the report “He was wounded for our transgressions” to the lost. The collective instrument of this mission is the church, receiving, as Moses received the tables of the law, the tables of the gospel. We know, alas too well! how this honoured trustee has kept her trust—among the faithful faithless only she. Trifles have too often engaged her attention when souls were being hurried past her ermine seats like the useless driftwood on a rushing tide. Too often has she toyed about the shape of a bishop’s gown, or the plush of a mimic throne, when the torrent of scathing sarcasm “What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?” has swept over her ears from the very gates of hell. Partly, she has even dared to sit in the chair of Alphonso, and philosophised on and improved, like him, the schemes of God, so that the bed of the divine philanthropy is made shorter than the generic man for whom it was measured and made. What is prevalent Calvinism but philosophy in mock friendship with revelation? It is the image of gold, silver, brass, iron, and clay. It is the negation, if not the speculative grave, of philanthropy, and has crippled her missionary by curtailing and confusing his message. Philanthropy, *as such*, is an utter impossibility to the church, as Calvinistic. Calvinistic philanthropy is a something to *men*. Biblical philanthropy is a something to *man*. The former has no regenerative possibility to the *race*. How often has God had to cry out, as the church, because a voluntary instrument, has crossed his path—“Oh my people what have I done unto thee?” And yet, the achievements of the cross are “as the stars in number.” Churches may fail, but ideas are immortal and invincible. Forms may die, but the ideas born with the divine philanthropy cannot perish. At the name of Jesus every knee shall bow. The potent opening word of the eastern fable is its faint adumbrative. It unnerves resistance, charms rebellion, chains reaction. Nothing else reaches the spring of the heart’s locket. The old lock, opening only to a certain arrangement of the rings of which it was made, which arrangement made the letters on the rings yield the potent word *Jesus*, is a faint picture of the victory of love over the most icy heart. Oh how great is the philanthropy of God! The consciousness of peace with God and self has been bestowed by it, when human systems pressed the soul with intolerable burdens. The drunkard’s home has been made a palace by it, when prelections on virtue only laid bare the overwhelming weakness of self. The social castaway has been redeemed from her vicious tyranny, a dishonoured grave,

and an awful hell, by it; when there was no room for her in the inn of popular and respectable theology. The untutored savage, sunk in the bestiality of his national worship, has been elevated and beautified by it; when the pioneers of heathen civilisation would only have harnessed him to the car of national victory. The mother and sister, formerly less recognised as units of humanity than as conveniences of lust or channels of propagation, have been raised, by it, to the platform of pure social equality. Ignorance, once the safety of tyrants and the instrument of crafty priests, has fallen before its illuminating power. Philosophy has drunk of its spirit. Poetry has worn its gems. Politics have borrowed its plumes. Social science has been baptized in its name. Education has been emblazoned with its arms. In short, the story of its achievements, as marked out in the historic page of the cross, is a tale *written in italics*, and stands out in sharp and lustrous emphasis on the surface of unalterable history. True it is, that the entire world does not yet bow to its sceptre, but as surely as the early command, "subdue the earth," is now being fully obeyed under the guidance of the genius of science, both on the earth above and in the earth beneath, so certainly will the triumphs of the gospel, in all lands, be as many as the leaves of their forests.

Yet, gentle reader, we would not so much recommend you to its achievements as to itself. The love of God is more wonderful than its results. They may be miracles, but that philanthropy that works them is *your* melting miracle. God loves *you!* Is not this *your* particular inference from the doctrine of God's love to all men? If you are still unsaved, we would press you to that bosom of love to you—to the Sacrifice for your sins, that you too may be a philanthropist.

J. S.—T.

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THE APOSTLE PAUL ON THE IMPERFECTION OF HIS OWN  
SANCTIFICATION.

"For that which I do I allow not; for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I." Rom. vii. 15.

WITH the preceding verse of this seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, an interesting and important paragraph commences. It is a paragraph in which the apostle at once vindicates the moral law as "holy, just, and good," and yet shows that it is necessary, even for a converted person, to be freed from its punitive dominion. Freedom from its punitive dominion is needed by the converted person, simply because, though converted,

he is yet only imperfectly sanctified. Being imperfectly sanctified, were he made subject to the penal sanction of the moral law, he would speedily fall under condemnation, and be no longer a sinner saved. And if he were to cease to be a sinner saved, he would cease to be a sinner sanctified.

The believing sinner, however,—the sinner, we mean, who believes on the Lord Jesus Christ as the propitiation for his sins, and as all his salvation,—is justified through faith. And he continues to be justified through his perseverance in faith. Continuing to be justified, he continues to be freed from the penalty of the law. The law hath no more dominion—no more penal dominion—over him. Hence “the blood of Jesus Christ, God’s Son, cleanseth him from all sin.” And, imperfect though he be, offend in many things though he do, he “forgets the things that are behind and presses forward toward the things that are before,” going “from strength to strength,” with his eye fixed upon “the prize of the high calling of God,” till at length he appear “perfect before God.”

In the words of the verse which we have quoted, we find the apostle exposing to view some of the darker crevices of his own inward man, and thus demonstrating the necessity of continued deliverance from exposedness to the penal sanction of the law, in his own case at least. He leaves it with his christian readers to determine whether or not they are equally with himself imperfect, and equally needing therefore to be continuously free from the dominion of the law. He says, “For that which I do I allow not : for what I would, that do I not ; but what I hate, that do I.”

The first word of the verse should be noticed,—“*for* that which I do I allow not.” It introduces some remarks which are intended to render a reason for what he had said of himself in the immediately preceding verse, namely, “I am carnal, having been sold under sin.” Compared with what the spiritual law required him to be, he was carnal. He was spiritual, indeed, compared with what he had formerly been, and with what most of his fellow-men around him still were. But he was carnal, compared with what he ought to have been. He was thus carnal, in consequence of the power of the habits of sinning, which he had contracted during the long course of his unconverted career when he was self-sold under sin.

The apostle thus frankly admits his imperfection. Nay he expresses it with strength and emphasis:—“I am carnal.” He continues—“*for* that which I do I allow not : for what I would, that I do not ; but what I hate, that do I.”

The words, as will be observed, which immediately succeed the

particle "for," are these,—“that which I do I allow not.” They are not a very literal rendering of the original expression. If literally rendered, it would run thus,—“What I do, I know not,” (*ὃ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω*). And the words are so rendered by the best modern critics, such as, de Wette, Meyer, Philippi, Alford, &c. The old Vulgate translator, too, gives them the same rendering, (*quod enim operor, non intelligo*). It is reproduced by Wiclif thus,—“I vnderstonde not that that I worche.” Tyndale gives it thus,—“I wote not what I doo.” Luther thus,—“I know not what I do,” (*ich weiss nicht, was ich thue*). Chrysostom explains it thus,—“I am upset, I know not how.”

We are not to wonder that the apostle should thus represent his own actions as incomprehensible to himself. No man living knows himself fully. The wisest and most knowing,—they who, more than any others, are self-knowing,—are those who, more than any others, are aware that they are a puzzle to themselves.

It is true that there are many things about ourselves which we know very well. When we look at ourselves in certain aspects, we see very clearly what we are; how good we are, and how bad we are; how strong we are, and how weak we are; how wise we are, and how foolish we are. But there are other aspects of ourselves, which we can take into account, and which the thoughtful are often constrained to contemplate, which baffle the intelligence, and bid defiance to our penetration.

The truth is, that, while there are many things concerning ourselves of which we are perfectly aware, there is nothing in ourselves which we really and fully comprehend. Our ignorance lies folded up within our knowledge, and is deeper in us than our knowledge. God only knows all things. He only knows all that is knowable about anything. He comprehends everything. There is not anything which is comprehended by any one but himself. That there are certain things in and beyond ourselves, we know well enough. But when we inquire why they are what they are, we very speedily begin to find that our knowledge is superficial indeed. Hence it was that the apostle says of his own actions,—“what I do, I know not,”—“I cannot comprehend *the why* of a great part of my procedure.”

We would notice, now, the explanation which the inspired man gives of his declaration of ignorance:—“for what I would (*i. e.* for what I wish), that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.” We may consider consecutively both clauses of the explanation.

The first runs thus,—“for what I wish, that do I not.” How



are we to account for the statement? It seems to be very extraordinary. It is extraordinary. But the extraordinary element does not lie in the statement as a statement; but in the unquestionable matter of fact of which the statement is the record. It is a matter of fact, however, which was by no means peculiar to the apostle. We feel persuaded that there are few persons alive, if any, who have not been conscious of a similar practical anomaly. There is something paradoxical, we apprehend, in the depths of every person's character.

"What I wish, that do I not." Certainly we are not to suppose that the apostle means that he never did anything that he wished. Far from it. The great bulk and body of his demeanour, so far as his fellow-men around him could be cognizant of it, was in harmony with what he wished. He wished to preach the gospel; and he preached it. He wished to preach it extensively; and he preached it extensively. He wished to make the preaching of the gospel the great business of his life; and his wish was fulfilled. He wished to live plainly, soberly, benevolently, piously, and spiritually; and his manner of life, everywhere, and always, was plain, sober, benevolent, pious, and spiritual.

There was much then, that he wished, which he did. Nevertheless there was also not a little which he wished to do, which he did not. And it is to this that he refers when he says, "for what I wish, that do I not."

What kind of things, then, were they, which, though he wished to do them, he yet did not do? Were they things which it was impossible for man to do? "We trow not." The non-performance of such things is no evidence of spiritual imperfection. The wish to do them might be evidence either of ignorance, or of the imperfect subordination of the desires of the heart to the dictates of the intelligence; but the non-performance of them could not possibly be sinful.

Were the things, then, which the apostle wished to do, and yet did not, things which the feelings desired but which the conscience interdicted? No: they were not these things. Doubtless there are many things, which, in the experience of all christian and of all moral persons, are desired by the feelings but which are vetoed by the conscience, and which therefore, though wished, are not done by those who are guided either by christian, or even by merely moral, principles. Improper feelings occasionally arise even in the best regulated hearts, which, however, are not yielded to in the conduct. They are stoutly, strictly, sternly, pertinaciously, and successfully resisted. It is the nobility of man in these circumstances, not to do what his heart impels him to do. It is his moral glory to resist his depraved desires.

Many a converted man may, for example, be conscious of desires springing up within him to indulge in some crime, to which, in his preceding career, he may have habituated himself. It may be the crime of some sensual indulgence. It is his glory to resist the base desire, and not to do what nevertheless his heart wishes and prompts him to do. He is a christian hero when he denies himself. Others, again, may, when provoked, feel the wish rise up within them, to retaliate with words, which would be as swords or daggers. It is their glory to put a veto on the wish, and to keep silence, or to speak in love. Others, again, may feel the uprisings of a selfish desire after their own exaltation, at the expense of their fellow-men around them, who have claims of benevolence on them. It is their glory to say "no" to the desire, and to lift up their hearts to their God that he may keep it from overstepping the limits of mere desire and going forth into deliberate or indeliberate words or works.

In all such cases, it is evidence of goodness, perhaps even of greatness in things moral, not to do as the heart wishes one to do. And consequently it cannot be to such contrariety between the wish and the work, that the apostle refers when, in self-condemnation, he says,—“I am carnal; for what I wish, that do I not.”

What, then, does he mean? What were the things which he wished to do, and yet did not do?

They were the things which his conscience approved of, and which the law of God commanded. And it was because he did not always do these things, which yet he wished to do, that he really did not understand himself, but found himself to be a riddle to himself.

It may be asked, indeed, how it could happen that he did not do the things which he wished to do, when his conscience approved of them? Motives to do things, or not to do them, can be found only in some condition of the intelligence—some thought, or in some condition of the heart—some feeling. If, then, the intelligence approve of certain practicable things, if the conscience affixes its imprimatur to them and says “they are right;” and if, at the same time, the heart likes them, so that the desires go out after them; how is it possible that they should be left undone? If, when the question—to do or not to do?—is put, the intelligence, including the conscience, is for them; and if the heart is also for them; how is it possible that they should be left undone? What can hinder them from being done? By supposition they are practicable;—things that may be done. And the two great elements in our nature which furnish all our motives to do anything, are on their side. Why then are they not done?

How can it happen that any one should be able to say, "the good that I wish, that do I not"?

The question can be answered only by studying our strange and many-sided nature. But when we take note of the peculiarity of this curious and curiously-varied system of things, we find that it is possible for us to have particular desires, which are at variance with our general desires. It is possible for us to have subordinate desires which are at variance with our chief desires,—secondary wishes which are at variance with those which are primary. We find this to be possible, just as it is possible for us to have particular, secondary, and subordinate intentions, at variance with our general, primary, and chief intentions; or as it is possible for us to have particular, secondary, and subordinate thoughts or views, which are inconsistent with the chief, primary, and general views which we entertain. Man, as we actually find him, is not a thoroughly consistent being. His views are not always self-consistent. His purposes are not always self-consistent. And, in like manner, his feelings are not always self-consistent. Hence it is the case that, while one's general feelings are in favour of that which is good and right, one's particular feelings are often found to be inconsistently inclined to that which is bad and wrong.

This was the case even with the holy apostle himself. His heart was on the side of universal holiness of conduct. He loved universal holiness of conduct. He desired to be characterized by universal holiness of conduct. This was the great, the main, the primary, the pervading wish of his heart. His heart—in its great outgoings—was thus entirely in harmony with his conscience. It was right with God. He wished, we doubt not, never to act selfishly; never to go contrary to the will of God; ever to love God supremely and with all his strength, and to love his neighbour as himself. He wished to be ever consistent, ever considerate, ever devout. He wished never to neglect his sabbath-day duties; never to neglect his week-day duties; never to be perfunctory in prayer, or praise, or preaching, or in any other duty, sacred or secular. Such, we may reasonably conceive,—such we cannot reasonably doubt,—were the desires of the holy apostle. They were noble desires, spiritual desires, Spirit-inspired desires, God-like desires.

But did the presence of such desires secure that there should never, on any particular occasion, on any particular emergency, on the occurrence of any particular temptation, start up within him strong particular desires to do what was inconsistent with his great, general, and primary desire? If we had not hearts, and were only speculating about other beings who have, we might imagine that it was not possible for the particular desire

to be contrary to the general; for the subordinate desire to be contrary to the chief; for the secondary desire to be contrary to the primary. We might, in short, suppose that there could be no such thing as inconsistency in desire. Indeed, were we mere speculatists, and not experimentalists, we might suppose that there could be no such thing as real experimental inconsistency at all. But we know, by experience, that there is such a thing as inconsistency. There is such a thing as inconsistency of heart—inconsistency in our desires. Nothing is more common than for a man to experience a particular desire, which is utterly inconsistent with his general desire. His general desire may be to speak the truth; but he may at times feel a particular desire to screen himself by telling an untruth. His general desire may be to lead a perfectly sober life; but he may sometimes feel a particular desire to indulge to excess. His general desire may be to cultivate humility; but he may yet be liable to feel a particular desire to say, or to do, or to assume, or to put on, what will minister to vanity. His general desire may be to observe and honour God's sabbath-day; but he may often feel a particular desire to do, on particular days, what would amount, either by omission or commission, to desecration.

Who has not felt, in these or in other instances, the conflict of inconsistency in his desires? The apostle was no stranger to the conflict. His main, his chief, his primary, his general, and all-pervading desires were after holiness, and against all manner of unholiness. Whatsoever things were true, and honest, and just, and pure, and lovely, and of good report,—on these things he thought,—after these things he aimed,—these things he sought, these things he desired. Nevertheless he was, at least occasionally, conscious that there were, rising up within him, contrary desires; and he sometimes yielded to these contrary desires, and thus sacrificed his higher desires; so that “what he wished, that did he not.”

It is true that he was able to resist the particular desires that rose up in rebellion against the general desire. His ability was unquestionable,—his ability to do all his duty. It was essential to his moral responsibility.

It is also true that in doing anything that was wrong, he must have done it at the solicitation of some desire, and thus, what he did, he wished to do; and what he wished to do, that he did. But as inconsistency is a thing that is possible; and even inconsistency in desire: every man of intelligence, or of any inward observation, may see that the general desire might be sacrificed, while the particular desire was gratified, and that thus, in an imperfectly sanctified man, it might happen that “what was

wished," with his chief, and great, and general, and all-per-vading wish, "that did he not."

The apostle adds—"but what I hate, that do I."

The words exhibit just the other side of the melancholy experience of the imperfectly sanctified man. If he did not what he really, in his chief or primary emotions, desired to do, it is not to be marvelled at that he should do, what, in his chief and primary emotions, he hated to do. It was sin which the apostle hated, and yet he sometimes committed it.

Doubtless he had a love for it when he committed it. His particular love was at variance with his general love. He generally loved holiness. Holiness was the object of his chief complacency and devotion. Nevertheless, thorough consistency was not in him. Sometimes he fell in love with what amounted to a sin of commission, or to a sin of omission. And sometimes he yielded to the influence of such inconsistent love. And then he sinned. He did the abominable thing which his soul hated, and which God infinitely hates.

In a man of the apostle's stamp, we may rest assured that the sins which he committed were principally inward sins,—sins known only to himself and to his God. The apostle was too holy a man to be outwardly inconsistent. Nevertheless, as inward consistency is required by the law of God, undeviating inward consistency; the apostle in weighing himself in the balance of the holy, just, and good law, could not but find himself wanting. Therefore did he confess that in some cases he did what he hated, and omitted to do what he desired. And thus does he try to shew that for him, at least, and for all who were like him, it was necessary that there should be deliverance from the penal power of the law. Were there no such deliverance there could be no salvation for their souls.

It will become us to learn from the apostle's words to estimate ourselves with impartiality, that we may know our own weakness and wickedness. Doubtless we daily require the application of the blood of Jesus Christ, God's son, which cleanseth from all sin. Let us thank God that the all-cleansing blood is for us, and that it has virtue in it even for those sins of believers, which are committed against light and against love. Let us bless God that "If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous: who is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world."

"THE ENGRAFTED WORD."

ALL changes stand variously related to causes, means, and conditions. So, consequently, is it in the great change from spiritual danger to safety; from spiritual trouble to peace; from sin to goodness; from Satan to God. In one place, we read that "Christ came into the world to save sinners." In another place, Paul says of himself, "I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some." And again, men are urged on this wise, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling." In another line of relation, it is written, "by grace are ye saved." Again, "thy faith hath saved thee." And yet again, we read, "Send and call Peter, who shall tell thee words, whereby thou and all thy house shall be saved."

Thus men are saved by Christ; pre-eminently and transcendently so: yet also by Paul; by themselves; by grace; by faith; by words. The representation varies, according to the point from which we view the change, or the aspect of it which we see and designate.

The last of the aspects specified is brought before us, in a fine figurative representation, by the apostle James;—"Receive with meekness *the engrafted word, which is able to save your souls.*" (James i. 21.)

The illustration is drawn from the vegetable world, and in order to appreciate it, we require to recognise two facts of vegetable physiology.

The first relates to the process of grafting. There are various tissues in plants; the fibrous, the vascular, and the cellular. Woody or fibrous tissue supports, by its strength and rigidity, the more delicate parts of the plant-structure. Vascular tissues, by their beautiful tubes, convey the plastic materials, the elaborated substances, and the rejected elements. The cellular tissues perform most interesting vital operations.

By the aid of the microscope, the cells of the cellular tissue are seen to have a circulation to and from a nucleus; as if each cell had its little heart, actively engaged in the pulsations of its microscopic life. This highly vitalized tissue exists in many parts of plants. And it is on it that the process of grafting depends. Between the bark and the alburnum or sapwood of trees, there is always a layer of this tissue,—it is called cambium,—and it is in this layer that budding and grafting are generally effected. If a bud, or a small branch supporting several buds, be separated from one living plant and attached to another, in which a place has been prepared for its reception, so that the cambium-layer of

the scion is placed in contact with that of the stock, the vital force of the cambium-cells soon effects a union of the two. They grow together, so that the scion is nourished and developed on the stock, just as if it had been its own original stem. Often a large limb, or even the whole bushy bulk of a tree, worthless in its fruit, but sound in its root and stem, is removed to make way for a tiny scion from some fruitful one of a valuable kind. That scion, having large advantage on a stock already established in the ground, soon grows to a fruit-laden limb or tree. The growth-power is in the stem and root; but it is the bud that determines what the fruit shall be. And thus the worthless tree is saved.

So is it with the soul. When, through sin, it has gone to vileness of fruit, and is to the great Husbandman useless,—even then, there are possibilities of fruitfulness in it, which, under skilful and patient husbandry, would satisfy and honour its owner. The same growth-power, which is now running out into woody rankness and sour and worthless fruit, would, if otherwise determined, spread out grateful boughs, and bear much fruit to the glory of God.

The soul cannot save itself, any more than the wild apple tree, ungrafted, could bear the luscious pippin on its boughs. But the soul's stock is constitutionally sound; and if it were only grafted, it could vitalize the scion of truth, and yield the fruit of love, as plenteously and as easily as it strikes forth those rank branches of barrenness, or that crabbed fruit of selfishness and sin. The soul is vile, as regards its fruit, but the constitutional root and stem are sound. The sinner, though most ungodlike in his practice, is still most god-like in his powers. He still thinks, and feels, and wills. And that thinking power could as well be spent in thinking truth as in thinking falsehood; those heart-springs of affection could as well flow forth in love as in selfishness; that energizing will could as well spend itself in deeds of obedience and righteousness, as in deeds of transgression and wrong. There is no reason why its motto should not be:—

"Better to sit at the fountain's birth  
Than a sea of waves to win;  
To dwell in the love that floweth forth,  
Than the love that cometh in."

But it must be grafted first. The soul that has fruited in sin cannot now fruit in righteousness till it has been grafted. And it cannot graft itself.

What then shall be done? Must it wait in its fruitlessness and dishonour till the Husbandman come with his graft and with his skill? Even so. But the Husbandman has come. God is "with us." And the word-bud is in his hand; the word-bud "which," when engrafted, "is able to save the soul." Behold some of those worthless trees already cut over, grafted, and saved.

They are grown into trees of righteousness and love,—the husbandry of God.

But why, then, are not all men saved? Why are some still fruitless of love? Why run so many still to wood and waste? Is God unwilling to save them? Has he no saving word-bud for these well-rooted, but sour-fruited, wild apple trees of men? Our illustration fails us. And yet it will so far supply its own lack, if we bring into view another fact of vegetable physiology.

In the vegetable world it is not the case that every plant will graft on every other. There are natural alliances of plants, within which the process of grafting will be successful; but beyond which, even if all the conditions involved in the facts already mentioned be fulfilled, the process will fail, and the graft will fade in its place. Plants have their occult sympathies and antipathies. Lindley says of grafting.—"This artificial union will only occur when the cellular tissues belong to the same species, or to two species of the same natural order. Therefore what we read in Virgil's *Georgics* is not true. That

'Barren Plane-trees healthful apples bear'

is a mere fiction; for the plane-tree belongs to the urtical, and the apple to the rosal, alliance." Thus we have, as it were, a positive and negative state of plants: an alliance and a non-alliance condition in relation to grafting, or any mode of inter-union. The willow may be grafted on the aspen tree: they are of one alliance. And so the beech may be grafted on the oak; and the peach on the cherry. But the peach scion will not grow on the beech stock; and the cherry will not grow on the ash: these are in non-alliance condition.

Thus it is with the soul and the word that is able to save it. For there are sympathies and antipathies in morals as well as in physicals. The word of the gospel will not grow on a proud unwilling soul. They are in non-alliance condition. That "engrafted word" must be "received with meekness." As well might we look for the apple of the orchard on the pine of the forest, as for the fruit of evangelical love in the man unwilling to receive the evangelical word with meekness. If man will not, he cannot, be saved. But if he be willing, all will be well. God can and will save all who will and can be saved.

Some of the details of this alliance-relation to the saving word, are given by the apostle in the context of the words we have been illustrating. "Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath." "Lay apart all filthiness," etc. These are specimens of alliance-condition. He who is slow to hear, unwilling to obey, cannot be grafted successfully with the authoritative word



of God. He who is swift to speak, a mere frivolous gossip, cannot be successfully grafted with the exceedingly earnest and solemn word of God. He who is swift to wrath, or prone to passion, unwilling to rein and restrain his temper, cannot be successfully grafted with the reason-rendering and reason-requiring word of God. He who chooses uncleanness and is unwilling to lay apart all filthiness cannot be successfully grafted with the holy word of God. A scion of holiness cannot grow on a stock that will not be pure. A scion of command cannot grow on a stock unwilling to obey. A scion of moral earnestness cannot grow on a stock that is rooted and grounded in utter frivolity.

This illustration sheds light on the reason why men remain unconverted under faithful preaching of the gospel. It also reveals the reason why, under the same sermon, or other means, one man is converted and saved, while another remains unmoved and unchanged. However accurately the scion of a peach might be grafted on the stock of a pine, it would not take. The scion would certainly fade. They are in non-alliance relation. So, however faithfully, and simply, and affectionately, the saving word may be preached and pressed upon the acceptance of a soul utterly unwilling to be saved, there will be no blissful result. For the word and the soul are in non-alliance.

Well, if men cannot be saved except by the engrafted word, and if they be in non-alliance relation to the word, what can be done? How are they to be brought into an alliance condition? Must they be regenerated before faith, and in order to faith? That cannot be; for the unregenerated are commanded to receive with meekness the engrafted word which is able to save the soul. And in the immediate context of our passage, we read, "Of his own will *begat he us with the word of truth.*" Regeneration, then, is effected by means of the engrafted word of truth. What is needed in order to produce the alliance condition is simply an honest, awakened, meek receptivity, or, in one word, *willingness*. It is implied that men must be willing to be saved. Men must accept salvation on God's terms, and not come making presumptuous and impossible terms of their own, when he, in the spontaneity of his love, has come to beget them to a better life, in the way his own infinite wisdom has most wisely devised.

But yet the sinner cannot become his own saviour. Mere alliance-condition does not save any tree. It is the grafting that saves it. It is the bud, not the stock, that determines what the future fruit shall be. And the tree, when laden with its mellowing and luscious burden, owes its honours to the husbandman, who, by grafting, saved it from barrenness and from burning. So is it with the sinner. His willingness to accept salvation on God's

terms simply makes his salvation possible. The salvation is all to come, and is all from God. It is the word that saves him. That wondrous bud of thought, that germ of love, sends its unseen fibres down through all his being, drawing up his strength into a glorious fruitfulness.

J. A.—B.

FAITH: ITS NATURE, CAUSES, OBJECT, AND EFFECTS.

*Christian Faith: its nature, object, causes, and effects.* By John H. Godwin. London: Jackson, &c., 1862.

*Strictures on some Passages in the Rev. J. H. Godwin's Congregational Lecture.* By John Howard Hinton. London: Houlston &c. 1862.

*The Rescues of Faith; or, A vindication of the Cross of Christ. Being an analysis and refutation of the rationalism of the age, as embodied in the Congregational Lecture on Christian Faith, by the Rev. J. H. Godwin, Professor in New College, St. John's Wood, London. Revised and corrected from the "British Standard," July to September, 1862.* By the Rev. Brewin Grant, B.A. London: Ward & Co. 1862.

We may say at once that we are disappointed with Professor Godwin's Lectures. We do not mean that there is nothing excellent about them. There is much which has afforded us very great pleasure: and we have felt quickened in heart by many of his observations on those effects of faith which he designates "christian goodness" and "christian usefulness." The spirit, moreover, in which he writes, is calm and benign. And so far as one can judge of the inner of a man, from the outer, he seems to be animated by a sincere desire to know the truth, and to follow it too, whithersoever it may lead him.

Still it is our conviction that he has lost his way in many of his investigations; and that the results, consequently, at which he has arrived, as regards much that is important in relation to "christian faith," are very far removed from "the truth," and are especially remote from "the truth as it is in Jesus." It pains us to make this avowal. But regard for what we conceive to be high and sacred interests extorts it from us.

Even in the preface to the Lectures, there is something which looks ominous to those who have felt their spirits harrowed by reading such *Appeals from Paul to Jesus*, as, for example, the "Not Paul, but Jesus" of Gamaliel Smith or Jeremy Bentham. Mr. Godwin says:—

"It scarcely accords with the honour which should be given to the instructions of the apostles, and especially to the words of Christ, that high importance should be assigned to what is never mentioned by Him; or that what is by them referred to rarely and incidentally, should be made the foundation of christian faith, or of christian doctrine."—p. vi.

The case is strongly put by our author; and there is truth in what he says. But yet his statement seems to us to be lying on one line

with "Not Paul, but Jesus." And our fear is confirmed, when we find that the first sentence of the first Lecture is the following :—

"In our inquiry respecting any portion of Christian Truth, it is evidently most proper to begin with words spoken by our Lord."—p. 1.

Mr. Godwin seems, in short, to attach a too preponderant importance to the immediate teaching of our Lord, *as distinguished from his mediate teaching through his inspired apostles*. He forgets, we apprehend, that during his personal ministry, our Lord was constrained to disclose the truth to his disciples, only in such progressive phases of it, and in such proportions, as their opening minds could bear. "I have yet many things," he declares, "to say unto you; but ye cannot bear them now." (John xvi. 12.) It was natural—considering their education and their circumstances—that they should feel a difficulty in apprehending and welcoming the fulness of the truth regarding himself. And all the more so, if we assume, as we are bound to do, that it was rather to do a work that our Saviour appeared, than to utter words. He was on earth, in other words, rather to be a propitiator than to be a teacher. And until his work was finished, and had thus become historical, it could not, from the nature of the case, be susceptible,—at least in relation to the mass of Jewish minds,—of the clearest possible exhibition, and the fullest possible popular explanation. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the "instructions of the apostles" may really contain a more developed phase of evangelical truth, than were those "words of Christ," which he uttered with his own lips, during his personal ministry.

What the author says, again, of the impropriety of attaching high importance to what is referred to "rarely and incidentally" in the apostolic writings, is true to a certain degree. And yet, if we bear in mind that the apostolic writings, possessed by us, were, for the most part, occasioned by incidental circumstances in the various churches addressed, we need not marvel, we apprehend, that some of the most important aspects of those realities, which constitute the sum and substance of christianity, should be only incidentally exhibited. Neither need the rarity of the exhibitions scare us, if there be reason to believe that the holy men, who made them, really "spake" consistently as they uttered them, and spake too "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

But we would now betake ourselves to the body of the Lectures. The first is devoted to the consideration of "the nature of faith." And, in it, the author contends strenuously that the faith, on which salvation depends, is not the simple *belief* of the truth. He holds it to be *trust*. And he maintains that this trust consists of four constituent elements, (1) thoughts respecting the unseen, (2) a belief of the reality of the unseen, (3) a desire for a promised good, and (4) a submission to a prescribed rule. (p. 36.) He says :—

"Trust, therefore, can be required only when some good is presented for desire and some course for choice: and it can be rendered only when there is not merely belief and desire, but the choice which is consequent, and which corresponds to them."—(p. 12.)

This choice, however, which is consequent on *belief* and *desire* is, it

must be borne in mind, not consequent on *faith*. It is an essential ingredient :—

“There cannot be trust without choice, nor choice without some kind of desire : and the choice is not distinct from the trust.”—p. 10.

“The requirement of trust is never merely the requirement of desire and belief : it is the requirement of some consequent and corresponding exercise of will.”—p. 11.

Such is Mr. Godwin's view of the nature of Faith. He insists upon it at great length. And he seems to think it a matter of no inconsiderable moment, that his idea should be embraced. He had said, indeed, in his preface, “that the controversies which have so long prevailed among Christians are of comparatively little moment.” (p. viii.) But he would seem to make an exception in reference to the nature of faith : for he contends, in his lecture, that “the injury occasioned by erroneous views of what it is *to believe in Christ*, has not been small.” (p. 5.)

We think his definition incorrect : although we are far from regarding it as the most objectionable feature of his system. If it had stood alone, as the doctrinal peculiarity of his volume, we should not have seen much reason to take exception to his theology.

We believe that whosoever really and enlightenedly trusts in *Jesus*, will be both saved and sanctified. He will be blessed with “everlasting life.” And we are, consequently, in the habit of urging inquirers *to trust to Jesus, to trust their guilty souls to Jesus, to intrust Jesus with their souls, to trust him for time and for eternity, to trust him through life and in death*. We could preach the gospel, in a popular way, from year to year, without employing the word *believe*, or the word *faith*, if we were allowed to use freely such terms as *trust* and *confidence*. And yet we are persuaded that *faith* is not absolutely identical with *trust*, just as *trust* is not absolutely identical with *confidence*. And we are convinced that Professor Godwin has missed the precise significance both of *trust* and of *faith*.

He has taken, we conceive, a too partial view of the applications of the word *trust*. He supposes, as we have seen, that it involves, in its essence, the constituents of *desire* and *choice* as well as *belief*,—desire for good, and choice of something or other to be done in order to the attainment of the good desired. But this supposition, we imagine, confounds some of the adjuncts of *trust*, with the essence of the state of mind which is so designated. When we read, for example, of “certain, who trusted in themselves, that they were righteous, and despised others,” (Luke xviii. 9); the term certainly does not import, although it implies, that they *desired* to be righteous. *Desire*, in other words, is not of the essence of the state of mind referred to. For the parties portrayed were persuaded that they were already righteous. Neither does the term mean that, by an act of volition, they chose to do what was needed in order to the attainment of righteousness. Doubtless they had been, so far, characterised by this choice, and they continued to be, to some extent or other, characterised by it. But when it is said that “they trusted that they were righteous,” the reference is neither to a state of desire in reference to righteousness, nor to an act of choice put forth for its attainment. It is exclusively to a certain *confidence* in their own character, which might be a mixture, indeed, of

something perverse in their intelligence, and of something perverse in their emotions, but which was clearly distinct from *desire* of righteousness on the one hand, and *volition* on the other.

It is true that in the passage we have quoted, the word in the original, which is translated "trusted," is different from the term which is generally translated "believed." But this only strengthens our conclusion, that *believing* and *faith* are not absolutely identical with *trust*.

Both in the New Testament and in the Septuagint, it is a different Greek word, (*πίστωθα*) which strictly corresponds to our English word *trust*. And we infer from this fact, that it is one thing to *trust*, and another thing to *believe*; although it is evident that the two states of mind are very intimately allied.

Professor Godwin, we conceive, in his anxiety to find, in *faith*, something totally different from *belief*, has overlooked the fundamental element of the word *trust*. He has overlooked the beautiful etymological relation of the word to the terms *true* and *truth*. When the word began, in times of yore, to be used, they who trusted any one, were they who saw *truth* reflected in the character of him whom they trusted. They hence subjectively attributed truthfulness to him. They reflected back upon him his own reality. *They believed him to be true*. Such is the fundamental notion of the word *trust*. The term naturally gathered around it, as its usage rolled on, the accessory notions of *repose* and voluntary *intrustment*. But it is totally distinct, in its essential import, either from *desire* or from *choice*.

Mr. Godwin has thus, we apprehend, got off the scent, in his research into the nature of saving faith. And the chief practical evil, arising from his notion of a fourfold complexity of things being inherent in its essence, is, that there is hidden from the evangelical preacher the thin edge of the wedge, which needs to be employed in seeking to effect an entrance for salvation into the mind of the sinner. If it be a fourfold complexity of things, which is requisite as the subjective condition of salvation, and thus of peace and hope in relation to God and to eternity:—if the sinner must needs have (1) a certain thought concerning the Saviour, and (2) a certain belief, and (3) a certain desire, and (4) a certain choice:—and if all this be *believing* or *faith*:—and if nothing less be *faith* or *believing*:—the edge of the wedge of truth is certainly broadened and blunted. And in the indefiniteness which is characteristic of the kind and amount of the *desire* that is requisite, and of the kind and extent of the *choice*, or "submission to the divine will," that is essential, there is danger of finding the wedge quite unadapted to enter in, except when the inquiring mind is, by a very deepened course of conviction, thoroughly opened up.

Mr. Godwin's principle ignores, we conceive, the fact that there is one grand evangelical reality, though unseen, which is of such a nature, and of such relations to our spiritual wants, that if the soul actually enters into its presence, and apprehends it, there will be a blessed moral change, involving every kind of blissful desire and blissful choice. And it is, we apprehend, in proportion as a man lives in the realized presence of this grand spiritual reality, that he becomes a good, a holy, a useful,

a happy, and a god-like man. If it were not the case that there is such a reality, there would be no means, at the disposal of even God himself, whereby a right emotional and volitional condition could, without necessitation, be rationally secured in any human being.

Professor Godwin's view of faith is, further, inconsistent, we apprehend, with the idea of the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews. For, not to discuss what is meant by the definitional enunciation that "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (xi. 1), it is said, at the very commencement of the illustrations:—"through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God." And yet, while in such a statement we see scope for *belief*, and for the apprehension of the *truth* of unseen realities, we certainly discover no room at all for the introduction of specific *desire* and *choice*. In believing that God is the creator of the worlds, we neither,—so far as the essence of our believing is concerned,—*desire*, nor *choose*, the divine relationship indicated. We have simply confidence in the unseen fact: and our confidence is just "the belief of the truth" regarding the great reality. By it "we *understand*." It is a confidence that culminates in the intelligence.

The professor's definition is equally at variance, we apprehend, with what is said by the apostle James of the *faith of devils*. He declares that "the devils *believe* that there is one God, and tremble." (ii. 19.) And yet he certainly does not mean that they desire and choose what they believe. There may no doubt, indeed, be an element of some kind of confidence in their faith. Their faith is, probably, a kind of confidence. There is thought in it:—confident thought. The thought is belief. But it would be misnamed *trust*; and very especially so, if we were to define trust as comprizing in its essence both specific *desire* and *choice*. The peculiarity of the faith of devils resolves itself into a peculiarity of the object on which it terminates, as that object is subjectively apprehended to be related to them, in their peculiar moral condition. They "tremble" in the presence of the unpropitiated God, against whom they have rebelled, and are still in rebellion. The apostle, in distinguishing their faith from the faith of saved human beings, does not intimate that there is any difference in essence, as regards the act of believing, in the two parties referred to. He only points out that, in the one case, there are no holy "works," the adjuncts or the consequences of the faith; while, in the other, there are.

The view which is advocated by Professor Godwin, seems, farther, to be at variance with the representations of the apostle John. In the fifth chapter of his catholic epistle, he speaks of faith as a *reception of the testimony of God*. He says,—

"If we receive the witness (or testimony) of men, the witness (or testimony) of God is greater: for this is the witness (testimony) of God, which he hath testified of his Son. He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness (testimony) in himself: he that believeth not God hath made him a liar; because he believeth not the record (testimony) that God gave of his Son. And this is the record (testimony)

that God hath given to us (hath presented to us as in a gift) eternal life, and this life is in his Son."—1 John v. 1-11.

It would appear, then, that the apostle John regarded faith as the reception of the divine testimony regarding the Son. Faith, in other words, was, in his estimation, belief. And hence, harmoniously, we read, on the one hand, in what we may call *The Gospel according to Isaiah*, "Who hath believed our report?" (Isa. liii. 1.), and, on the other, in Paul's Epistle to the Romans, "So then faith cometh by hearing (the report), and hearing (the report) by the word of God." (x. 17.)

It is in admirable consonance with these views, and at variance with the idea of Professor Godwin, that it is said, by our Lord, to be "eternal life"—to "know the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent." (John xvii. 3.) It is a kind of knowledge, it seems, which is "the principal thing." It is the "one thing needful," subjectively. "They that know God's name will put their trust in him." (Ps. ix. 10.) And thus what is requisite in order that "all men should be saved," is that "they should come unto the knowledge of the truth." (1 Tim. ii. 4.) We have reason to believe, indeed, that God's own infinite purity of character is everlastingly secured, though not necessitated, by the realities which are included within the infinite scope of his knowledge. And correspondingly, there is a certain grand reality, having moral relations to man, and of such wondrous widths of adaptation, that, if the human mind be consciously in its presence, there will be peace and purity within the soul. That reality is exhibited in "the gospel of God's grace;" and it is found, as might be expected, in God himself, but in God as he is "God manifest in the flesh." It is because of the nature of this reality, and because all other realities, in our human sphere of things, have more or less of vital relation to it, that there is ground for plying, with encouragement and in hope, all the various instrumentalities within our reach, for consummating the thorough education of the world. Every line of truth, which has relation to man, runs up into, and finds its real central termination in, God as he is "in Christ." It thus points to Christ. And if once all mankind were, "with open face," to stand consciously in the August Presence, and to look upon Christ as he is, and upon God in Christ as He too is, they would all be "changed into the same image from glory to glory," as "by the Lord the Spirit."

It is some such view of things which lies, as we conceive, at the basis of the *ways and means* of practical christianity. And we conclude, therefore, that if Mr. Godwin had only occupied another, and, as we regard it, a higher, stand-point, he would have embraced a very different conception of the essential nature of faith.

As he adduces, however, a variety of reasons for holding "that christian faith is," in its essence, "more than any kind of belief," we shall glance at them, and then pass on to the ulterior elements of his theological system.

- (1.) His first argument is, that "trust is the more common sig-

nification of the word, and the more appropriate." (p. 13.) We have intimated already that we could accept the translation *trust*, in the etymological import of the term, or in the sense of *confidence*, though by no means in the complex meaning attached to it by Mr. Godwin. But apart from this, we would remark that if Mr. Godwin refer to the biblical usage of the terms *believe* and *faith*, the facts of the case are rather the reverse of what he avers. Keeping out of view the passages that speak of *believing in Christ* or *faith in Christ*,—as the import of these passages involves the very question in dispute;—and also keeping out of view the passages in which the verb is used transitively and complexly, and the noun objectively;—it is certain that in the other passages, it is a "kind of belief," or etymological trust, which is the "common signification of the word." The passages are not numerous; and the following are fair representative instances:—"If any man shall say unto you, lo, here is Christ, or there; *believe it not*," (Mat. xxiv. 23);—"behold, thou shalt be dumb, and not able to speak, until the day that these things be performed, because *thou believest not my words* (Luke i. 20);—"But the Jews did not *believe concerning him*, that he had been blind," (Jo. ix. 18);—"but they were all afraid of him, and *believed not* that he was a disciple," (Acts ix. 26);—"For one *believeth* that he may eat all things; another, who is weak, eateth herbs," (Rom. xiv. 2);—"without *faith* it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must *believe* that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him," (Heb. xi. 6);—"He that doubteth is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of *faith* (but in *doubt*) Rom. xiv. 23;—"Through *faith* we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God." It is sufficient to quote the passages. They do not require any comment.

(2.) Mr. Godwin's second argument is, that "belief is a description of knowledge," whereas, "the testimony of both Scripture and experience is opposed to the supposition, that the possession of any knowledge is sufficient to ensure salvation." (p. 14.) But it is enough, surely, to re-quote the asseveration of our Saviour,—"*This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.*" And it accords, we presume with the common experience of Christians that it was by "looking unto Jesus," and seeing something in him, previously overlooked, but wondrously adapted to their spiritual necessities, that their hearts leaped for joy, and entered into "peace with God," and felt constrained to turn into the pathway of obedience to his holy will. It was as we stood at the foot of the cross, and looked up, that our burden fell off, and all that was within became "new."

(3.) Our author's third argument is thus expressed:—"The duty enjoined in the Old Testament, which appears to correspond to the faith required in the New, is trust or confidence in God." (p. 14.) We grant it, to a certain extent; although we must ever bear in mind that the reason of the trust which is enjoined in the Old Testament, was exhibited symbolically, down through the ages, in the appointed sacrificial ritual: and that sacrificial ritual was a hieroglyphic testimony, which



claimed to be *believed*. It is also a matter of some moment to bear in mind, that, when the antitype had become historical, there was freer scope,—just because of the element of the definite that is found in accomplished facts,—for putting a sharpened point upon the edge of the spiritual wedge, which is to open up the soul to heavenly and recuperative influences. That sharper point was what is now designated *believing* or *faith*, and which is so designated in the New Testament throughout, and in that one wondrous enunciation of Habakkuk ii. 4, which is the essence and quintessence of the entire Bible, (See Rom. i. 17),—the sum and substance, in miniature, of the whole theology both of the Old Testament and of the New.

(4.) The professor's fourth argument is, that "the truths, of which the simple belief is by some supposed to be christian faith, were not known by those who first had this faith." (p. 15.) He refers to the fact that the Saviour's "death was not expected by his disciples, not even by his apostles." "They had faith in him," he adds, "and through this faith they became his followers; they were acknowledged to be his friends and kindred, were assured of their forgiveness and acceptance; and yet they did not believe it was needful that Christ should suffer." The objection confounds the implicit with the explicit; and overlooks the difference which may be characteristic, under different circumstances, of the form of a thing, although the substance of it continues to be the same. Even the death of Christ,—though now the natural object of faith, since the fact has actually transpired,—is, within the scheme of salvation, but a means to an end. The end is the divine propitioussness, or that state of the divine mind which involves a readiness to forgive our sins, and to overcome with good all the evils of our hearts. And he, consequently, who had of old, or who has even now, explicit faith in the end, had or has implicit faith in the means. He who explicitly believes that God is somehow or other propitiated, implicitly believes in the propitiatory death of our Lord Jesus-Christ.

(5.) Mr. Godwin proceeds to say, fifthly;—"that faith, in reference to Christ, is not simply belief, appears from the verbal expressions which are employed." He adds,—

"When the Greek verb denotes merely *to believe*, it is connected with the proposition believed by a particle equivalent to the English conjunction *that*; or with the name of the object believed in the accusative case. Thus we read, 'Do you *believe* that I am able to do this?' 'The Jews did not *believe* respecting him, *that* he was blind.' 'They all feared him, not *believing* that he was a disciple.' 'I work a work in your days, a work which ye will not believe, should any one declare it unto you.' The same meaning belongs to the verb when joined to a noun in the dative case, though this form of expression is generally used when trust is meant, and not simply belief. But when faith is mentioned in connection with Christ as its object, and salvation as its end, another form of expression is used. The verb is then connected by particles corresponding to the English prepositions, *to*, *in*, and *on*."—pp. 16, 17.

"To have faith in any person, is more than to believe the truth of his words. It is this, and also to desire and choose something in consequence."—p. 322.

The Hebrew verb "is construed with several particles, *b*, *l*, *ki*, *eth*; but it is never used with the first, to denote simple *belief*. When thus construed, it is commonly translated, *believe in*."—p. 321.

In reference to these observations, we would begin with the last we have quoted: the assertion, namely, that the Hebrew verb, when

construed with the particle *b*, "is commonly translated, *believe in*." Mr. Godwin has made a mistake in this matter. The phrase, to which he refers, is indeed sometimes translated in the way he specifies, as for example in Genesis xv. 6; 2 Kings xvii. 14; 2 Chron. xx. 20; Ps. lxxviii. 22;—these four passages. We remember no others. It receives a kindred translation, *trust in*, in Job iv. 18; xv. 15; xv. 31; Mic. vii. 5:—also four passages. But the same construction occurs in Ex. xiv. 31; xix. 9; Num. xiv. 11; xx. 12; Deut. i. 32; xxviii. 66; 1 Sam. xxvii. 12; 2 Chron. xx. 20; Job. xxiv. 22; xxxix. 12; Ps. lviii. 32; cvi. 12; cxix. 66; Prov. xxvi. 25; Jer. xii. 6; Jon. iii. 5:—seventeen passages in all: and yet in none of them does it receive the translation *believe in*. In most of them, the expression is simply translated *believe*, as if the particle *l* had been employed.

We agree, however, with professor Godwin when he says, that "to have *faith in* any person is more than to believe the truth of his words." At all events, it may mean more; and to a certainty it very often means more. But we differ from him, when he adds, in explanation of the overplus of meaning,—"*it is this, and also to desire and choose something in consequence.*" When it is said, for example, in Gen. xv. 6, that Abraham "believed in the Lord; and he counted it to him for righteousness," the expression does not mean that Abraham desired and chose God, or that he desired and chose what God had promised. The apostle Paul adopts the Septuagint translation, and renders the expression, with no doubt substantial accuracy, "Abraham *believed God*; and it was counted unto him for righteousness." Abraham believed the Messianic promise of God,—the promise which was the inner essence of all that was outward, when it was divinely said to him, "Look now toward heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to number them:—so shall thy seed be."

We grant, however, that the expression *to believe in*, as employed in the Old Testament, generally means *to have confidence in*, and, in that sense of the expression, though not in Mr. Godwin's, *to trust in*. Thus when it is said in Ex. xiv. 31, "And Israel saw that great work which the Lord did upon the Egyptians; and the people feared the Lord, and *believed (in) the Lord, and (in) his servant Moses*";—the meaning seems to be that they had confidence at once in the Lord and in his servant Moses. The same is the import of the phrase in 2 Chron. xx. 20, "*Believe in the Lord your God; so shall ye be established: believe (in) his prophets: so shall ye prosper.*" These are representative passages. And in both of them, as in most of the kindred expressions occurring in the Old Testament, the persons, human or divine, *believed in* or *to be believed in*, are persons *confided in* or *to be confided in*: and that too, as persons *whose word is trust-worthy, reliable, or believiable*. And we still, indeed, in our current conventional language, use, with a similar reference, the expression *to have faith in*. We have faith in a man whose promises and professions we can trust,—whose word is reliable. We have no faith in a man, whose professions or promises are unreliable,—whose word we cannot trust. But in the New Testament, the analogous expression, *to believe in* or *to believe on*,—(generally πιστεύειν σίς, sometimes πιστεύειν ἐπί, and also, to have πίστιν ἐν,)—when used, as it almost always is, in reference to Christ, as the object on which the believing

terminates, has a somewhat different adjunct of import. We say "adjunct;" for the essence of the meaning of the phrase is the same. The expression means, as in all the Old Testament instances, *to have faith in*, that is, *to have confidence in*, or, *to trust to and in*. But it has a more pointed edge of import, as is manifest especially from the peculiar use of the preposition *to* in the original. It means *to have faith in* (that is, in Christ), in the sense of *having faith, that goes out to him, and then reposes IN or ON him*. And more, the faith, which thus goes out to Christ, and rests IN or ON him, is not so much confidence in him *as one whose word is trustworthy or believable*, as it is confidence in him *as one who is exhibited in some other trustworthy or believable word, some trustworthy or believable testimony, record, or report, regarding him; the gospel, to wit*. And thus, from the nature of the case, the expression *to believe on Christ*, or *to have faith in Christ*, means to have *belief*—(belief of course in a trustworthy testimony)—going out to Christ, terminating on him, and there abiding and reposing. This is the sharp point of the import of the New Testament phrase. And hence it is that *to believe in Christ* is really equivalent to such other phrases as *to believe the gospel concerning him, to receive God's testimony regarding him, to know him, or, to behold him*. And the word *believe* in such a phrase, has thus the same import which is ascribed to it, even by professor Godwin, in those phrases in which it is followed by the conjunction *that*; as when, for example, it is said, "if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt *believe* in thine heart (that is, the heart of thy being, the *mind*, as distinguished from the *mouth*,) *that* God hath raised him from the dead, *thou shalt be saved*." (Rom. x. 9.)

(6.) The next argument of Mr. Godwin is derived from "the expressions, which are sometimes used as equivalents for faith." He specifies *coming to Christ, receiving him, and acknowledging him*. These, he thinks, "show that more than belief is required." (p. 18.) But we do not see that they do. When we *come* to Christ, it is with the mind of course. And when we come to him with, or in, the mind, it is, we presume, by means of the mind's element of thought. That is the true locomotive of the mind. And the thought-element, in the case referred to, must certainly be belief. For the thought could not reach its spiritual object, we presume, except by means of a testimony of some kind or other. But he who thus "comes" to Christ, and "looks" upon him, will "live." He will find in the Great Presence what will at once inspire him with peace, and awe him into adoration and obedience.

It is in a similar sense that the soul *receives* Christ. It receives him, first of all, into the thought. That is the ante-chamber of the soul. But no sooner does the realization of his glorious and gracious Presence within that chamber, take place, than every door of every other apartment of the spirit is thrown open for his ingress. The power of his Presence is felt to be sweetly, but mightily, constraining. And immediately upon being felt within "the heart," it is "confessed with the mouth." Hence the Saviour is *acknowledged*. But the acknowledgement is strictly, of course, like praise, and prayer, and consecration as on the altar, a consequent, not an ingredient, of saving faith.

(7.) "This is confirmed," says Mr. Godwin, in the last place, "by the consideration, that the faith required in connection with the miracles of Christ was more than belief: it was trust." (p. 18.) Yes: it was trust, in the proper and etymological acceptance of the term. But, when the term is thus understood, the edge of its import was, after all, just a *belief that the Lord was both able and willing*. And hence we read in Mat. ix. 28,—“And when he was come into the house, the blind men came unto him: and Jesus saith unto them, *believe ye that I am able to do this?* They said unto him, yea, Lord. Then touched he their eyes, saying, according to your *faith* be it unto you. And their eyes were opened.” The *faith* referred to, is the *believing* that is specified. And according to Mr. Godwin's own canon, the *believing* that is specified, being followed by the conjunction *that*, naturally denotes simply believing.

Such are the professor's reasons for regarding *faith* as something more than *believing*. They are not, so far as we can see, a sufficient foundation to bear the weight of the superstructure erected upon it. And when we take into account the professor's peculiar psychological analysis of the ingredients of *trust*, we cannot avoid the conclusion, that he has, to a very considerable extent, misconceived the precise import of that, which he has so appropriately designated, “Christian Faith.”

His second lecture is on “The Object of Faith,”—in some respect a supremely momentous topic. Mr. Godwin, however, does not prepare us, by what he says in his first lecture, for entering, with *confidence and trust and belief*, upon the consideration of his views on the subject. We do not refer, in this remark, to his peculiar notions on the nature of christian faith. We refer to an ominous observation, which drops from his pen, towards the conclusion of his first lecture, and which is a kind of prolepsis, or anticipation, of the purport of the second. In discussing the nature of faith, as viewed in the light of the apostle Paul's teaching, in the Epistle to the Romans, Mr. Godwin says:—

Submission to the divine will is in other places shown to be an essential part of the faith of Abraham, and of all christian faith. To this subject the apostle advances in the sixth chapter, where he states that *the whole example of Christ, as a revelation of the divine will, is the object of christian faith*; so that it must include the present choice of seeking to be like him.”—p. 37.

The words, which we have italicised, indicate, in our opinion, a misapprehension, at once of the meaning of the epistle to the Romans, and of the distinguishing principles of objective christianity. Our Lord was, indeed, a pattern. That is true. He was a model-man. That is unquestionable. But to ignore that he was far more,—that he was a propitiation for our sins; to ignore this, while exhibiting “the object of christian faith”; and to ignore that all his model sinlessness, though of inestimable value as an example, and as thus a distinct end in his work, derived nevertheless its primary and palmary value from being an indispensable means to another end, and that a sacrificial and expiatory end;—for Mr. Godwin to ignore all this, leads us to entertain the gravest solicitude regarding the merits and probable effect of the whole of his theology.

Our solicitude is not much alleviated by a perusal of the second lecture. He begins by saying :—

“Having considered the nature of faith, we proceed to the inquiry respecting the object of christian faith. What is this? Is it a proposition, or a system of propositions? Is it a fact, or a series of facts? Or is it some person? What, or whom, are we required to trust?”—p. 39.

“The inquiry respecting the immediate object of christian faith, is of speculative and practical importance.”—p. 40.

“To this question, the words of our Lord, already mentioned, give a very distinct and satisfactory reply. Speaking to the people of Capernaum, he declared himself to be the object of that faith, which was required by God, and would ensure eternal life. ‘This is the service of God, that you trust to him whom he sent.’ And so in all the passages quoted to illustrate the nature of faith. It is not said that we are saved by trusting to the doctrine which Christ taught, or by trusting to what he has done or will do, but by trusting to himself.”—p. 41.

Mr. Godwin concludes his lectures by reiterating the same ideas :—

“If Jesus Christ be the object of christian faith, those representations must be erroneous, which assign this place to any particular facts or propositions. Not the birth of Christ, nor his death, nor his resurrection, can be the object of this faith; though these and many other facts will be included in the knowledge of Christ, which is possessed by those who have faith in him. The proposition, that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God, is not the object of this faith, though this must be believed that there may be faith in him. The sufficiency of his sacrifice for the pardon of sin, cannot be alone the object of this faith; though it will be believed and trusted by all who have faith in him. The proposition, that the gospel is true, is not the object of christian faith, though this must be known and believed; nor all the propositions which set forth the whole system of christian doctrine and duty, though these will be believed so far as they are known. The proposition, that some particular person is saved, or will be saved, cannot be the object of that faith through which salvation is received; for it may be a false proposition, and it must be without evidence, until there be that faith of which Christ himself is the object. This is the only ground on which any can reasonably believe, that they will have the good which is promised to those who have faith in him. *According to the sacred Scriptures, no fact or series of facts, no proposition or system of propositions, but Jesus Christ himself, the Son of God, is the object of faith, in whom men will find all that is to be believed, desired, and chosen, that they may receive through him eternal life.*”—p. 73.

The last sentence of our quotation, the one which we have italicised, is a representative one. It is a specimen of several others, which we have quoted, and of many more, which are to be found throughout the lecture. And it affords us much satisfaction to acknowledge that it involves an element of very important truth. For assuredly Mr. Godwin is right in believing that it is Christ, Christ himself, who is the great object of christian faith. And yet, when his sentence is taken in its entirety, and in combination with the other sentences quoted, and in connection with the lecture as a whole, and in relation to the prophetic sentence which we have adduced from the conclusion of the preceding lecture, we find, we conceive, ingredients in it of a very questionable description.

There is even, it appears to us, an ingredient of contradiction to his own anticipative remark referred to. In that remark, as we have seen, Mr. Godwin declares, that the apostle Paul states, in the sixth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, “that the whole example of Christ, as a revelation of the divine will, is the object of christian faith.” And in thus specifying this supposed statement of the apostle, Mr. Godwin is certainly looking in another direction, than down the line of things which

leads to "Not Paul but Christ." He evidently approves of the idea which he conceives to be enunciated by Paul. And in the lecture, with which at present we are more immediately concerned, he re-reiterates it, as we shall see, and that too without appending to it any special and questionable apostolic imprimatur. But yet, it is an idea which appears to us to be at variance with the final finding of the lecture,—the finding, that, "according to the sacred Scriptures, no fact or series of facts, no proposition or system of propositions, but Jesus Christ himself, the Son of God, is the object of faith." For what was Christ's "example,"—the example which he "left us," "that we should follow his steps"? Was it not simply "a series of (sublime) facts."? Every thing, indeed, about Christ, which was not "a fact," was an incommunicable perfection, which could not possibly be imitated. For certainly it was within the sphere of his choices alone,—the sphere, that is to say, of facts,—that he exhibited to us that glorious ideal of life, life even in the flesh, which is at once the faultless and the peerless archetype, after which it is our privilege to copy. It is "his steps," which we are to "follow." But if it be, and if it also be the case that it is "the whole example of Christ which is the object of christian faith," then Mr. Godwin has come, so far as we can see, to two mutually inconsistent conclusions. He holds, ambidextrously, that it both is, and is not, "a series of facts," which is the object of christian faith.

Again,—to take another ingredient,—when he maintains that it is "no proposition, or system of propositions," which is "the object of saving faith," his notion seems to us to be decidedly divergent from express biblical statements; and it is, as we apprehend, to be traced to the professor's inexact conception of the nature of faith. If no proposition, or system of propositions, be the object of christian faith, it will follow that it cannot be the case that "the gospel," or "the word of the truth of the gospel," is, in any legitimate acceptation of the terms, the object of christian faith. But if it be not, what are we to make of the great commission itself;—"Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature"? Why was the gospel to be preached? Was it not that it might be believed, or, that men might have faith in it? And did not our Saviour, moreover, in giving the commission to preach the gospel, intimate that men's future and final condition would be one of salvation, or the contrary, according as they believed or did not believe it? And is not the "gospel" a proposition? Is it not "the word of the truth of the gospel"? Is not, indeed, every "word," strictly speaking, propositional? It is an element at least of a proposition. And assuredly all "truth," strictly speaking, is propositional. *Truth*, when used strictly, and in distinction from *reality*, is either a proposition, or a system of propositions.

And the commission of our Lord is not solitary evidence that a proposition, or system of propositions, may be the object of christian and saving faith. Let us observe what Paul says, when he acted on his Lord's commission. He writes thus to the Corinthians:—

"Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain: for I

delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures."—1. Cor. xv. 1-4.

Here the apostle exhibits "the gospel which he preached." And when we look at his exhibition, we find it to consist of a series of very explicit propositions. And yet he distinctly says of it,—“by which also *ye are saved*, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you.” He adds, indeed, “unless ye have believed in vain.” But he means, by this addition, as he subsequently explains, that “if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, *and your faith is also vain.*” But as Christ is risen, the faith of the Corinthian brethren was not vain. They were saved, and would continue to be saved, and by and by would be finally and completely saved, “if they kept in memory what he preached unto them.” In this passage, then, the object of saving faith is expressly exhibited as a series of propositions. And thus, unless we retrograde to the very questionable principle, “Not Paul, but Jesus,” we seem shut up to the conclusion, that Mr. Godwin’s mind has got a twist on the subject, by some grave misapprehension. And that there is no room for the retrogression referred to, is evident; for the disciple, in his declaration to the Corinthians, seems to be merely echoing the declaration of the Master, in the great evangelical commission, to which we have already appealed.

The same apostle, in another and still more emphatic passage, seems to look at the subject from a standing-point altogether different from that occupied by professor Godwin. He says in the eminently pregnant words, which constitute the theme of the most doctrinal of all his epistles, the epistle to the Romans:—“I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for *it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth.*” (Rom. i. 16.) It is “the gospel,” it will be perceived, or in other words the great evangelical “proposition” or “system of propositions,” of which the apostle speaks so magnificently. It is it, which is “the power of God unto salvation, to every one who believeth.” And the inspired writer proceeds, in the remainder of his thesis, to explain the secret of its spiritual power:—“for therein is the righteousness of God (the saving righteousness provided by God, and wrought out by Christ Jesus) revealed, from faith to faith; as it is written, the righteous by faith shall live.” The gospel, then, is not only, according to Paul, the object of faith. It is “the power of God unto salvation” to every one who has faith in it. And the reason why it is thus the saving power of God, is found in the revelation which it embodies,—the revelation of the (substitutionary) righteousness provided by God, and which is available “by faith.” In other words the “proposition” of the gospel, when made an object of faith, is experienced to be “the power of God unto salvation,” because, in that proposition, the “series of facts,” which constitutes “the (substitutionary) righteousness of God” is revealed to be believed. The object of faith is thus, in the theme of the epistle to the Romans, exhibited in two of those phases, which Mr. Godwin repudiates.

We might refer to many other statements of Scripture equally decisive. But we need not deal in superfluities. It may suffice to point to the fact that it is “with the word of truth,”—a proposition or system of

propositions,—that the Father “begets.” (Jam. i. 18.) It is “by the word of God,”—a proposition or system of propositions,—that men are “born again.” (1 Pet. i. 23.) It is too “in obeying the truth,”—a proposition or system of propositions,—that “men purify their souls.” (1 Pet. i. 22.) And it is by the “truth,” that the Father “sanctifies,”—by “his own truth,” “his word” which “is truth.” (Jo. xvii. 17.) It is Jesus himself, and neither Paul nor Peter, who says this. And he elsewhere says, “ye shall know the truth; and the truth shall make you free.” (Jo. viii. 32.) But if the proposition or system of propositions, which constitutes “the truth,” has, when believed, such a mighty effect, it must certainly be the object of christian faith, and be indeed, as we have seen, the very “power of God unto salvation.”

It is, we conceive, because Professor Godwin has got his mind entangled in a false notion of the nature of faith, or of that “trust,” which may be regarded as the free-and-easy synonyme of faith, that he has got into this attitude of antagonism to some of the representations of Scripture. For, just as he is certainly right, when he represents Christ as being the object of christian faith; he is as certainly wrong, when he declares that “no fact or facts, no proposition or system of propositions, is the object of faith.” The two representations are coincidentally scriptural; and no conception of the nature of faith can be correct which does not exhibit their perfect harmony. Mr. Godwin’s conception, it seems, fails him in this emergency. And the conception which he discards, and which regards faith as *believing*, or *belief*, or etymological *trusting*, or holding-for-true, (*fürwahrhalten*), affords a perfect means of conciliation.

*Faith* in the sense of *believing*,—(and it must be borne in mind that the Greek word for *believing* is just the verbal form of the Greek word for *faith*,)—has, from the very nature of the case, to do with “things unseen.” (Heb. xi. i.) It has relation to objects, at least in its ultimate reference, which are beyond the sphere of immediate perception. We do not stand “face to face” with the ultimate objects of faith. If we stood “envisaging” them, or if they were objects of direct intuition, they would, in strictness of speech, be *known* rather than *believed*. Faith, popularly viewed, is a kind of knowledge. But, scientifically viewed, it is distinguished from knowledge; inasmuch as knowledge is immediately intuitive or demonstrative, whereas faith ever reaches its ultimate object mediately, and yet indemonstratively, and is thus dependent either on what is actual testimony, strictly so called, or on what constructively amounts to actual testimony. Hence it is that, while the proper and complete object of knowledge is found in things presentative, as distinguished from things representative, and is, as an object, one and simple, the proper and complete object of faith is found in things representative, as distinguished from things presentative, and is, as an object, complex and twofold. There is in fact a first and last object in faith,—an object which is proximate, and an object which is ultimate. The proximate object is the object by which the ultimate is reached, (the *objectum quo* of the schoolmen.) The ultimate object, again, is the object finally arrived at, and in order to arrive at which the proximate is intermediate. (It is the *objectum quod* of the schoolmen.)



The whole apparent contrariety of things, in the representations of Scripture, is thus, in an instant, conciliated in the light of the real nature of faith. Christ is the ultimate object of faith. The gospel, the evangelical testimony or record,—“a proposition, or a system of propositions,”—is the proximate object. Both are absolutely indispensable. The ultimate cannot be reached except by means of the proximate. And, on the other hand, the proximate is of no use whatever, except as leading to the ultimate. Whosoever pauses upon it, rests as upon a mere algebraical formula. He altogether overlooks the relation of means to ends.

In the light of these obvious distinctions, we cannot but regard the opinion of Professor Godwin as quite aside from the truth, when he avows that if “Jesus Christ be the object of christian faith, those representations must be erroneous, which assign this place to any particular facts or propositions.” (p. 73.) Propositions, subjective or objective,—subjective explicitly, and objective implicitly at least—are essential to faith, in relation to its ultimate object. And even those who, with their eyes, saw Christ, while he was upon the earth, and heard him with their ears, needed to have faith, in both of its elements, as distinguished from knowledge. It was something unseen in the Saviour, something unheard, something spiritual, which was the final object of their belief; and which therefore required to be construed to their minds, in “a proposition or system of propositions.”

So far as the supposed antithesis between Christ, the ultimate object of faith, and “propositions,” the proximate object, is concerned, Mr. Godwin’s misapprehension is obvious. It is equally so, in so far as regards a supposed antithesis between Christ, as the true object of christian faith, and “particular facts” in his terrestrial history. For all the particular facts in his terrestrial history were animated by a particular design, and they culminated in a particular result. They constituted his mediatorial work; and resulted in that peculiar propitious relation of the great Governor of the universe, in virtue of which he is ready to confer unmerited salvation, in place of merited damnation. He is ready to make this exchange, in reference to all who are in such a relation to the work, or the Worker, that their moral renovation is secured. He is ready to make it, in other words, in reference to all who have faith in the work of the Worker, or, in the Worker of the work. If we were to separate the acts from the great Agent, we should be dealing with mere illusory abstractions. And if, on the other hand, we were to separate the Worker from the work, we should be obliterating from our thoughts everything mediatorial and remedial, and thus everything which is truly christian, and indeed everything which is really actual or factual. When we realise that the facts of Christ’s terrestrial life are nothing more, nothing less, and nothing else, than just *Himself in acts*, we find it impossible, on the one hand, to have intelligent faith in the acts, apart from intelligent faith in himself, the agent; and we find, on the other, that intelligent faith in himself, not as an absolute entity, or an unrelational essence, but as an agent and a mediator, resolves itself into faith in what he did, and did for us, and

for all our fellows of mankind. He became "obedient until death" for us all. He made atonement for us all. He accomplished a propitiation (to God) for our sins, and the sins of the whole world. And the propitiation was consummated, when the sacrifice was consumed. Hence it is that such an one as Paul the apostle could say, referring to the culminating "particular fact," that rose up over, and comprehended within itself, all the preceding particular facts, which were the tissue of our Lord's terrestrial existence,—“ God forbid that I should glory save in *the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.*”

We regret that Mr. Godwin does not seem to see, that all the acts of Christ's mediatorial life on earth culminated in his propitiation to God for the sins of the world. He holds up Christ, indeed, as the grand object of faith; and therein we rejoice. But it is Christ in a crowd of detached and miscellaneous aspects of activity. Or, if there be a connecting principle that brings them into unity, it is rather that of example than that of propitiation.—He says:—

“ When Christ said that the whole service of God was now comprehended in the direction, that they should trust to His Son, the good for which they should trust to Him was said to be eternal life.”—p. 52.

“ They were to come to him for this. He required of men nothing but a willingness to receive this life; but as it consisted in a resemblance to Him, it could only be received by learning of Him, and following Him.”—p. 60.

“ When faith is required, He is not represented simply as the teacher, whose doctrine should be believed. More frequently He is referred to as the leader whose example is to be followed, the Lord whose commands are to be obeyed, the Saviour whose salvation is to be sought. Moreover, the work of Christ is a whole, the parts of which cannot be dissevered. If we trust to Him for a life which is divine and eternal, we must know Him, and consent to follow Him, and submit to Him, and seek to be like Him.”—p. 68.

Mr. Godwin, indeed, seems to look upon our faith in Christ, as being just an humbler phase of that “higher faith in God which Christ himself possessed.” (p. 72.) So rigidly does he carry, through and through, his favourite idea of example. We regret it. For his idea of things, is, to our mind, like an orrery-exhibition of the solar system with the sun left out.

Mr. Godwin's third lecture is on “the causes of faith,”—a subject, which has, apparently, occasioned him a considerable amount of perplexity. And his perplexity has been all the greater, we conceive, in consequence of the correctness of some of his views on the subject of causation. Mr. Godwin recognises the freedom of the will, and believes therefore that the divine foreordination is not to be measured in its amplitude by the divine foreknowledge. His views on this class of subjects, are, in the main, highly satisfactory. They all lean, at least, in the right direction,—the direction which conciliates psychology with theology; which exhibits, as a thing intact, the basis of moral obligation; and which accounts for the unholiness that is found in the world, without insinuating an impeachment of the inner will of God, even when we come to the last analysis of causes. Still we can only say that it is, in the main, that Mr. Godwin's views are satisfactory. And we conceive that it is in the collision of his comparatively satisfactory conceptions on these topics, with his unsatisfactory conceptions on the

distinctive nature of faith, that several of those perplexities have originated, which exert so unhappy an influence on the sum total of his theology.

Mr. Godwin starts by saying that "the natural causes of the existences and alterations, which we observe within us and without, are the observed antecedents regularly connected with these consequents." (p. 74.) We note the expression "within us." And we are surprised to find Mr. Godwin speaking, without limitation or reservation, of the observed "causes" of "alterations within us" as merely "antecedents." Can he really mean that we are not conscious within ourselves, in the matter of "alterations," of anything more than antecedence and sequence? If he does, whence, we would ask, would it be a possibility to men to gather the idea of efficient causation? If men are not conscious of efficient causation within themselves, it appears to us that the terms *efficient cause* would be utterly unintelligible to us for ever. We would be absolutely devoid of the mental alphabet and grammar, which would qualify us to articulate and construe their import.

And yet it would appear that Mr. Godwin recognises nothing more in causation, within the field of our consciousness, than antecedence and sequence. For he speaks of "metaphysical causes" as being only "inferred," (p. 77); assuming, apparently, that there is no metaphysical cause within the mind itself; no metaphysical cause, therefore, of which a man can be conscious. And,—what seems to render his idea on this subject unquestionable,—he says:—

"That all effects must be according to their causes, is a useless truism; the question being—are volitions effects, equally with all other changes?"—p. 166.

"If the axiom, which is derived from other changes, were applicable to volitions, it would not be needed as proof; for axioms are only general expressions for truths which are self-evident."—p. 107.

We are confounded. Professor Godwin actually seems to suppose that "volitions are not effects, equally with all other changes." He supposes, in other words, that there are exceptions to the axiom, that every change *must* have a cause! The supposition, we need not say, is the latent assumption of universal scepticism; and to the mind that consciously makes it, there is no longer the possibility either of proving the existence of God, or of tracing up any specific act whatsoever to any specific agent. He who sees not that the will itself is the efficient cause of all its volitions, is, as regards all moral and theological subjects, out at sea, and that a stormy one, without chart, without compass, without star, without rudder, without oar, without sail, without any guide or means of guidance whatsoever. He is at the mercy of whatever winds may blow. And it depends entirely on them, and not on him, whether he shall be drifted toward rocks of ruin, or into some haven of refuge and security.

In referring to metaphysical causes, Mr. Godwin cannot and does not ignore the agency of the Holy Spirit of God. And, as "every good and perfect gift cometh down from the Father of lights," he admits that "faith is always the work of the Spirit." (p. 94.) But yet, holding as he does, that human volitions are unecessitated,—and something

more, as we have seen,—he has very great difficulty in perceiving how faith can be, in any special respect, “the gift of God.” His difficulty arises from his conception of the nature of faith. He thinks that faith is a complexity of mental states, of which the culminating element is a choice, or a volition. And if, consequently, the will is free,—if it be not God who is the efficient cause of all human volitions; and if, indeed, it cannot be the case that he is the efficient cause of any human volition; it is impossible to see how faith can be, in any special respect, his “gift.” Mr. Godwin has thus, by relegating faith, in its chief ingredient, to the volitional element of the mind, shut himself up, either to accept the necessitarian theory of the will, with all its involved pantheism and pantheistic obliteration of moral distinctions, or to ignore the living and loving agency of God the holy Spirit, in the psychological genesis, and maintenance, and increase of saving faith. He has accepted what amounts to the latter alternative. Had he, on the other hand, perceived that faith is realised not in the element of will, but in the imperial element of thought, he would have found, the further back he pushed his mental analysis, that the door was ever open for the ingress of the personal divine agency in the production of the subjective condition, on which the enjoyment of salvation is suspended. If we go round the vast circle of ascertained or ascertainable truth, there is a point at which the highest theology and the deepest philosophy meet and embrace.

We may mention, in this connection of things, that Mr. Godwin uses an expression in reference to the Holy Spirit of God, which seems to assume a theory on the subject of the Trinity, which appears to us to be quite unscriptural. He says,—“The Spirit of God is a form of the operation and manifestation of God.” (p. 95.) The expression is altogether unaccountable as coming from the pen of one who believes in the tri-personality of God. And, indeed, we must conclude from it, that Mr. Godwin repudiates the idea of a plurality of personality in the one Godhead, in any other than a Sabellian or Swedenborgian sense. He does not repudiate, indeed, the use of the word “person.” On the contrary, he says, “The Spirit of God is a person, in the common and most complete sense of the term.” (p. 330.) And he says both of the Spirit, and of the Word or Name,—for he thinks that Jesus is the Name of God,—that they are “not merely distinctions in human thought: they are differences in the divine nature.” (p. 330.) And yet he adds,—

“When it is said that there are three persons in the Divine Nature, and that God and man are one person in Christ, the term is used with the signification of the Latin word *persona*. It represents a form, character, and mode of being, or some relation and office: and not a single separate conscious existence. From the statement of personal plurality, it cannot be inferred that there is plurality of intelligence, affection, and will.”—p. 331.

And then he makes a distinction without a difference:

“Plurality of persons implies plurality, not in all that constitutes a person, but only in that which distinguishes a person. So unity of person implies unity, not in all that constitutes, but only in that which distinguishes.”—p. 331.

Passing the attempted, but abortive, hair-splitting of the last quotation,—for of course *that which distinguishes*, in the philosophical sense of the expression, is just *that which constitutes*,—Mr. Godwin’s notions of the personal plurality of the Godhead seem to us to be, not only, self-

inconsistent in their base; they look like negations of the doctrine, in the shape of affirmations of it. And he really seems to regard the distinctions of Father, Son, and Spirit, as being rather relative and official impersonations or personifications of one personal Being, than living personalities, distinct in consciousness, though numerically one in the substantive-substrate of their being. His conception we regard as unscriptural; and, we may add, unphilosophical. We have no faith in an absolutely Absolute. We think it unthinkable. We regard it as necessarily unreal. We believe, that, in the most intimate nature of things, relativity is fundamental; and that conscious society is a higher and more glorious phase of existence than conscious solitude. But even although, on an august subject like this, we could not philosophise in a line that runs parallel with scripture, we should feel bound, in deference to the word of God, to accept such a plurality in the divine unity, as admits of reciprocation of thought, emotion, and volition,—the reciprocation, in one word, which is outwardly symbolised in the reciprocal use, by the Three-in-One, of the three personal pronouns, *I, Thou, He*.

We do not deem it necessary to thread our way, step by step, through the remainder of Professor Godwin's Lectures. They are all on "the effects of faith;" and, in so far as they are practical, rather than theoretical, they contain many important, fresh, and just observations;—thrown out, however, we may add, in the accumulative or aggregative style, rather than systematically wrought out, from root to stem, from stem to boughs, and from boughs to branchlets and twigs and individual out-buddings of thought. The theoretical, doctrinal, or strictly theological, element, is not quite to our mind, as might be expected from what we have already had occasion to remark. And, in some important respects, we think that the truth, as it is exhibited in Scripture, has been entirely missed.

The fourth Lecture is on "the forgiveness of sin,"—a subject, which, as we apprehend, is only very partially grasped by Mr. Godwin, chiefly because he does not see its precise scriptural relation to "salvation." He looks upon "salvation" as being, "primarily, a deliverance from the evil that is within." (p. 65.) He regards it, in other words, as being to a great extent identical with sanctification. Hence, too, he regards the "life," which Christ gives, as being chiefly "a life of righteousness and holiness,"—the life which Christ himself "exhibited on earth." (pp. 61, 65.) These views we look upon as inexact. It seems to us that the "life" which Jesus gives, is properly "eternal life," or "everlasting life." And, as such, it is the antithesis of the "death," which is referred to, when it is said, "the wages of sin is death." "He who believeth on the Son, shall not perish, (shall not die) but shall have *everlasting life*." (Rom. vi. 23; Jo. iii. 16.) He shall be safe from that second death, which is "everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord." (2 Thess. i. 9.) And, in consonance with this idea of life, the "salvation," which is announced in the gospel of God's grace, is, we apprehend, the opposite of "damnation." It is, properly, a future thing;—although earnest and instalments of it are enjoyed

in time, and immediately, indeed, on the occurrence of faith in Christ Jesus. It is "reserved in heaven." It is "ready to be revealed in in the last time." It is "he who perseveres to the end, who shall be saved." So that, "salvation from sin," (Mat. i. 21), is really, like "justification from sin," (Rom. vi. 18, *Greek*), deliverance from that "wrath to come," which is the proper penalty of sin.

The immortality of man was very profoundly realised by the New Testament writers. And the vast, illimitable, stretch of our being, which is on the other side of natural death, occupied so much of their thoughts, that the life, which now is, shrivelled up, in their view, into comparative insignificance, except in so far as it stood, porch-wise, before eternity, and thus sustained the relation to eternity, of a brief, and uncertain, but all-important, period of probation. From this scriptural point of view, duties are performed aright, and trials are endured to profit, when, and "while, we look not at the things which are seen, temporal, and temporary, but at the things which are unseen and eternal." (2 Cor. iv. 18.)

Hence it is that forgiveness, as an ingredient of salvation, has primary and principal reference to things everlasting. He who is forgiven, is he who is no longer in danger of that ever-enduring "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish," which is the proper penalty or "wages of sin." (Mark. iii. 29.)

Mr. Godwin views these subjects from another standpoint: and he holds up before his eyes, so largely and so constantly, the mere earnestness of eternal realities, that he is apt to veil from his view the immense preponderance of the things that are to come, and consequently to seek, in present experiences, a very large proportion, at least, of that which constitutes a state of forgiveness. He says:—

"They who are forgiven are at once released from all punishment. The worst consequences of sin cease immediately and entirely: and those which continue are no longer punishment. Their outward form may be the same, but their design and character are altogether different. They become good instead of evil."—p. 124.

"Where there has been wrong, and the consequent condition is on the whole worse, then there is punishment. It is punishment, so long as the state is one of entire disadvantage to the subject; but it ceases to be punishment, when it becomes beneficial."—p. 134.

Not only do these views err, as we conceive, in the inversion of the relation of things present to things future; they exhibit an incorrect idea of punishment. They represent it as realised, only when the condition of the transgressor is one "of entire disadvantage." Whereas, it is perfectly compatible with punishment, when not ultimate and extreme, to contemplate the benefit or advantage of the wrong-doer. And thus punishment, or chastisement, may continue, even when the penal evil is overruled, and, indeed, desired and intended, for good. To much of this penal evil are believers exposed, as long as they continue on earth. And yet, in their greatest, grandest, all-important relationships, they are forgiven, forgiven fully, forgiven freely, forgiven frankly, and for ever.

In another respect Mr Godwin's notion of forgiveness strikes us as strange. He says:—

"The forgiveness of God, like the forgiveness of men, is both a change of judgment and affection respecting those who have done wrong: and a deliverance from the ill

consequences of wrong, so far as these are occasioned by the will of him who has been offended."—p. 125.

"God cannot but recognise the change produced by the manifestation and exercise of his mercy; and therefore he must judge the penitent to be different from the impenitent. But this is only a part of forgiveness. When we seek forgiveness from God, we ask that he would not judge us according to our past sins; and also that he would remove from us all punishment, deliver us from all the ill consequences of sin, and restore to us our lost opportunities of God."—p. 137.

We confess that we are surprised at meeting with such a conception of the nature of forgiveness. And we are utterly at a loss to conjecture the ground, on which professor Godwin thinks it possible for it to stand. He regards it as embracing in its essence, or as part of itself, the act of "judging the penitent to be different from the impenitent!" Surely the professor has forgotten, that in many cases men may extend forgiveness even to the impenitent. And although they could not, still forgiveness is most assuredly not an exercise of the observing powers, or the intelligence, but an act of the powers which are volitional and executive. There is *giving in forgiving*. There is *forth-giving*. There is the *giving-forth*, and *out*, and *away*, of the claim of payment, or the right of punishment, which was previously held.

Mr. Godwin's fifth Lecture is entitled "the righteousness of faith," and treats of "justification." It is still less satisfactory than the lecture on forgiveness.

He admits that the word *to justify* generally means, not *to make right*, but *to judge to be right*. (p. 158.) He thus differs from the common Tridentine or Roman Catholic doctrine.

He contends for the word *right*, as distinguished from the word *righteous*. He says that the adjective, usually translated *righteous* in the New Testament, "is not restricted to persons; nor, when applied to persons, does it always refer to character." (p. 336.) He forgets, however, to state that when it is applied, in the New Testament, to persons, it does always refer to character.

It is admitted, nevertheless, that the word has the wider signification of *right*, and does not always mean *righteous*. But the professor, starting from this admission, makes a rather extraordinary statement regarding the meaning of the cognate verb. He says;—"It follows that *to be justified* does not in scripture language mean, to be considered or declared *righteous*; but to be considered or declared *right*." (p. 336.) In other words, he contends that, as the adjective does not always mean *righteous*, therefore the verb never means at all to *be considered, declared, or judged, righteous*. An extraordinary inference certainly. For how can a universal be inferred or demonstrated from a particular? We should rather judge, on the contrary, that as the adjective, when applied to persons in the New Testament, always means *righteous*, so the verb, when likewise applied to persons, will most likely denote, when used actively, *to make out to be righteous, to judge to be righteous, or to judge as righteous*, and when used passively, *to be made out to be righteous, or to be judged as righteous*.

In like manner the professor contends that the noun *righteousness* should rather be translated *rightness*; forgetful that its opposite, *unright-*

*eousness*, always refers to character, and thus means *unrighteousness*, and not merely *unrightness*.

Passing from these minutiae, we may at once proceed to his doctrine of justification. He holds that "they who have faith in Christ as the Son of God,—faith for the great salvation which he came to bestow,—have the faith which is the principle of all righteousness. They become upright and righteous persons." (p. 168.) He remarks,—

"There must be the full and deliberate determination of the will, to observe and obey all that is right: for without this none can become Christ's followers."—p. 168.

"They are right in purpose, upright in heart. In this sense they are righteous, and they have this righteousness through faith in Christ. It is not declared that men are righteous persons, because they believe the truth of God's testimony; though certainly this belief is right. Nor are they judged to be righteous, because they desire the happiness of heaven: though this desire is right. But if, believing the truth and love, and desiring the favour of God, they submit themselves entirely to the divine will,—if, by trusting to Christ, it has become the real choice of their minds to seek the righteousness which he required and promised,—to be righteous universally as he was righteous,—then they are declared to be righteous persons. And they are righteous. There is a righteousness belonging to them, to their choice and purpose, which has such significance as an expression of character, and receives such support from its connection with the divine will, thus being a proof of the present and a promise of the future,—that they who have this righteousness may be said to be upright, righteous persons. They are such in the judgment of men, according to the common meaning of the expression: and they are declared to be righteous by God.

"But more than this is included in the statement, that they who have faith in Christ are judged to be right by God; being, in the language of Scripture, justified. A person is not right with another, unless he is in the state for receiving such benefits as have been promised and expected. If a benefactor has promised some favour to a dependent on certain conditions, and then declares him to be right, the reference will be to the promised favour. He is right in relation to this. And so it must be with the justification of men. They who are justified, are declared to be right, with reference to the divine favour,—in relation to the good promised, and the rule appointed by God."—pp. 168, 169.

"Now, all who have faith in Christ *are right* in relation to the rule appointed for them; and they *are right* in relation to God who has appointed this rule; and they *are right* in relation to the eternal life, which is the hope of man, and the promise of God."—p. 170.

"They have this twofold rightness,—a rightness of principle, comprehending all that can be sought for of righteousness; and a rightness of condition, comprehending all the good that is contained in the favour and promises of God."—p. 170.

Such, according to Professor Godwin, is evangelical justification. Faith is the principle of righteousness. It is submission to the divine will. It is the choice or determination "to be righteous universally as Christ was righteous." And thus all who have faith, are really righteous in character, and are consequently right in relation to all the good that God has promised. And because they are all this, God justifies them, that is, he judges them to be what they are,—judges them to be right, both in character and in prospect. Their "faith is counted to them for righteousness." And it is thus counted to them, not in the sense of being counted for what it is not, but in the sense of being counted for what it is; for it is, according to professor Godwin, both righteousness and rightness.

This, as most of our readers will be aware, amounts to a total repudiation of the common Protestant doctrine of justification,—the doctrine which Luther pronounced to be the article of a standing or falling



church. And it modifies only very partially the doctrine of Roman Catholicism, as determined by the council of Trent. It modifies it only to this extent,—that it goes farther in the same direction;—farther we mean from the standpoint of Protestantism. The Roman Catholic doctrine of justification is, that God, in the act of justification, makes the believer right and righteous. He infuses, as it is expressed, righteousness into the believer. He infuses it by means of the believer's faith, or on condition of his faith. But Professor Godwin's doctrine is, that God, finding the believer to be, in virtue of his faith, already righteous and right, declares him to be so.

We very earnestly object to the doctrine: and regard it as altogether at variance with Scripture. For—

(1.) It assumes that sanctification, or personal righteousness of character,—such personal righteousness as makes meet for the kingdom of heaven,—precedes justification. But the doctrine of Scripture is, that God “justifieth the ungodly.” (Rom. iv. 5.)

(2.) It could never account for the slanderous report, which was raised against the apostles, that they said, “Let us do evil, that good may come.” (Rom. iii. 8.) If the doctrine of the apostles was, *ye must be good, ye must be holy, that ye may be justified*, we cannot conceive how the slander referred to could originate.

(3.) If Mr. Godwin's doctrine had been that of Paul, we cannot understand how the latter could be led, in stating it, to repel the objection that it seemed to encourage continuance in sin. He says, “what shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?” (Rom. vi. 1.) If justification be simply the judicial declaration of the rightness and righteousness of those who are really righteous and right, we do not see the loop-hole through which the alleged objection could find its way in.

(4.) In Rom. v. 12–19, the apostle runs a parallel between Adam and Christ, and shews that as all connected with Adam by birth, suffer death, on the ground of what he, their Paradisiacal representative did, so all connected with Christ by faith, enjoy life, life eternal, on the ground of what he, their redemptive representative, did. As those connected with Adam by birth, are liable to death, not on account of their own personal unrighteousness, but on account of the unrighteousness of their paradisiacal representative,—for death reigns even over those “who do not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression,”—so, those connected with Christ by faith, are made heirs of eternal life, not on account of their own personal righteousness, but on account of the righteousness of their redemptive representative—the Lord Jesus Christ.

(5) The same apostle teaches that believers are “justified freely (or gratuitously) by God's grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.” (Rom. iii. 24.) But we do not see anything of the nature of gratuity in declaring persons to be righteous and right, when they are really right and righteous.

(6.) “David,” we read, “describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God *imputeth righteousness without works*, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin.” (Rom. iv.

6-8.) There is an imputation of righteousness, it seems, without works of personal righteousness, on the part of the person who is "blessed." And this imputation of righteousness is substantially identical with the non-imputation of sin, or the forgiveness of iniquities. But if it be, it cannot simply mean, that righteousness is imputed to those who are really righteous and right.

(7.) If Mr. Godwin's view were correct, the distinction between "him who worketh" and "him who believeth" would vanish into nonentity. For the culminating element of faith, according to Mr. Godwin, is choosing, or submitting to, the divine will. It is the voluntary imitation of Christ, in so far as Christ did what was enjoined in the eternal law of right. "Believing," in other words, is just "working righteousness." Where, then, is the reality of the distinction, which is drawn in such words as the following:—"to him that *worketh not, but believeth on him* that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness"? (Rom. iv. 5.)

(8.) "The law is not of faith," we read, "but, the man that doeth them, (the things enjoined in the law,) shall live in them." (Gal. iii. 12.) Such is the view of the apostle Paul. But Mr. Godwin says,— "Faith must always be the will of God for all who are called to any service. The law, which knows nothing of faith, can only be a part of the divine will. If it does not require faith, how can it require love?" (p. 186.) Are not the two views essentially divergent? Paul distinguished between faith and the doing of the law. Mr. Godwin runs them up into identity. Paul was thinking of the difference that subsists between working out a righteousness of one's own, and believing in the substitutionary righteousness of another, which may be "imputed" to one "without works." Mr. Godwin seems to find no place in his thinking for such a substitutionary righteousness, and hence, with him, *to have faith is really to do what the law enjoins.*

(9.) The apostle says,— "by the deeds of the law, there shall no flesh be justified in God's sight." (Rom. iii. 20.) And the law to which he refers must, at all events include, the moral law; for the same apostle says, "Where there is no law, there is no transgression." (Rom. iv. 15.) And he also says, "I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." (Rom. vii. 7.) "Wherefore," he says again, "the law is holy, and the commandment holy, just, and good." (Rom. vii. 12.) If then it is not "by the deeds of the law" that men are justified, it cannot be the case that they are justified in virtue of their own righteousness and rightness.

(10.) The correlation that subsists between the divine treatment which Christ received, and the divine treatment experienced by believers in Christ, seems to be, irreconcilably, at variance with the idea of professor Godwin. "Christ," says the apostle, "was made sin for us; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." (2. Cor. v. 21.) Believers are "made," it seems, "the righteousness of God in Christ," just in some such sense as Christ was "made sin for them." But assuredly Christ did not become sin, in the sense of becoming personally sinful. Neither did God judge him to be sinful, as being really sinful. He only treated him as if our sins had been his. And in like manner,—

if the correlation which is pointed out by the apostle be a reality,—believers are made “the righteousness of God,” not in Mr. Godwin’s sense,—the sense of becoming really righteous as Jesus was and God is, but in the sense of being treated as if the righteousness of God, which was wrought by Jesus, was their own. In other words, the righteousness referred to, was a substitutionary righteousness,—wrought out and brought in for the express purpose, of enabling all who receive it by faith, to exclaim, with that ancient father, who wrote the epistle to Diognetus, “O sweet interchange!” and with the great Saxon reformer, “O Lord Jesus, I am thy sin, and thou art my righteousness!”

(11.) According to the apostle Paul, it is “Christ” who is “the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth.” (Rom. x. 4.) According to Mr. Godwin, it is every one’s own faith that is his righteousness.

(12.) The same apostle distinguishes between “the righteousness which is of the law” and “the righteousness which is of faith.” Moses, he says, describes the former thus,—“the man which doeth these things shall live by them.” The latter “speaketh on this wise, the word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that is, the word of faith, which we preach; that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.” (Rom. x. 5-9.) The distinction between the two contrary methods of obtaining justification is this:—The one consists in *doing* the things enjoined; the other consists *not* in doing a work, but in believing a “word” regarding another. It cannot, then, be the case that faith either is, or involves within it, the doing of those things, which, if done, would constitute “one’s own righteousness.”

(13.) It is they, says the apostle, who are “ignorant of God’s righteousness,” who “go about to establish their own.” (Rom. x. 3.) Then it cannot be the case, that that righteousness of God, which gives power to the gospel, constituting it, indeed, “the power of God unto salvation,” (Rom. i. 16, 17), and which is the ground of justification, is, howsoever it may be originated, “our own righteousness.”

(14.) It is noticeable and remarkable that Mr. Godwin’s view of justification leads him to a habitual mis-translation of an important part of the inspired phraseology. He says, that “in the writings of Paul we find the phrase, *the righteousness of God*, and he (the apostle) states that men are *justified by faith*, or *through faith*, or *on account of faith*.” (p. 152.) He drops out of sight, however, almost altogether, as he proceeds, the expressions “by faith” and “through faith,” and gives an ominous pre-eminence to the third expression, “on account of faith.” Men, says he, “are judged to be right, *for, because, or on account of, faith*.” (p. 160.) “Abel was declared to be righteous *on account of his faith*.” (p. 172.) “Enoch was rewarded *for his faith*.” (p. 172.) “Noah obtained the rightness which is *on account of faith*.” (p. 173.) “Abraham was justified *on account of his faith*.” (p. 177.) He was considered to be right *on account of his faith in God*.” (p. 178.) “Abraham was justified,—considered and judged to be right,—*on account of his faith in God*.” (p. 179.) “He was justified *for his faith*.” (p. 179.) These are specimen quotations. But it is noteworthy that the inspired writers never speak thus. They

never represent men as being justified *for, because of, or on account of* faith. They exhibit the matter otherwise; and speak of justification as being *through* (*διά*), or *from* (*ἐκ*), or *on condition of* (*ἰπτι*), faith. Mr. Godwin's translation would be justified if the Greek preposition *διά*, with the accusative, were used. But it never is. When it is *διά* that is employed, it is invariably construed with the genitive. In other words, the preposition means, not *on account of*, but *through*.

(15.) In remarking on the expression, that Abraham's "faith was counted to him for righteousness," Mr. Godwin says:—

"The statement that *faith* is counted for *righteousness*, is often understood to mean, that the former is *instead* of the latter. But there is nothing to require this interpretation. It is not the meaning of any similar passages either in the Old or the New Testament. St. Paul says that uncircumcision will be counted *for* circumcision, and that the children of promise are counted *for* a seed. The meaning of these declarations evidently is, that the uncircumcised, who obey the commands of God, are considered to be circumcised; because they *are* so in the highest sense of the word: and that the children of promise are considered to be the seed of Abraham; because they *are* so, and are the only seed to whom the blessing belongs."—p. 174.

As to the latter of the two expressions, on which Mr. Godwin comments, we admit that it does not suggest the idea of substitution. It has another reference: and it is to be vindicated and explained on the principle, that what properly belongs to a person, may be properly counted or imputed to him. And thus too the conduct of Phinehas "was counted to him for righteousness," (Ps. cvi. 31); for it was truly and literally a deed of righteousness. But when the apostle asks, in respect to the uncircumcised, "who keep the righteousness of the law,"—"shall not their uncircumcision be counted for circumcision?" (Rom. ii. 26), the expression does certainly mean, "shall not their uncircumcision be counted for what it is not? shall it not be counted as if it were circumcision, although it is not?" This counting of uncircumcision for circumcision will take place, we admit, in consideration of the inward peculiarity of the uncircumcised persons referred to, and because of the relation of that inward peculiarity, as the thing spiritually typified or signified, to the outward sign of circumcision. Nevertheless, their "uncircumcision" is not, in fact, "circumcision," but the reverse: and yet it will be counted for it. And so Abraham's faith was not in fact justifying righteousness, and yet it was counted for it. It was set to his account,—because of its relation, to wit, to the great evangelical object on which it terminated,—as if it had been justifying, or glory-meriting, righteousness;—which, however, it was not.

(16.) Mr. Godwin imagines that he finds support for his views on justification, in the second chapter of the epistle of James,—the passage in which the apostle shews that "by works a man is justified, and not by faith only." We conceive, however, that, like many others, Mr. Godwin has been led into perplexity from not noticing that evangelical or christian justification, as is obvious from the very nature of the case, may be viewed from two very different standpoints. It may be viewed in its reference to our objective *title* to eternal life; and it may be viewed in its reference to our subjective *meekness* for that state of celestial blessedness. When viewed in the former respect, then the expression to *justify a person* means to *make him out to be righteous, as*

*possessing an evangelical title to everlasting life.* When viewed in the latter respect, the same expression means *to make him out to be righteous as possessing evangelical meetness for everlasting life.* It is generally in the former sense that Paul uses the expression. And when thus employed, the meaning is, that he only is justified who has, for his title, "the righteousness of God," *the righteousness provided by God, the righteousness, that is, which was wrought out by Christ Jesus, "the righteousness which is from God on condition of faith,"* (Phil. iii. 9), in short, the substitutionary righteousness, which is available by faith. But Paul sometimes uses the expression with its other end of reference; as when he refers to the transactions of the great day of judgment, and says that then "the doers of the law shall be justified." (Rom. ii. 13-16; viii. 30.) He means that on that great day of assize, the proceedings shall be conducted with a view to the public satisfaction and confidence of the moral universe; and that therefore those only shall be "glorified," who are publicly made out to be evangelically righteous, —to be really, though it may be imperfectly, righteous. Men shall then receive "according to the deeds done in the body, whether they be good or bad." (2 Cor. v. 10; Mat. xxv. 31-46.) And those only, whose faith has verified its reality, by works of faith and labours of love, shall be publicly approved of, publicly justified, or publicly made out to be evangelically meet for heaven, that is, evangelically righteous. Their *meetness* for glory will be publicly established. It is to this aspect and end of evangelical justification, though as proleptically and progressively verifying itself during the believer's course of life on earth, that the apostle James refers. They, and they only, are publicly made out to be evangelically righteous, and thus meet for heaven, who have works as well as faith. And they are thus publicly made out to be righteous, when, "by works, their faith is made perfect."

But we need not farther prosecute our critique. And we shall therefore conclude our observations with one or two miscellaneous remarks.

1. There is a want of thoroughness in Mr Godwin's investigations. And, as a consequence, there is a want of great leading veins of thought in his lectures. His ideas do not gather into rills and rivulets, and thence roll on into larger tributaries, until at length they swell into some majestic river of thinking. They rather break upon the reader's mind in an almost infinite succession of infinitesimal wavelets. And, as a consequence of this aggregative feature, there is often found, in one region, some little ripple of thought, which bears on its elevation an idea that belongs to a different circle of doctrine altogether than that in which the rest of the system moves and has its being. We could thus imagine that Mr. Godwin may easily quote a sentence or two, here and there, in support of almost every one of the doctrines which, nevertheless, it is the business of his volume to set aside.

2. He is extremely unfortunate in many of the emendations which he tries to make on the authorized version of the Scriptures. For example, he has frequent occasion to quote John vi. 29: "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." But he invariably translates it thus,—"This is the *service* of God, that you trust

to him whom he sent." Now the word *service* is altogether unauthorized as a translation of the original term; for the Greek word no more means *service* than does the English word *work*. Of course some works may be service; but their peculiarity, as service, is not indicated by the word. If Mr. Godwin had only looked at the preceding verse, he would have seen how extremely inappropriate his translation is. That verse gives occasion to our Lord's observation, and runs thus,—“Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we might work the works of God?” If rendered according to Professor Godwin's principle, it would run thus,—“What shall we do, that we might serve the services of God?”—a most uninviting medley. Then, if we were to carry the new translation into some of the adjoining chapters, what would be the consequence? We should need to say, for example, in translating John ix. 41, “Ye do the *services* of your father (the devil).” And again in John ix. 3, we should need to read thus,—“Jesus answered, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the *services* of God should be made manifest in him.” These are surely unsightly blemishes of things. And yet Professor Godwin manfully carries out his predeliction. And hence, when he has occasion to quote Rom. iv. 4, “to him that worketh, is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt,” he renders it thus,—to him *who does service*, his reward is not counted as a favour, but as a debt.” (p. 177.) Be it so, for this passage. But let us try the new translation in some other passages; as, for instance, in John v. 17,—“Jesus answered them, My Father *doeth service* hitherto, and I *do service*.” It looks ill. Again, John vi. 27, “*Do not service* for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give you.” It is no improvement certainly.

Then, again, he quotes John vi. 40,—“This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.” But he translates the last clause thus,—“And I will *exalt* him at the last day.” (p. 41.) If the translation were legitimate, then we should read in Mat. xxii. 24. “If a man die, having no children, his brother shall marry his wife, and *exalt* seed unto his brother.” And when Jesus and Martha conversed concerning the loved brother, who was deceased, their words should be read thus:—“Jesus saith unto her, Thy brother shall be *exalted*. Martha saith unto him, I know that he shall be *exalted*, in the resurrection at the last day.” It is really no improvement. It misses the mark altogether. Then again, he thus quotes 1. Tim. ii. 5, “there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, *a* man Christ Jesus.” And yet on the very next page, he quotes the words of the angel to Mary, thus,—“he shall be called *the* son of the Highest,”—“the holy one born of thee shall be called *the* Son of God.” Now he should have been consistent. And if the mere omission of the definite article, in the original of the first passage, demanded the introduction of the English indefinite article, “*a* man,”—then the same omission in Luke demands that we should translate thus,—“*a* son of the Highest,” “*a* son of God.” It is with equal in-succcess, that he attempts many other emendations, as for example, the promise made to Abraham, “*with* thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed.” But we refrain and cease.

There are many important remarks in the pamphlets of Mr. Hinton and Mr. B. Grant. But the former is deficient in a critical point of view. And the latter is pervaded by a tone of antagonistic keenness and acerbity, which rasps upon the feelings, and mars the judicial, not to say the judicious, processes of the understanding.

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#### OTHER BOOKS.

*The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined.* By the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Parts I. and II. London: Longman, &c. 1862 and 1863.

WE have, for the present, just a few *general* remarks to make in reference to Bishop Colenso's attack upon the Pentateuch.

1. He has not furnished the public with hostages of his thoroughly honest attachment to truth. He assumed his ecclesiastical position on the foot of the avowal that he "unfeignedly believed all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament." When ordained as a bishop, he "promised to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine contrary to God's word." And yet, though he has now taken his position, openly and publicly, beside von Bohlen and Thomas Paine, and ridicules the idea that the Pentateuch can be given by inspiration of God, he clings to his ecclesiastical office and its emoluments. If this be consistent with thorough sincerity, then, so far as we can see, any man, in any counting-house, warehouse, office, bank, or shop, may, without immorality, say one thing and do the opposite,—promise and profess to do one thing and do the reverse.

2. If the bishop's mind had been judicial, and therefore judicious, on such subjects as are involved in the canonicity and inspiration of the Scriptures, he would not have rushed with such hot haste into infidelity, and especially into the public avowal of it. He admits that in the beginning of 1861, he "had not the most distant idea of the results at which he has now arrived." He was at that time unversed in the literature of the subject, either on the one side or on the other. And now he has already published two volumes to prove that the Pentateuch, at least, and the book of Joshua, cannot have been given by inspiration of God! This incontinent haste, not only to embrace infidelity, but to rush with it into print, without ever letting any one item of the whole vast subject, and all that is involved in it, lie *a-steep* in his mind, does not indicate that cast of intelligence which constitutes a man a thinker on moral subjects, and which would entitle him to be listened to on such topics.

3. The bishop either does not see, or he does see, that he has entered on an incline, which leads directly to the repudiation of the whole Scriptures,—the New Testament, as well as the Old,—so far as their claim to be a divine revelation is concerned. If he does not see that he has entered on this incline, he is destitute of that forecasting sagacity, which enables a man, when dealing with far-reaching principles, to see the end from the beginning. And he must be very insufficiently informed, moreover. He must be unaware that he is merely repeating

the initiation of an experiment, which has been completed long ago in Germany, and which has there brought forth, to the full, its logically-legitimate consequences. If, however, the bishop has contemplated these logically-legitimate consequences, and thus actually sees the incline down which he is sliding, and perceives whither it infallibly conducts,—if this be the case, then we are at a loss for words of sufficient strength to express the intensity of our surprise, the depth of our regret, and the keenness of our sense of the moral inconsistency of his conduct.

4. We have been acquainted with the Bishop's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, since the period of its publication. And it has certainly failed to impress us with a conviction of his competency for biblical criticism. It is anything but masterly. It is anything but scholarly. It is anything but well-digested. It is evidently a very hasty concoction;—for the bishop seems ever to be in a hurry: and almost all that is good in it is borrowed from the "Notes" of Dr. Vaughan. Wherever he either misses or deserts the doctor's guidance, he bewrays his own peculiarity in recklessness of exegesis, misapprehension of the niceties of Greek, inacquaintance with the history of criticism, and an inveterate tendency to rush to extremes. As for recklessness of exegesis, we may point to a single "straw" of a specimen. In the enumeration of the vices of heathendom, contained in Rom. i. 28-32, the apostle represents the Gentiles as "full of envy, *murder*, etc." (Ver. 29.) The bishop, however, in his new translation of the epistle cashiers the word "murder," and substitutes the word "hatred;" and says in a note, "The Greek word means literally *murder*, but appears to be used here in the sense of *hatred*." As regards deficient acquaintance with Greek, we may take another "straw" of a specimen. In Rom. ii. 3, we read, "and thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them which do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt *escape* the judgment of God?" The Bishop is not pleased with the simple word "escape." He translates it "wholly escape;" and says in his note, "this gives better the force of the Greek; *clean escape*, not merely *escape*, as in the English version." Every scholar will perceive at a glance that the bishop has misunderstood the force of the Greek word. Then, as for inacquaintance with the history of criticism, take another "straw" of a specimen. In the old received text of Rom. ii. 17, we read, at the commencement of the verse, "*Behold*, thou art called a Jew." But even Calvin, in his day, suspected that the reading, "behold," was spurious; and he said that he would prefer the other reading, namely "but if," were it only sufficiently supported. It is sufficiently supported: and it is as clear as sunlight that "but if" is the true reading. It is found in the uncial manuscripts ABDEK. It was the reading of the manuscripts from which the Syriac and Vulgate versions were made. It is the reading of Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, Theophylact, and Ruffinus's translation of Origen. And it has been approved of by all the critical editors,—both the greater and the lesser luminaries,—such as Bengel, Griesbach, Knapp, Vater, Scholz, Lachmann, Fritzsche, Tischendorf, Schott, Goeschen, Reiche, etc. And all modern critics know it, and have approved of it; *except Bishop Coleman, who reproduces the old reading in his text, without saying a word about it.* Then again, as to his inveterate tendency to go to extremes, take the following straw of a specimen.



In one of the paragraphs already referred to, that in which the apostle depicts the prominent vices of heathendom,—and in the very verse of that paragraph from which we have already quoted, viz. Rom. i. 29, we read, “Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; *full* of envy, murder, etc.” The authors of our authorised version have given the proper, customary, adequate, and complete translation of the adjective, which they render *full*. The same translation is given in all the preceding English versions. It corresponds with the version of the Vulgate, which was approved of by Beza, Piscator, and the great body of the other Latin translators. The analogous term is used in German by Luther, Bengel, and Zinzen-dorf. Diodati reproduces it in Italian. The Dutch translators in Dutch. But it will not satisfy Bishop Colenso. He must needs translate it “*crammed* with envy, etc.” We are not wrong, then, in saying that we certainly desiderate in the Bishop the qualifications that would fit him for working out a just, sober, and comprehensive critique on any book or books of Scripture, or on any book whatever, that has to do with other subjects than those which lie on the line of arithmetic or algebra.

5. Then, again, the Bishop's work on the Pentateuch and Joshua, is wholly on the line of that which is *destructive*. There is not an atom in it used for *constructive* purposes. He labours, with might and main, to tear down. He does not move so much as his little finger to build up. In the good old times, “a man was famous according as he had lifted up axes upon the thick trees,” for the purpose of providing timber for useful erections. The Bishop, however, seems to have another aim, and to seek another fame. “But now they break down the carved work at once with axes and hammers. They have cast fire into the sanctuary: they have defiled by casting down the dwelling-place of God's name to the ground. They have said in their hearts, Let us destroy them together.”

6. Hence the result of the Bishop's investigations is nothing but a heap of *negations*. The Pentateuch is *not* what the pious take it to be. It is *not* to be depended on. It is *not* divine. It is *not* true. This is the “negative theology” in the superlative degree.

7. The bishop, we should suppose, must have known that the inward peace of mind possessed by a very large proportion of the best inhabitants of Great Britain and its colonies, not to mention other countries, depends on what is contained in the sacred Scriptures. It reposes on what is regarded as revealed in that book, which is regarded as “the word of God.” He must also, we should imagine, be aware that the piety which exists in Christendom, and which is the purifying and preservative “salt of the earth,” has its source in the contents of the same volume. It is thence too, that light irradiates “the valley of the shadow of death.” It is thence, too, that there is consolation to the bereaved, and for such as are otherwise afflicted and broken-hearted. The bishop must have had some knowledge of these things. But if he had, did he act, we would ask, the part of a true philanthropist, or of a really wise and loving man, whose heart is at once broad and deep, when he rushed, with axe in hand, to cut, hack, demolish, and smash, with the utmost haste and violence, the pillars which support so much of what is good, and so much of what ministers to the moral elevation of the purest and

noblest part of the best peoples of the world? Was it wise? If it was not, is it likely that much which concerns the highest wisdom, or much which concerns men's highest weal, or much, in short, which concerns the Bible and its relations to man, will be learned from his critique?

8. Is the bishop aware that the morality of the masses, though to a large extent a thing of custom, is nevertheless resting ultimately on the conviction that God has spoken, and that it is his will which is, to us, the only immovable and absolute ground of moral distinctions? Is he also aware that if christianity be renounced, there is no logical resting-place for the mind, in all questions of morality, but what can be got in the bottomless abyss of pantheism or atheism? If he is not, he is a mere layman and novice in these spiritual and social subjects, and has not mastered their initial philosophy. If he is, and has yet begun to do his best to cut the cords that tie the public mind to the authoritative source of morals, is he not going hand in hand with those enemies of our race, who are undermining the fabric of social confidence, benevolence, purity, and peace?

9. In so far as the bishop's destructive work progresses, and thus in so far as his influence, as an opponent of the Bible, extends, is he not contributing, though no doubt unconsciously, to the production of political and social *despair*, in all the nobler minds of the age,—the minds which are the homes of sympathy and solicitude in reference to the progression of the race? If the Bible be wrested from the people, how long will the people's christianity last? And if the people's christianity "take wings and fly away," where will be the moral groundwork on which moral and social elevation can be progressively reared?

10. Notwithstanding his infidelity, Voltaire shuddered at its logical consequences, and started back from atheism. He said, "If there be not a God, we must invent Him." May we not well say, in the interests of society, "If there be not christianity, we must invent it"? Can society get on and get up, without it? If it cannot, must not this indispensable christianity be a reality? And, again, if it cannot, is not he who has inaugurated a crusade against it, by inaugurating a crusade against the people's Book, in which alone they find it, setting himself, however unconsciously, in antagonism to all the highest interests of the world?

11. Bishop Colenso may meet, at present, with encouragement, and applause, and material support, from a certain class of British society. A similar class on the continent cheered on the infidels in the days of Frederick the Great, and the generation that followed. They dreamed that they were emancipating men from the reign of superstition. They farther dreamed that if men were once thus emancipated, the world would be happy. But this same class of men, after revolution upon revolution, have now awaked out of their dream. And they find that it was the wind which was sown; and that hence it is the whirlwind which is reaped. Whoever has travelled in Germany, with his eyes and ears open, knows to what we refer.

12. The reasoning of the whole of Part II. of the bishop's work, is shattered and shivered from its summit to its base, if we only read the last clause of Exodus vi. 3, interrogatively,—“And by my name Jehovah

was I not known?" And yet this may be but one of several ways of meeting difficulties, which, at first sight, seem formidable.

13. If the bishop had only started difficulties, as subjects for investigation; or if he had only proposed queries as to whether or not there may not be considerable, or even extensive, corruption of the extant copies of the sacred text: or if he had but tentatively ventilated theories of inspiration; or if he had simply passed under review the actual and possible varieties of the exegetical *ways and means*,—extending even to the mystic, the parabolic, and the Origenic,—of making fit and full use of the ancient Scriptures;—if he had worked in some such directions as these, and with becoming caution and reverence, he might have been hailed as a benefactor of mankind. But he has already, in the short space of a few months, revolutionised his mind into an attitude of antagonism to all the highest interests of the race.

They, however, *who have got a blessing in the Bible*, will rest assured that the bishop must have missed his way. And they will show, by their life, that there is a reality in the peculiar and sublime contents of "the volume of the book."

*Words for the Weary.* By the Rev. John Whitson. Carlisle: Arthur. 1863.

A PRECIOUS little book:—like a "rainbow in the cloud." The contents are:—(1) The day of trouble: (2) Earthly afflictions, heavenly blessings: (3) Comfort under trial: (4) Jesus, and those in trouble: (5) The last earthly trial: (6) Heavenly attractions: (7) His will be done. The author has evidently learned the secret of that divine alchemy, which brings good out of evil. His own spirit, when bruised, has emitted a richer fragrance than ever before.

*Waw Conversive, unnecessary, imperfect, and unparalleled: the Hebrew tense, illustrated from the original text of the Old Testament; the cognate Semitic languages; the Talmudim, the Perushim, and the Midrashim; the Greek New Testament; the Sanscrit and Indo-European languages; Etc.* By Robert Young, author of a new translation of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. Edinburgh: Fullerton.

THE devotion of Mr. Young to biblical and oriental literature is worthy of all admiration. And his opinions, as indicated and defended in this pamphlet, though possibly not demanding the submission that is due to final findings, deserve to be treated with the most respectful consideration.

*A Critical History of Free Thought in reference to the Christian Religion. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1862, on the foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A.* By Adam Storey Farrar, M.A. London: Murray. 1862.

A BOOK of great research, and constituting, indeed, quite a storehouse of information regarding the principal phases of infidelity which have hitherto been developed, in relation to christianity. It gives an account of the opposition of the early heathens, such as Lucian, Celsus, Porphyry,

Hierocles, and Julian the Apostate. It traces the course of scepticism in the Middle Ages, and at the Renaissance. It gives a succinct outline of the deistic movement in England during the latter half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century. It sketches the history of the flood of materialistic infidelity and atheism which overran France in the eighteenth century, and thence washed the shores of Great Britain through the influence of Gibbon, Paine, Robert Owen, Byron, Shelley, etc. It then goes into detail regarding the great German movements in the direction of anti-supernaturalism and anti-christianism; and winds up with a view of "free thought in England in the present century." Mr. Farrar has achieved a great and instructive work. But it would, we think, have been still more masterly, if his learning on the subject had been more matured. He has evidently read extensively, with a view to preparation for his lectures. But at the time of composing them, his researches have been only at that stage, at which a man is somewhat encumbered with his newly acquired materials.

*Watch and Pray.* By Newman Hall, LL.B. London: Nisbet. 1863. An eminently useful tractate;—quite the right thing; and written in the right spirit. Mr. Hall justly says,—“We err when we unduly exalt human effort; we also err when we exclusively direct attention to the need of divine grace. The Bible exhibits both phases of truth with impartial distinctness, reminding us, now, of the necessity of effort—‘Watch’: now, of our dependence on divine grace—‘Pray’: and often blending both admonitions, ‘Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation.’”—p. 6. This is the key-note of the whole treatise. And it seems to us to be the key of truth.

*The Canadian Day-Star: a Monthly Magazine devoted to the exhibition of the gospel in its glorious fulness and unfettered freeness.* Editors, Rev. Henry Melville, Toronto; Rev. George Anderson, Huntingdon. Vol. I. Montreal: Lovell. 1862.

WE are delighted with this handsome volume, edited by the beloved brethren whose names appear on the title page. It is a noble and successful effort to diffuse, through the Canadian press, all-important evangelical truth. And we trust that the friends of the Evangelical movement at home will devise means for encouraging and aiding our brethren abroad. It is well to bear in mind that, in the world of spirit, the brethren on the two sides of the Atlantic are really near to one another. May they be near in heart!

*Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church, with an Introduction on the Study of Ecclesiastical History.* By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D. Second edition. London: Murray. 1862.

THESE Lectures are the products of a mind that is at once highly cultured and richly stored. They brim with information, and are eminently suggestive of far-reaching principles. But the author's ideas of what constitutes a church, and perhaps even of what constitutes christianity, are very different from those which we should be disposed to entertain. He hence looks at his entire subject from a stand-point which we cannot occupy.

*Praying and Working : being some account of what men can do when in earnest.* By the Rev. William Fleming Stevenson, Dublin. London : Strahan. 1862.

ВРОТНЕР ministers ! get this book, and get into its spirit. Ye brothers and sisters in Christ, who labour in sabbath-schools and kindred institutions, get the book, and get into its spirit. All ye brethren, everywhere, who feel a longing and yearning of soul to do some good thing for Christ, and for those whom Christ has purchased with his precious blood, get the book, and get into its spirit. There is a blessing in it.

Its pages give a pleasing account of the devotedness and labours of some German Christians,—John Falk, Immanuel Wichern, Theodore Fliedner, John Evangelist Gossner, and Louis Harms :—men who had, each, at least implicitly, as the motto of his life—“To me to live is Christ,” and who have agreed with one another in holding their life as a trust and precious thing, chiefly because it belonged to Christ and was to be consecrated to his service.

We should not wish, indeed, that any of our brethren should attempt a slavish imitation of the outside forms and outer ways of any of the worthies whose story is recorded. Different men have different spheres. And the spheres of most of us will always be of comparatively small diameter. But there is something pure and lofty,—fit inmate of the innermost chambers of the soul,—which may be ours, as really as theirs, or as Luther's or as Paul's. With this glory within, the cup of our usefulness and bliss, however small the cup's calibre may be, will brim and run over. Without it, life will be a failure ; and the cup which has been put by God into our hands, will either be an empty and inverted thing, or it will have in it but a pittance of a drop or two, which will only mock the measure of its capacity.

We think that even Immanuel Wichern and Louis Harms, as well as Geo. Müller of Bristol, have made some mistakes in their theory of things. They have not always, as we suppose, accurately distinguished what lies respectively on either side of the line which divides the human from the divine ; and they consequently, we conceive, misinterpret, to a certain extent, some facts that occur within the sphere of consciousness, on the one hand, and certain other facts which transpire outside, but still in reference to our inner selves. Hence the work of these great and good men is not an unmingled blessing to the world. We must not worship the men ; or treat them as if they were infallible ; or suppose that they have been wholly led by the Spirit of God. We must not look upon their work as divine. Neither must we imagine that it would be inconsistent with a reverent regard for what is divine, to criticise with freedom portions of their opinions and practices. But there is nevertheless in the history of their life and labours, something that takes us wonderfully near to the meeting-place of the human and divine, and hence much to instruct, and to encourage, and to stimulate, more especially such as, in consequence of the exclusiveness of men, are thrown in upon a close companionship with God. There will be an improvement upon their style of living and working, when the same kind of spirit, instead of concentrating itself in vast organisations, few and far between, succeeds in scattering itself abroad into innumer-

able smaller circles of activity; and when the same principle that is applied by them to money or its equivalents, is applied to every other means of serving God. It is for this reason that we commend so earnestly the volume before us.

*The American War. Lecture to Working Men, delivered in London, Oct. 20, 1862.* By Newman Hall, LL.B. London. Nisbet.

An able, eloquent, and noble-hearted lecture, brimful of earnest sympathy with the North, and of equally earnest detestation of the South; and abounding withal in widely ramifying views of the interests involved in the present struggle. We could wish its very extensive circulation. And we only regret that our strong conviction of the utter inexpediency of dis-allowing the secession, on the one hand, and of the triply, quadruply, quintuply, and indeed almost infinitely, intensified inexpediency of inviting four millions of untutored, and semi-savage slaves, to rise outright upon their masters and mistresses, and take hold of freedom as best they can, makes it impossible for us to feel that absolutely unmingled sympathy with the North, which, on other grounds we so strongly desire. The whole contest is not purely moral. It is mixed; and is to a large degree political. And hence the scope for criticism, even on the part of those who hold the highest views of the criminality of American slavery, as a merely moral question. As regards ourselves, for example, our very desire for the destruction of slavery dictates to us the conviction, that if the North had simply said to the South, as soon as the flag of pro-slavery independence was hoisted, "Be off with you!" the sympathies of the whole civilised world would have gathered round the act of political amputation and cession, while the erection of the southern confederacy on a separate foundation, with slavery as its corner-stone, would have drawn toward itself the detestation of all good men and true throughout Europe and the world.

*The Duty of Giving away a stated Proportion of our Income. An Address delivered in the Victoria Hall, Belfast.* By William Arthur, A.M. London: Nisbet. 1863.

INCOMPARABLE. The Christian lives not, we imagine,—if he be a Christian in reality,—who will not be delighted and blessed by the perusal of this address.

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If a man's chief enjoyment be conditioned on the presence of a fellow-creature, must he not become wretched if death bereave him of his companion? Would it not, then, be wise, to have our chief enjoyment reposing on the presence of One, who cannot die?

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## LETTER FROM AN ABSENT PASTOR TO HIS FLOCK.

XXXIII.

EISELEBEN, March 2, 1856.

*To the Independent Church and Congregation assembling for the Public Worship of God, in the N. D. ——— St. Chapel, G. ———.*

MY BELOVED BRETHREN AND FRIENDS,—This is the Lord's day morning; and it is yet four hours before the time of your assembling for the services of the sanctuary. I have been longing, however, to write to you; and I feel that I cannot well restrain myself from spending the earliest portion of the sacred day in communicating with you. O may the entire day long be a day among a thousand to you, and to me, and to thousands and millions more.

My last letter was sent to you from Erfurt,—the scene of the unspeakably important heart-struggles in which the foundations of the Reformation, introduced by Luther, were laid. Before leaving Erfurt, but after I had despatched my letter to you, I walked out to a beautifully situated hill in the vicinity, called the Steiger. It is laid out in delightful pleasure-walks, along some parts of which are placed numerous statues and busts; and it commands an interesting view of the ancient city and its suburbs. I sat down upon one of the benches, which are stationed along the footpaths for the accommodation of the public, and, beholding the city, I realised its intimate historical connection with that vast ecclesiastical movement which has shed innumerable, though not unmixed, blessings, either directly or indirectly, over the whole of Europe and indeed the greater part of the world. Doubtless the young student, Luther, would often take his promenade, with his friend Alexia, upon the Steiger-hill, and would look thence toward the numerous and picturesque steeples of the city, where they were pursuing their education. Possibly it was on that very hill that he lost his companion, and was aroused in conscience so powerfully by the awful incident, that he resolved to seek refuge from his sins in what he regarded as the sanctifying austerities of a holy convent. As the day on which I visited the hill was beautifully bright, I ascended, when I returned to the city, the steeple of the cathedral, and got thence a still more panoramic view; and amongst the numerous bells which are hung in the various compartments of the steeple, I took special notice of that monster one which had been baptised with the name of "Great Susannah." It is a truly gigantic bell, which is only used on great and rare occasions, and which, when used, requires the strength of twenty men to ring it. Solemn must be the tones which it emits, and well fitted will they be to attract the spiritually sensitive soul to the place of devout meditation and prayer.

From Erfurt I journeyed to Weimar, the chief town of the principality of Saxe-Weimar. It too is a centre of interesting associations; though they are rather of an artistic and literary, than of an ecclesiastical, character. Weimar used to be called the Athens of Germany. Germany's greatest poets lived and died and were buried in it. Wieland lived in it. His house is still shown. Herder lived in it. His house too is still shown; and his statue is erected before the city church; and his tomb-stone is within the church. The tomb-stone bears a representation of his seal, the finely significant motto of which consisted of the three most precious words,—alliterative in German as in English,—"Light, Love, Life." Schiller also spent the evening of his life in Weimar; and so did Göthe. Their houses are objects of interest; and the mausoleum of the Duke, who was their patron, contains their ashes. Besides these modern luminaries of German literature, Lucas Cranach, the great painter, the friend of Luther, and who has furnished the world with by far the best portraits of the reformer, lived in Weimar. His house is shewn, and his curious tomb-stone is in the wall of St. James's church. One of his finest paintings is preserved in the city-church, and it is as fresh as if it had been finished only yesterday. It consists of four compartments; in one of which Jesus is represented as overcoming the first enemy of man with a spear of light and lightning from heaven; in another is a representation of the crucifixion, and, adjoining the cross, the painter has stationed John the Baptist, himself, and Luther. The portrait of Luther is superlatively fine. It is regarded as the best extant, and is as large as life. In the other two compartments are portraits of Johann Frederic, elector of Saxony, and of his wife, and three sons. In the sacristy of the same city-church is another painting, which

would have been of peculiar value, had the artist possessed the powers of Lucas Cranach. It is a triple portrait of Luther,—of Luther as a monk, of Luther as a Reformer, and of Luther as Squire George while he lived in the Wartburg. The artist, however, was not competent to carry out his conception; and hence the picture is, in execution, a failure. Luther is not Luther in any of the three portraits.

I attended divine service in the city-church. There were three ministers officiating; and the music was livelier than any I had hitherto heard in Germany; but the audience was very small. There are two galleries in the church; but there would not be above a hundred and fifty persons present. During the part of the service that was intoned, the minister stood behind a high altar, on which were placed two unlighted candles, two bunches of artificial flowers under glass-covers, and a crucifix. The minister was literally almost entirely hidden *behind the cross*. His position was an interesting representation of what every minister should, in spirit, be. I was grieved to notice that the ducal pavilion in the church was unoccupied; and thus the congregation had not the benefit of the good example of their Sovereign. By and by, however, in a more advanced stage of things, all kings and princes will be "nursing-fathers" indeed, and queens and princesses will be "nursing mothers" indeed, in the church of the living God: and, in a still more advanced stage of things, all the people will be as "kings and queens unto God," for all will be the highly elevated and truly ennobled people of the Lord.

I went on foot from Weimar to Jena. Jena is peacefully and unostentatiously situated in a vale that is surrounded by bold and bare mountains. It is celebrated as the seat of a university which has about sixty teachers; and it is still more extensively celebrated as the scene of one of the most brilliant and influential of the many brilliant and influential victories of the first Napoleon. I walked out to the field of battle, and noticed the valley through which the French, under Lannes, were conducted by a neighbouring German pastor to a position on the heights that enabled them to strike upon the Saxons and Prussians a most decisive blow. The gentleman who conducted me received the narrative of the circumstances from the lips of the pastor himself. I visited the university library, and was delighted to see many interesting busts and portraits of distinguished theologians and philosophers. In the manuscript-room there are numerous precious volumes; and, among the rest, a splendid German Bible, printed on vellum, which belonged to Luther's great patron, Johann Friedrich, elector of Saxony. There are likewise two other volumes more precious still, though by no means so magnificent. They are early copies of Luther's translation of the old and new Testaments; copies which had belonged to Luther himself; and which contain an immense number of emendations of the translation in his own handwriting. His translation is the noblest monument which he has erected to himself; and it was the basis of all the other protestant versions of the sacred volume.

When in Jena, I lodged in a hotel, which has been in existence for more than three hundred years. It is called "the Black Bear," and it bore the same name more than three hundred years ago. Luther lodged in it; and he lodged in it under romantic circumstances. After lying in his Wartburg refuge for about a year, his spirit burned so within him to resume his labours in Wittenberg, that he could not longer brook his confinement. So he set out for his house, but equipped in his knightly attire. On his way he put up at the hotel of the Black Bear in Jena, where, while partaking of some refreshment, he got engrossed in a book which he had laid on the table before him. While thus engrossed two students from Switzerland entered the hotel. Luther conversed with them in a friendly, and, what appeared to them, a condescending manner. They told him that they were on their way to Wittenberg to study under Luther and Melancthon; and they asked him if he knew whether Luther had yet returned to the university. He stated to them that he was in a position to inform them that the teacher under whom they desired to study, was not yet in Wittenberg, but that he would soon be there. In the course of conversation he told them that he thought it a matter of great moment that students of theology should make themselves well acquainted with the original Scriptures. As he sat at ease with his hands laid upon the hilt of his sword, one of the students caught a glimpse of the book in which he had been reading. It was a Hebrew Psalter. By and by he pursued his journey on horseback, as became a knight, and they pursued theirs on foot. When they arrived in Wittenberg, and presented themselves before their professors, they found the knight seated beside Melancthon; and you may consider their surprise and delight when he informed them that he was Luther.



I may also mention that, while in Jena, I accidentally met with Professor Hoffman, with whose admirable Syriac grammar I have been for nearly twenty years acquainted, and out of which I had drawn most of the little knowledge of Syriac which I possess. It was far from uninteresting to me to meet the venerable old scholar, who has done so much to throw light upon the oldest version of the New Testament in existence, and to throw a side-light upon the language in which "holy men of old" wrote the Old Testament "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

From Jena I journeyed, partly on foot and partly by rail, to Halle, another and much larger university town. It is chiefly its university that sheds lustre upon it. The old university in Wittenberg, in which Luther and Melancthon lived and laboured, and which they rendered world-renowned, and in which Shakespear represents Hamlet as being educated, was in 1815 united to that of Halle; and now the university of Halle-Wittenberg is one of the most important theological schools in Germany. Two of the most eminent evangelical professors in the country occupy chairs in it, namely Professor Tholuck and Professor Julius Müller. The former is well known in Great Britain by his commentaries on some of the New Testament books, and the latter has recently erected to himself a still nobler pillar of fame in his learned and truly profound and comprehensive treatise on Sin. He is a determined opponent of Calvinism, and a zealous and able defender of the fundamental doctrine of the freedom of the will. There is at present no more distinguished name in the evangelical hemisphere of the little world of Germany, than that of Julius Müller. I have heard two lectures from him; and three from Professor Tholuck; and one from a celebrated teacher of philosophy, Professor Erdmann. I have also visited with deep interest the Orphan-house,—now an immense institution, but founded in littleness by the holy and devoted Franke. It was founded in material littleness, but in moral greatness,—in the greatness of extraordinary uplooking toward God. Nothing imparts such greatness to little man and ultimately such greatness to his little works, as constantly conscious aspiration toward the infinitely great One.

I see that I have reached the conclusion of my space without having said anything concerning the place from which my letter is dated and where it is written. It is a place indelibly associated with the history of Luther; and it has often been somewhat exaggeratedly designated "the Bethlehem of Germany." I shall make mention of its peculiar claims on our interest in my next epistle, if, by the mercy of Him "in whom we live and move and have our being," I be spared and privileged to write you once more.

Meanwhile farewell: and may every blessing rest upon you as a church, and as a congregation, and as families, and as individuals. May "the pleasure of the Lord" prosper in the midst of you; may happiness be in your homes; may peace, like a heavenly dove, hover over your assemblies; may glory fill your lovely tabernacle; and may holiness abide within your hearts. These, the desires of my soul in reference to you, will be all fulfilled, if, in the language of my vademecum for to day, you "render unto God the things that are God's," and, with "hearts enlarged," run "in the way of his commandments."—Believe me to be your ever loving Pastor,

J ——— M ———.

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THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGEMENT WITHIN THE SPHERES OF  
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

THERE are two circumstances, each of stupendous magnitude, which render the assertion and the definition of the right of private judgement matters of first-rate importance. These two circumstances, or rather two sets of circumstances, exist in our own times and country. First, the present is, and ought to be, a transitional theological period. A very great and favourable revolution is being wrought in the theological sentiments of large sections of the community, or in the interpretation of the sacred Scriptures. This blessed general change of theological belief is, as we understand the case, the result of the operation of at least three instrumental causes. (1) The general progress of the age has had a most favourable bearing on the correction and enlargement of theological opinion. An improved humanity has yearned after a more christian divinity. Thus, sometimes, are the errors of a theological creed destroyed by the very civilisation which, to a large extent, is the fruit of the truths of that creed. Should this suggest the incongruous idea of the child teaching the parent, we cannot help that. It is ours to keep to the inexorable logic of facts. (2) Then, in this country and these times, while we have been greatly damaged, we have also been greatly aided, by the importation of foreign theological works. The ministerial mind of the land has been much stimulated, and has frequently received scriptural guidance from continental biblical literature. (3) Again, no false modesty ought to repress the assertion that the religious community, with which we have the honour to be identified, is exercising its own, and that not a meagre, influence on the theological belief of our times. We repeat, we are in a transition state, and have good reason to be so, and these three instrumental causes are in operation in helping us to rectify our theology.

The second set of circumstances rendering the assertion and definition, especially the definition, of the right of private judgement so imperative, is very different from the first, though they are generally conjoined in the history of theological inquiry. Freedom of thought in reference to the interpretation of the Holy Bible is, in some quarters, taking flight into the regions of lawlessness. The right of private judgement is lawlessly exercised. Hence, then, while on the one hand we roundly assert this right, we must, on the other, carefully define it, and point out the qualifications necessary for the salutary exercise of the right. It is a grand and glorious *birthright*; but many a man employs it to his own and his neighbour's everlasting detriment. Many a man as truly squanders it in riotous mental living, as the scape-grace squanders the fortune which is his birthright.

It may be well to state what the right of private judgement is not. It is not permission to take any one of the ascertained doctrines of biblical theology, and to say,—So much of it is true, so much of it is untrue,—so much of it is eternal truth, and so much of it is the product of Jewish prejudice. When God is not the speaker or the author, when some man inspired by God to know and utter the truth, is not the speaker or the author, then, in the exercise of our own judgement, we may pronounce this or that a mistake or something worse. Take, for example, the sayings of the Devil in the bible, or take some of the sayings of Job's friends;—in such cases we have the right to reject or condemn. But the permission to act in this way does not enter into the exercise of the right of private judgement in reference to the messages from God. The right of private judgement, in relation to the revelation of God, is very different from the right of private judgement in relation to the opinions of men. The omniscient holy God does not publish a book inviting and provoking the criticism of a short-sighted race, and a race not disposed to follow the light they do see. This were to turn the moral universe upside down, and to make as many gods as there are human beings. While God affords to us the opportunity of understanding the meaning of his word, he literally commands our faith. Whatever the right of private judgement may be in relation to the opinions or conduct of men, though it may give us license to protest against the opinion of the universal church and the un-circumscribed world, we hold the right in behalf of God; we hold it much more in behalf of God than even in behalf of our own manhood or conscience. That fact clearly understood will save us from superstition in the presence of men, and from infidelity in the presence of God.

It cannot be too distinctly remembered, that the right of

private judgement, as claimed by any christian man, recognises the truthfulness of christian theology, and while maintaining the claims of conscience and personal liberty, does this from a sense of the claims of God in the matter. The sceptic may claim this right in the name of all uncertainty; but how he has found out that he can draw from his uncertain premises the certain conclusion that there is such a right, we should be puzzled to tell. We claim the right in the name of the most holy God, and we claim it not only as a boon for ourselves in that awful name, but we claim it chiefly that we may pay our debt to Him. It is a right held in trust for Him. This is a fact which disputes both the supreme authority of others and of ourselves. The principle of the right of private judgement entwines itself around the pillars of the divine throne, and is meekly and adoringly submissive to God, while it may be defiant toward men.

The right of private judgement, within the spheres specified, is the liberty of coming to the word of God to read, to meditate, to search, to interpret, and then to act for ourselves. No man has a right to sit in judgement on the truth of God, and to say, the message of heaven is a mistake, is false; and no man using aright the privilege now under consideration can come to that conclusion, or dare to pass such a sentence. Every man, as a man made in the image of God, has a right to look on God with his own eyes, and not through the eyes of his neighbour. The word comes to the individual soul, "for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness;" and to the individual soul, the word appeals, not for sentence, perhaps for condemnation, but for apprehension, for approval, for obedience. It is not the word of an equal coming to an equal for review, for confirmation, perhaps for revisal. It is the word of a God coming to a man who has, in his manifold being, as many of the elements of the intellectual and moral nature of his maker as will undoubtedly lead him to a knowledge of the truth revealed, if he only use aright his God-given and God-like faculties. This is true even of fallen man. To every man the oracle speaks, and every man has a right to say, Let me hear with my own ears. Between himself and every man, God has opened up these avenues along which even sinful souls can go to his own heart and his own throne. Blessed fact! Onerous birthright! No civil government, no pope, no conclave of bishops, no general assembly, no synod, no presbytery, no union, no church, no minister, can deprive any man of this birthright. The poorest member of a congregation in a christian chapel, is at liberty to review the discourse of his teacher; and if that teacher understand his relations to God and to his people, if he understand his own fallibility,

and the sacred rights of his flock, he will be thankful to share with others the responsibility of finding out the meaning of the truth. This royal principle of the right of private judgement lies at the root of all theological growth, lies along the path of all religious reformation, and accompanies in all directions the spirit of christian progress.

That the right of private judgement is recognised by the sacred writers is undeniable. "Above all things, hold fast that which is good." (1 Thess. v. 21.) "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." (Rom. xiv. 5.) "I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say." (1 Cor. x. 15.) "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world." (1 John, iv. 1.) Such portions of the Word as these clearly prove that "holy men of God, moved by the Holy Ghost," wished their readers to exercise the right of private judgement, within the spheres of theology and religion. This is a fact of paramount importance, in relation to the topic of this article.

The question, how it comes to pass that man is endowed with the right of private judgement, is a very interesting one. The reason why this right is conferred on us is a very important matter in the eye of any one wishing to form a philosophical estimate of the fundamental principles of religious liberty. The fact that each person will have to answer for himself on the great day of reckoning is a reason why he should be allowed to choose the theological sentiments and the course of religious conduct on which the sentence will hinge. Still, that manner of stating the basis of the right of private judgement is not satisfactory. We believe that man is endowed with the right of private judgement within the spheres of theology and religion, because he is gifted with faculties which, under proper guidance, are capable of understanding the true meaning of the subject-matter of the word of God. It is there, it is in that illustrious fact, that the warrant for this right lies and shines. Had man not been made in the image of God, with reason, and conscience, and heart, and will, like those of Him who is the sum of all theology and the bond of all religion, as well as the revealer of truth, we cannot see how he could ever have been entrusted with the right of private judgement. An imbecile, idiotic man has not this right, just because in him the necessary faculties, the judging faculties, have no existence. An infant has not this right, just because the capability of knowing the truth is not yet developed. The irrational animals have not this right, just because they are neither the parties to which God reveals himself nor possess the power of

reflecting on the revelation itself. God can bestow this birth-right only on men, and on men capable of considering moral truth. It is at the period when we become capable of considering the various questions which form the subject-matter of christian doctrine and law, that this right is conferred on us. Or, if we speak of it as a natural right, as a birthright, then we cannot use it till the faculties, which form its basis, are so developed as to be capable of reflecting on theological topics and moral relations.

There are several things men must do in order to qualify themselves to exercise this right in such a manner, that they will be certain to apprehend divine truth, and to walk in the paths of righteousness. This is an obligation generally overlooked by the masses who maintain the right of private judgement. Truth is so revealed, and the soul of man is so fashioned, that the latter would never miss the former were the right of private judgement only exercised under right circumstances. That is a broad assertion, but it can be maintained. The soul of man—the soul made in the image of God—face to face with truth and duty, would always see some aspect of the truth and some path of duty. All men are not capable of going up to the same stand-points, and therefore all could not form equally comprehensive and complete estimates of revealed truth; yet all may form, so far as it goes, a true view of the truth or duty. An elector sometimes declines to use his right of voting for a member of parliament because he is not in circumstances to vote intelligently and conscientiously. So it were well if many a man were to suspend the use of his right of private judgement in relation to the interpretation of the scriptures, till he has qualified himself to employ his faculties intelligently and conscientiously. The parent has a natural right to teach the child in regard to many things, and to rule the child in his own home. Still, parents have to qualify themselves to teach what is true, and to rule in love and righteousness. The same here,—we need to qualify ourselves to reach the very mind of God. We do not speak here so much of ministers qualifying themselves to interpret the word, as of every reader qualifying himself to understand it and take away from it the very truth. One of the foremost qualifications for the proper use of this royal right, is that spirit of bravery which fears no being save God. This is perfectly compatible with the respect due to great names and good men. The enquirer, the subject, to use his right righteously, must cast out the fear of man, and know only the fear of God. That will save him from a thousand mistakes both in the direction of stereotyped creeds and the opinionativeness of self. Another of these qualifications is the

measure of thoughtfulness necessary to catch the truth when it is unveiled, or to draw aside the veil when the truth is covered. The mind must cast itself all round the subject of inquiry and penetrate its recesses. It will not do for a thoughtless man to stand upon his right to think for himself. He is not exercising that right. He is asserting that he has a right to speak without thinking, which we altogether question. Another of the qualifications for the right use of our freedom in the spheres of theology and religion, is the spirit of sympathy with the true and the right. The man sincerely anxious to find the true only, to know the right only, has within him a powerful magnet which draws truth out of the most unlikely corners, and which discovers the right amid the most conflicting statements. The only other qualification we now mention, necessary for the legitimate exercise of the right of private judgement, is that a man study and receive christian truths in something like their logical order. We do not mean that he must understand everything pertaining to one truth or fact before he proceeds to another; but he must know as much about the A B C of responsibility to God as will introduce him to the idea of duty or of sin, before he can know that he is a sinner. The existence of God on the one hand and of a soul made in his image on the other, is antecedent to the fact of responsibility. The fact of responsibility is antecedent to the possibility, much more the reality, of sin. The fact of sin is antecedent to the cross on which the sacrifice for sin bleeds. All these facts and many more are antecedent (logically) to the idea of the last judgement. Now, if any man would form a true personal private judgement in regard to any one of these facts,—say the cross,—he must first consider the antecedent facts, either as expressly stated or distinctly implied. We need scarcely add that all available means must be employed, while exercising these qualifications,—the means of consciousness, the means of our personal history, the means of the word, the means of the throne, the means of Providence, the means of wise books and neighbours,—if our private judgement is to be a true finding. Only thus will the spirit of God guide us into all truth and into all duty. Only thus shall we employ our right for our personal benefit, for the good of others, for the pleasure and honour of God.

It is perfectly compatible with our neighbour's interest in this universal and priceless right, that we press on his attention our views of theological truth and religious duty. Of course, he has the very same right to press on our attention his views of doctrine and practice. Here is just the very place where many persons, holding this great principle in words, deny it in fact, by doing much more than asserting and exemplifying a legitimate exercise

of the right of private judgement. They speak to their neighbours as if they were cyphers, and as if they themselves were gods. They deny the right to their neighbours. They claim a great deal more than the right for themselves. They speak of the Bible as if they had found something there merely confirmatory of their views. They hold the right, not for God, but for themselves chiefly, and thus they become impious toward God and tyrannical toward their neighbours. This is not compatible either with our own or our neighbour's legitimate interest in the right of private judgement. But that each should, according to his ability and opportunity, find out the truth, and press it respectfully and earnestly and even vehemently on the attention of his fellow, is but what we owe to one another and to God. That it is perfectly possible to do this to others, and to allow it to be done to us, without passion, without unholy anger, is one of the things many Protestants need to learn. Whenever our christian indignation against error and errorists, degenerates into anger that scorches even the breast cherishing it, we have violated the right of private judgement by transforming the mistakes or heresies of the errorist into an offence against us, rather than aberrations from the truth or an offence against God. The Father of spirits, the God of truth, the king of righteousness, has appointed freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of pen, freedom of action, within the hemispheres of theology and religion, as one of the grand conditions toward the discovery of all truth, toward the perfect interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, toward the perfecting of the characters of the subjects of the kingdom composed of the freemen of the Lord. But this freedom must be enjoyed under a most vivid and unslumbering consciousness of the fact, that as the freedom is conferred by God it is to be used for God, and that the freedom is conferred on our neighbours as well as ourselves, and that we, no less than they, are fallible. This manner of exercising the right will keep the red flame of unholy passion from coming between the mind and the truth, or our own mind and another. Were the right of private judgement so used, and not abused, how soon would theological controversy lose its fierceness, though it would gain in christian earnestness, how soon would the bitter waters of religious strife be sweetened, how soon would universal biblical truth reveal itself to the universal mind of the christian ministry and church, and how soon would religion, like theology, be full-orbed, many-sided.

It is very vain, it is very wicked, for christian men to palliate violations, either by themselves or others of the right of private judgement, by saying, what can you expect of inflammatory and infirm human nature but such exhibitions of weakness and tyranny? Surely, if that is the way that even christian men are



to apologise for offences committed by trespassers within the inclosures of the most sacred of religious rights, it is not worth while for the great King to give to us any chartered rights. God expects that we sanctify these rights, not that we apologise for their violation, which is just one way of undervaluing them.

W. B.—K.

#### STILL WITH GOD.

THE Psalmist, in Psalm cxxxix. 18, says, "when I awake, I am still with thee." It is note-worthy that he does not say, "when I awake, thou, O my God, art still with me." It is the other side of a great two-sided reality, which he turns up to view.

No doubt he might have said, and no doubt he very often thought,—“when I awake, thou, O my God, art still with me.” It was a glorious fact,—for which doubtless he was profoundly grateful, and over which he often pondered with a delight that rose up into rapture,—that every morning when he awoke, God was still with him, and with him as a God of infinite majesty and goodness and love. Had not God been with him, as he lay down, he could not have been blessed with repose. Had not God been with him as he lay asleep, he could not have enjoyed quiet, refreshing, and recruiting rest. It is God who giveth sleep; and the sleep which he giveth, is specially sweet to those who are his “beloved” with a love of complacency. Had not God been still with him when he awoke, he could not have lifted his head from his pillow, or his hand from his side. In God he “lived and moved and had his being.” In God we all “live, and move, and have our being.” In God we all sit, and stand, and walk, and work, and sleep and wake. It is because he is with us, upholding us, working in us and around us,—“working hitherto,”—that our heart beats, our lungs breathe, our eyes see or sleep, our ears hear, our mouths taste and speak, our hands handle, our feet walk, our spirits think and feel and act. It is because God is with us, that we are surrounded every morning, and from every morning to every night, with “good and perfect gifts,” which are fitted to make us happy, and which would make us happier still, if we always received them with truly grateful hearts. All these “good and perfect gifts” are strewn around us by the hand of a very present God.

It is true, then, that God was with the Psalmist every morning when he awoke, and every evening when he fell asleep, and every day and all day long between morning and evening. It is true, too, that God is every day and all day with us all. It is a sublime, and most delightful, truth. God is with us always. Our

homes are full of God. The world is full of God. Wherever we are, in whatsoever company we happen to be, in whatsoever work we are engaged, whatever words we are speaking, whatever thoughts we are thinking, whatever purpose we are meditating, even when we are sinning, God is standing by, noticing all, feeling in reference to all, and with his heart of infinite goodness and love yearning over us, with unutterable longing after our holiness and happiness.

All this is true; most solemn and most momentous truth. But it is not the truth, to which the Psalmist gives utterance when he says,—“when I awake, I am still with thee.” If he had said, “when I awake, thou art still with me,” his words would have had a wider application than they really have. They could have been taken up, and appropriated, by every man, all the world over. For when every one awakes, whether it be during the watches of the night, or after the sun has begun his race for the day, God is still with him. God is ever with him; and hence it is that every man has being, and may have well-being.

It is also true that,—since God is with every man when he awakes, and all day long till he sleeps, and all night too while he sleeps,—every man should be reciprocally with God,—with God every morning, noon, and evening,—every day and all day. This should be the case. And until this be the case, with all men everywhere, it cannot possibly be well with the world; it cannot be reasonably expected that the world should be ruled by a providence which is divested of frowns. All this is true; and hence it is that all those on earth, who are not with God every day and all day, are hindering the superinduction of such a providential rule of the world, as would bring to every nation and home and individual, blessings only, without chastisements and woes. But, nevertheless, it is not the case that all everywhere can say, “when I awake, I am still with thee.”

There is a sense, indeed, in which it might possibly be said of every one, that *when he awakes he is still with God*. There is a thin, meagre, metaphysical sense in which this is true. Every one is in the presence of God, for no one can pass beyond the boundaries of God's spirit, or flee from his presence. None. When thou, O believer, shalt “ascend up into heaven,” thou wilt find God there. When thou, O persistently impenitent unbeliever, shalt sooner or later, if thou repent not, enter upon thine everlasting night, and “make thy bed in hell,” behold God will be there. When thou, O brother or sister, about to emigrate to far-away lands, “takest the wings of the morning,” and hiest thee to dwell in what is, in relation to this the land of your nativity,

“the uttermost parts of the sea,” even there shall God be with thee, and his hand shall lead thee, and his right hand hold thee. As God is with us everywhere, and at all times, so there is a sense in which it might be said that all are always with God. Their presence is beside his presence. Their being is with and in his being.

But this, as we have said, is a thin, meagre, metaphysical, sense of the expression, which should rather be expressed by the words *God is with us*, than by the words, *we are with God*. It is a sense of the expression, in which it might be as truly affirmed of stones and stars, of birds of the air, of beasts of the field, and of fishes of the sea, as of moral and immortal men. It is a possible meaning of the words; and, in its own place, good and important. But it cannot be the idea that was in the mind of the Psalmist. It was something far different from an unconscious presence with God of which he spoke and sung.

In saying “when I awake, I am still with thee,” he evidently means, *when I awake, I am still in thought with thee:—I am still with thee in feeling:—I still realise thy presence in my thoughts; I still feel in my heart that thou art a very present God*. It was thus consciously, that the Psalmist was still with God. He was with him thinkingly, believingly, trustingly, lovingly, adoringly, rejoicingly. His thoughts were with God. His heart was with God. His will was with God, and putting up, as it were, its little hand into the great hand of the will of God, that it might be guided and upheld. It was thus *consciously*, or *in his consciousness*, that the Psalmist was with God. And it is thus, consciously, that every good man and woman on the face of the earth, every believer in Christ Jesus, who is a believer indeed, and whose faith is a present reality, and not a mere ghost or memory of something that is past,—is still with God when he awakes, and is still with God when he arises, and is still with God when he goes forth to his daily work, and is still with God when he sits down to eat, and is still with God when he walks in the way and when he talks with his fellows, and is still with God when he goes to the amiable tabernacle, or when he returns to his own home, and is still with God when he lies down to get repose.

Indeed it is only because it is in a similarly conscious way that God is with us, that his omnipresence is a blessing, and is fitted to be a joy. Were God with us only in some unconscious way, as is the air we breathe, or the light we see, we should, as regards our souls, and our aspirations, and our prospects, be poor, desolate, destitute things in the universe. We should be spiritual orphans, and might any hour we chose throw up existence in despair.

But it is not thus that God is with us. His presence, in the midst of which we are,—his presence, as it fills our homes, and fills our earth, and fills the universe, constituting it the magnificent cathedral in which he may be constantly praised,—his presence is a conscious presence. He is consciously with us, and around us, and interpenetrating us, wherever we are. He is beside us with all his thoughts. He is beside us with all his feelings. He is beside us with his whole infinite mind and heart,—looking at us, and gazing into us, yearning over us, and seeking to embrace us in the arms of his boundless compassion, that he may win us to be good like himself, so that we may be like himself happy for ever. It is thus that God is with us. He is with us consciously. And it is thus that the good man is still with God when he awakes. He is with Him consciously, realising His presence, beholding Him with his mental eye, loving Him with his heart, adoring Him with his soul, and bowing before Him in his inmost will. It is thus that God wishes us to be with him; and it is only when we learn to be thus with God, that we shall learn the secret of being blessed, whatever may betide us in our relations to our fellow-men, and to outward things at large. It is only, too, when we learn to be thus with God, that we shall learn the secret of being holy, and of becoming holier and holier the longer that we live.

Let us suppose a case. We address one of the humblest of our readers. The queen does not know you. She knows nothing about you. She does not know your name. She does not know your character. She does not know your circumstances. She does not know your existence. She does not do anything with a conscious reference to you, to carry blessing to you, or to exercise an elevating influence upon you. You know something of the queen; but she knows nothing of you. This is the real state of the case, as regards the queen and you. But suppose that the queen should come to know of you, and should begin to think of you, and to think of you with interest and kindness. And suppose that you should learn that the queen thinks of you, and thinks of you with interest and kindness:—would not you feel greatly interested in this fact, and would not all the sentiments of a respectful and devoted loyalty be stirred up within you? Suppose, further, that the queen should know the particulars of your history and circumstances, and should feel sympathizingly with you in all your trials and distresses. If you knew this,—would you not be profoundly stirred in your heart's emotions? Would you not be frequently thinking, in return, of the queen, and thinking with up-gushing emotions of gratitude and devotedness? Surely you would. You would love her

with a deeply reciprocating love, because you knew that she first loved you. Suppose, still further, that the queen got so interested in you, poor and uncultivated though you be, that she began to write letters to you, and encouraged you to correspond, in your own simple and unlearned manner with her, making known to her your domestic trials, your little difficulties, and also your joys. If the queen did all this, and you actually began to handle with your hands the queen's own letters to you, and to read her benignant words with your eyes, would you not feel your whole soul heaving toward her in most loyal and loving attachment, and would you fail to embrace the privilege which she pressed upon you of opening up, as best you could, your mind to her? Would not such intercourse with the queen, if genuine and frank and truly sympathetic on her part, be esteemed by you as a very precious boon? Would you despise it? Would you neglect it? Or would you trifle with it, and be careless and unconcerned to make out what she meant in her letters to you? Or would you take no interest to do your best to write with the utmost propriety to her, when you availed yourself of your privilege to communicate to her your desire or whatever else was interesting to you? Are we wrong when we say that there would be no carelessness or unconcern within you, either as to her communications to you, or as to yours to her? But, suppose still further, that the queen should actually come down to visit you in your humble home. Suppose that she should enter your door,—enter it with a smile of benignity on her countenance, and with gifts in her hand, and should come in beside you, and be seated near you, so as to see you and hear you, and be for a season close beside you, that there might be intercommunion with you,—how would you feel? Would you act as if she were not present? Would you take no notice of her? Would you pay no attention to her words? Would you receive her gifts as if they were things that came you knew not whence, or perchance from your own merit? Would you never own that she gave you them, and never thank her for them? Would you never think within yourself in some such manner as the following,—What would be the way of acting which would be most respectful to my loving sovereign, and most in accordance with her gracious will? Would you go on, unconscious of her presence, with no words of homage on your lips, no feelings of loyalty in your heart? Would you, could you, act thus? Never. If the queen were consciously with you, and benignant toward you, and loving you, yea making some very great sacrifice for you, you would be consciously with her, and you would act accordingly. You would “love her, because she first loved you.”

And yet the queen does not know you. She does not feel any

interest in you. She makes no sacrifice for you. She does not write to you. She does not encourage you to communicate with her. No. But a far higher than she—the King of kings,—the Monarch of the universe,—He knows you. He loves you. He is personally interested in you. He, every day of your existence, confers good and perfect gifts upon you. He has written to you. He wishes you to communicate your mind and feelings to him. He has made,—Monarch of the whole universe though he is,—a very great sacrifice for you. He gave up his Son to suffer the penalty of your sins that you might go free. He is, indeed, in your home, adorning it with his adorable presence. He is beside you, a very present God. He is beside you, with a heart full of boundless compassion for you and benignity toward you. He is thus, and thus consciously, thus lovingly, thus, daily and nightly, with you. And yet—wonder O queen of Great Britain, wonder O heavens and earth, wonder ye stones in the walls around us, and ye beams in the timber, beneath our feet,—wonder fellow immortal, at thyself,—thou hast not been living consciously with him! Thou hast not been filled with loyalty and love, and acting as he would have thee to act. Is it not a shame to you? Ought it not to be felt by you to be a burning shame, to have thus rejected with neglect and contempt the condescension and grace of your sovereign and your Lord? Will you, O will you, live one other day “without God in the world”?

Mark the emphasis of the Psalmist’s expression, “when I awake, I am still with thee.” He not only says “I am with thee.” He says “I am *still* with thee.” The expression implies that he had been with God before he fell asleep. He had been consciously with God in the evening. He was still consciously with God in the morning. He would doubtless be consciously with God all the day long. His language might have been that of the 73rd Psalm, 23rd verse, “I am *continually* with thee.” The secret of the Lord was with him, and he was blessed.

Who would not imitate the Psalmist in this matter? Who will not? Many have an ambition to get into *high society*. Their desire may be satisfied. They may get into the society of the Monarch of the universe,—the highest possible society. Is it not glorious? Many have a more wholesome ambition to get into *good society*. Their desire too may be instantly gratified. They may now, and from henceforth, be constantly in the best possible society:—in the society of the purest Being in the universe. God is saying—“Lo, I am with you always.” Who will not responsively say to him, “here am I, O Lord,—I am with thee;—I will be *continually with thee*”?

PRACTICAL EXPOSITION  
OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.  
VERSES 5-9.

THE inspired writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews had high ideas of the Saviour of men. He had high ideas of his official work, as being the greatest achievement of the ages, the gathering up and the consummation of all that was good and glorious in preceding times, and the starting-point of all the higher developments of goodness, and nobleness, and holiness, in the times that were to come. He had correspondingly high ideas of the intrinsic greatness and grandeur of the Saviour's person. It was meet that he, who was to achieve the greatest of works, and who was, in virtue of that work, to be the highest of high priests, the supreme "Lord of lords," the Judge of judges, and "the King of kings;" and who, as "the Reflection of the Father's glory, and the Express Image of his person," was to sway the destinies, not only of all immortal men and women upon the earth, but also of all moral beings throughout the entire universe;—it was meet that he should be, in his essential nature, greater than the greatest of all creatures. It was needful, indeed, for several high and holy purposes, that he should be wonderfully allied to one of the least of moral creatures;—it was needful that he should be intimately allied to men. For if men,—as beings who are capable, indeed, of rising up toward God, rising up for ever, and higher and higher; but who, notwithstanding this capability, have taken the other direction, and fallen indefinitely downward, so far as their thoughts, and feelings, and will, and character, are concerned,—if men are to rise, they must be raised by the mediation of one who unites in himself all that is essentially human with all that is essentially divine. Hence it is that our Saviour is "Immanuel." He is both God and man. Just as man, in his complex nature, is two-sided, being partly material and partly spiritual, and thus fitted for sustaining two distinct sets of relations,—relations toward the universe of matter below, and relations toward the universe of spirit above,—so is our Saviour two-sided in the higher complexity of his nature, being partly human and partly divine. And in consequence of this twofold element in his personality, he was gloriously fit to be a middleman and mediator between God and men, and thus to establish a foundation, in the work which he accomplished, on which, as a meeting-place, the separated creature and Creator could once more meet in harmony, and be re-united in the blissful consciousness of everlasting fellowship and love.

Filled with these high ideas regarding the twofold nature of

our Saviour, and looking adoringly upward from the lower of its two constituents to the higher, the inspired writer of this epistle, having asserted, in the fourth verse, that our Lord was "made," on the completion of his propitiatory work, "so much better than the angels," or, that he was promoted, in our humanity, to so much greater dignity, and honour, and glory, than the highest of created beings, "as he hath by inheritance (and thus of right) obtained a more excellent name than they," proceeds, in the remainder of the chapter, to show to the Hebrews, by testimonies taken from the Hebrew Scriptures, the high intrinsic superiority of our Lord to the most exalted intelligences within the bounds of creation.

Verse 5. *For unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son.*

The most excellent name of our Saviour is, as we have seen, a many-syllabled name, a name which cannot be fully articulated by any but a divine being. "No man knoweth it, but he himself." It is a name, which, for the purpose of distinguishing him from all other beings, must needs designate the fulness of what he is;—the fulness of what he is in all the elements of his two-fold nature; the fulness of what he is in all his relations to things around, to things above, and to things beneath; and the fulness of what he is in all his acts, whether done before his incarnation, but with a view to it, or done during his career on earth, or done and being done now that he is exalted in our glorified humanity to the right hand of the majesty on high. There is no wonder that the name which expresses the fulness of all this, should be a polysyllabic name, of almost illimitable import, which no one can truly spell, fully articulate, construe, and understand, but himself and his fellows in divinity.

But just as truly as man is made to aspire, and has the capability and yearning within him of soaring higher and higher, in his thoughts and feelings and purposes and plans,—so when he thinks upward and Godward and eternity-ward, by thinking Christ-ward, he must try to lip either inwardly or outwardly, or both inwardly and outwardly, some of the broken fragments and syllables of the great name of the Saviour. He is like a little child, whose mind and heart are shooting outward and upward, and who tries to name, though most imperfectly, its father and mother, or the other persons around it, to whom it looks up, and in reference to whom it feels itself attracted by observed manifestations of interest and love. Hence it is that the believer catches such broken fractions of the name of the Saviour, as



he can grasp and articulate, and lispingly says, "Jesus," or "Christ," or "my Lord and my God," or "O thou incarnate Love," thou "Son of man" and "Son of God."

It is the last of these fragmentary names of our Saviour, on which, as representing, and thus representatively comprehending, all the other elements of the supremely "excellent name," the inspired writer before us fastens. And he very legitimately regards it, when considering the special and peculiarly significant way in which it was applied to our Lord, as evidence that he was greater, in glory of nature,—greater by far,—than the greatest of mere creatures:—"for unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son."

The argument of the inspired writer might be thus represented:—"I have said that our Saviour is exalted, in our humanity, "to the right hand of the majesty on high, far above all created "principalities and powers, not only on earth, but also in heaven. "He sits, in short, on the throne of the universe, the fellow of the "Father, though also, in his lower relationship, the fellow of men. "And when I thus ascribe to our Lord the highest dignity in the "universe, exalting him far above all angels and archangels, I do "nothing more than what is warranted by the intrinsic glory and "excellency of his nature, as is evident, indeed, from the way in "which he is named in the Hebrew Scriptures themselves, and "spoken of in connection with his names. Take, for example, the "representative name *Son, Son of God*. It is applicable, to be "sure, in a loose sense, to every moral being, who is made in the "likeness of God, and who is thus capable of attaining and main- "taining a moral character which is akin to the moral character "of God. In this loose sense—glorious enough in its own place— "the name is applicable to Adam, and to men in general, and "especially to men good and great, and to angels too; all of whom "are sometimes honoured, and thus stimulated to high aspirations "and to profound gratitude, by being thus designated. Neverthe- "less it is by a stretch of the elastic applicability of the name that "it is thus employed in reference to men and angels. And no one "who is not strictly of the same nature with the divine Father, is "strictly, and in the sublimest sense of the term, his Son. No "other one is his 'begotten Son.' And hence I am warranted, "by way of challenge to say:—'*For unto which of the angels said "he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? "And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a "Son.*' I am warranted to put forth this challenge all the more "emphatically, as in the oracles from which these passages are "quoted, there are statements made, relative to Him who is em-

“phatically the Son of God, higher and more glorious than are “legitimately applicable to any creature, human or angelic.”—Such we may conceive to have been the purport of the thoughts of the inspired writer.

There is a double quotation ; one, the more emphatic, from the seventh verse of the second Psalm ; and the other, which is of the nature of an additament to the first, is from the oracle which was spoken by Nathan to king David, and which is recorded in the seventh chapter of second Samuel, and the seventeenth chapter of first Chronicles, and referred to in 1 Chron. xxii. and xxviii ; 2 Chron. vi, vii ; and 1 Kings v, vi, viii, and ix, and which forms, apparently, the basis of many representations, in many passages, regarding the perpetuity of the throne and kingdom of David,—a perpetuity which is realized only in him who is the most illustrious of David’s sons and successors, and who was also David’s “Root” and “Lord.”

As to the first of the two quotations,—“Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee,” it occurs in a Psalm which is manifestly Messianic. The strain of the Psalm is so high, that its contents are altogether inapplicable to David himself, or to any of his merely human successors, or indeed to any merely human potentate. Neither of David, nor of any other one who was or is “of the earth,” earthy and earthly, could it be said—“ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen (that is, the nations) for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.” Neither in reference to David, nor to any similar monarch, however exalted, could it be said, “Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings, be instructed ye judges (ye rulers) of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son (accord to the Son the kiss of loyal fealty and obedience) lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way.” It must be the case that a greater than David is here ; a greater than Solomon, or Hezekiah, or Josiah ; a greater than any merely human monarch, emperor, or czar. Thus the Psalm stands on the page of Scripture, a sublime monument of Old Testament prediction, which has pointed its prophetic finger down the ages, for millenniums, to that King of kings who is gradually extending his grand dominion over our globe, and without the realization of whose reign, despair of universal prosperity, universal peace, and universal purity, would seize all the loftier minds in all countries. The universal reign of Christ is a divine “decree.” And his competency for the office is founded on the essential dignity of his nature. He is God’s SON, in the highest and strictest sense of the term. He is of one nature with the Father ; and thus

“thinks it no robbery to be equal with God.” “Thou art my Son,” says the Father, “this day have I begotten thee.” “This day:”—the reference is to the epoch-period, when he condescended to enter, in his divinity, into personal union with our humanity, and thus became at one and the same time *the Son of man* and *the Son of God*. The angel said to Mary, “The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore also that holy thing, which shall be born of thee, shall be called *the Son of God*.” (Luke i. 35.) And the Apostle Paul, in his address in the synagogue at Antioch, as recorded in the thirteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, says, (vs. 32, 33), “We declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise, which was made to the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus,”—(for the word should not be translated *raised up again*)—“as it is also written in the second Psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.”

The other quotation, appended to this emphatic one from the second Psalm, is taken, as we have said, from the oracle delivered by Nathan the prophet to David, in reference to the good monarch's desire to build a temple for the Lord. As the oracle stands in 1 Chron. xvii., we read thus,—“Furthermore I tell thee that the Lord will build thee an house. And it shall come to pass, when thy days be expired, that thou must go to be with thy fathers, that I will raise up thy seed after thee, which shall be of thy sons; and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build me an house, and I will establish his throne for ever. *I will be his Father, and he shall be my Son*: and I will not take my mercy away from him, as I took it from him that was before thee. But I will settle him in mine house and in my kingdom for ever: and his throne shall be established for evermore.” (vs. 10–14.) The version of the oracle contained in 2 Sam. vii. is almost identical, with the exception of a remarkable clause, coming after the words “I will be his Father, and he shall be my Son.” It is the following,—“*If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men*: but my mercy,” it is added, “shall not depart away from him, as I took it from Saul, whom I put away before thee. And thine house and thy kingdom shall be established for ever before thee: thy throne shall be established for ever.” The clause “if he commit iniquity” has perplexed some expositors. Pierce, having but little conception of the tier-above-tier perspective of prophecy, thought that there must be a mis-translation. He would render the words thus,—“Whosoever shall commit iniquity.” And Dr. John Brown, though not referring to Pierce, accepts the altera-

tion, and says that the words may thus be "fairly rendered." It is a mistake, however. And it suffices, for every exegetical emergency, to notice that the expression is entirely hypothetical,—*only introducing a declaration of what would be the result, if it should be the case that the Son of David did commit iniquity.* The prediction, in short, had a relation to a typical person; Solomon to wit. And thus there is in it both a typical and an antitypical element,—the latter stretching out beyond, and rising magnificently above, the former. When the Lord said "I will set up thy seed after thee, which shall proceed out of thy bowels, and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build an house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever,"—the oracle, in its elongated unity, had two ends of reference, a nearer or proximate, and a remoter or ultimate. Its nearer or proximate reference was realized in Solomon. Its remoter and ultimate reference was realized in One who is the ideal Solomon, the true Prince of Peace, and the highest Wisdom of God. When it is added, "I will be his Father, and he shall be my Son," there is still the same twofold reference. In the first Solomon, there was a divine typical adumbration of the glorious sonship of the second; even as in the first man, there was, in another respect, a divine typical adumbration of the same wondrous filiation of "the second Adam"; and even indeed as there is in every man, to a greater or lesser extent, a dim reflected outline of the same magnificent relationship; for "we are all God's offspring." Then, when it is added,—*"If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men; but my mercy shall not depart away from him, as I took it from Saul, whom I put away before thee,"* the unity of reference is still applicable, both to the imperfect type and to the perfect antitype. But the hypothesis was, of course, *realized* only in the extremely imperfect son;—although, it must ever be borne in mind that the perfect Son too had to do with iniquity, and "was made sin" for sinners, and endured chastisement, "the chastisement of our peace," as "with the rod of men, and as with the stripes of the children of men." And it was because he was the Seed within the seed, and the truest, the ideal Solomon, that the promise was fulfilled to David,—*"And thine house and thy kingdom shall be established for ever before thee: thy throne shall be established for ever."*

It was Christ, and Christ alone, in whom was fully fulfilled the great running "promise made unto the fathers." He, and he emphatically, is the Seed of the woman; and the Seed of Abraham. He is the Alpha and Omega of the sum-total of the Old Testament histories, and types, and predictions, and prayers, and praises, and longings, and yearnings. He is "the Lord, the spirit"

(2 Cor. iii. 18), the Lord, the animating soul of the whole Old Testament or Covenant; and indeed of the whole of the merciful dispensations of God. He is the heart and essence and glory of the New Testament order of things. He is the Alpha and Omega of the gospel. And, either as he is exhibited in that gospel, or, as he lives in the life of those who believe it and live by faith in him, or, as he acts through the overshadowing and interpenetrating evangelical agency of the Holy Spirit, his fellow-worker, Christ is really he who is doing all that is being done on earth to make it "a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness," to make it a happy and holy earth,—a paradise restored. It is Christ, who is the Aim of all the deepest tendencies of all ages. It is Christ, who is the Scope, and the Moral of all history. It is Christ, who is the Goal of all philosophy. It is Christ, who is the Solution of all the mighty and perplexing problems of social and political economy. It is Christ, who is the Source of all purity. It is Christ, who is the Magnet that draws upward, Godward, and heavenward, all aspiration. It is Christ, who is the Channel of all praise and prayer. It is Christ, who is the Refuge of all who are in trouble. It is Christ, who is the Consolation of all who are in sorrow. It is Christ who is the Rock of ages, whither all the moral wrecks and waifs of the world may betake themselves, and where they may be safe and saved. Christ is the Foundation of all permanent schemes of benevolence. He is the Possibility and the Bond of universal brotherhood. It is he, and he alone, who is the Prince of universal peace. He is, in one word,—if men only knew themselves aright, and could disintegrate the essential in them from the accidental, "the Desire of all nations," and of all in all nations. He is "All in all."

Verse 6. *And, again, when he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him.*

The word "again" is transposed by our translators. In the original it is connected with the following verb:—"and when again he bringeth in," that is "and when he bringeth in again the first-begotten into the world." Or, we might translate the clause still more literally thus, "and *when he shall have brought in again* (ὅταν δὲ πάλιν εισαγάγῃ) the first-begotten into the world, he saith, *And let all the angels of God worship him.*" The reference of the inspired writer is to a second introduction of our Lord into this world. For we read that when our Saviour was translated into glory, and "while his disciples looked stedfastly toward heaven, as he went up," behold two celestial messengers "stood by them in white apparel, and said, ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven? This same Jesus, which is taken up

from you into heaven, *shall so come in like manner, as ye have seen him go into heaven.*" (Acts, i. 10, 11.) "Unto them that look for him, shall he appear the second time, without sin, unto salvation." (Heb. ix. 28.) When he appeared the first time, he assumed our sin. He came as the sacrificial Lamb of God, bearing our sin. He became "sin" for us. But at his second coming, he shall appear "without sin." He shall come "to take unto himself his great name," and "reign." He shall succeed in "overturning, overturning, overturning, whatsoever opposeth him;" and, sweeping away, as with "the besom of destruction," all the moral pollutions, which are festering throughout society, in high places and in low, he shall introduce the golden age of the world. He shall gather into unity the separated families of mankind, and reconstruct the various kingdoms, which subdivide the race, into the fulness and oneness of his own heavenly kingdom, *the kingdom of heaven on earth.* Then "in him"—according to the promise made to Abraham of old—"shall all the families of the earth be blessed." (Gen. xxviii. 14.) And "all nations shall call him blessed." (Ps. lxxii. 17.) It is to this second coming of our Lord, as we apprehend, that the inspired writer refers in the verse before us.

It is noticeable that our Saviour is designated "the First begotten." The designation is substantially equivalent to the name "Son." Only it beautifully subsumes, and thus suggests, that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is the Head of a holy family; and is thus the Father of numerous sons and daughters, who are the brothers and sisters of our Saviour. In this holy family—all the members of which are the objects of the peculiar favour and complacency of the Father—Jesus is "the elder Brother." He is "the First born among many brethren" (Rom. viii. 29); as he is indeed,—in a still larger, yet concentric, circle of things—"the First-born of every creature." (Col. i. 15.) In the holy family, he is the "first-born;" so far as regards the logical at least, if not in so far as regards the chronological, order of things. And hence he is "the heir" proper, "the heir of all things" (Heb. i. 2). And it is only because the other members of the family are his brothers and sisters, that they too are "heirs of God," and thus entitled to "an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away." They are "joint heirs with Christ." (Rom. viii. 17.) It is in virtue of their peculiar relation to him, that they have good reason to look up to everlasting glory as their portion.

"And when he shall have brought in again the First-begotten into the world, he saith, *And let all the angels of God worship*

him." The quotation is most probably taken from the last clause of the 7th verse of the 97th Psalm. The clause is rendered indeed in our version, "worship him, all ye gods." And this rendering is in perfect harmony with the original Hebrew, as we have it in our modern editions of the Bible. But the inspired writer quotes from the Greek version of the Psalms, which renders the clause thus, "worship him, all his angels,"—a rendering based either upon a peculiar interpretation of the etymological import of the word translated "gods," as a word that probably meant "Powers," or upon a more ancient and correct reading of the original text, in which, as we may suppose, the word which is commonly translated "angels" stood in place of the word which is rendered "gods." Whichever view of the subject we may take, there can be no doubt that the translation of the clause, which is approved of by the inspired writer, conveys the true idea of the Psalmist. For as the "gods" of the heathens are, as we learn from the preceding part of the verse, "idols" and "graven images," we cannot well imagine, that they should be summoned by the Holy Spirit to worship our Lord. It would, we think, be an unworthy recognition of them, as if they were Living Realities, to call upon them to adore our Lord. And although it should be the case that they were thus recognized, honoured, and called, still, being, but "graven images," they could not, we think, obey the call. The whole verse in the Psalms, runs thus:—"confounded be all they that serve *graven images*, that boast themselves of *idols*: worship him, all ye gods"—"worship him, all ye powers:"—"worship him, all ye angels:"—"worship him, all ye principalities and powers, in heaven, as well as on earth." (Comp. 1 Peter, iii. 22: Phil. ii. 10, 11.)

The Psalm, from which the quotation is taken, is evidently Messianic in its reference. It belongs to a cluster,—extending from the 93rd to the 100th, inclusive,—which celebrates the glory of *the kingdom of heaven upon earth*,—the kingdom of heaven as it shall yet be, when right shall everywhere triumph over wrong, benevolence over selfishness, and purity over wickedness;—when all political tyrannies, and every kind of slave-holding, and when all other species of gigantic crimes, as well as lesser evils, shall be ground, as into powder, by the on-rolling, over the earth, of the Stone, "cut out without hands,"—"the Rock of ages." The key-note of the whole of this magnificent cluster of psalms, is, "The Lord reigneth," that is, "the Lord our Saviour reigneth." And the 1st verse of the 97th psalm, from which our quotation is taken, is, "The Lord reigneth: let the earth rejoice: let the multitude of isles be glad." The rest of the Psalm runs thus:—

"(2.) Clouds and darkness are round about him, (there is an awful glory of gloom around him in relation to his persistent enemies): righteousness and

judgement are the habitations of his throne. (3.) A fire goeth before him and burneth up his enemies round about. (4.) His lightnings enlightened the world; the earth saw, and trembled. (5.) The hills melted like wax at the presence of the Lord, at the presence of the Lord of the whole earth. (6.) The heavens declare his righteousness, and all the peoples see his glory. (7.) Confounded be all they that serve graven images, that boast themselves of idols; *worship him, all ye his angels.* (8.) Zion hath heard and is glad: and the daughters of Judah rejoice, because of thy judgements, O Lord. (9.) For thou, Lord, art high above all the earth: thou art exalted far above all gods. (10.) Ye that love the Lord, hate evil. He preserveth the souls of his saints. He delivereth them out of the hand of the wicked. (11.) Light is sown for the righteous, and gladness for the upright in heart. (12.) Rejoice in the Lord, ye righteous; and give thanks at the remembrance of his holiness."

It is a glorious hymn, inaugurating, as it were, the millennial reign of our Lord, and appropriately calling, in the passage quoted by the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews, on the heavenly principalities and powers to do homage to Him, whose right hand and out-stretched arm have put down iniquity in the universe, and thus reclaimed this world of ours from the tyranny of sin and Satan.

Some, inclusive of Alford and Lünemann and Thrupp, have supposed that the quotation—"and let all the angels of God worship him"—is taken, not from this 97th Psalm, but from the conclusion of the final song of Moses, as contained in the 32nd chapter of the book of Deuteronomy, from the first to the 43rd verse. The words quoted, though not occurring in the Hebrew text, and therefore not appearing in the English version, are nevertheless found in the Septuagint version, and with the little conjunction "and" at their announcement,—which is wanting in the Psalm. If the reading of the Septuagint were established, this would doubtless be the source of the quotation. But as it is not sufficiently confirmed, we are contented with the reference to the 97th Psalm. And it is, at all events, certain that in the Old Testament Scriptures, the Scriptures committed to the guardianship of the Hebrews, our Lord is represented as exalted, to an immeasurable height, above the most exalted of creatures. It is the duty and the privilege of the loftiest of these beings to "worship" Him. It is their duty and privilege to bend lowly before him and to adore, as they stoop to look into the things which constitute his wonderful mediatorial work.

It is a beautiful feature of angelic goodness,—this interest in Jesus, as the Saviour of men. It is a manifestation of disinterested admiration and delight, and of benevolence that is nobly pure. To joy in our joy, to be filled with that love which "seeketh not her own things," but the things of others, is transcendent moral loveliness.

There is no good reason, however, why we should be outdone



by the angels, in devotion to Christ. If there were and are good reasons why it should be said "let all the angels of God worship him," there are assuredly the same good reasons, and many others besides, why it should be said "let all the sons and daughters of men bow before him and worship him." He made us: that is one good reason. He sustains us: that is another good reason. He will by and by judge us: that is another good reason. He holds in his hands our everlasting weal or woe. It is from him that we must receive, either the sentence that will fill us with blessing and bliss, or the doom that will overwhelm us with unutterable tribulation and woe. And that surely is a good reason why we should bow before him and exclaim, each for himself, "My Lord and my God." He loves us, moreover, with most ineffable love: that surely is a very good reason why we should, not only love him in return, but worship him. He came nigh to us, when he saw us in danger of destruction;—he came nigh, not to look listlessly and unsympathizingly upon our unavailing struggles, but to rescue us, to bring us salvation. He is our Saviour. That surely is reason piled upon reason, why we should worship him. He took our place that he might bear our sins, and carry our sorrows. That is still additional reason why we should worship him. He had power over his life to keep it back from death, or to lay it down. He laid it down. He laid it down on the altar of divine justice, as a sacrifice for our sins,—a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world,—a propitiatory sacrifice,—so that now and henceforward God is in him propitious, ready to forgive and to receive us back into the fulness of his favour. Surely, surely, this is most ample reason why we should, in the heart of our heart, and for ever, render him the most devoted worship. We have all the high reasons that weigh with angels, and the innumerable reasons, in addition, that spring from our own peculiar necessities, and his own peculiar loving-kindness to us.

"*Worthy* is the Lamb." *Worth* belonging to him,—*worthiness* and *worship*. It is our duty and our privilege to realize it, and thus, in our recognition of it, to reflect back upon himself his own peerless excellency. We should *worship* him, or *worship* him, with our knee, with our heart, with our life.

Ver. 7. *And of the angels he saith, Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.*

The inspired writer, in introducing the quotation contained in this verse, uses the expression, "he saith":—"and in reference to the angels, *he saith*." We may ask, "who saith?" And when we look back to the two preceding verses, we cannot doubt that the meaning is, "God saith." There is no other available nom-

inative to the verb "saith." And yet it is noticeable that in the passage which is quoted, and again, in the other passage which is quoted afterwards in verses 8 and 9, it is not God himself who is directly speaking. He is spoken of. The expression is thus somewhat equivalent to the impersonal expression "it is said";—"and in reference to the angels *it is said*, Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire." Only, there is this all-important idea implied, that the Scriptures, as a whole, are *the word of God*, so that whatsoever was spoken "by inspiration of God," may legitimately, though of course under certain limitations, be regarded as *said by God*.

The quotation itself is taken from the 104th Psalm, 4th verse,—which runs thus in the Psalm, "who maketh his angels spirits; his ministers a flaming fire." The Psalm is emphatically *a hymn to God as the God of nature*. But, as was to be expected, it specially refers to his relation to that portion of universal nature, which consists of our own earth. "The earth is *the Lord's*, and the fulness thereof." The Lord has made it; and arranged it; and, in his own living personality, he is ever ruling in it, and over it. The earth is thus holy ground. And, accordingly, the psalmist concludes his hymn with an earnest prayer that it may be freed from the curse of sin. "Let the sinner," he says, "be consumed out of the earth, and let the wicked be no more. Bless thou the Lord, O my soul. Praise ye the Lord."

Such is the sublime conclusion of the Psalm. There is a corresponding sublimity at the commencement. The psalmist glances at God's intimate relation to what is above and beyond the solid earth:—"O Lord my God, thou art very great; thou art clothed with honour and majesty: who coverest thyself with light as with a garment, (what a magnificent robe!), who stretchest out the heavens like a curtain (like the star-spangled curtain of thine own gorgeous tabernacle); who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters; who maketh the clouds his chariot; who walketh (who moveth) upon the wings of the wind." God is, in these words, represented, by a species of gorgeous poetry, which makes no pretensions to an accurate scientific theory of the universe, as the august sovereign of the world, who has his throne on high, and who is controlling, with absolute sway, all the elements which have relation to this our nether and terrestrial sphere of things.

It is then added, in verse 4, "who maketh his angels spirits; his ministers a flaming fire." The parallelism of the two clauses makes it evident that Luther was right in giving to the word translated "spirits," its other and original import, "winds":—"who maketh his angels *winds*, his ministers a *flaming fire*,"

or, "*a flame of fire.*" There is a reference to two of the grand agencies which play down upon the earth, *winds* and *lightning*: and these agencies are represented as the actings of God's angels.

Some have supposed, and among the rest Calvin, that the Septuagint translation of the verse, which has been adopted by the inspired writer, proceeds upon a misapprehension of the original. The passage, as it stands in the Psalms, says Calvin, has no reference to angels, (*nihil hoc ad angelos pertinet*). It is supposed by him, and by the circle of critics who cluster around him, that the psalmist means this,—“who maketh the winds his messengers, and the lightning his ministers.” But this interpretation is not only disparaging to the judgement of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and consequently perilous to the idea of his full inspiration: it is also at variance with the grammatical requirements of the words. For, while we can legitimately say, “who maketh the winds his messengers,” we cannot, as legitimately, use the plural word “ministers,” when referring, in the way contended for by Calvin, to the singular word “lightning.” We should require to say, “the lightning his minister,” not “his ministers.” The interpretation, moreover, overlooks, we think, the sublime idea of the psalmist. Before proceeding to pourtray the rule of God over the vast domains of the dry land and the sea, he pictures forth his august relation to the higher regions, and to the empyrean elements and agencies of the universe. God, as it were, sits above, enthroned in glory; or he moves about with all the majesty of a sovereign, surrounded with his ministers, who are ready to execute his behests. These ministers are his “angels,” who are not only swift as winds, and ardent as flames of fire, but who are also the agents of these agencies;—so that every gentle zephyr or irresistible hurricane, and every gleam of lightning or bolt of thunder, is a ministry of unseen spirits. The psalmist, in other words, seemed to think that on the other side of all visible things, there is a corresponding side of invisible agents, who have to do with visible things; and who are the agents of the things that are done; and many of whom are “ministering spirits sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation.” It is a high position which they occupy. It is an honourable mission which they have to fulfil. And those of the hierarchy who are exalted to eminent posts, will no doubt stand exceedingly near the throne, and be of very great service in the government of the universe. The archangels will “excel in glory.” And yet, as compared with the glory of our Saviour, it will be “no glory.” Hence the inspired writer proceeds to say:—

Verses, 8, 9. *But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy*

*kingdom : thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity, therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.*

This quotation is taken from the 6th and 7th verses of the 45th Psalm, which, like the second Psalm, is, beyond doubt, to be interpreted spiritually, prophetically, and messianically. It is "the King"—the Messiah, "the King"—our Saviour, who is described : although, no doubt, the description is sketched from a very peculiar and oriental stand-point. Without entering into the consideration of the psalm in general, we shall confine our attention, to that portion of it, which is quoted.

(1.) It is worthy of notice that the Son, our Saviour, is addressed as "God,"—"O God." Grotius, indeed, would render the clause thus :—"God is thy throne;" but most unwarrantably and grotesquely. "O God,"—as an address to our Saviour,—is undoubtedly the correct translation. And there is no reason why we should have the slightest hesitation in accepting it. For in one element of his being, and that the chief, the Son our Saviour is God,—"God over all, blessed for ever." He is "the true God, and Eternal Life." Being the true Son of a divine Father, the "begotten Son," he is, like all other true sons, of the same nature with his Father. And hence he thinks it "no robbery to be equal with God." It is not then in the way of flattery, it is not by a species of oriental exaggeration, it is not as a piece of mere courtesy, that he is addressed, "O God." It is because he was "with God" and "is God," that he accepts the title, and that those, who acted as his heralds, ascribed it to him.

(2.) But the Son, our Saviour, is spoken of also as a sovereign :—"Thy throne, O God." "Pilate said unto him, Art thou a king then ? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king,"—"I acknowledge, I avow, that I am a king." He was, in reality, "the King of the Jews." Yea, "all power has been given to him in heaven and on earth." He is the King of men : "the King of glory : " "the King of kings." He has a right to reign in every land. He has a right to reign over every people. He has a right to reign in, and over, every heart. His laws are above all other laws. They are supreme and ought to be obeyed, whatsoever other edicts should be disobeyed. Allegiance to him is due from every mortal, whether peasant or peer, whether subject or sovereign. If rule is held by any, in defiance of his authority, it is unlawfully held. And it will, in the end, be put down. He will reign, until he has put all opposition, and all his enemies, underneath his feet; and then his sway shall extend, not only from the river to the sea, but "from sea to sea," and "from the rising to the setting of the sun," and from pole to pole.

(3.) He is a king “for ever and ever:”—“thy throne, O God, is *for ever and ever.*” And in being “for ever and ever,” it is different from all other thrones, and dynasties, and kingdoms, and empires. The Assyrian empire was and is not. It was succeeded by the Babylonian. The Babylonian empire was and is not. It was succeeded by the Medo-Persian. The Medo-Persian empire was succeeded by the Grecian; the Grecian by the Roman; and the Roman by a number of co-ordinate kingdoms, some of which have waxed and waned, and others of which will yet wane and be dissolved, and be numbered with the things that were. And within these various empires and kingdoms various dynasties have sprung up, have stood for a time, and have then vanished away. Throne after throne has tottered and tumbled, or been rudely and ruthlessly tossed aside by rival factions or by exasperated peoples. But “the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ,” is “an everlasting kingdom.” Ichabod has not, and never shall be, written over its institutions. Its glory shall never depart. “Thy throne, O God (our Saviour), is for ever and ever.” True, the time shall come “when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father.” But the kingdom shall stand, and he shall remain its King. “When all things shall be subdued unto him, then also, (even then as heretofore), shall the Son himself be subject unto him who hath put all things under him, that God may be all in all.” (1 Cor. xv. 24, 26.) The mediatorial king, as Immanuel, shall be subject to the original King. The mediatorial throne shall be subordinate to the primal and imperial throne. Nevertheless the king incarnate shall ever be. Even after he has delivered over the kingdom to the Father,—having fully reclaimed for the primary proprietor what originally belonged to him,—even then he shall act viceregally; and his “throne” shall be established “for ever and ever.” His will shall be, to everlasting, the royal rule of life to all his redeemed people.

(4.) It is added;—“the sceptre of thy kingdom is a sceptre of uprightness.” In this respect, too, he is different from all other kings. Many of these have been tyrants. But there never has been, and there never will be, any tyranny in his rule. Many other kings have been notorious for favouritism. But there never has been, and there never will be, any partiality in his rule. It has been not an uncommon thing for kings to be actuated by caprice. But there never has been, and there never will be, any caprice with him. In multitudes of cases, monarchs have taken to themselves, or granted to their familiars, a licence of licentiousness. But there never has been, and there never will be, any such licence under the sceptre of our royal Saviour. Nothing crooked can be found in the policy of his administration. All is straight and straightforward, right and righteous. And hence,

in proportion as the boundaries of his kingdom shall advance over the earth, right shall triumph everywhere and in everything: wrong everywhere and in everything shall be put down or chased away. And by and by—O glorious prospect—the earth shall become “a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness,”—a “holy of holies,” in which the Lord, the infinite One, shall be unceasingly adored.

(5.) It is still farther said, “thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity,” or, more literally still, “thou lovedst righteousness, and hatedst lawlessness.” It is worthy of being noticed that the expression looks to the past. The inspired writer does not say, “thou *lovest* righteousness, and *hatest* lawlessness;” though this would have been emphatically true. He was looking, from his particular standpoint, to a period of the life of our royal Saviour, when, in some pre-eminent manner, he gave evidence of his love to righteousness and his hatred of lawlessness. Most probably he was looking to that period of the life of our Lord, which preceded his exaltation to the mediatorial throne,—the period of his propitiatory humiliation, when he humbled himself to bear our iniquities, that he might bear them away. He thus humbled himself, because “he loved righteousness and hated lawlessness.” He loved us, and gave himself for us, that he might deliver us from our lawlessness, and win us over to his righteousness. His hatred of our sins was equal to his love for our souls; and, underlying at once both his hatred in the one direction, and his love in the other, was his love for that which alone can make souls lovely in their character, and fit them for the enjoyments and ennoblements of love throughout eternity.

(6.) The quotation concludes with the words, “therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.” It is noticeable that, although our Lord is himself called “God,” and is really “God over all, blessed for ever,” yet, as clothed with our humanity, he is subordinate to the Father, who is his Father as well as ours, and his God as well as ours. “Go unto my brethren,” said he to Mary Magdalene, “and say unto them, I ascend to my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God.” (Jo. xx. 17.) This his Father and God, the Head of the great economy of salvation, “hath anointed him with the oil of gladness above his fellows,” because “he loved righteousness and hated lawlessness.” The language refers to the oriental custom of pouring upon honoured individuals deliciously perfumed ointments, on occasions of gladness. The aroma of these unguents is, in sultry climates, exquisitely refreshing. It intensifies “gladness.” And thus the perfume is an “oil of gladness.” In great oriental courts, when very costly perfumes are being sprinkled upon the guests of the sovereign,

the finest and most delightful will, doubtless, be reserved for the most exalted or the most meritorious. And, in like manner, the highest honours and joys have been, and will continue to be, conferred by the God of all upon our Saviour, the mediatorial king. Because of his wondrous work, which laid the basis of the success of his mediatorial reign, God, even our God and his God, has singled him out from all who partake with him of holy honour and holy joy, and hath given him a far higher throne, a far richer crown, a much more extensive kingdom, a far profounder and loftier joy. In proportion as one gives, so does one ultimately get. The greatest giver becomes at last the greatest receiver. "There is that scattereth and yet increaseth : and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, and it tendeth to poverty. The liberal soul shall be made fat : and he that watereth (and refresheth) others, shall be watered (and refreshed) also himself." This is true both in the lower, and in the higher, sphere of things. The blessedness of the soul ultimately corresponds to the blessing which it has conferred. And hence it is that Christ himself is the most blessed in all his kingdom. "Above" all his fellows, that sit down with him in glory, to the marriage supper of the Lamb, he himself is anointed with the richest "oil of gladness."

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#### THE POSSIBILITY & DANGER OF APOSTASY.

CHRISTIANS may with great propriety be designated "saints," or holy ones. The chiefest of the apostles did not hesitate to apply this term to them; and we cannot err to follow his example. Faith in the gospel never fails to convert sinners into saints; and it is not to be wondered at that it should, for the "truth as it is in Jesus" is finely adapted to change their hearts, and through their hearts their lives. Christians may not be morally perfect, albeit they are commanded to be perfect, and would find it for their present and future advantage to be "complete in all the will of God"; but they all stand on the side of God and holiness, and may be represented as holy persons. If they have not attained to holiness, in the full sense of the word, they are in process of sanctification. It is characteristic of them that they hate sin. They have no desire to commit it; and when they do inadvertently fall into it, they are heartily sorry. Their aim is to do their whole duty, and sooner or later it will be realised, provided that they "quench not the spirit," and maintain their connexion with the Lord Jesus. They are holy as compared with their former selves and the unconverted around them. There

would be impropriety, when we distinguish "sinners" from "saints," in calling them *sinners*, and, all things taken into account, there is manifest propriety in speaking of them as *saints*. The term may be more applicable to one christian than to another, but it may be affirmed of christians, without exception, that they are saints. They are all sanctified to that degree, that were they to die, their souls would rise to heaven; and we are assured that "without holiness no man shall see the Lord." Moral meetness for it is indispensable to our admission into the kingdom of God. Destruction is sure to overtake us if we do not, by the reception of the gospel-message, "cease to do evil," and become saints.

And not only is it necessary to salvation that we become saints, we must *continue* saints, or perish. A temporary union with the Saviour is of no use. If the utmost that a sinner can say on the judgement day be,—“I was once a christian, or a saint,” the judge will not acquit him. His condemnation is certain, and will be specially severe. On that august occasion the decisive question will be, what *are* we?—not, what *were* we? Addressing the disciples, Christ said—“he that endureth to the end shall be saved.” These words are very explicit; and they imply that if we, as his followers, do not endure unto the end, we shall not be saved. To gain eternal life we must persevere as saints. This is admitted on all hands. If we are united through faith to Christ, and then, by unbelief, separate ourselves from him—if we adopt the moral law as a rule of conduct, and then abandon it, no mercy will be shown us. Instead, the wrath of God will come upon us to the uttermost. There is a passage in chapter xviii. of Ezekiel whose meaning it is impossible to mistake—“When a righteous man turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and dieth in them; for his iniquity that he hath done shall he die.” As regards moral condition, there is no real difference between the unbeliever and the apostate. The state of the latter is even worse than that of the former. Hence, if God will not save the unbeliever, we may conclude that he will not save the apostate. To win the “crown of life,” christians must be “faithful unto death.” Alas! for those saints who do not persevere. Important as it is to believe on Christ, it is of still greater importance to remain believers. Had Paul not been able to say—“I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith,” he could not have rejoiced in anticipation of the “crown of righteousness” which he felt confident was laid up for him, and for all who should play a similar part. Realising the need of perseverance, he was most anxious to die as well as live a saint. To accomplish this, he was prepared, if God should so will it, to sacrifice sweet life itself. Observe how he expresses himself—“But none of these things move me,



neither count I my life dear unto myself, so that I might finish my course with joy." No faith is of any avail except a *persevering* faith.

Now, is the doctrine of *the infallible perseverance of all who have once been saints*, a true doctrine—a doctrine of scripture? It is generally regarded in this light; but for our parts we cannot so regard it. We no more believe in it than we do in limited atonement, or unconditional election, or the irresistibility of the Holy Spirit's influence.

No doubt God is *able* to keep christians from falling or stumbling. No one who possesses a correct knowledge of God will dispute this for a moment. His power to preserve them unto his heavenly kingdom is unquestionable; but it is *conditionally* exercised. God is able to save all men, so far as power is concerned, but before he will do it, the condition of faith in the gospel must be supplied. In like manner, He is able to keep christians from falling into fatal inconsistencies of conduct; but if they wish to be kept by him, they must not relapse into unbelief. God keeps none but believers; and this was Peter's idea. Speaking of the christian strangers to whom his epistles were sent, he says—"who are kept by the power of God *through faith* unto salvation." Mark the words "*through faith*." The keeping is conditioned on faith. Failing a continuance of faith, christians come short of salvation. They never perish because God is unable to keep them, but solely because they let go their hold of Christ. No doubt vast numbers of christians do persevere. It would be strange if they did not. There are a thousand reasons why they should "go on unto perfection"; and if they consider these reasons, they cannot but be influenced by them. There is much, indeed, against them. In their progress heaven-ward, they are opposed by the flesh, the world, and the devil—three formidable enemies; but God is for them, and "greater is he that is for them than all that can be against them." It is not surprising, therefore, that many of them should persevere in the faith and well-doing, and eventually reach the "better country." What proportion of them do, is a point beyond our determination. Doubtless a very great majority of them do. It is such a serious thing for a christian to apostatize, that we would fain persuade ourselves that cases of backsliding do not often occur in ordinary circumstances; and of those who do draw back, probably many do not "draw back unto perdition." After a while they may, by the earnest striving of the Holy Spirit of God, be brought to repentance. Just as no sinner is compelled to believe in Christ, so no Christian is compelled to abide in Christ. If God respects the

free-wills of sinners, how much more the free-wills of his own children! Every step that the christian takes as he marches along the "narrow way" that issues in everlasting glory, is strictly voluntary. Neither prior to conversion nor after it, is coercion used; but it is our conviction that a large proportion of the converted "press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus," and all might. No christian is obliged to apostatize. Even in times of hottest persecution, christians have it in their power to confess Christ, and take the consequences. Tens of thousands have done so. When they depart from Christ, they choose to desert him. The inducements to apostasy may be numerous and powerful; but the motives to steadfastness in the faith both outnumber and outweigh them; and were they sufficiently considered, their influence would be profoundly felt. Apostates may imagine that they could not help making "shipwreck of faith and a good conscience"; but they labour under a mistake. Had they chosen to persevere, they might; and at bottom they know that they might. Had they sought aid from on high, and not lost sight of the cross and the crown, there can be no question but that they would have stood their ground. There never was a christian who was under the necessity of backsliding, and there never will be. It is the duty of all who begin the christian race to finish it; and it would not be their duty, if they, in reality, could not.

But, while we are satisfied of God's ability to keep Christians from falling—satisfied that the great majority of Christians do persevere, and that none, whatever may be their circumstances, lack the power to advance steadily in the divine life—we cannot accept as a Bible-doctrine the infallible perseverance of all the saints. We do not hold that "once in grace, always in grace"; that though "Christians may fall *in* the way, they cannot fall *out* of it." It would be pleasant to think that none ever exchange the way of life for the way of death, but it would not be safe, inasmuch as such a thought is demonstrably false. We have no fear of the ultimate salvation of those who *continue Christ's sheep*. Referring to them, Jesus observes, "And I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." So long as they keep, by faith, in the hand of the "Good Shepherd," they are absolutely safe. But we hold that it is *possible* for the saints to fall away; nay, that there is *danger* of their falling away; and we undertake to prove that these statements are amply borne out by the Scriptures. And,

*ment is a proof of the possibility of apostasy on the part of Christians.*

The epistles of the New Testament were, we should suppose, written for a variety of purposes; but it will be granted that one object of the writers was to *confirm* those to whom they were addressed in their christian beliefs and practices. This is the impression left upon the mind by a careful perusal of them. They formed no unimportant part of the means employed by the apostles to promote the spiritual well-being of the saints for whose benefit they were penned. Anxious that the members of the churches which they had succeeded in planting should not lose their standing, but "grow in grace and the knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ," they compensated for their absence by occasionally sending them a letter. But why, we ask, should the apostles have concerned themselves about those of whose christianity they had no doubt, if it was a thing sincerely believed by them that it was not possible for the saints to fall away? Their conduct appears to us inexplicable, if they entertained any such idea. In place of consuming time writing to Christians, they should have devoted every hour at their disposal to the multiplying of converts. But how natural in them to write and forward epistles to the different churches, if they held that Christians were liable to apostatize!

II. *The prayers of the apostles, with which we meet in their epistles, are inconsistent with the infallible perseverance of all who have ever been saints.*

As specimens, we present the following;—Col. i. 9 and 10, "For this cause we also, since the day we heard it, do not cease to pray for you, and to desire that ye might be filled with the knowledge of his will in all wisdom and spiritual understanding; that ye might walk worthy of the Lord unto all pleasing, being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God." 2 Thess. ii. 16 and 17, "Now our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and God, even our Father, which hath loved us, and hath given us everlasting consolation, and good hope through grace, comfort your hearts, and stablish you in every good word and work." 1 Pet. v. 10, "But the God of all grace, who hath called us unto his eternal glory by Christ Jesus, after that ye have suffered awhile, make you perfect, stablish, strengthen, settle you." Now, what is implied in these prayers? Evidently this—that those Christians in whose behalf they were offered might perpetrate the sin of apostasy. Had the apostles thought otherwise, it is incredible that they would have so prayed for them at all.

### III. *Salvation is conditioned on continuing in the faith.*

In support of this proposition, passages without number almost might be quoted. We must content ourselves with the selection of a few. We begin with 1 Cor. xv. 2—"By which (gospel) ye are saved, *if ye keep in memory* what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain." Again, John xv. 6—"If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered." Further, Col. i. 22, 23—"To present you holy, and unblameable, and unreprouable in his sight; *if ye continue in the faith* grounded and settled, and be not moved away from the hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, and which was preached to every creature which is under heaven; whereof I Paul am made a minister."

Now, why these *ifs*? Are Christians necessitated to remember the gospel, to abide in Christ, to continue in the faith? Of course not. These *ifs* teach us that it is *optional* with Christians to persevere in the faith. They may, or they may not, as they may themselves determine. If they do, they will be saved. If they do not, ruin will be the result.

### IV. *Christians are exhorted to steadfastness.*

There is hardly an epistle in which we do not find several exhortations to steadfastness. In Acts xi. 23, we read of Barnabas, that he exhorted the believers whom he found at Antioch to "*cleave into the Lord.*" The 5th chap. of Galatians opens thus:—"stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free." The xii. chap. of Hebrews begins thus:—"Wherefore, seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us." We might go on quoting at great length; but why exhort christians to steadfastness, if it be a fact that all genuine christians do hold fast the profession of their faith, etc? The exhortations are not called for, unless it be the case that christians may and are apt to fall away.

### V. *Christians are cautioned against apostasy.*

"Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." (1 Cor. x. 12.) "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling." (Phil. ii. 12.) "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ." (Col. ii. 8.) "Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God." (Heb. iii. 12.) "Cast not away, therefore, your confidence, which hath great recompense of reward." (Heb. x. 35.) These words of warning and advice imply that it is possible for Christians to fall

away, and that there is danger of apostasy. What leads a mother to caution her child against going near the fire during her absence? The realisation that it may get itself burned. If it were prostrate with sickness, she would never think of cautioning it against the fire. Similarly, if it were impossible for christians to backslide, there would be no cautions against apostasy in the Bible. Since, however, it abounds with them, we are forced to the conclusion that there is in christians a liability to be "overcome of evil." One would have thought that there would have been no need for exhorting so eminent a christian as Timothy to continuance in the faith, and good behaviour—no need for cautioning him against committing the sin of apostasy, and yet Paul took a different view. His two epistles contain many exhortations and cautions. There is hardly a chapter without them. We can only give examples, and refer our readers to the epistles themselves for more. "Take heed unto thyself, and unto the doctrine; continue in them: for in doing this thou shalt both save thyself, and them that hear thee." (1 Tim. iv. 16.) "Hold fast the form of sound words, which thou hast heard of me, in faith and love which is in Christ Jesus." (2 Tim. i. 13.) "Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ." (2 Tim. ii. 3.) If, then, Timothy needed to be urged to perseverance as a christian and a preacher, and cautioned against a renunciation of christianity, surely it becomes christians in general to "fear lest a promise being left them of entering into rest, any of them should seem to come short of it." Verily Paul was afraid that he might be himself a cast-a-way, and he adopted measures to prevent his reprobation. "But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast-a-way." (1 Cor. ix. 27.) This verse is of itself sufficient to show that no christian can afford to dispense with watchfulness, and that the best christians may so fall from grace as to be finally rejected. Indeed, if they are neglectful of themselves, and do not act as persons who may, at any time, be taken captive by the Devil, the chances are that he will "get an advantage of them." If so holy a man as Paul required to control his appetites and passions, lest they should prove a snare to his soul; how much more vigilant ought they to be who cannot boast of his knowledge and virtues!

VI. *Christians are plied with the strongest conceivable motives to perseverance.*

"For if after they have escaped the pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, they are again entangled therein, and overcome, the latter end is

worse with them than the beginning." (2 Pet. ii. 20.) "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?" (Heb. ii. 3.) "He that despised Moses' law died without mercy under two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?" (Heb. x. 28, 29.) "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame." (Heb. vi. 4-6.) These four passages contain the strongest conceivable motives to perseverance; and what rendered the presentation of them necessary? Would Paul and Peter have plied christians with them, had they been under the impression that no christian does, or can fall away? We cannot believe that they would. Their design in presenting them was to fortify those to whom they wrote against the temptations to apostasy to which they were daily exposed. So impressed were they with the fact that all men are *free*, and with the *danger* that christians are in of falling away, that they felt it to be incumbent upon them to do their utmost to hinder apostasy from Christ and his cause. Their feeling was that they could not do too much to keep their brethren in their position as Christ's professed followers. The times were trying, and they brought forward those motives to steadfastness which had most weight with themselves. They were hopeful that the christians for whose good their epistles were written, would retain their hold of Christ, if they pondered such thoughts as these—that no apostate, *as such*, can escape punishment,—that his state is peculiarly bad—that his renewal again into repentance is a matter of extreme difficulty,—and that remaining an apostate, his end will be singularly dreadful: and well they might. The mere bringing forward of these motives demonstrates two things: (1st.) the possibility of apostasy, and (2nd) that there are times when christians are strongly tempted to cut themselves off from Christ. Who is there among us that would not be hard pressed, were the sword of persecution to be drawn against us? Persecution is commonly fatal to those whose faith is of a languid type.

VII. *Christians are guarded against so acting as to destroy weak christian brethren.*

Twice over, Paul touches on this subject. He urges the saints at Rome not to judge one another any more, but to judge this

rather "that no man put a stumbling block, or an occasion to fall, in his brother's way." He then adds—"Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." He expresses himself to the same effect in his first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter viii. "But take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling-block to them that are weak." He goes on—"And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish for whom Christ died." It is true that no Christian can perish *as a Christian*; but a Christian may perish by ceasing to be a Christian. This was Paul's belief, else there is no meaning in the passages to which reference has just been made. It is a solemn thought, that by inconsiderate and unbrotherly conduct Christians may so act as actually to occasion the destruction of christian brethren weaker than themselves; and it is to be feared that they have so acted frequently. Christians cannot walk too circumspectly or charitably. By persistently doing what certain of their fellow-Christians cannot do without their consciences accusing them, they may become the destroyers of blood-bought and believing souls; so that we are justified in holding that Christians may backslide and be for ever lost.

#### VIII. *There is a backsliding class recognised in Scripture.*

In the parable of the sower there are four classes of hearers; and we have the following description of the second class from Christ's own lips,—“But he that received the seed into stony places, the same is he that heareth the word, and anon with joy receiveth it; yet hath he not root in himself, but *dureth for a while*, for when tribulation or persecution ariseth because of the word, by and by he is offended.” It will be perceived that Christ gives the second class credit for hearing, understanding, and receiving the word. They become Christians; but the pity is that they do not persevere. To escape persecution, they draw off from Christ, and dying in a Christless state, they lose their souls. It stands written in the tenth chapter of Hebrews, the thirtieth verse, “But we are not of them who draw back unto perdition.” According to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, there is a class of Christians who draw back. Nor do they stop in their backward course till they are engulfed in perdition. He does not give us any information respecting the class, whether it be large or small; but he recognizes a backsliding class. There were Christians who, in his judgment, drew back unto perdition; and if so, we think they “err, not knowing the Scriptures,” who allege that all Christians so run as to obtain an incorruptible crown. The bulk of them may, but some of them allow themselves to be turned aside, and miss the promised prize. Their faith breaks down, and, lacking

perseverance, they take their place among unsuccessful competitors.

*IX. The possibility and danger of apostasy may be inferred from the state of the Galatian Churches, and the state of at least five of the seven Churches of Asia.*

How any one can unprejudicedly read the Epistle to the Galatians, or the first three chapters of Revelation, and cling to the doctrine of the infallible perseverance of all saints, is to us unaccountable. What was the state of the Galatian churches? Was it satisfactory to Paul? Far from it. Judaizing teachers had somehow got in among the Galatian Christians; and it is but too clear that they were successful in drawing some away from the simplicity which is in Christ. The apostle reasons with them as with apostates. "I marvel," says he, "that ye are so soon removed from him that called you into the grace of Christ unto another gospel." (i. 6.) What a combination of faithfulness and tenderness in these words,—*"My little children, of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you"*! (iv. 19.) Farther on, after stating that they *"did run well"* for a time, he demands, *"who did hinder you that ye should not obey the truth?"* (v. 7.) Who can read these extracts, and deny that it is possible for Christians to fall away? It seems to be the case that some of the members of the Galatian church did fall away; and it is highly improbable that they all *"recovered themselves out of the snare of the Devil."* When a number of christians are led away into error and sin, it seldom happens that they all repent and return unto the Lord.

In Laodicea there was once a flourishing Church; but alas! judging from the letter which John, as Christ's amanuensis, was instructed to send it, its members had, in course of time, lost their vitality and warmth. Its condition became so miserable that Christ threatened that, if it did not speedily repent, he would *"spue it out of his mouth."* Christians cannot fall away! How then came it to pass that the Laodicean saints sank into a lukewarm state, and incurred the displeasure of the *"faithful and true witness"*?

*X. There are passages of Scripture in which the apostasy of Christians is distinctly foretold.*

We would remind the reader of what Paul said to the Elders of the Ephesian Church. *"Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood. For I know this, that after my departing shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock. Also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse*



things, to draw away disciples after them." (Acts xx. 28, 29, 30.) We would likewise remind the reader of a prediction for which we are indebted to the pen of the apostle Peter,—“But there were false prophets also among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction. And many shall follow their pernicious ways; by reason of whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of.” (2 Pet. ii. 1, 2.) We may assume that these prophecies were fulfilled; and on the supposition that they were, what can be plainer than that the seduction of christians is a thing of too easy accomplishment?

*XI. Instances of apostasy are both mentioned and alluded to in the Bible.*

“Holding faith, and a good conscience; which some having put away, concerning faith have made shipwreck: of whom is Hymeneus and Alexander; whom I have delivered unto Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme.” (1 Tim. i. 19, 20.) “Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils.” (1 Tim. iv. 1.) “For some are already turned aside after Satan.” (1 Tim. v. 15.) “For the love of money is the root of all evil: which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows.” (1 Tim. vi. 10.) “O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called: which some professing, have erred concerning the faith. Grace be with thee. Amen.” (1 Tim. vi. 20, 21.) “This thou knowest, that all they which are in Asia be turned away from me; of whom are Phygellus and Hermogenes.” (2 Tim. i. 15.) “But shun profane and vain babblings: for they will increase unto more ungodliness. And their word will eat as doth a canker: of whom is Hymeneus and Philetus; who concerning the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already; and overthrow the faith of some.” (2 Tim. ii. 16, 17, 18.) “Demas hath forsaken me, having loved this present world, and is departed unto Thessalonica; Crescens to Galatia, Titus unto Dalmatia.” (2 Tim. iv. 10.)

These passages are all taken from the Epistles of Paul to Timothy; and they suggest that, had the writer felt inclined, he could have unfolded a sad tale regarding not a few who had “cast off their first faith.” Many a case of actual apostasy he knew. He gives the names of some individuals, and the names of others he withholds, in mercy to themselves. There was no occasion for mentioning them, and it must have been painful to

his great, tender, and Christ-loving heart, to call to mind this and that band of apostates in the various places which he had visited. No wonder, when he thought of the numbers that had backslidden, that he was concerned about his "own son Timothy," and solicitous that he for one should be "stedfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord." These verses support each other; and they command our faith the more readily that most of us have known persons who gave every evidence of being soundly converted, and who afterwards became impressive illustrations of the Proverb, "The dog is turned to his own vomit again." With all confidence may it be asserted, that it is possible for Christians to fall away, and that there is danger of them falling away. Paul being witness, there have been, not merely *apparent*, but also *actual* instances of apostasy; and when Christians draw back they are prone to persevere in their backsliding. By sinning wilfully, they all but cut the bridge behind them; and the apostate cannot calculate on an hour any more than the most active Christian.

In this paper we have not adduced nearly all the passages of which we might have availed ourselves in the effort to prove the possibility and danger of apostasy; but we have intentionally drawn largely upon the sacred volume for arguments, and we candidly state that we see not how their force can be resisted. Assume that the infallible perseverance of all saints is a false doctrine, and the Bible is intelligible throughout. Assume that it is a true doctrine, and there is not an epistle in the New Testament that is not disturbed by it from the first chapter to the last.

Christian reader, dream not, that having become a christian, all danger is past. Your wisdom will lie in not yielding to a feeling of security till you are in heaven. How true it is that we cannot be sure of it till we enter it! Life in this world from its beginning to its close is a scene of trial. Christians are not Christ's *slaves*, but his freemen. They may leave him any moment, and require every day to "watch and pray that they enter not into temptation." It does not behove them to be overconfident. The strongest of them are all too weak. Peter boasted that he would follow Christ at all hazards, and it was not long till he denied him with oaths. Permit not yourself to forget that our first parents were beguiled by the serpent, and that there were angels which "kept not their first estate." Facts like these bid us never be off our guard. The causes that made us sinners are still at work. There is no reason for despondency. If we vigorously use the appointed means of salvation, we may sing with humble boldness:—

"Tis Jesus, the first and the last,  
[His] Spirit shall guide us safe home."

If we continue sheep, we cannot perish for this simple reason, that God is "greater than all"; but, while we are in the body, we cannot afford to lay aside our christian armour. To do that is perilous—is to lose the victory. There was a "need" for Paul saying to the Ephesian saints—"Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand." Especially is there an intimate connexion between "standing," and using the "shield of faith," and the "sword of the spirit, which is the word of God." The christian who casts away these pieces of well tried armour runs a terrible risk. How can he so fight as to conquer? Every effort should be made by christians not to fall. To stand should be their object; and to realise it, they must protect themselves with the shield of faith and dexterously wield the sword of the spirit. Their enemies are cunning, powerful and persevering; the way is rough and steep; and it is only *through Christ strengthening them incessantly* that the end can be reached and a triumph achieved. Let us, therefore, abide in Christ, and "come boldly to the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need."

G. C.—B.

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#### ABRAHAM'S FAITH AND RIGHTEOUSNESS.

THE mind that looks beneath the surface of things, cannot but be deeply impressed with the changing and evanescent nature of all those relations that are bounded by earth and time. Mobility and change are everywhere, and fixedness is nowhere discoverable among things seen and temporal. Empires and nations have been raised by the prowess of man, only to flourish for a season, and then to decline and fall into obscurity and ruins. Some families have, by the exercise of their peculiar gifts, seized hold of the government of large portions of the globe; but in a short time their name and their fame have taken to themselves wings and passed away. So with individuals. They are carried on and down the stream of time, and are made to feel that at best they are but pilgrims and sojourners in an ever-shifting scene. While, however, there are many things which can be, and which are shaken, there are other things which never have been, and never can be, moved. These are as steadfast as the everlasting hills, and are as immovable as the throne of the eternal. Such things are not of the earth, nor of men, they are of God; and, like himself, they are immutable.

Among these unchanging realities, are the principles which regulate the divine procedure in reference to the salvation of man. What these principles were when Adam lived, they are now; what they are now, they shall remain till the angel shall declare that probation shall be no longer. This the apostle Paul knew, and this he seeks to establish in the fourth chapter of his epistle to the Roman christians. He had already shewn that all men had sinned and come short of the glory of God. The Gentile nations had changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the creator. The Jews who boasted in the law of God, violated its sacred spirit, and thereby dishonoured the Holy One, whom they professed to revere. Both Jew and Gentile, therefore, were under sin, and the declaration stood true, "there is none righteous no not one." Having shewn that all were sinners, and that by the deeds of the law no flesh could be justified, the apostle proceeds to unfold the gospel-plan by which the unrighteous might avail themselves of a justifying righteousness, provided for them, which is unto all and upon all them who believe. Possessing this righteousness, the ungodly would be justified freely and be fully accepted by God. Its possession is conditioned, not on works of law, but on faith in Jesus. It is consequently not a character which the sinner is to work out for himself, and of which he might boast. It is a free gift to be received from heaven, in which, if man glories, he should only glory in the Lord.

This method of salvation is not something new. It is the great scheme of mercy by which all who have been saved have been blessed. I proclaim, Paul in effect says, no new doctrine—no new gospel—no new remedy for the old disease of sin. It is the old and true doctrine which is the burden of my message, for "Abraham believed God and it was counted to him for righteousness."

I. *Let us contemplate this spiritually great man, Abraham.* The mind of man is so constituted that it naturally goes out in search for that which is majestic and great, and when it is found it raises within the soul emotions of wonder and awe. There is something solemn and grand to the mind in the towering mountains, the heaving ocean, the arched canopy of heaven, and the rolling stars. But there is something grander and more inspiring still, in the noble form, the lofty aspiration, and the religious soul, of a great, genuine, man. God has realised the worth of those few, who have exhibited more fully than the rest, what the race ought to have done and might have become. His spirit has not left unrecorded nor unapproved of, their works of faith and their labours of love. He inspired his servants to pluck from the

tree of fame its leaves, and on them to inscribe the names of his great ones, that by the current of human history they might be borne down to the end of the world. Hence the Bible, more particularly the Old Testament, is made up to a great extent of the lives of such worthies. Other ancient histories are taken up with fables concerning demigods and monsters,—thereby proving their untrustworthiness; while the sacred histories briefly detail the lives of those, who, though human, were nevertheless channels through which many blessings have become ours. And among that noble band, whose deeds and words are embalmed in the book of God, there are few more worthy of our study than the patriarch Abraham.

With Abraham, as the son of Terah, a merely natural man, we have nothing at present to do. In his human relations he was characterised by like passions and like frailties with ourselves. To look at him intently in this aspect, would be like using a microscope to detect his littlenesses, while we ignored his spiritual greatness. If he had been only the son of Terah, his name would have perished in the ruins of the past. But he was more than this; for he was the called of the Lord, and, as such, was the father of multitudes, and the father of the faithful. He formed a link, and no unimportant link, in the chain of our common humanity, which binds the seed of the woman to the original Father of the race; and he was also constituted the head of the people, “of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came,—who is over all, God blessed for ever.”

The place that Abraham occupies in the development of the kingdom of God, is not difficult to determine. After man had broken away from the restraining love of God, and sinned against the law that is holy, just, and good, the Divine Father promised that the enemy should be conquered, and that evil should be destroyed. The seed of the woman, God said to our guilty parents in Eden, shall bruise the serpent's head, and an end shall be put to that enemy's reign over man. This promise of a future deliverance and Deliverer, wrought as a spiritual power in the hearts of man for a season. By trusting to it, Adam was saved, Abel was rendered fit for glory, Enoch was spiritualized, and Noah made a preacher of righteousness and of a judgement to come. But as time rolled past, the power of this gospel promise gradually waned; sin increased, and the hold of the truth of God over human souls decreased. So low did society sink, that when the omniscient eye looked down upon earth, it could discover nought but evil only and evil continually. In wrath, the Lord swept the inhabitants of the old world into a watery grave; and in mercy he saved one family, that the historic unity of the race might be preserved.

From this new starting point, God sought once more to work out his great scheme of mercy—his covenant of grace. Speedily, however, evil triumphed again over good, and it reached a climax in utter heathenism; when, with impious designs, the people sought, in a plain in the land of Shinar, to build a tower whose top was to be unto heaven. Then came the dispersion, which scattered abroad the members of the hitherto united family of Adam. It was now no longer possible for God to effect his designs by operating on the whole race. No other way, apparently, was open to divine wisdom, if it desired to preserve the true Light among men, than that of selecting one man from the many that existed, and separating him from all others as the founder of a family that should grow into a nation, in whose bosom the kingdom of God should be erected. We say that no other plan was open, not because of our penetration, but because this plan was adopted as the best, and of its wisdom no man can rationally doubt.

The man chosen was Abraham, the son of Terah the idolater. He was to be the head of a new nation,—a peculiar and peculiarly loved people. God called him with a special personal call. The Lord said unto him,—“Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father’s house, unto a land that I will shew thee.” A promise of gracious import was added to this call, to the effect,—“I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great; and thou shalt be a blessing: and I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee: and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed.” This promise was repeated in a slightly altered form, again and again. It was believed and trusted in by the strong-souled man, and, until the day that he yielded up the ghost, he exercised unwavering confidence in the words spoken. How appropriately, then, does the apostle, when he desired to confirm and illustrate the doctrine of justification by faith, appeal to the case of Abraham. All are ready to acknowledge that the patriarch was good, as he was great; that he was the friend of God, as well as the founder of the Jewish nation. Christian doctrine cannot be wrong if it be in harmony with the principles, according to which Abraham was treated by God. And that it is in harmony with these principles is most evident, for Paul says, “HE BELIEVED GOD, AND IT WAS COUNTED TO HIM FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS.”

II. *We come now to consider the faith, which the patriarch possessed.* He was distinguished for faith, and received, because of it, the honourable designation of the “father of the faithful.” Instead, however, of dwelling on the strength of Abraham’s faith, (which all must acknowledge), let us endeavour to define its

nature. And first, let it be noted that it was, in the highest sense of the phrase, *saving faith*. It saved him from doubt, from despondency, from sin, from self, and from hell. It has taken him to heaven; and to be "in Abraham's bosom," is to be in the holiest, happiest, and most heavenly place, of the paradise above. Abraham's faith was the same in its nature with that which serves, in these our days, to unite to Jesus, and thus to be the condition of justification and peace with God. All the proof requisite to establish this proposition is found in the fact, that the reason why the apostle mentions the faith of Abraham at all, was, that his inspired eye saw that it was essentially the same with that which served as the basis of the spiritual life which throbbed in his own being.

(1.) *The faith of the Patriarch had to do with things unseen.* The blessings promised were not near at hand, and within the scope of the physical vision of Abraham; but they lay away forward in the future, and could only be cognised by the eye of the mind. So is it with the faith of the soul in these days. It is "the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen;" and when they are seen, faith gives place to sight. He who sees, therefore, does not in strictness of speech believe. He knows; and his knowledge transcends in its certainty the sphere of faith. The case of Thomas, when rightly understood, is in full harmony with what we say. He doubted, and refused to believe the testimony of others, when they bore witness to him, that Jesus had arisen a conqueror over death and the grave. He declared, "except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe." Afterwards, when the saviour revealed himself to his sensuous observation, Thomas confessed that he was "his Lord and his God." The faith of Thomas at this moment far transcended the sphere of what he observed with his eyes. It penetrated into the unseen—the spiritual. He saw before him a body with the marks of the nails in the hands, and with a scar on its side; and, as he saw these things, his faith went beyond the immediately present material object to an object unperceived by the bodily eye, and it rested on the fact that he who stood before him was none other than his Lord and his God. Similarly, all faith has to do with what lies beyond and above. It connects us with the unseen and the eternal, and enables us to understand, ere we leave this world, somewhat of "the rest that remaineth" for those who sleep in the Lord.

(2.) We remark still further;—*That faith has to do with testimony, as the proximate object on which it reposes.* This principle is true regarding all faith, and consequently regarding saving faith. The case of Abraham illustrates it as clearly as any case

that could be named. Paul says that he "believed God." In the book of Genesis we read that he "believed in the Lord," a slightly altered form of expression. Both, however, when viewed in their relations, teach substantially one and the same thing, viz. :—that Abraham believed in the promise made by God, which promise was that his seed should be numerous as the stars of heaven. This promise being uttered by God, or construed to the Patriarch's mind in words, assumed the form of a testimony. It made known what would be in the future. It told of things unseen by the bodily eye, and thus became the connecting link that made their existence exercise an influence on the patriarch's mind and life. It is the same with the full-orbed gospel. As glad tidings, it makes known to mankind-sinners things which no eye can see and no ear can hear. It proclaims to us that Jesus is the Christ. It reveals the truth that his life and death were a sacrifice for the sins of the world. It bears witness to the propitious relations, which God, when viewed in Jesus, sustains to the race. And it declares that God is now ready to receive the repentant soul, back to his bosom of love. All these facts would have been to the race of man, as if they were not, had it not been for the gospel-testimony. This testimony brings their existence, their power, and their adaptation within the reach of the mind of man. It is the electric wire that connects the heart of God and the heart of the sinner. It is the telescope through which faith can look into the region of truth, and the bosom of the Great Father. It is in a word the proximate object with which we have to do when like the father of the faithful we believe in God.

(3.) Finally, be it observed that, *faith is the persuasion of the mind that the unseen things testified of, are or shall be in existence.* When we believe in the promise made by a friend that, on a certain day, yet future, he shall do a given deed, we are persuaded that the words are true and that the deed shall be done. When we believe that there was such a man as Socrates, we are persuaded in our mind that the testimony we have to that effect is true, and that he had a real existence. Persuasion of the truthfulness of both things is comprehended in the one act of faith. We do not first believe the historic testimony, and then the fact testified, but by the one act of the mind we have faith in the testimony and the facts testified. To return to our previous definition; testimony, as before stated, is the proximate object of our faith, and the things testified are the ultimate objects in which we believe, and in the reality of which we feel persuaded. We may distinguish these in thought, but we cannot separate them. They are as indissoluble as the ends of a walking staff, or the two sides of a book. Understanding this distinction, we can be at no



loss to determine the amount of truth and of error in the prevalent opinion that faith in a proposition or doctrine is not faith in a person. By not a few authors, in the present day, it is asserted, that it is possible to have faith in the Gospel, and yet not believe in the person of the Saviour. On the contrary, we maintain that we can no more believe a proposition concerning Jesus, his life and death, without believing in his person to the extent to which the doctrine concerns him, than we are able to believe in a being of whom we have never heard. We can have faith only to the extent that we understand; and we can only be persuaded of the truth of a testimony to the extent that it is apprehended by the apprehending mind. These thoughts are illustrated and substantiated by the experience of Abraham. He believed the word of promise that fell upon his ear. But he did more. His faith rose up by means of the promise to the great Promiser, and to the great Object promised. And hence, he believed in God as a true God, who would bring to pass, in his own good time, all he had declared regarding the world's Messiah. Thus the propositional promise involved the person promised as well as the person promising. And faith in the promise necessarily involved faith in both the promiser and the promised. In this faith of the faithful Abraham we have no elements that are particular or special. The faith of all Christians is the same. It embraces the gospel-testimony, but it rests not there. It goes up the mediumistic instrumentality and embraces the person of Jesus and of God, their relations, and the whole facts which the glad tidings make known. He who believes to the salvation of his soul comes to "the knowledge of the truth," and knows God, "whom to know," in Christ Jesus, "is life eternal". And this faith is the persuasion of the mind that the things testified of are real.

III. *The object of Abraham's faith requires our more particular attention.* A few words will suffice on this point, after what has already been advanced incidentally. In turning to the book of Genesis, we discover that the Lord called Abraham from Haran. He promised that the patriarch should have a seed. He promised, also, that his seed should be numerous. And, pointing apparently to a Seed within the numerous seed, and for whose sake the numerous seed was a blessing, he declared that, "in him, and in his seed, all the families of the earth should be blessed." To strengthen the old man in his faith,—for old he was, comparatively, before the promise began to receive its actual fulfilment,—the promise was repeated immediately after he was separated from Lot, and again when he dwelt in the plains of Mamre. In the fifteenth chapter of Genesis, at the fifth verse, we read,—  
"And the Lord brought him forth abroad, and said, Look now

toward heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to number them. And he said unto him, So shall thy seed be. And he believed in the Lord; and it was counted to him for righteousness." This promise must not be looked at as if it were isolated from all the other communications, which God had previously made. It must be viewed as containing in its heart all the evangelical promises given to Adam and to Noah. And, if thus viewed by Abraham, as doubtless it was, as by one previously educated to understand its gracious import, it would be seen to be pregnant with the hope and the salvation of the world. To the far-seeing mind of the Jewish father, it revealed the futurity of a Messianic people. And it taught him, that in the midst of the star-like multitude, and as the vital germ of the whole, the Seed of the woman should appear, who would save the souls of men by righteousness, and destroy the works of the devil. It was this aspect of the promise that Abraham grasped most firmly, and held on by most tenaciously. He looked down the vista of ages, and saw the Saviour's day afar off, and was glad.

We agree not, then, with Neander, when he says, that the object of Abraham's faith differed from that of the Christians at Rome; though the essence of the faith of both was the same. We believe, indeed, that the object was circumstantially different: but we hold that it was essentially the same. Both Abraham and the Roman believers believed the word of God regarding a spiritual deliverance and Deliverer. The only difference was, that the one believed the glad tidings of a promise, and the other, the glad tidings of a fact already transpired. But to both, the object, when believed, was "the power of God unto salvation" from the penalty and the dominion of sin.

IV. We observe, still further, that *Abraham's faith, in the Divine promise, was counted unto him for righteousness.* The Greek word rendered in this phrase "counted" is elsewhere translated *reckoned, imputed, and accounted*;—all of which translations are in perfect harmony with the original. Etymologically the original expression means *to think, to reason, to count, to recount, to reckon, to impute.* We have not, however, in our present task so much to do with the meaning that the word may have had primarily, as with the idea sought to be expressed by it by the Apostle and other inspired writers. There seems to us to be only two distinct ways in which the word is employed by the sacred penmen, and these run into a fundamental unity in their subjective elements. The inspired writers use the word in the sense (1) of *thinking and acting toward a person, who is, in character, that which is imputed to him,* and they use it (2) to signify *thinking and acting toward a person as if he was in character,*

*though he is not, what is imputed to him.* The common ground that unites both applications of the word is, of course, the thinking of and acting toward the person to whom anything is imputed. Albert Barnes, in his commentary on Romans, after producing all the passages in the Old Testament in which the word occurs, remarks, "I have examined *all* the passages, and as the result of my examination have come to the conclusion there is not *one* in which the word was used in the sense of *reckoning* or *imputing* to a man that which does not strictly *belong* to him; or of charging on him that which *ought* not to have been charged on him, as a matter of personal right. The word . . . is never used to denote charging that on one which does not properly belong to him. "The same (he adds) is the case in the New Testament." These are determined words. But never were statements of man more apart from the truth. Coming from the pen of one who professed to have examined all the passages, the statement is no common marvel of prejudice and misconception. Certain we are that the opposite is nearer the truth; for in the great majority of instances, and absolutely in all the cases in the New Testament, the word when employed to denote the imputation to any person of anything, means *charging that on one which does not properly belong to him, or the thinking of, and acting toward a person, as if he were what he was not.* That the word also means *to impute to a man that which properly belongs to him,* we have already admitted. An illustration of this use is found in the *cvi.* psalm, 31 verse. There we read that the judgement executed by Phinehas "was counted unto him for righteousness unto all generations for evermore." The act was righteous, and it was imputed for what it was. This usage of the word is admitted; but, at the same time, we are bound to contend for the usage which Barnes, and writers of his school, so strongly deny. Let us take a few cases out of both Testaments that we may test the averments of the American Divine. 1 Sam. i. 13, is quoted and runs thus, "Now Hannah, she spake in her heart; only her lips moved, but her voice was not heard; therefore, Eli thought she had been drunken," literally *reckoned her drunken,* that is, Eli thought of her and treated her, as if she had been guilty of a sin which, in reality, she had not committed. It is said of Jesus, Luke, xxii. 37, that "he was reckoned among the transgressors." Surely Barnes would not maintain, that the people charged upon the Son of God what ought to have been charged on him, as a matter of personal right? From such a thought our whole nature revolts; while the passage is made harmonious by the explanation, that the people treated the Lord as if he had been the worst of transgressors, though he was, in fact, the Holy Lamb of God. Another interesting example of

the same usage of the word is found in Acts, xix. 27, where we find the silversmith, Demetrius, discoursing to the following effect:—"this Paul persuadeth much people, and teacheth them that Diana should be despised, and her magnificence should be destroyed," literally, *should be counted nothing*. The silversmith was afraid that the people would treat the magnificence for what, in the eyes of the eloquent idolater, it was not. The last passage we shall adduce is one that throws a flood of light on the meaning of the word, and on the doctrine of imputation. It is in the short epistle to Philemon, 18 verse. Paul speaking of Onesimus, whom he had begotten in his bonds, says, "If he hath wronged thee or oweth thee ought, *put that to mine account*." This declaration of the large-hearted apostle is tantamount to, *treat me as he deserves, and treat him as myself*. Such being the way in which the word "counted" is used by the holy men who wrote the Bible, the question arises,—in which of the two senses is it employed by Paul, when he says, that faith *was counted to Abraham for righteousness*? After what has been said, we need have no hesitation in answering, that it is used, not in the former, but in the latter sense. Faith was not imputed to the patriarch for what it was, but for what it was not. In itself, faith was not such righteousness as will justify; but because it terminated on such righteousness—the righteousness of the Messiah—it was counted to him, in the sense that God treated him as if he possessed what he did not possess—a perfect personal righteousness, in which he could appear and be accepted at the bar of the Most High. Abraham believed the divine promise that exhibited the Saviour's day and work; and God treated him ever after, as if he were possessed of a character of unsullied purity and spotless righteousness. In this gracious treatment the patriarch found his salvation. In this way he was justified and had peace with God. From this, as a root, sprang the noble outgrowth of his after life and character; the influence of which is felt at this distant hour, and will be felt till the present shall give place to the future, and the seen to the unseen, and the temporal to the eternal. So may it be with all who read these words. We, too, may have our faith imputed to us for righteousness. What Abraham enjoyed, is provided for us in the Lord Jesus Christ. And we shall enjoy it, if we "live in the flesh a life of faith on him who loved us and gave himself for us."

W. A.—P.

THE MARRIAGE OF THE PRINCE OF WALES AND THE PRINCESS  
ALEXANDRA:—REJOICE.

THERE are no circumstances, in the condition of believers in Jesus, in which rejoicing is not a possibility and a duty. It is true, indeed, that even the most experienced believers may be thrown into circumstances, in which they must feel anxiety, or perplexity, or sorrow. Jesus himself was "a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief." "Jesus wept." He had times of "sore crying with tears." And once at least "his soul was exceeding sorrowful, even unto death." All human beings, inclusive of all believers in Jesus, are exposed, while they continue on earth, to occurrences within their souls, or within their homes, or within their neighbourhoods, or within the larger social circles, wherein they move and have their being, which occasion vexation, and distress, and sometimes even an agony of woe. Reverses may be experienced; pains may be inflicted; ties may be sundered; hopes may be blighted and blasted. And when such events occur, men have no alternative. They must either get hearts of iron, or they must feel stricken and sorrowful. The disciples of Jesus, when placed in such circumstances, cannot but know what it is to be distressed and mourn.

And yet, there are no circumstances whatever, possible to our lot on earth, which are irreconcilable with the privilege and the duty of rejoicing. Even if a man be an unbeliever, he has room and reason for rejoicing, whatever be the peculiarity of his circumstances, inward or outward. He has room and reason for rejoicing that he is not yet in the worst possible condition. He is not yet in bottomless woe. He is still on blood-besprinkled ground. He is still a prisoner of hope: it is possible for him to get his fetters struck off, and to go forth free,—free from condemnation, and free from the tyrannous dominion of sin. The sceptre of mercy is still extended toward him from the throne of the King of kings. The grace of everlasting life is still available and pressed upon his acceptance. The gates of heaven are still open, and no man has power to shut them in his face. Providence is still benignant and bountiful. The Spirit of God is still hovering over his heart like a dove, and striving within it. The still small voice of conscience is continuing to let itself be heard. Jesus is still willing to have him. The Father of all is still waiting to receive him; "and yet there is room." Surely, then, even the unbeliever has reason to rejoice; whatever be the special circumstances of grief, which may have occurred in his lot. He may mourn, indeed. He may well mourn. But nevertheless, seeing it is not the case that "*judgement without mercy*" has been

dealt out to him, as his portion, he ought to feel the uprising of joy within his sorrow. There is a morning-star in the horizon of gloom that surrounds him. And if he would but hail it as the harbinger of heaven's light and warmth, there is "a dayspring from on high" which would visit him, and he would see all things clearly, and be himself, in his own person, fully blessed, in the vivifying beams of the Sun of Righteousness.

But if even to the unbeliever there be reason for rejoicing, in the midst of whatsoever circumstances he may be placed,—so long as he continues in this the place of probation,—how much more must the believer in Jesus have occasion to fulfil the divine injunction,—“rejoice *evermore*.” Believer, indeed, though he be, he cannot be shielded, while on earth, from everything that is fitted to wound, and harrow, and harrass, and disappoint, and distress. “Man is born to troubles.” They come as naturally in our terrestrial condition, “as sparks fly upward.” And believers in Jesus are often peculiarly sensitive in these feelings. They are often, besides, exposed to peculiar kinds of trial. But still, in the midst of their deepest darkness, there is light. In their bitterest cup, there is an element of sweetness, not only at the bottom, but mingled through and through. That on which they lean is not a reed, but a rock. Above their every cross, there is a crown. Even though the furnace, into which they are cast is heated sevenfold, they can walk unfettered in the midst of it, for lo there is One with them, and he is like unto, and he is, the Son of God. Amid the loudest din of onset or insult that may assail their ears, there is a sweet and charming voice that can be heard, “Fear not, for I am with thee: be not dismayed for I am thy God.” Hence it is that believers, “knowing the joyful sound,” can “rejoice in God’s name all the day.” They “rejoice because their names are written in heaven.” They “rejoice in hope of the glory of God,”—“wherein they greatly rejoice, though now for a season, if need be, they are in heaviness through manifest trials.” Not only do they believe in Jesus, “though now they see him not,” they also rejoice in him “with joy unspeakable and full of glory.” And hence an apostle says to them, “Rejoice in the Lord alway; and again I say, rejoice.” And that same apostle says of himself, that, as he was “poor, yet making many rich,” so was he “as sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing.” And a greater than that apostle said to his believing followers, “Blessed are ye that weep now; for ye shall rejoice. Blessed are ye, when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate you from their company, and shall reproach you, and cast out your name as evil, for the Son of man’s sake; rejoice ye in that day, and leap for joy: for, behold, your reward is great

in heaven." Thus the wonderful language of the Psalmist is verified, and even "the broken bones" of believers "rejoice." And over and above all these occasions of rejoicing to believers, they are ever ready, in proportion as they are true believers, and whatever may be their own private sorrows, "to rejoice with them that do rejoice." They can afford to be generous in their joy; and they *are* generous. Their hearts sympathetically respond to the joys of those around them.

This leads us to remark that we presume that all believers in Jesus throughout the whole of the British empire, have been rejoicing, very heartily, in the great public event that has of late so auspiciously transpired within our land, and in the happy circumstances that preceded and accompanied it. We refer to the marriage of the youthful Prince of Wales and the Princess Alexandra of Denmark. As for ourselves, we rejoiced in the event very sincerely, though not boisterously. And often while thinking over it, and while reading the public accounts of its concomitant circumstances, we felt the silent tear of sympathetic gladness instinctively stealing from our eyes.

(1.) *We rejoiced for the sake of the young people themselves, who have been united, as man and woman, in wedlock.* They are bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh; of one nature with ourselves; made "of one blood" with us all. And their union is a "touch of nature," that may well "make the whole world feel kin." It became us, then, and it becomes us, to rejoice in their joy. It becomes us to cherish toward them that love that seeketh not her own things, but the things of others. They are in high places, indeed; and for that very reason they are like a city set on a hill: they cannot be hid from us. Though they take no note of us, they cannot hinder us from taking note of them. And when we do take note of them, and see that they meet in innocence, and are blessed in one another, it becomes us to be sharers with them of their joy.

(2.) But it was meet that we should rejoice on another account:—*on account of the consolation which is experienced by her, whom, as our sovereign, we are bound and commanded to "honour;" whom, as a lady, we are constrained to esteem; with whom, as a widow, "who is a widow indeed," we cannot but sympathize; and who, as the mother of her people, we love.* It is seldom, indeed, that such virtue is found on a throne, as is characteristic of our queen. In the language of king Lemuel, "many daughters have done virtuously," "but she," among queens, "excels them all." And the secret of her excelling seems to be found "in the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not corruptible;" it is "the

ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which is in the sight of God of great price." Our queen evidently wears her brightest jewels within. And she has sought to "look well to the ways of her household, and has not eaten the bread of idleness." Being such, and being constrained moreover, as well as the poorest of her subjects, to enter into the precincts of the valley of the shadow of death, and to feel that she is more emphatically a woman than a queen, we could not but weep with her when she wept, and it becomes us now to rejoice with her, when she rejoices.

(3.) But, again, it became and becomes us to rejoice, with very great joy, over the event referred to, *in the interests of morality*. Those of our readers who are old enough to remember something of the state of the court under previous reigns, and all the rest of us who know, either from history or by hearsay, what was the character of some of our queen's predecessors, cannot but feel that we have very great occasion to be both grateful and glad, over the innocent union, "for better, for worse," that has been lately consummated. The cause of good morals has achieved a triumph on a very public arena. Virtue has been vindicated. And in this honour done to virtue within the precincts of the highest place in our land, all everywhere within the borders of the British empire, who know that it is "righteousness that exalteth a nation," and who see that if morality be set aside, the foundations of social stability and prosperity are loosened or undermined, must, and do, and will, rejoice. When we take into account, moreover, the imitative nature of man, and consider how mightily the higher circles of society are influenced by the example of the court, and how mightily the lower circles of society are influenced by the example of the higher, it is certainly a very natural and becoming occasion of rejoicing, when we find the most exalted personage under the throne following, to all appearance, in his mother's footsteps, and acting a part that is fitted to bring into discredit, on the one hand, every species of moral licentiousness and looseness, and to bring into credit, on the other, innocent and virtuous love. We did rejoice, and we do rejoice, and we will rejoice, very much, in the great and good event.

(4.) But there was something connected with the event in which we rejoiced, and do rejoice, still more than in the event itself. *We rejoiced and rejoice in the universal rejoicings of the people*. It was these universal outbursts of the glad goodwill of a mighty and united people, that have most powerfully affected our heart. We rejoiced and rejoice in them,—

1st. *For the sake of the people themselves*. The rejoicing will have done the people a very great deal of good. It will have done them good,—not only in the way of gratifying them with a holi-



day-relief from the perpetual reiteration of their common worldly work. That is but a small part of the benefit received. The rejoicings will have had a far profounder influence upon the national heart. They will have deepened the tone of the people's loyalty to the distinctive institutions of the country. That is a much higher result. But there is another result that is higher still. *The rejoicings were an outburst of the generous emotions. There was nothing of the selfish in them.* And therein we rejoice and will rejoice. For nothing does a man more decided moral good than to have the generous element of his nature turned uppermost, and the selfish element thrust undermost, or pushed aside altogether. And as it is with an individual man, so is it with a nation. Nothing does it, as a nation, more moral good, than to find the unselfish affections taking hold of the helm of things, and guiding the people as a mass in a direction outward and upward from self. It always has been, it is now, and it always will be, far "more blessed to give than to receive"; and of this blessedness our nation has to some extent been participant in the recent rejoicings.

2nd. But again, we would rejoice in the rejoicings of the people, *for the sake of their vast moral influence on the court, and on all the high and mighty in our land.* The rejoicings, from all accounts, have been greater, more unanimous, and more intense, than have ever been witnessed before by any now living. In all likelihood, they have been more universal and profound than have ever transpired in our land, or in any land, on any similar occasion. And why is this? The real reason,—when we have accorded all their due weight to the adventitious facilities of the age for giving a kind of instantaneous omnipresence to public news and to the ideas that are stirring in the higher order of minds,—the real reason is undoubtedly to be found in the natural homage which both the conscience and the heart of universal man constrain him to pay to virtue. It is not the mere fact that it was a marriage in high places that was on hand. Such marriages occur often, and elicit no such tumult of rejoicing. It is not the mere fact that the prince is youthful and the princess fair. Royal youth and beauty have met before, and elicited no such intensity of congratulatory emotion. It was nothing of the mere tinsel of outward show. There was no special attempt in that way. It was not jewellery or decoration or wealth. There was no obtrusion of these; and of what was inevitably exhibited, but little notice was taken; and in it but little interest was felt. What then was it which aroused the heart of the people? It was no military achievements on the part of the prince. It was no manifestation of dazzling genius on his part. Neither was it an idea of anything approximating peerless beauty or unparalleled ac-

complishments, on the part of the princess. There was nothing, moreover, of romance in the affair. What was it, then, that moved the whole mighty population to the heart of its heart, and that occasioned the universal sympathy and joy? It was, undoubtedly, the deeply-rooted regard and reverence, which have been divinely implanted as instincts in our nature, in reference to moral innocence and virtue. Courts of sovereigns have too often paid but little heed to virtue. But too seldom have they recognised that virtue lies at the basis of the purest enjoyments, and that, because it does, princes and peasants must meet on one level in reference to all that is most essential to bliss. Princes have too frequently attempted to get a grander, a more gorgeous, or a more highly flavoured, a more piquant, happiness, in the libertinism and vice that were within their reach, than the commonality could get within the bonds of those simple social ties that are within the reach of all. In every such attempt, however, they have failed; and they have found in the end, that, by sowing the wind of wickedness, they only reaped the whirlwind of vanity and vexation. Still, others of their order have imagined that by putting into practice some other and more recondite tricks of expediency than their predecessors attempted, they would gain a happiness outside the charmed circle of simple virtue, a happiness that would excel all the happiness which common people can find within their reach. Yet no. All has been "vanity and vexation of spirit," *and kings and princes have been obliged to return to the simple practices of simple people, in order to find happiness.* Hence the homage that has been paid to virtue within the court of our queen. And hence the high esteem in which she herself is held. And hence too the universal outburst of enthusiasm on occasion of the marriage of the heir-apparent to the throne. Our nobility and gentry will learn that there is nothing, after all, that will ultimately stand the test, and secure the united sympathy and attachment of all classes of the community, but goodness. Is it not a most momentous lesson? Are we not well entitled to rejoice over the rejoicings which have been inculcating such a lesson upon the attention of the earth's potentates and nobles, and indeed, upon the attention of every reflecting individual in the civilized world?

May the Great King, the Father of mercies, and the Author of love, bless the royal couple! May their hearts be knit together into uninterrupted harmony! May their love to each other be from first to last the love of benevolence:—the husband seeking rather to give happiness, than to get it; the wife seeking not so much to get bliss to herself, as to give it to her husband! May their best thoughts go out intertwiningly beyond themselves, and float far and wide over the length and breadth of the great empire

that is stretching around them and rejoicing over them! May their purest and profoundest emotions well up within them toward their common heavenly Father! May they daily resort to the throne of the universe and do obeisance: may they daily bow the knee before the cross of Christ Jesus! And by and by, after discharging their terrestrial duty, after enduring their terrestrial trials, and after victoriously repelling all terrestrial temptations, may they rise up higher to be for ever above sorrows and sins: to be for ever "with the Lord"! This is our ardent prayer for the Prince and Princess of Wales.

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 REVIEW.

*Answers to James Morison's Questions on the Shorter Catechism.* By a United Presbyterian. Edinburgh. 1863.

ANOTHER critic, and this time a United Presbyterian, has descended into the arena. We bid him welcome, for we wish to be overcome if we be contending, not for, but against, the truth.

We have no interest whatever in the maintenance of error. It is not our friend. It is utterly incapable of conferring upon us any spiritual and everlasting benefit. And if it be, as our critic supposes, the characteristic of the theology which we have hitherto been holding and propounding, it has certainly conferred upon us no rewards of a material or social description. We have nothing, therefore, to gain by clinging to error. We have everything for eternity to gain, by embracing truth. And could we adopt as truth the views which our critic maintains, we would have, as we have been given to understand, considerable advantages in time. We are therefore sincerely desirous to be effectually refuted, so far as we are really in error.

Our critic, while not indulging, as many others have done, in expressions of unmitigated scorn in reference to the author of "Questions on the Shorter Catechism," and while in some cases ascribing to him a much larger meed of appreciation and commendation, than we could feel warranted in conceding, nevertheless will satisfy most of our opponents by the very full measure,—full indeed to overflowing,—of his contempt, (1) for the Tractate which he criticises, (2) for the system of theology to which it is affiliated, and, (3) for the author's brethren in the Evangelical Union.

(1.) He says of the Tractate,—“It is a feeble, a captious, a pert, a censorious, a puerile performance.”—p. iv. And in the body of his criticisms, he frequently gives expression to similar sentiments; while he flavours, throughout, the tone of his production with a sufficiently high and mighty assumption of superiority. We are accustomed to this kind of depreciation. And meanwhile we shall let it pass. It requires, so far as we can see, no great altitude of soul, no towering ability, no storied acquirements, and no remarkable height of holiness, to enable a man to speak in extremely disparaging phraseology. It is

easy for the feeblest, the most captious, the most pert, the most censorious, the most puerile, to transfer unconsciously to the utterances and performances of others the attributes of their own souls.

(2.) As to the theology, which runs through the "Questions on the Shorter Catechism," our critic is, if possible, still more lavish in depreciation. He informs us that "it has little attraction except for smatterers and half-thinkers." "Few men," he adds, "will embrace it who know what fundamental investigation is."—p. ix. And hence, no doubt, it does not number our critic himself among its adherents. His mind, it would appear, is far too profound and capacious to be susceptible of influence from such ideas. Calvinists alone, he would seem to imagine, are men of mind and of thought; and anti-Calvinists must be mere sciolists and imbeciles. And yet,—need we remind our readers,—it is only in Scotland that Calvinism is predominant! And in the first three centuries of the christian era, its tenets were either unknown or opposed!

(3.) As to the ministerial brethren of the author of the "Questions," our critic says,—“Dr. Morison, with his high attainments in scholarship and in theology, must often be obliged to smile at the crude and chaotic ratiocinations of his less disciplined fellow-labourers.”—p. ix. And he makes specially depreciatory reference to “a well-known fellow-labourer, whose name it is unnecessary to introduce here.”—p. x. We have a different view of the relative position of the author of the "Questions" and his fellow-labourers. While, of course, they are not all of one calibre, or characterised by the same acquirements; there is at least a full average proportion of them, who are in every important respect the peers of the author of the "Questions;" while in some very important respects many of his brethren excel him. We are certain that he himself makes no pretension to any "high attainments;" and we should think he does not believe,—or at all events we do not believe,—that he possesses them. And we are equally certain that as some of his brethren really rise above him, so those who know the circle best will esteem its members most. At the universities, the students of the Evangelical Union, though often labouring under the effects of early disadvantages, and though generally fettered, moreover, by practical engagements, from which other students are almost always free, yet occupy a sufficiently respectable position and carry off a fair proportion of prizes. And the majority of its preachers and ministers are solely indebted to their mental and moral superiority, for their ability to stand, and to withstand, and to grow, although all the powerful influences of society, both secular and ecclesiastical, are set in array against them. When other preachers and ministers, who are working around them, under the smile of the world, give equally indubitable proofs of their self-sacrificing devotedness, and mental and moral firmness and stamina, it will be time enough for our critic, and such as he, to vaunt on the one hand, and to tread, trample, and spurn, on the other.

Our critic, referring to the author of the Questions, says,—

"I honestly consider him as having done more to hurt the cause of religion in Scotland than any divine now living."

"When I remember that he has discarded from his creed some of the most essential

doctrines of the christian system,—when I remember that some of the doctrines he has not discarded he has frittered into inanity,—when I remember that he is devoting his time and talents to the advocacy and diffusion of a shallow and superficial theology,—when I remember that he is endeavouring to substitute a religion of excitement, slight and short-lived, for the religion of principle, deep-seated and durable, which has hitherto been the glory of Scotland,—when I remember that he is dotting the country with societies which, wherever they are organized, seek to undermine the influence, and perhaps to injure the christian reputation, of every minister who does not preach the gospel in the phraseology on which the Evangelical Union has set its seal,—when I remember these things, I cannot hesitate to express my opinion, that the time has arrived for a more systematic exposure of his errors than has hitherto been attempted.”—pp. iv. v.

This is rather strong. But when we consider that it is but the out-pouring of a man, who has, as yet, given no evidence that he is capable of arriving at an impartial and enlightened conclusion in reference to the complicated subjects referred to, we sit easy under the censures and imputations. It is not always, as we have noticed, the fullest barrels that rumble loudest as they roll. We have even heard of a proverb to the effect,—that the contrary is not unfrequently the case. Our critic continues :—

“I think this end could be best served by a popular treatise on the errors of Morisonianism with regard to the human will, the divine decrees, original sin, the love of God in the salvation of man, the atonement of Christ, the work of the Holy Spirit, election, moral and natural inability, the relation between the human and divine wills, faith, repentance, assurance, perseverance, prayer. There are more than five hundred ministers in the church to which I have the honour to belong, who could perform this work more efficiently than myself; yet such is my conviction of its necessity, that, if it be not speedily undertaken by another, I shall not scruple to do what I can.”—p. v.

It would appear that our critic is not fully satisfied with the brochure of the Free Churchman, Mr. Gall,—*Wherein the Morisonians are Wrong*. He ignores it. Neither, it would appear, is he satisfied with the pamphlets of those other Free Churchmen, the Rev. Mr. Nixon of Montrose, and the Rev. John Stewart of Ardrossan. He ignores them. Perhaps he never saw them. Neither, it would appear, is he fully satisfied with the *Review of the Doctrinal Declaration of the Evangelical Union*, “by a Minister of the Church of Scotland.” It discusses in detail all the topics which our critic specifies; and, when it appeared, it was loudly belauded as an effectual demolition and indeed final entombment of “Morisonian heresy.” But our critic, somehow or other, ignores it; and evidently thinks that it does not altogether suffice. In this latter idea we agree with him. But as we are most anxious to get rid of our errors, and to get out of our superficialities and shallows and inanities and short-living excitements, into depths in which we may dive, up to heights on which we may sun ourselves, and on to solid rocks, like the Rock of Ages, on which we can rest in firmness and security, we shall hail with all our heart, our critic’s Refutation of “the errors of Morisonianism.” And we shall not be slow to acknowledge our defeat. We are painfully conscious of the unripeness of most of the tracts and tractates which were prematurely plucked from our minds by the force of peculiar circumstances. And even in that *Exposition of Romans IX.* to which our critic refers, there is much that is undigested and undeveloped; much consequently that stands in need of overhauling, which we hope to be able, ere very long, to find given to it. Hence, no doubt,

there is ample scope for criticism. We could finely assist our reviewer in his task, were it not that he would be apt to exclaim, *non tali auxilio*. But we candidly promise him a candid acknowledgment of all the errors and mistakes which he may discover. And we shall thank him for all the light he shall diffuse. Light, light, more light,—is one of the inmost and most earnest cries of our spirit.

Our critic, meanwhile, and without forestalling the sum and substance of his future work, makes four general criticisms on our views. He says,—“1. Morisonianism assumes, as its fundamental principles, tenets which it has not proved, and which it cannot prove.”—p. vi. We admit it. And we maintain that the anthropological, philosophical, or theological system which does not start, in its fundamental principles, from tenets which are not proved, and which cannot be proved, is utterly baseless. That which is fundamental, must, just because it is fundamental, be indemonstrable. It affords the basis of all subsequent demonstrations. Our critic refers especially, as he tells us, to our doctrine of the freedom of the will, and he asks, “where is the proof of the self-determining power of the will by any divine of the Morisonian school?” We answer his question by saying, that on this subject we start from the indemonstrable facts of consciousness. But if he chooses to reproduce to us the dialectical reasonings of Hobbes, Collins, and Edwards, we can assure him that we shall be only too glad to have another opportunity of proving that these reasonings are fallacious. Or if, on the other hand, he invent some new process of argumentation on the subject, or raise the ghost of some old process that has been laid, we promise to consider it, and to tell him our mind concerning it. It is true that we have not yet published on this subject any elaborate dissertation. But we were not aware that this was requisite ere we should have a theology. Neither are we aware that any theologian of the United Presbyterian church has done much to throw light upon the subject. And Calvin himself did not write exhaustingly, not even extensively, on the point. And, besides, we have written on it; and written, indeed, so much, especially in the pages of the Repository, and in our “Apology,” etc., that we should be exceedingly glad to see ourselves refuted. And by and by, we doubt not, if life and health, and wind and tide, are granted, the public will be able to lay its hand upon some systematic treatise on the topic, from some “Morisonian divine” or other.

Our critic continues his critique:—“2. Morisonianism construes the whole christian system in accordance with some view of the divine character, which, however just and important, has no more claim to exclusive supremacy than any other.”—p. vii. He refers to our view of the love of God:—a view, certainly, to which we do not desire to give exclusive heed, but which, as certainly, we deem deserving of having the pre-eminence and “exclusive supremacy” in a scheme of things, which is avowedly remedial in its nature, and admittedly a plan of mercy. If christianity be not a device and development of “the grace of God,” or, in other words, an outgrowth of the love of God to the guilty, the wretched, and the depraved, we acknowledge that we are ignorant of its principia. For, while it would, indeed, be obviously

and glaringly wrong to suppose that the divine love overrides the divine justice, or that it annihilates the divine wrath; it must assuredly be true that the christian scheme is, in its very essence, either nothing at all, or an embodiment of loving-kindness or benevolence. When our critic says that this aspect of the divine character has "no more claim," in the christian system, to "exclusive supremacy than any other," he fills us with amazement, and scarcely leads us to anticipate that he is fitted to throw light upon evangelical topics. If he had said that the divine love "has no more claim to exclusive *consideration* than any other," we should have most heartily responded to his remark. But if he does not acknowledge a culminating point in the divine attributes, as manifested in christianity, and if he does not admit that it is love or grace or mercy which is, and is alone, this culminating point, and which consequently has "exclusive supremacy," we fear that he has not yet reached either a sufficiently elevated biblical, or a sufficiently commanding philosophical stand-point, from which to view the subjects of which he undertakes to write.

He remarks, 3rd, that "Morisonianism is characterised by an excessive love of simplicity."—p. viii. And he says that the simplicity by which it is characterised, is "the simplicity of the sailor, who should steer in one uniform direction for the port at which he wished to arrive, without diverging from it to reach the intermediate ports at which he ought to call."—p. ix. The asseveration is perfectly intelligible: but as it is merely an asseveration, unsupported by even a single atom of proof, we have a right to regard it as entirely gratuitous. And we have merely therefore to say in reply, Produce your proof, in addition to your assumed instances. We admit that to introduce simplicity where complexity is necessary, is indeed a blunder. But we also contend that to introduce complexity, where simplicity is required, is no less at variance with the mastery of any given object of thought. "Smatterers and half-thinkers," who cannot penetrate to first principles, and the germs of things, may imagine that it is wealth of thought to add co-ordinate detail to detail; while those "who know what fundamental investigation is," may be able, without losing sight of multiform developments, to seize the genetic element, whence all the developments shoot forth.

His fourth general criticism is thus expressed:—"Morisonianism is defended by a singular parade of the forms of logic without its substance;"—although he adds that "truth requires us to say, that there is much less of this in the works of Dr. Morison than" in some others. It is, we say again, a gratuitous allegation, unsubstantiated by any proof. If he mean, indeed, that illogical things have been said and written by the author of the "Questions," or by some of his brethren, we are not very careful to ascertain whether or not his allegation be correct. We presume that illogical things have been said and written by many Calvinists, and by Calvin himself. But if he mean that the system of views, which we profess, is essentially characterised by logical but empty forms, we invite him to the verification of his allegation.

The work on which our critic has, in the present publication, expended his zeal, is a comparatively trifling Tractate, which comprehends,

and was intended to comprehend, observations of a minute and somewhat trivial nature, as well as others, which the author no doubt regards as of very considerable importance. His design was to shew that the *Shorter Catechism* is not, either in its great outlines, or in its minuter details, so perfect a transcript of Scripture truth, or indeed, in any respect, so perfect a work, as to deserve the very high position, which, by ancient ecclesiastical ordinance and prescription, has been assigned to it in Scotland. Had the *Catechism* been the production merely of some individual theologian, who acted on his own responsibility, and had it been left to find its own level in the world of books, the writer of the "Questions," if he had ever chanced to light upon it, would, in all probability, have never thought of subjecting it to dissection; and, even though he had, he would not have deemed it necessary to use, so frequently, the point of the knife, to touch little and unessential fibres of expression and opinion. But when a catechism is elevated to a very lofty position of authority in a country, and even made part and parcel, in ecclesiastical bodies, of their subordinate standards,—to the details of which adherence is exacted on the part of ministerial and other office-bearers,—it would require to be almost faultless, at once in great things and in small. Such the author of the "Questions" once regarded it. But such he has not, after more thorough and impartial investigation, found it to be. And hence his Tractate.

It will not be expected that we should go over the whole length of the *Shorter Catechism*, and consider in succession the *Answers* given by the critic to the *Questions* proposed by the Questioner. To do this would occupy a very large amount of space; and seeing the critic deals almost exclusively, in assumptions and asseverations, we should feel shut up, in the great majority of instances, simply to repeat our original queries. We shall take, however, from the commencement of the *Answers*, a few specimens of our critic's critical powers; and thus we shall enable our readers to form their own judgement regarding the merits of his performance.

The first Question and Answer in the *Shorter Catechism*, are as follows:—

Q. *What is the chief end of man?*

A. *Man's chief end is to glorify God, and enjoy him for ever.*

The *Questions* of the questioner on this answer are as follows:—

"Is the question really answered? In the question there is inquiry, in reference to the end of man—the chief end; and why, then, are there two ends specified in the answer? If it should be said that the expression, "man's chief end," means "man's chief complex end," why is there no reference to man's duty to his fellow-men? Is it not as truly a part of man's chief complex end, to do good to his fellow-men, as it is to seek his own enjoyment for ever?"

Our critic's *Answers* to these queries are as follows:—

"The question is really answered. It declares man's chief end—both the chief end his Maker proposed in his creation, and the chief end he should propose to himself in theory and in practice—to be to glorify God, and enjoy Him for ever. This answer, although it consists of two clauses, contemplates one object—setting God before our mind as our chief good, as our portion. In explaining it, a teacher might introduce



man's duty to his fellow-men as involved in glorifying God. But to speak of 'doing good to his fellow-men' as being a thing co-ordinate with what is here declared to be man's chief end, would be to betray gross ignorance of the first principles of christian theology. 'Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter; Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man.' (Eccles. xii. 13.) There is as little mention of 'doing good to our fellow-men' in the words of Solomon as in this answer."—p. 1.

To us the *Questions* are not answered. We wonder if they have even been apprehended. The answer in the *Shorter Catechism*, says our critic, "although it consists of two clauses, contemplates one object,—setting God before our mind as our chief good, as our portion." The critic, we imagine, has misunderstood his *Shorter Catechism*; for, as every man who is more than a "half-thinker" will perceive at a glance, it is only in the second clause, that God is referred to as "our chief good, our portion." It should be our aim "to enjoy God for ever," because he is "our chief good, our portion." But all who are acquainted with "the first principles of theology," know that it is, pre-eminently and transcendently, for another reason, that it should be our chief aim "to glorify God." It is because he is, in his own intrinsic excellency, worthy of being glorified. We are surprised that our critic does not know this: and that thus, notwithstanding all his parade about "fundamental investigation," he should, at the very first opportunity that he had, do nothing but bustlingly plash, ankle deep, into the shallowest superficiality. The great theologians of his own church, if he had but studied them for a moment, would have enlightened him on such a fundamental subject. Ebenezer Erskine, Ralph Erskine, and Mr. Fisher, in explaining the first question of the *Catechism* ask, "What ought to be man's chief aim and design?" And they unite in answering their own query thus,—“The glory of God,”—making no reference to man's enjoyment of God. But when they come to the second clause of the *Catechism's* answer, they ask,—“What is it, next to the glory of God, we should aim at?” Their answer is,—“Next unto God's glory, we should aim at the enjoyment of him.” Then they ask again,—“Why should we aim at the enjoyment of God?” And their answer is,—“Because he is *the chief good* of the rational creature, and nothing else, besides him, is either suitable to the nature or satisfying to the desires of the immortal soul.” It will be noticed how accurately they discriminate between glorifying God and enjoying him; and how discriminatively they represent him as “*the chief good*,” when he is exhibited as a being who is to be enjoyed. They ask again, farther on, “Did the covenant of works oblige man to make his own life and happiness the chief end of his obedience?” And their answer is the following:—“By no means: the promise of life was an encouragement to his obedience, but the glory of God was to be the chief end therein; to which any view of his own happiness was to be subordinate, otherwise his obedience had not been perfect.” (*Quest. 12.*) So very far were these distinguished theologians from thinking that man's chief end is realised in “setting God before our mind as our chief good, as our portion.”

We agree with Ebenezer Erskine, and Ralph, and Mr. Fisher, in holding that man's chief end is “to glorify God.” His chief aim is to terminate on God. And God's end in making him was unquestionably in

accordance with this aim. But if something is to be added to this chief end, and yet huddlingly included under the one designation, it is, as we maintain, a blunder, and a blunder which is very deep-drawing in its moral consequences, to introduce an aim that goes exclusively in upon self, rather than primarily out, in the spirit of the second table of the law, to our fellows around us.

When our critic quotes Eccles. xii. 13,—“ Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter : Fear God, and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man,”—and adds, argumentatively, “ There is as little mention of *doing good to our fellow-men* in the words of Solomon as in this answer (of the *Catechism*),” we are led to think of what he says about “ puerility.” Does he really need to be reminded that one of God’s most express “ commandments ” is *to love our neighbour as we love ourselves* ?

The second question and answer in the *Catechism* run thus :—

*Q. What rule hath God given to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy him ?*

*A. The Word of God, which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy him.*

The *Questions* of the questioner run thus :—

“ Why do the Westminster theologians say ‘ only ’ ? If ‘ the Word of God, which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the *only* rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy God,’ are not the heathen without a rule to direct them how to glorify and enjoy God ? Are they, then, free from obligation ‘ to glorify God and enjoy him for ever ’ ?—free from obligation to fulfil the great end of their existence ?—free from obligation to do their duty ? Are they irresponsible ? Is the apostle mistaken when he says of them,—‘ These, having not the law, (the written revelation,) are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts ’ ? (Rom. ii. 14, 15.) Is not the great purpose of God in nature,—his purpose to reveal himself, and by consequence, to reveal some part of his will,—overlooked or ignored by the compilers ? And is not much of the doctrine of what is commonly called ‘ final causes ’ in nature, set aside ? ”

The *Answers* of our critic are as follows .—

“ The Westminster theologians say ‘ only ’ because the Bible is the only authoritative revelation of God’s will. He has given no other rule by which to direct men in realising the chief end of their being. If they would know how they may glorify God and enjoy him for ever, they must consult the Word of God alone. It is their sole guide-book to a holy and happy immortality. The heathen being destitute of revelation, are necessarily without a rule to direct them how to glorify and enjoy God—that is, they are without a rule given by God in the same sense in which he has given the Bible. Whether they have any other rule, is a matter on which this answer is entirely silent, and it is a wise silence, for why should the answer open up a deep and difficult speculation, with which the question has not the most remote connexion ? There is surely, however, a difference between the grounds of their obligation to glorify and enjoy God, and the rule in which the nature and extent of their obligation are specified. Their responsibility depends on something altogether apart from this inspired rule. The study of nature and the investigation of final causes are very serviceable in their own place, but they are overlooked or ignored by the compilers, simply because they remembered that they belong to natural theology and not to revelation. The Bible is the only inspired standard of religious truth. It is God’s Book, God’s only Book, whatever may be the doom of the heathen, whatever may be the teachings of nature.”—pp. 2, 3.

A larger heap of mere asseverations, and similar observations, it would

perhaps be difficult to find anywhere else. "The Westminster theologians say 'only,' because the Bible is the only authoritative revelation of God's will." Our critic asseverates it:—that, we presume, he esteems sufficient proof. "He has given no other rule by which to direct men in realising the chief end of their being." Our critic asseverates it. "If they would know how they may glorify God and enjoy him for ever, they must consult the word of God alone." Our critic asseverates it. "It is their sole guide-book to a holy and happy immortality." Our critic asseverates it. "The heathen being destitute of revelation, are necessarily without a rule to direct them how to glorify and enjoy God—." Our critic asseverates it: but, as by an afterthought, taking into account that some weight should be attached to what the Scripture says concerning the responsibility of the heathen in general, and the actual attainments of some heathens in particular, he adds,—"that is, they are without a rule given by God in the same sense in which he has given the Bible." Our critic asseverates it; and perhaps he imagines that he exhibits it most luminously;—"in the same sense in which he has given the Bible." Will he, then, explain the peculiar "sense,"—we ask not, *of the Bible*, but *in which the Bible has been given?* He continues;—"whether they have any other rule, is a matter on which this answer is entirely silent." So our critic asseverates: but erroneously; for the answer of the Westminster divines determines that there is no other rule but the Scriptures. Our critic proceeds,—"and it is a wise silence, for why should the answer open up a deep and difficult speculation with which the question has not the most remote connection?" But certainly there must be some connection, if there be indeed another rule besides the Bible, given by God to direct us how to glorify and enjoy him. And whether, moreover, it be silence to say that there is no other rule; or whether this silence be wise, we leave with our readers, as open questions. But our critic proceeds,—"There is surely, however, a difference between the grounds of their obligation to glorify and enjoy God, and the rule in which the nature and extent of this obligation are specified. Their responsibility depends on something altogether apart from this inspired rule." So our critic asseverates. But he is doubtless forgetting his own criticisms on "an excessive love of simplicity." For while it is as clear as sun-light that something more than a divine "rule" is needed in order to responsibility, it is equally clear that a divine rule is essential. For moral accountability is nothing else than responsibility for complying, or for not complying, with a divine rule. Moral character in general, and all moral action in particular, are as impossible without a rule, as it would be impossible, in things physical, to have a right side and a left without a medial line. Our critic continues:—"the study of nature and the investigation of final causes, are very serviceable in their own place, but they are overlooked or ignored by the compilers, simply because they remembered that they belong to natural theology and not to revelation." Another asseveration. But we question much whether the compilers of the *Catechism* would have been disposed to accept it as an explanation of their omissions. For "natural theology" is still "theology," and must therefore teach something regarding the thoughts and feelings and will of God. It must, indeed, be the basis of Bible-theology; and for this

very reason it should not have been overlooked or ignored when inquisition was made into "the rule which God hath given to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy him." The answer, moreover, to the second question of the *Catechism* was the very place in which the existence of natural theology should have been recognised, and the superior claims in comparison,—though only in comparison,—of Bible-theology exhibited. And it should, besides, be borne in mind that there is no proper antithesis between "natural theology and revelation." Revelation is not confined to words. And he who thinks that it is, scoops out from beneath his own feet, though it may be unwittingly, all foundation whatsoever on which it is possible to erect any valid demonstration that the Bible is the Book of God. Our critic continues:—"The Bible is the only inspired standard of religious truth." Another asseveration:—to which, however, we cordially assent, if he mean by "inspired" *given through the intermediacy of creatures who spoke or wrote under the inspiration of God.* But still, it is not true that the Bible is the only divinely-given standard of religious truth. There is another, by the help of which we ascertain the Bible to be an inspired standard. Our critic concludes by saying of the Bible:—"It is God's book, God's only book, whatever may be the doom of the heathen, whatever may be the teachings of nature." These are reiterated asseverations; but not, as we take it, characterised by either breadth or depth of thought. We like better the idea of Nathanael Culverwel, whose book on the *Light of Nature* was a favourite with a distinguished member and minister of the Presbyterian body, to which our critic belongs, the late Dr. John Brown. In reproducing, appropriating, some remarks of Chrysostom on *the law of nature*, the "rule" given to all to direct them in their moral relations, this old Puritan thinker represents men as having "a scripture of God within them"—"a bible of God's own printing."—p. 37. *ed.* 1654. He says again, "There are stamped and printed upon the being of man, some clear and undelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions; by putting together of which it can spell out the law of nature"—p. 47. There are thus two books of God,—the book of his works, and the book of his words; and they are, as is profoundly shewn, especially by Raymond de Sabunde, though also by many others, wonderfully harmonious with one another, when their respective dialects are correctly interpreted. Sabunde's idea, and that of Culverwel, is but the transcript of the idea of the Apostle Paul himself, who speaks of the heathens having "the work of the law written in their hearts," and "knowing the statute of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death."—Rom. i. 28; ii. 14, 15.

The third question and answer of the *Catechism* are the following:—

Q. *What do the Scriptures principally teach?*

A. *The Scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man.*

The questions proposed by the questioner are, as will be perceived, hypothetically put, and are as follows:—

"If by the expression 'what man is to believe concerning God' be meant 'all that man is to believe concerning God,' and if by the expression 'what duty God requires

of man' be meant 'all the duty that God requires of man;' is it really the case that the teaching of Scripture exhausts all that man is to believe concerning God, and all that he is to believe concerning his own duty? Is there nothing of what man is to believe concerning God that is left for science to teach? nothing for providence? nothing for history? And is there nothing of 'the duty God requires of man,' left to conscience to teach?"

The following is the answer of our critic:—

"One would have supposed that we have here an unobjectionable question and an unobjectionable answer. The question is, What are the principal teachings of the Bible? The answer is, Its teaching concerning what we are to believe, and concerning what we are to do. Doctrine and practice, the *credenda* and the *agenda*, form a complete system of religion. To complain that a professed manual of christian theology does not contain science or history is simply ridiculous. A manual of christian theology should be a manual of christian theology."—p. 3.

The questioner makes no complaint of the kind indicated by the critic. And the critic would never have imagined that he does, if he had apprehended the real state of the case. The question of the *Catechism* is viewed by the questioner, in its obvious connection with the immediately preceding question. As we have seen, the Westminster divines have asserted that "the word of God, which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the *only* rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy God." And hence, when they proceed to say that "the Scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man," it is natural to assume that they mean, and must mean, that the Scriptures, besides teaching some subordinate things, teach *all* that man is to believe concerning God, and *all* the duty that God requires of man. The questioner, however, does not assert that this is the idea of the Westminster divines. And hence he merely proposes his queries hypothetically, and says,—"*if* by the expression, etc." He no doubt thinks that in the phraseology employed by the Westminster divines,—taking their two questions together,—there were breakers ahead in the Hutchinsonian direction,—breakers on which science was for too long a time to be dashed and beaten, and on which, again, after a period of revolution, Scriptural theology, in its turn, is in danger of being driven. One would have thought that a critic, who speaks loudly of "fundamental investigation," would not have contented himself with a "superficial" view of such subjects.

One would also have thought that he would have looked so far forward to what was to come in his own *Answers*, as to have realised that men may learn something,—from geology for example,—as to what is to be "believed concerning God." (*See Answers on question 9.*)

The fourth question of the *Catechism* is on a most interesting subject:—

Q. *What is God?*

A. *God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.*

The questioner's queries run thus:—

"As to the answer to this 4th question, is it an adequate exhibition of the idea of God? Would any one learn from it, except by remote inference, that he had anything to do with God, or that God had anything to do with him? Is it not an essential element in a just idea of God—such as should dwell in the human mind—that he be viewed as the Great First Cause? Could God be our God, if he were not our Creator, our Father, our Preserver, and Moral Governor?"

"When it is said, moreover, that 'God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal,' is there not either a redundancy or a deficiency? Is not eternity a mode of infinity, and therefore included in infinity? But if it were proper to add eternity to infinity, why not add immensity too?"

"Why, too, specify 'unchangeableness'—the accident, and omit 'perfection'—the essence?"

"Why, too, such a jumble of elements as 'being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth'? Why is power intermixed with the moral attributes? Why is knowledge omitted? Why is freedom omitted? Why is happiness omitted? Are not 'justice, goodness, and truth' involved in 'holiness'? If not, why are love, grace and mercy left out?"

The critic's answers are as follows:—

"Who ever saw, or who ever hopes to see, an *adequate* exhibition of the idea of God? The relations he sustains to his creatures, however momentous, are not included in the idea of God, and in their logical order they are amply unfolded in the Catechism. To have added 'immensity' to 'infinity' in this answer would have been to load it with a superfluous accumulation of nearly synonymous words; to have withdrawn 'eternity' would have been to omit from it an incommunicable attribute, which no other word singly expresses. It will be easy to explain why God is not called perfect, when any one names a perfection that is not substantially included in this list. There is no jumble of elements here, except it be in the mind of the critic. All the perfections of God are either natural or intellectual or moral. In modern schools of philosophy as well as theology, it is usual to designate them by the names of power, wisdom, and goodness. The Westminster theologians adopt this threefold classification—expanding their statement of the moral attributes, because scriptural conceptions of the moral character of God are so essential to right views of the Christian system. Power is not intermixed with the moral attributes but precedes them. Knowledge is included in wisdom. Holiness is distinct from justice, goodness, and truth. Love, grace, and mercy, are included in goodness. Freedom and happiness are omitted, because it was supposed that even children might be safely left to infer that he who is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his holiness must be both free and happy. We challenge Mr. Morison to quote from the whole circle of uninspired literature an answer to the question, What is God? that may be compared with this in its comprehensiveness, in its accuracy, or in its conciseness?"

The questioner might perhaps be perfectly prepared to accept the challenge of the answerer, if he had only evidence that the answerer is prepared to institute comparisons in a spirit of impartiality. But there is such a thing as a determination to defend on the one hand, and to oppose on the other, *through thick and thin*.

We regard the answer to the question of the *Catechism* as containing much that is admirable. And indeed it could not well have been otherwise; when nothing else could legitimately be done, in the way of exhibiting the idea of God, than culling and grouping some of the prominent representations of Scripture. We bear in mind, moreover, the awe which was felt by the Committee of the Westminster Assembly, when it was about to prepare its answer to the question. We appreciate the devotional spirit which pervaded the compilers. And if the words of the answer were really borrowed from the supplicatory address to God, which was offered up by the youngest member of the committee, it might be wrong, indeed, to conclude with Dr. Hetherington, that they contain "God's own answer" to the question, but doubtless they will be steeped in an element of profound reverence and adoration. Nevertheless we do not feel constrained to think that no others have, with equal sincerity, looked up for guidance in their thoughts and expressions. Nor do we deem it dutiful to surrender our right to consider whether or not the exhibition given of the idea of God be so complete

and well-ordered, that it could not be improved. We believe that, with all its excellencies, it could be very much improved.

The critic says, "who ever saw, or who ever hopes to see, an adequate exhibition of the idea of God?" He would thus impeach, we presume, the questioner's first query, as being out of place. But we would have thought that one, who keeps at such a remove from "half thinking," would have noticed that the questioner does not ask, whether the answer of the *Catechism* exhibits an adequate idea of God. The questioner would never, we imagine, have dreamed of proposing such a query; for he no doubt knew that an adequate idea of God would be an idea which co-extensively corresponds to the infinite Objective Reality. But the query which he puts in reference to the answer of the *Catechism* is this,—“Is it an adequate exhibition of the idea of God?”—that is to say, *Is the answer an adequate exhibition of the finite and subjective idea, which is actually entertained by mature-minded men in reference to God?* The two questions are wide as the poles asunder,—the one having reference to what is adequate to an infinite Reality, the other having reference to what is adequate to a finite fact.

When the critic proceeds to say that "the relations which God sustains to his creatures, however momentous, are not included in the idea of God," so that it is no part of the idea of God, that he is our Creator, our Father, our Preserver, our Moral Governor, we again stumble on a curious instance of "half-thinking." He takes it, and obviously in the most off-hand manner, for granted that the term God has nothing in it—etymologically or conventionally—that implies objective relativity. He looks upon it as denoting only what is absolute, and thus only what is entirely self-containing and self-contained. But we wholly demur to this free-and-easy assumption, and demand proof. And we ask, in particular, how, on such a hypothesis, it could come to pass that the term, at once in our modern languages, and in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew,—for we would waive, at present, appeal to the alleged Scandinavian etymology,—admits of intimate connection with pronominal adjuncts, such as *my God, thy God, our God, their God*, whereas the absolute word "Jehovah" cannot be thus construed. We cannot say, either in Hebrew or in English, *my, thy, our, or their Jehovah*.

The critic thinks, moreover, that "to have added 'immensity' to infinity, would have been to load the answer with a superfluous accumulation of nearly synonymous words"; and "to have withdrawn 'eternity' would have been to omit from it an incommunicable attribute, which no other word singly expresses." But he might just as legitimately have said, so far as we can see, that "to have added eternity to 'infinity' would have been to load the answer with a superfluous accumulation of nearly synonymous words: and to have withdrawn 'immensity' would have been to omit from it an incommunicable attribute, which no other word singly expresses." Immensity, or infinity of extension, is, in our opinion, just as much an incommunicable and distinct attribute, as eternity, or infinity of duration.

"It will be easy," our critic continues, "to explain why God is not called perfect, when any one names a perfection that is not substantially included in the list." But the remark, we humbly think, wears somewhat of the aspect of what he so graciously calls "pertness."

And the questioner, moreover, does not inquire why God is not called perfect. He only inquires why "unchangeable,—the accident" is specified, when "perfection—the essence" is omitted. He was, no doubt, well aware that all perfection is implied in "infinity," and that therefore every perfection in detail is "substantially included" in the list actually given. But it did not seem to him that the specification of details is the best possible.

The critic then goes on to say that there is no jumble of elements in the words,—“being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.” He remarks that “all the perfections of God are either natural or intellectual or moral.” We are willing to accept the classification for popular purposes. But we cannot regard it as precise. It involves a theory concerning the emotional element, which we cannot subscribe.

He continues:—“In modern schools of philosophy as well as theology, it is usual to designate them by the names of power, wisdom, and goodness.” For the reason specified, as well as for others, we regard the division as only popularly useful. For the term “goodness,”—not to speak of the term “wisdom,”—is equivocal, and is used to designate sometimes a characteristic of the will, and sometimes a characteristic of the heart. “The Westminster theologians adopt,” continues our critic, “this threefold classification—expanding their statement of the moral attributes, because Scriptural conceptions of the moral character of God are so essential to right views of the christian system.” “Power,” he adds, “is not intermixed with the moral attributes, but precedes them.” But it comes after “wisdom,” which, in its prevailing biblical acceptation, denotes a moral quality, and, when ascribed to God, is distinguished from his knowledge. See Rom. xi. 33. Hence in the *Larger Catechism*, in answer to the same question, *What is God?* we have, in the enumeration of his attributes, “knowing all things, most wise.” Wisdom involves the right use of knowledge; and, in its highest reach,—such as is characteristic of God—it implies the choice of the best ends, absolutely, as well as the choice of the best means to reach the ends. But the choice of the best ends absolutely, is the highest exercise of the moral faculty. And hence it is that Jonathan Edwards is right in saying of the Devil, that “though exceeding crafty and subtle,” he is yet “one of the greatest fools and blockheads in the world.” The two Erskines and Mr. Fisher, in like manner, ask, “what conception may we have of the difference betwixt the infinite knowledge and wisdom of God?” And they answer their question thus,—“His infinite knowledge comprehends all things in heaven and earth, by one intuitive glance of his infinite mind: but his infinite wisdom directs all these things to the proper ends, for which he gave them their being.”

When our critic proceeds to say that “holiness is distinct from justice, goodness, and truth,” while love, grace, and mercy are included in “goodness,” he might just as legitimately have reversed his representation,—and in all probability he would with the utmost suppleness have done so, had it suited his purpose,—and said, “Goodness is distinct from love, grace, and mercy: and justice, goodness, and truth are included in holiness.” As for ourselves, we certainly think that it is unfortunate, and everything the reverse of felicitous, that the word “love” should be omitted from any exhibition of the idea of God,



which gives itself liberty to borrow freely from the phraseology of the New Testament, which so emphatically asserts and re-asserts that "God is love."

Our critic proceeds, however, and says, "Freedom and happiness are omitted, because it was supposed that even children might be safely left to infer that he who is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his holiness, must be both free and happy." But yet, in the Confession of Faith, which is not just intended for children, God's freedom is expressly mentioned in the description of God:—"most wise, most holy, *most free*." (ii. 1.) And in the Larger Catechism which was intended for such as could draw inferences better than mere children, God's happiness is expressly specified, "infinite in being, glory, *blessedness*, and perfection." Perfection too is specified.

On the whole, we deem ourselves abundantly justified in asking liberty to reach out to something superior, something more fully orb'd, something better-ordered, something more adequately representative of the fulness of Scripture, than we possess in the *Catechism's* answer to the question, "What is God?"

The questioner's remarks on the answers to the 5th and 6th questions are of a comparatively trivial nature; and we shall therefore pass on to the 6th question,—“What are the decrees of God?” The answer of the Westminster compilers is the following,—“The decrees of God are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.”

The questioner's questions are as follows:—

“Why are the ‘decrees of God’ said to be his ‘purpose’ rather than his ‘purposes’? Is it because multiplicity would be inconsistent with infinity, or with the divine simplicity? If so, would not the triplicity of personality, which is declared in the answer to the preceding question, be an impossibility? And would not creation also, as an act distinct from the foreordination of it, be impossible?”

“And where is the evidence in Scripture, or out of it, that God ‘hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass’? Has he foreordained all the sins that come to pass? If he had, would not every sin be his device? his pleasure? his good pleasure? Would not sin, then, have something divine in it, and be good?”

“If God had foreordained every sin that comes to pass, would not sin be really the creature of God's will? And how then could it be sin?”

“If God had foreordained every sin, would not every sin come necessarily to pass? Could there be failure in the foreordination of God? But if every human sin be a necessity, can man be to blame for it? Can man be the real sinner?”

“If it be said that God's decree or foreordination of sin is permissive only, what is the idea? Is it that God instead of decreeing sin itself, only decreed to permit it? If it be, is it not clear that it is only God's own permission that is foreordained? And what then becomes of the permitted sin? Does it come to pass unordained?”

In reply to the first query of the questioner, the answerer says,—“The decrees of God are said to be his purpose, rather than his purposes, to denote their unity; for although they are numerically different, and relate to different objects, they are one as they exist in the mind of God—one vast and comprehensive plan.” If this were really the idea intended by the singular word “purpose,” we could cordially subscribe to it. But we fear that the answerer is inventing. And we rather suppose that it was for a different reason altogether that the singular term was employed. The Westminster divines, we apprehend, did not regard “the decrees of God” as “numerically different.” They agreed

with Turretin, who says that "the decrees of God are not many *intrinsically*." (*Decreta Dei non sunt multa intrinsice.*—iv. i.) Hence the third chapter of the confession is entitled, "of God's eternal *decrees*." And Dr. John Dick, a very high authority in the answerer's ecclesiastical communion, says,—“I call the decrees of God his *purpose* or *determination*, in the singular number, because there was only one act of his infinite mind about future things; although we speak as if there had been many, in reference to the process of our own minds, which form successive resolutions, as thoughts and occasions arise, or in reference to the objects of his decree, which being many, seem to require a distinct purpose for each.”—*Lectures* 34. p. 159. And hence too the Erskines and Mr. Fisher ask, “Is the decreeing act of God one simple act only?” And they answer their question thus,—“Yes; because of the perfect oneness or simplicity of his nature, on account whereof he could not but decree all things at once; because all things are naked and open unto his omniscient eye, and because of his immutability.” They ask again, “Why then do we speak of the divine decrees as various, or many?” And their reply is as follows,—“Because of the many objects which the decreeing act of God doth respect: the things decreed are many, but the act decreeing is but one only.”—*Catechism*, in loc.

But passing this blunder of the answerer,—which, however, gives no great augury of comprehensive competency for exhibiting “fundamental investigation,”—we proceed to notice that he goes on to say that “The evidence in Scripture that God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass consists of such passages as these—Isai. xlv. 10; xliii, 13; Dan. iv. 35; Rev. iv. 11; Acts xv. 18; Eph. i. 11.” And he adds, “These are the Scriptural proofs of the doctrine; and till it is not only affirmed but shewn that they are invalid, we shall continue to believe the doctrine.” It is very right in the answerer, to seek for proofs rather than affirmations; and it would not, we may remark, be altogether wrong were he himself occasionally to give something higher than his own assertions. We shall look at his proof-texts.

Isai. xlv. 10 is, we presume, a typographical mistake for Isai. xlv. 7,—“I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil. I the Lord do all these things.” It will be noticed that it is not said “I the Lord do all things.” And surely even the answerer might see, from the antithesis that subsists between the words “evil” and “peace,” that the reference of the former is not to moral, but to penal evil. Gesenius translates the two-membered clause, thus,—“I create prosperity, and produce adversity,” (*schaffe Glück und wirke Unglück*).

Isai. xliii. 13, is the next passage,—“Yea, before the day was, I am he; and there is none that can deliver out of my hand: I will work, and who shall let it?” We suppose that the reference is to the concluding clause, which, however, does not assert that God “will work *everything*,” but only that when God will do anything, none can hinder him from doing it. A cogent proof, certainly, of universal foreordination!

The next passage is Dan. iv. 35,—in which king Nebuchadnezzar says of God,—“he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say

unto him, what doest thou?"—a strange proof-text for the universality of foreordination. For, passing by the assumption of Nebuchadnezzar's inspiration, it is obvious at a glance that the restored monarch does not say that God doeth everything, or that he willed and wills everything that is done. He only says that what he does actually do, he "doeth according to his will," and whatsoever he wills to do, that he actually does, without the possibility of frustration.

The next passage is Rev. iv. 11,—“Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.” But a less eager and one-sided polemic would have noticed that the passage simply refers to the creation of the universe. “Thou hast created all things,” that is, says Alford, “this universal whole,—the universe.” It was “because of the Lord's good pleasure,” that the universe sprang into being.

The next passage quoted is Acts xv. 18,—a most unfortunate appeal, shewing at once the paucity of the apparent proofs which the critic could pick up, and the remarkable antithesis that subsists between his profession of “fundamental investigation” and his actual practice. The passage in our English version, and in the Greek “received text” runs thus,—“Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world.” But (1.) it does not speak at all of foreordination, but of foreknowledge, which is not called in question. That is blunder the first. (2.) It does not even speak of the universality of God's foreknowledge, but only of his foreknowledge of his own works. That is blunder the second. And (3.) there is almost absolute certainty that the passage is exceedingly corrupted, by the introduction of marginal glosses. Matthæi and Schottomit the whole verse altogether, as spurious. Lachmann, following the vulgate and the Alexandrian MS. and Beza's Codex, reads the verse thus,—“Known from the beginning of the world (or, from everlasting) to the Lord is his work.” The Vatican MS. again, and that of Ephraem (C) omit the whole of the verse with the exception of the first three words “known from everlasting,” which would in that case require to be connected with the expression “these things” at the conclusion of verse 17. And this is the reading, which is approved of by Griesbach, Scholz, and Tischendorf, and defended by Meyer, Alford, etc. etc. Even the “all” of the 17th verse must be struck out. And yet this is one of our critic's proof-texts! The allegation of it is a crowd of blunders.

The last passage adduced is Eph. i. 11,—“in whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” But the adduction of this passage too is, we fear, another blunder. For if it be valid as a proof that God foreordained all things, it is doubly sufficient as a demonstration that he does all things,—an idea, which is not quite acceptable to our critic, if we may judge from some of his subsequent remarks. And if the mere occurrence of the phrase “all things” seems to him to imply absolute universality of foreordination, what will he make, we would ask, of Phil. iii. 8, where the apostle says of Christ, “for whom I have suffered the loss of *all things*”? Does the apostle mean that he had, for the sake of Christ, suffered the loss of faith, love, hope, peace, holiness, and heaven? If he does not,

what becomes of our critic's argument, that the expression "worketh all things" proves that God has "foreordained whatsoever comes to pass"? When it is said in Mark iv. 11, "unto them that are without, *all things* are done in parables," does our Saviour refer to "whatsoever comes to pass"? If he does not, what becomes of our critic's argument? When the apostle says to the Colossians, "But now ye also put off *all things*, anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy communication out of your mouths," (iii. 8.), does he enjoin them to put off "whatsoever comes to pass"? If he does, why does he proceed to tell them that there were some things, which they were to "put on"? Could they both "put off" and "put on" "whatsoever comes to pass"? But if the apostle had no such reference, what becomes of our critic's argument? In the last two passages, which we have quoted, our translators supplement the expression, and render it, interpretatively, "all *these* things." And it has doubtless a similar definiteness of reference in Phil. iii. 8; and so, says Piscator, has it in Eph. i. 11,— "who worketh all things, that is, *who worketh all these things.*" Piscator was one of the most zealous of Calvinists, and no "smatterer." But if our critic demurs to Piscator's critical authority, we shall simply beg him to interpret Phil. 14, "*do all things* without murmurings and disputings." Surely the words are not an injunction to "do whatsoever comes to pass." An unprejudiced critic will easily, we apprehend, perceive, that the apostle, when saying in Eph. i. 11, "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will," simply means, *who, in reference to the things spoken of in the preceding context, and in reference to all else that he really does, worketh all that he does according to his own will and good pleasure.* Whatever God does, he does all according to the counsel of his will.

We proceed now to some other remarks of our critic. He quotes from the questioner's questions the following queries:—"Has God foreordained all the sins that come to pass? If he had, would not every sin be his device? his pleasure? his good pleasure? Would not sin, then, have something divine in it, and be good?" Having quoted these queries, our critic thus magnificently refutes all the argument that is involved in them:—"Absolute foreordination is taught in Scripture, but it is not the only doctrine taught there. We believe in the holiness of God; and therefore we believe that he is holy when he foreordains,—yes, when he foreordains sin." We leave the argument in all its glory;—only remarking that all other believers in the Bible who take that "half" of "thinking," which is dissociated from "smattering," admit that if we prove any idea to be utterly at variance with God's holiness, we prove it to be unscriptural. But our critic continues,— "It is no part of the doctrine of the divine decrees, as we hold it, that it 'imparts to sin something divine,' and modesty should prevent any one from imputing such outrageous nonsense to a body of men like the Westminster assembly, unless he is prepared to make good the charge." But modesty, we would reply, should also prevent a man from bringing outrageously false accusation even against an enemy. For the questioner never imputed the idea specified to the assembly of divines. He only suggested that it is a legitimate inference from their doctrine. And if the critic does not know that it is one thing to maintain that a man holds a certain tenet, and another thing altogether to

maintain that he holds all that is logically involved in his belief, he is a greater stranger to controversies in things moral, than he ought to be. At all events his "investigation" is by no means so "fundamental," as he would wish his readers to suppose.

He proceeds to quote some more of the queries of the questioner,— "If God foreordained every sin that comes to pass, would not sin be really the creature of God's will? And how then could it be sin?" And then he proceeds to his refutation;—"Foreordination is not creation. What we affirm, and Mr. Morison denies, is, that God's foreordination of sin does not place him in the same relation to it as if he had committed it. We affirm that the two things are not the same in themselves or in their moral bearings." We certainly notice, perfectly well, that our critic "affirms." No one will doubt his capability in this direction. But unprejudiced readers may possibly desire something more than autocratic affirmation. It is proof, proof, which is in logic the one thing needful. And to most unprejudiced minds, there will appear, so far as intent is concerned, a wonderful approximation to identity, in determining to do a thing, and in determining to make another do it. With us, at least, it is an axiom, that *the cause of the cause, is the cause of the caused.* *He that does a thing by another, does it, in another respect, by himself.* There is, indeed, a circumstantial difference between foreordaining a thing and creating it; but if the foreordination be a purpose, and if the purpose necessitate the creation, the origin of the thing created is, in the last analysis, to be found in the foreordination.

The critic continues:—"As to sin ceasing to be sin, that is an ethical refinement beyond the ken of our gross senses." We are sorry to think that it should; for it puts it for ever beyond the ken of his faculties to apprehend the power and pith of the argument of the apostle Paul,— "otherwise grace is no more grace,"—"otherwise work is no more work."—Rom. xi. 6.

He proceeds, however, to things that seem to him to be within his ken, and quotes from the questioner the following queries,— "If God had foreordained every sin, would not every sin come necessarily to pass? Could there be failure in the foreordination of God? But if every human sin be a necessity, can man be to blame for it? Can man be the real sinner?" He then answers the queries thus;—"Every sin that is foreordained will certainly come to pass. There can be no failure. But since every human sin, though a certainty, is a voluntary certainty, a necessity with the will, man is to blame for it, and is the real sinner." But when he speaks of "a necessity *with* the will," he does not, with all his "fundamental investigation," go far enough back for us. All sin, in its last analysis, is *in* the will. And therefore, in order to meet our difficulty, our critic must go farther in his "investigation," and say that every human sin is "a necessity *in* the will." And what then? Is the poor necessitated will to blame? Is the poor necessitated creature to be punished? Is he the real sinner?

He concludes his critique on the queries regarding this question, by referring to the last paragraph,—which we request the reader to re-peruse. He says of the idea of God's "permissive decree,"—"it is not only that God, instead of decreeing sin itself, only decreed to permit it :

it is also that God's decree of sin does not overbear the personal agency of the sinner." Calvin objected altogether to the idea of *permissive decrees, or decrees to permit*. And while many of his successors contend very earnestly for the expression, we challenge our critic to produce, from any one of them, if of respectable standing as a theologian, and in particular from any member of the Westminster Assembly, or from any respectable expounder of their theology, a single sentence to the effect of his own explanation of the phrase. His explanation is a pure invention. For Calvinistic theologians, who know what Calvinism is, and "what fundamental investigation is," hold, without exception, that God no more "overbears the personal agency" of men in what is good, than he does in what is evil. It is for another reason altogether that they speak of the permission of sin. Whenever they employ the expression, they mean to convey the idea, *that God withholds his grace, because he wills or wishes not to hinder the commission of sin*. As one of the most distinguished members of the Westminster Assembly, Samuel Rutherford, expresses it, permission of sin is *not a mere forbearance to overbear the creature's personal agency; it is a negation of habitual and actual grace*. (Permissio non est "nuda non-violentatio," sed "negatio gratiæ habitualis et actualis."—*De Providentia, vi. vii.*) The phrase, as Turretin says, "is to be understood *positively and affirmatively*, not merely that *God does not wish to hinder sin*, which would be an otiose negation, but *that he wishes not to hinder it*, which is an efficacious affirmation." (Concipienda est *positive et affirmative*, non simpliciter ut Deus *non velit impedire* peccatum, quæ est otiosa negatio, sed ut *velit non impedire*, quæ efficax est affirmatio.—vii. 7.)

It is needless to proceed further with our critic's *Answers*. From beginning to ending they are characterised by the "smattering" and "half-thinking" which he would attribute to others; and are withal, "feeble, captious, pert, censorious, and puerile," and swarming, to boot, with historico-theological blunders. We must look, it would appear, somewhere else for light. And when that much coveted light shall be actually about to dawn upon us, we shall, no doubt, find that it comes in its own sweet and winning way, without attempting to herald its approach by loud flourishes of trumpets.

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#### LETTERS FROM AN ABSENT PASTOR TO HIS FLOCK.

XXXIII.

WITTENBERG, *March 4, 1856.*

MY BELOVED BRETHREN AND FRIENDS,—In my last letter, which was dated from Eisleben, I gave you some account of my visits to Weimar and Jena and Halle. I mentioned to you that I had heard lectures in Halle from Professors Tholuck and Müller, and I remarked that the latter of these two distinguished teachers stands peculiarly high in Germany, in respect of talents, acquirements, character, and moral influence. The lectures which I heard from him were delivered on Wednesday and Thursday, last week. I noticed, while hearing the lectures, and I made the observation to one of the students, that the articulation of the Professor was far from being

distinct. On Friday he was laid low upon his bed, and deprived entirely of the power of speech, by a stroke of paralysis. How uncertain to all, and especially to those who live by the wrung-out sweat of the brain, are speech, and health, and life! Another awakening voice has issued from the mouth of Providence, and sounded from the halls of Halle, and resounded around, "Be ye also ready."

From Halle I went to Leipsic, the great centre of the book-trade of Germany, and the seat of a flourishing university. I visited the university; walked round the boulevards of the town; noticed the old castle of Pleissenberg, where Carlstadt and Luther disputed for several days with Dr. Eck; and then I went out to the quiet park of Rosenthal, and took a long and contemplative promenade along its beautiful and sequestered paths. This park was a favourite resort of one of the greatest thinkers that ever trod upon our earth, Leibnitz, who was a native of Leipsic. When I realised that I was walking in his walks, my thoughts took wing, and my inner man lived for a time in an intellectual region where it found itself surrounded by problems that are difficult indeed of solution, but that are, to the future of our race, to the future of each individual, to universal morality, and to that highest branch of morality—religion, of incomparable importance. I also visited the cemetery and witnessed three interments. The first was that of a person of some distinction. The coffin, covered with a sable cloth, which again was covered with wreaths of flowers, was borne upon an uncovered hearse, and was followed by eight or nine carriages filled with the male and female relatives and friends of the deceased. When the procession reached the family burial place, the coffin was uncovered and laid above the grave. It was made of oak, and was not painted black. The richest of the garlands was then placed over the region of the head. Then all the attendants retired to a respectful distance, and stood in solemn thoughtfulness, while eight musicians sung most beautifully and touchingly an appropriate hymn. After the hymn was finished, the workmen lowered the coffin, and then retired, while another hymn was sung. When this second hymn was concluded, the musicians retired, and the relatives, male and female, approached the grave, and threw, each, some particles of earth upon the resounding coffin. As they performed this final act, I saw the hands of several tremble, I saw their lips quiver, and I saw the tears drop from their eyes. Aye, there are fond fathers and mothers, and husbands and wives, and sons and daughters, and brothers and sisters, in Leipsic as well as in Glasgow, and there are there and in every other place swords that pierce into the heart of their fondness. After the few little clods of earth had been cast into the grave, the party left, and the workmen filled up the grave and spread the numerous remaining wreaths on its top. The second interment, which I witnessed, was of an humbler person. The friends were conveyed in a single carriage; and before it, was borne, by two workmen, the decently covered coffin. It was laid upon a frame; it was painted in imitation of oak; and on its cover were several wreaths of flowers. When it was laid over the grave, four musicians sung harmoniously the first funeral hymn; and after it was lowered, and while the grave was being filled, the second hymn was sung. The words and notes were sweet and full of consolation. As the solemn ceremony closed, another company, with another corpse, arrived: and the interment of this corpse was in some respects the most affecting, and in others the most disgusting, I have ever witnessed. There were two carriages in the procession. One, the first, was empty. Out of the second four females descended;—three were young, and the fourth was old. My heart broke as I saw them, all alone, approach the grave, and the involuntary tear stole down my cheek. "What," thought I, "is there no father, no husband, no brother, no son, no cousin, no neighbour-man, to bear along with these desolate females the burden of their grief? Poor friendless creatures," my thoughts added, "I trust your hearts are rising up toward the great Friend on high." The coffin was painted black, and had no manner of ornament. There was no wreath of flowers laid upon it. There was no hymn sung over the interment. But I looked again and more critically at the group of females. I saw by their countenances that they were not sisters and mother. The elderly woman was ill-favoured, though she had been once beautiful. Her hardened features never relaxed as she stood, like an insensate rock, beside the grave. The two older of the three young females held their handkerchiefs to their faces; but I noticed that they were *trying* to appear to weep; and yet one of them could not restrain herself from laughing.—I suppose at her own hypocrisy. The third made no attempt at grief. All three were gaily dressed; and long ere the grave was filled they wandered away, with tripping steps and giddy faces, to visit another grave. I noticed that several onlookers

were whispering concerning them. Poor creatures! poor creatures! poor, poor, poor creatures! They had buried a sister in sin; and while the countenances of the young survivors seemed to indicate complacency on deliverance from an object of jealous rivalry, the countenance of the fourth was like that of a mother of abominations, who was glad to be freed from an expensive burden. Ah! young men, see the pitiful and yet unpitied friendlessness of the end of those who are the objects of unhallowed lusts, and let your generous feelings take counsel with morality, and with religion, and even with prudence itself. And ye, young women! Beware! O beware! The loss of virtue is the loss of all that is desirable: it is the loss even of all love, of all true friendship, and of all true sympathy.

From Leipsic I returned to Halle, and walked thence to Eisleben, a distance of above twenty English miles. It was on the forenoon of last Saturday that I had this walk, for I wished to worship on Sabbath in the town where Luther was born, and in the church where he was baptized. My wish was gratified, and in some respects most delightfully gratified. Saturday was a golden day. The sky was clear; the road was dry and smooth, lined too all the way with trees; and though the scenery is not surpassing in beauty or grandeur, it nevertheless reminded me vividly of some parts of my native Caledonia. For some miles in succession the road passed along lakes. While looking upon these, and while listening to the numerous larks that were pouring forth their joyful music from the sky, I could not help feeling that my heart had fled to the land of my home; and many were my thoughts of the beloved people of my pastoral charge, of the other churches, of the academy, of my brethren in the ministry, of the sabbath-schools, and of my friends in detail. In the fulness of my mental buoyancy I likewise again and again made experiments on my voice, when no human ear was near to hear; and I felt grateful to be able to mark a decided improvement in the clearness and strength of its tones. I could speak, as I thought, with much less labour of the chest and throat. By and by I arrived in comfort and with a grateful heart at my destination.

Eisleben is a town of about 7000 inhabitants,—the original stock of whom were workers in the adjoining silver mines. A considerable proportion of the people of the town are still miners, who wear a peculiar professional dress. Luther's father, in consequence, as it is supposed, of having unintentionally killed a man in Möhra, his native place, left his home near Eisenach, and sought employment in the mines near Eisleben. He obtained it, and in this, the town of his adoption, his son Martin was born a few months after his arrival. It was on the 10th of Nov. 1483, that the future Reformer saw the light. He was baptized on the following day; and as the day happened to be, according to the Romish calendar, St. Martin's day, the boy was called Martin. The house in which he was born has been renewed, and a portion of it is used now as a free school; but the apartment in which the birth took place is preserved in nearly its original state; and in two other apartments are kept many Lutheran memorials; such as paintings, manuscripts, coins and medals, as also a reading desk that had belonged to the Reformer. The church in which he was baptized has also been renewed; but the font from which the baptism was administered is preserved. By one of the many singular whirls that occur in Providence, Eisleben became the death-place, as it had been the birth-place of Luther. Eisleben lay within the Mansfeld domains; and it happened that, in the year 1545 two contending Counts of Mansfeld agreed to refer their disputes to the arbitration of the then venerable Reformer. They invited him to visit them for this purpose. He complied with their invitation, and, though not in good health, he left Wittenberg on Jan. 23, 1546, in the company of his two sons Martin and Paul, and set out for Eisleben. When he reached Halle, he found the river Saal flooded, and he was in consequence detained there three days, during which time he lived with Dr. Justus Jonas. On the fourth day, he succeeded, though at some risk, in crossing the river, and he was received with great distinction by the Counts in Eisleben. Soon after his arrival, however, his illness increased upon him; and though he was able for several days to attend to the business for which he had come, and to preach four times, and to preside in the consecration of two ministers, yet at length physical nature completely and rapidly broke down, and his spirit left his worn-out frame on the morning of the 18th day of February. His last conversations and ejaculations breathed the full assurance of faith and of hope. Three times he called out,—“Into thy hands I commend my spirit; thou hast redeemed me, O thou faithful God;” and when asked by Dr. Justus Jonas, who had accompanied him from Halle, “if he could in death rest firmly on Christ and on the doctrine he had



preached," he answered loudly and distinctly and with folded hands, "yes." His death occurred in the house of the town-clerk, with whom he was lodging. The house is still standing. It is opposite St. Andrew's church, in which he preached and presided at the consecration of the two ministers. The pulpit from which he preached is preserved, though it is not now used. It has a curious old hour-glass affixed to it, similar to the one in Schmalkalden. I mounted the pulpit in St. Andrew's, and turned round the hour-glass. I laid my hand in the baptismal font of St. Peter's; and I entered and examined the birth-house and the death-house. I attempt not to depict the feelings of interest that rose around the centre of my soul, and permeated it, as I witnessed each scene in succession. On the Lord's day I went to St. Peter's church; but alas! all was cold, cold. There were only about forty persons present. Ah! the present non-religion of Germany presents a most melancholy spectacle to the eye of one who is capable of seeing into the spiritual element of our nature, and into our relations to the infinite Spirit.

From Eisleben I walked back to Halle, and journeyed thence by rail to Wittenberg, from which place this letter is dated. It is a place, whose name is more or less familiar to you all. It is the place where Luther and Melancthon spent the chief part of their lives, and where they wrought together, by tongue and pen, and head and heart, in the great cause of the Reformation. It is the place where Luther, on the 31st of October, 1517, nailed to the chief door of the castle-church his ninety-five theses against indulgences, and by that act unconsciously inaugurated the Reformation. It is the place where, outside the Elster gate, on the 10th of December, 1520, he publicly burned the Bull that the Pope had issued against him. It is the place where the first Protestant congregation met, in the city-church, to worship God. It is the place where Luther broke through the rules of the Romish celibacy, and married Catherina von Bora, formerly a nun. It is the place where Melancthon drew around him students, sometimes to the number of three thousand at one time, so that the university of Wittenberg acquired a world-wide renown. It is the place where the mortal remains of both Luther and Melancthon were buried. I visited Melancthon's house. It is still a stately and noble and conspicuous building. Above the door is the inscription—"Here dwelt and taught and died Philip Melancthon." I entered the room in which he died. I walked through the garden, on the walls of which are the visible remains of his vast auditorium. I of course visited Luther's house. It too is a noble residence. His sitting apartment is finely preserved in its ancient condition. It is a large and lofty and oak-pannelled room; and it contains a massive table which he used, a curious double chair on which he and his Catherine would often sit together, a stove which was formed and figured according to his own directions, and a jug out of which he drank,—much more moderate in its dimensions than the Wartburg one, and the still more gigantic one in Coburg. It also contains some of Catherine's embroidery-work, and specially, an embroidered, though rude, likeness of the man to whom she had devoted her heart and her earthly all,—of Luther. In another apartment is preserved the elegant professorial cathedra, from which the Reformer lectured in the university; and another cheerful apartment is the chamber in which he slept. In the city-church is the baptismal font, made by Herman Vischer, from which he baptized. In the castle-church is his grave and tombstone, and the grave and tombstone of Melancthon. In the Rathhaus is preserved the rosary (or string of beads) which he used when a monk. All these objects I saw. I gazed too at the doorway where his ninety-five theses were nailed up, though the old door itself was destroyed by the French. I walked round the spot where he burned the Papal Bull, though the old tree is gone, and it is a comparatively young one that is growing in its place. I contemplated and re-contemplated the noble bronze statue of him, formed by Schadow, and erected in 1822 in the market-place. And I was enabled, I think, from Cranach's portraits of him and of Melancthon in the castle-church, the Rathhaus, and in the great altar-piece of the city church, to form a more precise idea of the appearance and even of the intellectual peculiarities of the two human pillars of the great German Reformation. I need not add that my visit to Wittenberg constituted a sunny spot in the varied scenery of my travels and of my life.—I remain your loving Pastor,

J. — M. —

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BE CAREFUL FOR NOTHING.

“Be careful for nothing: but in every thing by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known unto God. And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus.”—Phil. iv. 6, 7.

THERE are many men, and perhaps some who read these pages, who carry on their spirit a heavy burden of care and anxiety.

Not a few are harassed, almost to agony, as to how they may get the common necessaries of life, so that they may have sufficient to eat and to drink and to be clothed withal.

Others, giving themselves scarcely any concern, as to how they themselves are to be fed and clothed, are nevertheless filled with distressing fears and agitating forebodings as to how their little ones or other near and dear relatives are to be provided for. It is in many respects a most amiable anxiety. And, in so far as it is a renunciation of improvidence and a crucifixion of self-indulgence, we must sympathise with it, and approve of it, and even admire it. But it is something more. In so far as it is harassing anxiety, it is most likely tinged with an element of distrust in Divine Providence, and thus with an element of discontent. As such, it is wrong: and its presence in the soul should be contested and resisted.

Others are equally bowed down and burdened under very different cares. Some, for instance, are distressed about their health. They feel, it may be, symptoms of disorder, which give ominous intimation of coming difficulties or dissolution; and they bear about with them a load of anxieties about the future: while others, true to more generous instincts, care comparatively little about their own health, but, when any unfavourable symptoms reveal themselves in the state of their children's health, or in other near relatives, they are in a perfect tumult of tormenting fears as to the consequences. Happiness in such circumstances is

a thing of utter impossibility. They would almost think it inhuman and sinful to be in a state of calm inward repose. They feel as if they were bound to carry on their soul a load of anxieties, and that it would be unnatural and unloving to try to get quit of it.

There are others, who are heavy-laden under a still different burden. They have been bereaved of children; lovely girls, it may be, or noble boys; or maidens, it may be, budding into the maturity of beauty,—accomplished, elegant, and innocent; or young men, upright, ingenuous, and manly. The bereavement disarranges, perhaps, a thousand schemes, and ruptures asunder something like a thousand heart-strings. It immediately loads the soul with anxieties as to how life is to be spent without the beloved object; or it burdens it with distresses and regrets that other and more likely means had not been employed to prevent the sad catastrophe. Perhaps, too, as affliction often comes in clusters, there is added, to the loss of children, the loss of a wife, it may be, or the loss of a husband. And in that loss, there seems to be another load of harassments laid upon the soul, in reference to the future, and in reference to the possibility of getting on, if not of getting up, in the struggle of life, now that one or more of the great objects of life have vanished out of sight.

It is needless to specify other occasions of carking carefulness. They are very numerous. Some are disappointed in business. Some are persecuted for conscience' sake. Some find friends to prove unfaithful. Some feel their spirit unequal to the high achievements, after which they aspired. And hence many are heavy-laden with anxieties: and as they look forward in the way, which stretches out before them, it seems to be covered with a settling, or settled, darkness and gloom. As they look, a weight is felt to be pressing on their heart, crushing it almost into despair.

Now all such persons, who are living in the dark hemisphere of things, and for whom the sun seems to be suffering a perpetual eclipse, must either be believers in Jesus, or unbelievers.

If they be believers, we would say to them, in the glorious language of the apostle,—“Be careful for nothing”—be anxious—distressingly solicitous—for nothing; “but in every thing by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known unto God. And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus.” There is a way of getting quit of your burden. There is a possibility of “casting all your care,” as the Apostle Peter expresses it, “upon God, who careth for you.” Trust in the Lord. You trust already in his propitiousness. You trust

in it for pardon, for present and for final acceptance, for admission into everlasting life and glory. It is well. Trust in his Providence too. Trust in Him, as one who is too wise to err, and too good to be unkind. Trust in Him, that all which he does to you, and all which he permits to be done, he will make to work together for your good. Trust in Him that he is able and willing and ready to lead you along the path that conducts to glory, honour, and immortality, although that pathway lies across precipitous mountains and treacherous morasses, and is infested on the right hand and on the left, at many a turn, with fiends and foes. Trust in the Lord, and thus "be careful,"—be oppressingly anxious,—“for nothing; but in everything by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known unto God: and the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your heart and mind through Christ Jesus.”

When you are exhorted to be "careful for nothing," the Holy Spirit means not that you should be *careless*. It is no virtue in a man to be careless. Assuredly there is no christianity in carelessness. In carelessness, there is neglect of duty. There is remissness. There is a want of diligence and industry and earnestness. And the example of Christ, the example of his apostles, the example of all his true disciples in early times and in all times, combine with the express injunctions of Scripture to assure us that a spirit of slothfulness, and negligence, and idleness, and unearnestness, is every thing the reverse of what God would have us to cherish; every thing the reverse of that on which his benediction is resting. We must not, then, be careless as to business. We must not be careless as to health. We must not be careless as regards the comfort of those who are near to us by ties of consanguinity or friendliness. We must not be careless about life or about death. We must not be careless about time or about eternity. We must not be careless about weal or about woe. We must not be careless about ourselves, or about our neighbours, or about our God. We must not be careless about any important reality, with which we have to do. In the good sense of the term, and within the limits of appropriate moderation in feeling, we should be *careful* about all these things. But in the gloomy sense of the term,—the sense that is inconsistent with conscious peace, and conscious joy, and lively hope,—the sense which is inconsistent with contentment of heart and bliss,—in this sense we must not be careful for anything. For nothing must we be over-careful. We must not carry about with us carking care. We must not be burdened and borne down with care. We must not be full of anxious care. But, on the contrary, we should, "in every thing by prayer and supplica-

tion, with thanksgiving, make known our requests unto God. And then the peace of God,"—the peace which God gives, and which God alone can give,—and which the world can no more take away than it can give,—“the peace of God, which passeth all understanding,” which not only surmounteth the creative powers of every human mind, but which baffleth the subtlest intellects of philosophers to comprehend,—“will keep our hearts, and all that is in them, through Christ Jesus.”

The cure of over-anxiety is thus to be found in drawing near, in our spirit, to God. “In everything,”—in every condition, which might involve in it the elements of heart-harassments, we should approach God “by prayer.” We should, that is to say, address ourselves to God. We should take words with us,—whether articulate or inarticulate, it matters little,—and speak unto God. We should go into the company of God. We should feel Him to be our companion; and commune with Him.

And, in the midst of such “prayer,” we should present specific “supplication,”—that is, express petition for what we want. And that petition,—so far at least as the heart of its essence is concerned,—will infallibly be granted. All in it, which is possible, in consistency with perfect wisdom and infinite love and human free-will, shall be granted: and nothing else assuredly, will really be wanted by any true believer in Jesus. Thus “all things whatsoever we shall ask in prayer, believing, we shall receive.”

And along with “prayer and supplication,” let there be “thanksgiving,”—bright-eyed, cheerful-hearted “thanksgiving” for the many mercies enjoyed in the past, retained in the present, and promised for the future. For never should we ask for more, except with lips that render thanks for the blessings which have been already vouchsafed.

If we thus go to God, and “cast our care upon him,” “the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep our heart and mind through Christ Jesus.”

But what of the unbeliever, whose spirit is burdened, and well nigh overwhelmed with care? He has no other refuge than that into which the believer has fled before him. He too, if he would get quit of his heart-gnawing care, must go in spirit to God. But Jesus is “the way.” He must go, therefore, first of all, to Jesus. He must believe in Jesus, as the propitiation for his sins, and as thus having for his soul present salvation. Fellow sinner, go thus to Jesus, in spirit, just now. Accept with the hand of faith the gift of eternal life. Believe that it is for you. And then, “in everything by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known unto God; and the

peace of God, which passeth all understanding, will keep your heart and mind, through Christ Jesus."

Blessed is the man who suffers himself to be thus divinely led in the way of true and lasting and everlasting pleasantness and peace.

## OUR WORK AS CO-WORKERS WITH GOD.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE OPENING OF THE E. U. ACADEMY, GLASGOW, AUGUST, 1863.

[We had the privilege of listening to the following Lecture when it was delivered by Professor Taylor. And believing that it would be healthfully stimulating to that considerable proportion of our *Repository-constituency*, which embraces ministers of the gospel and theological students, and that it would be interesting and profitable to our readers in general, we solicited its publication in our pages.

For the information of those who are not familiar with the history of the *Evangelical Union*, we may mention that the Association, so called, is a band of independent churches and ministers, knit together by doctrinal, and especially by evangelical, sympathies and practical aims, and sustaining a theological Academy,—at the present session of which more than forty students were enrolled.—*Ed. of E. Repository.*]

MR. PRESIDENT AND BELOVED BRETHREN,—At the commencement of this session, and at the beginning of my labours as one of the appointed teachers of our Academy, I wish to say a few things concerning *our work as co-workers with God*. I shall do so in the following order:—I shall consider, first, the work we have to do as co-workers with God; secondly, the qualifications needed for the work: thirdly, the grand end at which we must aim.

I. *The work which we have to do as co-workers with God.* In the announcement of this part of our subject, three things are implied:—(1) That there is a God, (2) That God is working, and (3) That we are in a position to co-operate with God in his work.

(1) *There is a God.* This is one of the most familiar affirmations of the human mind. Few, indeed, may be able to trace the intellectual process by which the conclusion is reached; yet it is reached, and rested in, by the human mind. God is the natural resting-place of all the thoughts and desires and aspirations of the soul. Without God, as the first and the last, the soul of man drifts on a shoreless, bottomless sea of doubt concerning everything in human experience and destiny. The spirit of man naturally and necessarily goes out beyond, and rises above, itself, and all earthly things, in search of the ultimate



Reason and Cause of all that is finite and phenomenal. As when we leave our homes on a winter night, our eyes are attracted by the stars that sparkle in the azure vault; so the mental eye ever turns toward that which is beyond and above this world,—to something spiritual and divine. The eagle may have her nest on the cliff, and the cry of the eaglets may be music to her ear; yet at times her native instinct makes her spread her wings and soar away to higher regions. So the human spirit may have a home on earth, where it finds attractions sweet and powerful; yet, by a native instinct, it rises above these lower things, and on the wings of thought and desire, ascends to that which is eternal, infinite, divine. The cattle of the field, the beasts of the earth, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the waters, may be abundantly satisfied with the objects of sense. But it is not so with the spirit of man; it passes the boundaries of matter and of sense, and grasps in its thoughts, affections, and aims, those things which are spiritual and eternal. Thus, by a certain internal force, or necessity of nature, the soul of man ever seeks, and never truly rests till it finds, the infinite and ever-blessed God as the First and the Last.

(2) It is implied, secondly, that *God is a worker*. Indeed, it is as a worker, as the first and chief of workers, that God is especially known to us. It is in and through his workings, without and within us, that we are able to know him. If God had simply and quiescently enjoyed himself, and wrought nothing objectively, then he would still have been in essence what he is, but there would have been no finite mind to know him, and no manifestation of him made. But he is not only the greatest of Beings, he is also the greatest of Workers; and it is in his workings that the glories and excellencies of his infinite Being are displayed. He has a work to do; and he does it, with the energy of omnipotence, with the vigilance of unerring wisdom, and with the beneficence of unlimited goodness. He works in the drifting sands of the desert, in the revolutions of the earth, and in the rushing constellations of heaven. He works in the beauty of every flower that adorns the world, and in the glories of sun, moon, and stars. In every plant as it grows, in every animal as it lives and breathes, in all things here below, and in all things above,—from the sands on the sea-shore to the innumerable worlds in space,—from the invisible atoms of life on earth to the noblest angel in heaven;—in all, and through all, God is ever working, and manifesting his own glories and excellencies.

(3) It is implied that *man is in a position to co-operate with God—to be a co-worker with God*. As not only the greatest of Beings, but as also the greatest of Workers, God has so constituted all things, that activity, working capacity, is the standard

of creature-dignity and nobility. If the ever-living, ever-working God wishes to give some of his creatures a God-like mission, he must give them power to work like himself, and place them in a sphere where they shall have the means and opportunity of being co-workers with him. Hence, as a matter of fact, the scale of being rises and falls according to the scale of life-activity possessed. The lowest form of existence is that of inorganic matter. With all its bulk, it is inert,—moving only as it is moved by a superior living cause. It is a magazine of latent forces which never act except at the touch of a living agent. In proportion as we rise above the inorganic and inert masses of matter, to life, we fix the status of each class of living creatures according to the various degrees of activity each class possesses. The noblest form of life on earth is human life, possessing as it does the most various powers and activities, adapted to perform the noblest work. Work is not, as the slothful imagine, our misfortune; nor is it our disgrace, as the foolishly proud suppose; but it is the seal and stamp of a divine dignity of nature, a nature which, because it approaches nearest to the image of God, has the greatest activity in it, and the greatest work assigned to it.

Our whole nature is constructed by God on the principle of our being workers together with him in the advancement of all our interests. Our entire constitution of body and of mind is designed for work. Look at our bodies; they are pillars of strength, which nevertheless are easily bent, and moved in every possible direction. Our arms and hands are instruments for working of the most wonderful description. They can draw every possible line, and construct the most delicate fabrics, or shatter a rock in pieces. Look at the organs of speech by which we can so easily utter in the ears, and pour into the souls of others, all that is in ourselves. And then, finally, look at the thinking, feeling, planning, contriving soul that lies behind, and animates this outer organism:—and we have before us a self-moving, self-acting, being, constructed by infinite power and wisdom for the express purpose of working with its Maker.

But still further, there are in our nature multitudinous wants and cravings, operating as instinctive impulses to work for, and to attain, that which satisfies. God gives the appropriate objects which are correlated to these wants and cravings; but the bridge by which the gifts of God pass over to meet and satisfy the wants, is formed by our own working, as workers together with God. Hence in every sphere of human life we find human and divine activity harmoniously interblending and co-operating. In the treasures of the harvest field, in the useful and ornamental products of the factory and the workshop, in the common benefits of

commerce, in the common-wealth of nations, and in the happiness and general well-being of the family, men and women and children are all workers together with God; and in him, and through him, are one and all capable of doing something to promote and advance the benignant ends God has in view.

Since, then, it is the design of our nature to work with God in attaining and promoting the general interests of our race, the question arises—what is the work to which *we* should more especially devote ourselves, and which we should make it the business of our lives to perform? I answer at once, it is the work of being ministers of the gospel,—co-workers with God in the gospel of Christ. The gospel—the good news—contains the record of the greatest work of God. All the works of God are great; but the greatest is that work which is set forth in the good news concerning Christ crucified—Christ the sacrifice for sin. To do this work, God became incarnate in the person of Christ Jesus. God incarnate in Jesus Christ came to do a great work in revealing the Father—the Godhead—to mankind. In doing this he wrought works of deliverance from the various forms of evil to which our race is subject. He gave sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, speech to the dumb, health to the diseased, symmetry to the deformed, soundness of mind to the demon-possessed, and life to the dead. In these works he revealed God as having power and willingness to deliver men from every form of evil and misery caused by sin. In his holy life of obedience to the law which men had transgressed, and in being “made sin,” and a “curse for us,” he magnified the law and made it honourable, at once in its precept and in its penalty. On the ground of this propitiatory sacrifice, God is ready to forgive, justify, purify, and finally glorify for ever, all who believe in the crucified Jesus. To convince the world of sin, and to bring men to Jesus and thence to God, the Holy Spirit is come, and works in and around all men, that they may believe. This is the evangelical work of a Three-one-God for man’s good and for God’s glory. This is the work which has had, and still has, and will for ever have, the greatest intrinsic importance; and it is in connection with this same work that we must be workers together with God.

But how, or in what way can we work together with God in the gospel of his Son? It is not in sending Christ, or in taking part in Christ’s atoning sacrifice, that we can work with God. All that is done—finished. But God the Holy Spirit has come to convince the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment; and according to the appointment of Christ, men are to work together

with God in these things. The great commission, the great command of Christ, is, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Hence his apostles went every where preaching the Lord Jesus. The Lord Jesus himself, in leaving this world, left his work to his followers as the good news which they were to take and carry to the perishing world, preaching it and commending it as God's truth to every man's conscience. This is the work of God to which we have devoted our lives. Our work is, not to make the gospel, but to take it as God gives it, and preach the word of the gospel; to "be instant in season and out of season; to reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long suffering and doctrine." In doing this we must watch in all things, endure afflictions if need be, and by all means do the work of evangelists, and make full proof of our ministry in the gospel. Our work is to know nothing, and to make known nothing among men, save Christ, and him crucified;—to preach Christ crucified, the power of God, and the wisdom of God, knowing that it pleases God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. To this work of preaching Christ, we must so give ourselves as that we "may finish our course with joy, and the ministry which we have received of the Lord Jesus, to testify the gospel of the grace of God." All this we must do, and "keep back nothing which is profitable to men, but shew them, and teach them publicly, and from house to house, testifying both to the Jews, and also to the Greeks, repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ." In one word, God has given to us the ministry of reconciliation, and has committed unto us the word of reconciliation, so that we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech men by us, we pray them in Christ's stead to be reconciled to God. Thus our work links on to the work of God and of Christ and of the Spirit, as we preach the unsearchable riches of Christ. If, then, we fulfil our mission as ministers of Christ,—Christ must be our great central theme; and as moon and planets revolve around the sun, and derive their light and beauty from his rays, so all truths of history, science, and philosophy, move in their respective orbits around the cross of Christ, and reflect something of his glory and excellence. In the hand of a skilful preacher of the gospel, every thing in heaven and in earth will be made tributary to the glory and honour of the crucified one.

II. *The qualifications needed for this work.* In an important respect, all Christians are qualified to preach Christ by their lives, and by their words. But the work of which I speak, is the work of the ministry, of public preaching and teaching, as the ambassadors of Christ to man. To do this work efficiently—to do it so as

to benefit men, and honour God, requires special qualifications. I shall refer to a few of these:—

(1.) And the first which I shall mention is *natural talent*.—In some quarters there is a tendency to depreciate the importance of this qualification for the work of the ministry. It is not, say they, human intellect, wisdom, or eloquence, which is to do the work of God in the church and in the world; it is to the grace of God, and the power of the Spirit alone, that we must look. There is an egregious mistake in such an idea. For the grace and the Spirit of God operate in harmony with man's nature, and never ignore it. Grace does not give natural, constitutional talent; it only takes original talent, and uses it for gracious ends. Hence it is, that we find some of the most holy and useful people of God in private life, who would be entirely out of their sphere, were they to attempt to occupy the position of public teachers. If a young man has not brought into the world, with him, the natural gifts of a preacher, let him seek out his proper sphere of usefulness and honour in the church, but let him not enter the ministry. For grace will never supply the place of native talent. For this work there is required a clear intellect, a sound judgment, a naturally warm and loving heart,—energy and prudence of character. Apart from such native constitutional attributes, we may be good and holy in the sight of God and man, but we shall not be good preachers, nor good ministers of the gospel. This is self evident, and therefore I proceed to notice:—

(2.) That another qualification needed for the work, is *the full and entire consecration of ourselves and of all we have to the Lord Jesus Christ*. It matters little what our native talents are, however great, if they are not, one and all, laid as an humble thank-offering at the feet of Jesus. We shall only be as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal to God and man. The mere professional minister of Christ, is the most abominable creature in God's universe; and God, in mercy to us and to the souls of men, forbid that any of us should ever enter the ministry, or stay a day in it, simply as a profession. This work must be to us, the one thing we do, the one thing we desire, the one thing to which in body, soul, and spirit, we are consecrated.

In order to this personal consecration to the work, we must, first of all, be converted men, be born again,—be new creatures in Christ Jesus. The unconverted man cannot be a man consecrated to God and the gospel. He is at "enmity against God." He is, in one form or another, his own idol. He will live for himself, till he is renewed in the spirit of his mind, and is restored to God and goodness through faith in Christ. Then he begins to love God supremely, love Christ supremely; and by this supreme love he is constrained to live not unto himself, but unto

him who loved him. This is essential, and if we have not felt this, if we have not realised this in our souls, we are unfit for the ministry.

Again, in order to our full and hearty consecration to this work, it is needful that we have faith in the gospel as the power of God to save them that believe. It is indispensable that we verily believe the gospel for ourselves, and realise our own safety in Christ. But if we would be devoted, heart and soul, to the preaching of the gospel, we must likewise have faith in it for others. It must not occur to our hearers to ask, does that man believe what he says? No. The faith of our soul in that blessed gospel must appear in every word, and every look, so as to make every one feel that we believe and therefore speak. He who is half in doubt as to whether the gospel which he preaches is adapted and divinely intended to save souls there and then, will be as one who beats the air. His soul will flag in its earnestness, and his hearers will be hushed into a sleep and torpor of soul. But if we have faith in the gospel as the power of God to save souls, it will move us to devote and consecrate ourselves to our great work.

Again, if we would fully consecrate all our powers to the service of Christ and the gospel, it will be needful for us to enter into sympathy with God and Jesus, and the Holy Spirit, in love to the souls of men. God the Father so loved the world, that he spared not his Son. God the Son so loved the world, that he gave himself a ransom for all. God the Spirit so loves the world, that he is come, and now works in divine love, to convince the world. A Three-one God is in loving holy earnest about the eternal good of souls, and he who would work with God, requires to be in sympathy with God, and feel with God in earnest, and this will secure a full and constant consecration to the work.

Finally, if we would be unflagging in our consecration to this work, we must give ourselves to prayer. Our fundamental relation to God is dependence; God's fundamental relation to us is all-sufficiency. But the degree and measure in which God's all-sufficiency meets and supplies all the wants of our dependent being, are conditioned on prayer,—We are filled with the fulness of God in proportion as we ask and receive, seek and find. A prayerless minister is a useless, powerless minister; but he who is a man of prayer, who prays always with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit, becomes a power for God, and for good in the world. Therefore let each one of us, with the first, and most successful co-workers with God, resolve and say "We will give ourselves continually to prayer and to the ministry of the word."

(3.) Another qualification for this work is a *well trained, well*

*instructed mind.* Suppose that a young man has good natural abilities, and, as a new creature in Christ Jesus, has fully consecrated himself to the work of the gospel ministry,—naturally and morally he is qualified for the work. But in as much as the work consists in public teaching concerning what God is, and has done; and what man is, and requires to be; it is manifest that the degree of his usefulness very much depends upon the culture of his intellect, and the acquirement of an adequate knowledge of whatever bears upon the great theme of his public ministry. Hence the necessity and importance of an institution like this to give young men a mental training preparatory to their entrance upon the work of the ministry. The aim of this institution, I apprehend, is two fold:—

First, *to train and discipline the mind, so as to give young men the full use of their native powers.* There is, doubtless, great difference in the native talents, and mental tendencies of men. These will manifest themselves, whatever sphere of life is occupied. But I believe the difference between one man and another, is chiefly owing to the difference in the training and discipline to which men are subjected. A man of ordinary abilities well trained and disciplined, will far outstrip, in practical power and efficiency, the man of far greater native talent, whose powers have been left without training. It is with the mind as it is with the body. Every thing depends upon the culture of original capability. At first we cannot use the eye, the hand, the foot, or the tongue. But by training and culture the eye becomes quick in its movements, and accurate in its observations. The hand and the foot become expert in every movement, and the inarticulate babbling of the babe becomes developed into perfect speech. So it is with the mind in systematic and clear thinking. At first, there are multitudinous defects and mistakes into which we are liable to fall. We have not the full use of our mental faculties. It is only by constant use and exercise that we can gain the mastery of our native powers. In pursuing your studies, brethren, in this academy, as also your studies elsewhere, remember that the benefit lies not merely in the stores of knowledge you may gather. One great advantage of your studies is the drill and training of your mind. In your studies, here, you will find a constant pressure upon you to think, to think clearly, to think vigorously, to think continuously. There is a necessity laid upon you to “scorn delights, and live laborious days.” You will feel constrained to deny yourselves to ease and self-indulgence, and to concentrate your whole energies upon the duties belonging to the various classes. Thus you will find the daily duties of the academy a mental gymnasium in which your mental faculties will be invi-

gorated by hard work; and every power that is in you will become more subject to your will, and be wielded by you with greater ease. For your own sakes, then, for the sake of each other, for the sake of your teachers, for the sake of the churches to which you may yet minister, I doubt not you will take advantage of all the duties of the session, as a means of mental training and discipline, so that as intellectual athletæ you may go forth into earth's moral arena prepared to conquer.

But another aim of our Academy is to impart *the needful knowledge of divine things for the work of the ministry*. As ministers of Christ our work is to make known to men the things necessary to salvation. But to do this, it is indispensable that we should know the things of God ourselves. Our knowledge as preachers, however, requires to be of a more complete, more comprehensive description than that possessed by our fellow Christians in general. The common-places of Christian doctrine are known in their simplest form by almost all our hearers. If we cannot go deeper than these, our ministry will be unprofitable, and, in fact, a failure. The aim of our institution is to impart knowledge which underlies the blessed common-places of christianity,—a knowledge which will give a power and originality in unfolding the simplest topics, and the best known principles of the faith. It is not to cram you with ready-made sermons, which you may, like parrots, retail to others, that we shall meet in this Hall; but it is, if possible, to make you masters of great principles, which, in after life, will enable you to think out things for yourselves, and work them up in forms at once instructive and attractive.

In the exegetical classes you will be instructed in the original languages of the Bible, and be put in possession of some of the more important principles of biblical hermeneutics. A knowledge of these languages, and of the principles of interpreting the inspired writings, is of essential importance in expounding the word of God. It is true that comparatively few are able to attain such an intimate knowledge of philology, and sacred learning, as to be independent, original expositors. Nevertheless all ought to be able intelligently to use, and to be competent judges of, the works of the best commentators. With the advantages you possess in this department of your studies, I am sure you will be put in possession of those principles of biblical interpretation, which will enable you to bring out of the inexhaustible mine of Scripture those intellectual and moral treasures, which will at once enrich and delight those to whom you minister.

But when you have attained such an amount of exegetical knowledge as qualifies you to go to the word of God, and ascertain what it means in its words, and clauses, and verses, and



chapters, and books, you require to know those general principles, or truths, which underlie and give unity to all the details and items of truth yielded by your exegetical studies. It is these general principles of divine truth which will be more especially brought before you in the Systematic Class. Our finite minds are easily bewildered by individual objects and details. We must generalize, and reduce the multitudinous to the uniform. The general principles of theology, in their relations and harmonies, open a new and vast field of thought. The knowledge of these principles guides and directs us in all our studies, and gives a unity to all our public ministrations. Without such knowledge we are destitute of rudder and compass, and shall drift and wander in thought. But if we possess this knowledge, it will be the means of guiding us in our study of details, and in our working of them up in their relations and harmonies, so that something fresh and original will always appear in our discourses.

Thus qualified to unlock the multiform treasures of the Bible, and to work them up into uniform system, you require to know how to use the whole of your mental stores for the greatest good. The end or aim of all is practical. Concerning this you will receive instruction in the Pastoral Theology Class. There you will have laid before you, general principles to guide you, when you come to deal with the concrete wants and trials of immortal men. Knowledge of these things is all-important. It will place you in a position to adapt your labours, and use all your stores for the edifying of the church of God, the conviction of the careless, and the conversion of the inquiring.

Now, brethren, without the indelicacy of praising your teachers, I make bold to affirm that having these advantages in this Academy, together with the pre-eminent advantages of our simple but sublime views of divine truth, you ought to turn out thoroughly good ministers of the gospel; and at all events, be very much better preachers and ministers than you would have been had you not been trained and drilled in the E. U. Academy. Therefore, let me, as a grateful son of the E. U. Academy, affectionately urge upon you who come here to study, most solemnly to devote and consecrate your blood-bought souls and bodies to the service of Jesus, and to be determined, as God shall help you, to make thorough work, this session, of all your studies. And if you have the native capacity in you, you will, by God's grace, show your profiting to all men, and be workmen needing not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth.

III. *The grand ends and aims of our work as co-workers with God.* All intelligent agents must have an end in view when

they work; and it is for the sake of that end that they do work. It would be the utter abnegation of intelligence to work without aim or end. It is, moreover, the end and aim of the worker, in which the moral character of the worker is realized, as good or bad, right or wrong. What then are the grand ends and aims of our work? Before answering in the positive, allow me a word or two in the negative.

(1) Our end and aim *must not be anything of the nature of personal ease or self-indulgence*. It is sometimes said that a young man seeks to enter the ministry, because he is too lazy to work hard at his original avocation, and his aim is to get an easy life of it. God forbid that such should be the ignoble aim of any of us. If we want ease, let us seek for it at a cheaper rate than the good of souls, and the glory of God. Nor must our aim be self-indulgence. I do not mean anything of carnal or fleshly indulgence, but the indulgence of literary or oratorical tastes. Doubtless these will, as a matter of course, be gratified, and called into requisition in this work. But the work ought not to be chosen for the sake of indulging and gratifying such tastes. If we have no higher, no nobler aim, let us seek a less sacred work than the ministry of reconciliation. Bear with me, brethren, if I insist on warning you against self-indulgence in literary tastes becoming your end and aim in the work. I know the danger, and have felt it. But it is most disastrous to the soul, and utterly subversive of the proper ends of our calling. In listening to many a preacher, with all charity, one is constrained to feel that literary tastes and pleasures have more to do with the composition, and delivery of the discourse, than the cross of Christ and the eternal good of man. Make all such tastes humble hewers of wood and drawers of water, and altogether subservient to the grand end.

(2.) Our ends and aims *must not be social position, and popular applause*. There is nothing wrong in a man trying to rise in the world, and die in a higher niche than his worthy father. Nor is there anything wrong in seeking the good opinion and respect of our fellow-men. But there is infinite wrong in having either of these, as our aim and end in the work of the ministry. Moreover, if these are the ends at which we aim, we are in the wrong place. The true Evangelical Union student knows that, for the present at least, there is a popular brand upon him, and that he must deny himself to popular applause, and social status as a minister of Christ, and have his name cast out as evil. Our aim, in this respect, must be to take up our cross, and deny ourselves, and suffer our country's reproach as perverters of the truth, and seducers of the people. If any young man wishes to enter the ministry for the sake of its honours and dignities, we frankly tell him that he must not come amongst us, but go some-

where else to find what he wants. What, then, are the ends at which we ought to aim?

(3) Our supreme end and aim in our work, as co-workers with God, *must be the honour and glory of God as he is revealed in the gospel of Christ*. God is necessarily the greatest, most exalted, and most glorious Being; and his greatness, majesty, and glory are necessarily the supreme end and aim of all that God himself does. In all things the creature is secondary to the Creator, and exists for him, to manifest and promote his honour and glory. For his honour and glory, the foundations of the world were laid, and mountain ranges piled, and earth's valleys, plains, rivers, lakes, and seas formed, and filled with multitudinous kinds of life. For his glory he made sun and moon, and scattered stars like sands on the shores of space. For his glory he created the angel in heaven, and man on earth, and breathed into them a spirit, in the image and likeness of himself, that they might intelligently apprehend his glories, and live for his honour. It is for this end that God himself supremely works, and every thing in the vast universe is constructed to work for God, and contribute some thing to the glory of the High and Lofty One, whose name is holy. Therefore in all our working and life-activities, our aim must be the supreme honour and glory of the infinitely glorious and worthy God. But especially as co-workers with God, in the gospel of his Son, must this be our supreme end and aim. For the glory of God, he who was in the form of God, did not retain his equality with God, but emptied himself, and took upon him the form of a servant. For this end Christ lived and died, and now lives and reigns over all things. For this end the Holy Spirit is come and pours forth his manifold blessings and influences upon the ransomed world. In working with God in this work, our end and aim must unwaveringly be the glory of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Every power of body must be consecrated to this end. For this end we must think God's thoughts, feel sympathetically and responsively God's feelings, and choose God's will in all things. Having this end before us, it will consecrate all our studies in the Academy, all our studies in our private rooms: and whatever we do in secret before God, or in public before men, will bear on it the inscription "To the King eternal, immortal, and invisible, the only wise God, be honour, and glory, for ever and ever. Amen."

But while this must ever be our supreme end, we can attain it only through means of certain proximate ends and aims. Amongst these subordinate and proximate ends, there is, (1) the moral and intellectual qualification of ourselves for the efficient performance of the work. We must aim at being personally holy, pure, God-like, Christ-like in character; at being filled with the

Spirit; and at possessing a competent knowledge of every thing essential to our efficiency as preachers. (2) Subordinately to God's glory, we must aim at the conviction, and conversion of souls to Christ. There is nothing by which God is so much honoured and glorified as this. It is God's pre-eminent glory to save souls by our instrumentality. It is in this we especially are to be co-workers with him. In every discourse we study and preach, let us aim at the saving of souls. Our work is a failure if we aim not at this. Woe be unto us, if we preach not the gospel so as to save souls. (3) Subordinately to God's glory, we must aim at building up, edifying the church of Christ, constantly affirming that they which have believed be careful to maintain good works. Holiness in believers, holiness in the church, is indispensable to the honour and glory of God in our work. Then (4) as a means to all these subordinate ends, to the supreme glory of God in ourselves, our fellow-sinners, and fellow-saints, we must aim at the manifestation of the truth of God in opposition to every perversion of that truth. I firmly believe that there is nothing of more importance in those days, and in our country. If we do not think so, we have no business here in this Academy. One of our aims, as Evangelical Unionists, is to overthrow that fatalistic system of theology, which blinds the people to their responsibility to be saved at once; which renders the preaching of the gospel to every creature a mockery and a falsehood to every one of the non-elect; which systematically repudiates the glorious universalities of the gospel, and fills our land with formalism, indifference, and despair. If we are true men, honest men, we shall never lower our testimony or meet our opponents half way, and compromise God's truth for man's favour. To do this may cost us something in the shape of self-sacrifice, while in this world; yet, if love to souls inspire us, if love to Christ urge us on, if our supreme desire and aim be the glory of God in the eternal well-being of the souls of men, then let cowards flee, and the time-serving cringe; but let the brave and the noble seize the banner of truth, with its honest gospel "for every man" emblazoned on it, and let them fight the battles and be crowned with the triumphs, of a second reformation in the theology of Scotland.

"Now the God of peace, that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great Shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well-pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen."

W. T.—K.

## DEVOTEDNESS TO CHRIST.

[THE following article was an address delivered at a district *Minister's Meeting* in connection with the Evangelical Union, on May 3, 1863. None but ministers were present. But as all who listened to it, felt blessed by it, we asked it for insertion in our pages,—believing that its perusal would be profitable to our readers in general. The *Ministers' Meeting* referred to is held quarterly for interchange of thought, and inter-communion of heart. Essays are read, and become the themes or starting-points of conversation, while devotional exercises interblend with the other engagements. At the same meeting, at which the following address was delivered, there were two essays read, one on *the advantages and disadvantages of the comparative isolation of E. U. ministers in Scotland*, and the other on *ancient and biblical forms of spiritualism, as compared with modern spiritualistic manifestations*. But as the head exists for the heart, it is in such a subject as *Devotedness to Christ*, that, after all our mental excursions into surrounding topics, we feel ourselves getting nearer to the aim of our aspirations, and the common home of our spirits. Ed. of *E. Repository*.]

**BELoved BRETHREN**,—Devotedness to Christ is more a practical than a speculative subject. We look on it not as a statue, which, however finely formed, is still cold and motionless; nor, as a picture, which however beautifully coloured, is destitute of life and feeling; but as embodied in a living, moving humanity richly endowed with grace, and symmetry, and energy, from on high. We view it as nothing less than the voluntary, cheerful, entire, and constant surrender of ourselves to Christ as our only rightful Lord: the surrender of the soul, with all its powers—intellectual, active, and moral; the surrender of the body, with all its limbs, organs, and senses: so that we are willing to use them in his service during the whole term of life, in such a manner that “it is no more we who live, but Christ who liveth in us.” Devotedness to Christ is not, therefore, a trivial or frivolous thing. It is a great and grave concern. It concerns others much, as they are remotely affected by our influence,—our teaching and example. It concerns ourselves immediately, and the most. It must neither be dubious nor hesitating, but certain and unceasing; and, while it should not be pompous or vaunting, it must be public and palpable. It cannot be hid.

It is, I trust, in the case of each of us, and of all our ministerial brethren in the Evangelical Union, not an acknowledged duty only, but an unmistakable realized fact. After youthful years devoted, probably, to the idol self in some one or other of its varied and ever varying forms:—years spent without God, and in ignorance of his true character,—years of mental darkness and moral gloom, during which we were crushed down under a sense of conscious sin, and direful anticipations of approaching woe;—what a relief did we feel, what a burden was removed from our conscience, what a heavenly light of joy dawned upon our soul, as, led by the good Spirit of God to Calvary,

we first beheld Christ as the propitiatory sacrifice for all our sins ! Although "evidently set forth crucified among us," we had never apprehended him before, nor felt his saving power upon the heart. It was the great event of our life. Did we not, then, experience, both in our state and character, both in our relations and feelings, a change which in importance far surpasses every other ? Was it not then that we were born into a new world, received through our union with Christ new spiritual life, breathed in a new atmosphere, and were exalted to a region of blessedness, to which we were previously utter strangers ? Was it not then that we felt, for the first time, the conviction, that we were not our own, but the blood-bought property of Christ ?—that it was mean and most despicable to live merely for self, merely for self-seeking or for self-gratification ? Under the influence of this deeply-rooted conviction, did we not yield ourselves entirely to Christ, placing body, soul, and spirit, completely at his disposal, only too glad to be used by him in any way, however humble, to promote his glory ? And was there not a warmth, a fervour, in our first love—a happiness which often constrains some of us even yet to ask, in the well known words of the too sensitive christian poet—

Where is the blessedness I knew,  
When first I saw the Lord ?

The novelty of these peaceful hours has passed forever away. Sometimes we wish, but in vain, for their return. They live in our recollection. They constitute a sunny memory, and shall do so not only throughout time, but, possibly, to all eternity. Yet the source of our happiness, of our joy, is the same,—the changeless love and ever perfect sacrifice of Christ ; so that, with the noble Paul, we can, respectively, say "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me."

Subsequent to the great change, and as a result of it,—while the dew of youth still lay upon our spirits, did we not all, baptised with the Holy Ghost and with fire, having hearts burning with new-born zeal, and love to Christ Jesus and to perishing souls for whom he died, solemnly, deliberately, and prayerfully resolve to consecrate ourselves entirely to the work of the holy ministry in which we are now engaged ? 'Tis true that there were other avenues open before us, leading to business or to other professions, which, as Christians, we might have followed ; some of them less laborious and more remunerative. But from all these we were induced to turn away : and guided, we trust, by the infallible Spirit of the Living God, not by selfish or sinister motives, we preferred that which led to the office of the ministry. It is, we cherish the belief, at once the noblest, and withal the most

responsible situation that a human being can fill. What distinguished bliss accompanies in this world, what a reward awaits in the next, all those who are truly faithful and devoted! But alas, what disgrace and degradation, deep and endless, must be the portion of the faithless and the false! "The unprofitable servant shall be cast into outer darkness, where there are weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth." Which of us, in calmly contemplating the number, the variety, the magnitude of our duties and responsibilities, together with their endless results, both to ourselves and to our hearers, is not compelled often to exclaim, "Who is sufficient for these?"

To be so in some small measure, there must be not only deep toned piety, not only entire consecration to the work. These are essential. Without them our ministry will be barren of good results, if not an utter failure. But in addition we must "scorn delights and live laborious days," yea years of study, preparatorily to entering upon the work,—cultivating our powers and laying up knowledge for after use. And after all this, have not some of us too frequent occasion to mourn over our insufficiency, realizing that we far too seldom discharge our duties in a manner satisfactory to ourselves, profitable to others, and honouring to our God? Have we not often reason earnestly to pray for the forgiveness of the sins of our most holy things, and to feel that if God were strict to mark iniquity we could not answer him for one of a thousand of our offences? At our ordination also, when solemnly set apart to the office of the pastorate, did we not all privately resolve and publicly engage to be men of prayer, men of study, men of God, everywhere?—not only to remain devoted to Christ, but to increase in that devotedness? These vows are upon us,—made before men, angels, and God. We dare not violate them. Having vowed unto the Lord, we cannot go back. God helping us, we must go on. Set for the defence and proclamation of the gospel in all its fulness and in all its freeness,—a gospel which reveals the love of God to all, and the death of Christ for all, the power of which we have felt, and still feel, in our own souls,—we must persevere. Mid opposition, obloquy, reproach, persecution, ingratitude, scorn, fightings without and fears within, we must, with the great apostle of the Gentiles, courageously say, each for himself, "None of these things move me; neither count I my life dear unto myself, so that I might finish my course with joy and the ministry which I have received of the Lord Jesus to testify the gospel of the grace of God." And surely there are reasons many and powerful for such devotedness.

First:—*Love to our souls and hatred of our sins prompted*

*Christ to endure unparalleled sufferings, and to die the most ignominious death, for our present, future, and eternal salvation.*

Viewing Christ as divine, equal with the Father, possessing all the natural attributes and all the moral perfections of Deity, uncaused, uncreated, self-existent, independent, and having also the same infinitely excellent character, it is manifestly our duty to love him supremely, and to consecrate all we are and all we have unceasingly to his service. Remembering, still further, that he is the creator and sovereign proprietor of all creatures, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, visible and invisible, in all worlds throughout the illimitable universe—and that he is the infinite and unfailing source of all life, of all intelligence, all activity, all holiness, and all happiness, in heaven and on earth;—reason, conscience, and revelation unite in their demand that we love Christ supremely and serve him with all our heart and soul and mind and strength. But how are his claims upon us, and upon all mankind, intensified, as we view him who is thus great and excellent, far beyond the utmost conceptions of the most exalted created beings, taking upon him the form of a servant, humbling himself and becoming obedient until death, even the death of the cross? And all this for the sake of the world, a portion of which we are! Contemplating such self-sacrificing love, such an ignominious death, can we live any longer merely for self? Can we withhold from such a Saviour our heart's best and purest affections? Does it not grieve us to the quick that we have done so little for Christ in the past? Are we not constrained by the amount and extent of his love to live more unreservedly to him for the future? Do we not all see the reasonableness and feel the force of the apostolic appeal, "What? know ye not that ye are not your own? for ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit which are God's." "How many claims," says John Angell James, "are comprised in that one, 'ye are bought with a price.' *Justice* demands it of you, for he has purchased you; and at how immense a price? To take what belongs to man is robbery, but to take what belongs to God is sacrilege. *Gratitude* demands it of you. What blessedness has God conferred upon you; from what degradation, misery, and eternal woe he has saved you, and to what honour, happiness, and eternal glory advanced you? *Interest* demands it of you. Can you be so highly honoured, so happily, for yourself, employed, as in glorifying God? What losses should we not willingly sustain, what sufferings endure, what labour maintain, what self-denial exercise, what enjoyment forego, what mortification inflict, in order that we may glorify God? *Love* demands it. . . . I do not now lead you forth to the vast fields of creation of



which you form a part, and remind you of the claim founded upon the power that made you and all things. I do not place you, in imagination, upon the borders of the flaming pit, from which there is no redemption, and, as the howlings of lost souls and the smoke of their torment ascend up for ever and ever, remind you of the dreadful award of justice upon those who will not glorify God. But I conduct you to Calvary at the hour of crucifixion, and as you gaze upon the Son of God hanging on the cross, while the blood is flowing from his wounds, and he is exclaiming from the lowest depths of his agony, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?'—I ask you what is the true meaning and design of this wondrous scene? It is Jesus Christ paying in groans and tears and blood the price of your redemption. It is Jesus Christ thus and for ever establishing his right to your whole self, your whole life, your whole possessions. It is Jesus Christ setting down the sum of your deliverance, and ratifying his claim to your entire temporal and eternal existence. What a robbery of God, what a felony upon heaven, is it, to attempt or even to wish to live for ourselves! Which of us can make the daring attempt, or cherish the unjust, ungrateful wish?" Has Jesus granted unto us, each of us, the knowledge of salvation by the remission of our sins? Has he given unto each of us everlasting consolation and good hope through grace of ever-increasing felicity with himself and with all the truly good and great in his own kingdom? Do we expect soon to see Christ as he is in his glory, and to take part in the enjoyments and employments of the heavenly state?—to sing with the victors that are already there, "the song of Moses the servant of God and of the Lamb"? Then had we a hundred hearts, a hundred tongues, a hundred lives, Jesus is deserving of them all. Never shall we be able to praise him sufficiently either for what he is in himself, or what he has done, is doing, and has promised to do for us. While we cannot discharge the debt, let us freely acknowledge the obligation by living a life of consecration to his service.

Secondly:—*The honour of Christ demands our constant and continually increasing devotedness.*

It is cheerfully and freely conceded, that the honour of Jesus does not depend upon us, or upon any finite or created beings. Even while he was upon the earth, in his state of humiliation, he received, once and again, honour from his Father, when a voice from the excellent glory announced, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." Fully conscious of his innocence, of his perfect holiness, and of the value and all-sufficiency of his mediatorial work, he could say,—“though Israel be not gathered, yet will I be glorious in the eyes of the Lord.”

(Isa. xlix. 5.) As his well-earned, his richly-merited reward, the Father hath not only raised him from the dead, but exalted him to his own right hand; given him a name that is above every name, and entrusted him with all power both in heaven and on earth. He is crowned, and we rejoice to know it, with glory and honour, and will be through all eternity. His essential honour is not, therefore, dependent upon any of his creatures. Nevertheless, God the Father calls, and justly, upon us, and upon all men, to honour the Son in thought, feeling, volition, word, and action, by giving him the chief place in all things. The divine command is, "whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." Would we reach this standard? Would we obey this command? Then our love must not be cold or half-hearted; our obedience must not be partial, fitful, or grudging; but impartial, implicit, constant, and cheerful. Less than supreme love, than continual consecration, may please the world, which always prefers a fashionable religion. It may even please some professors, whose hearts are not in sympathy with the heart of God. But it will not please Christ. Our supreme desire and leading aim, should ever be that of the prince of preachers, expressed in these memorable words: "We labour, that, whether present or absent, we may be accepted of him." Even then we shall all, doubtless, feel and confess with sorrow, that we come far short of honouring Christ as we ought. But if less than this be our leading aim, then it is too low, and the failure will be all the greater, and the more to be deplored. O brethren, is the honour and glory of Christ the end of our being, of our redemption, of our ministry? Then let us, by all means, fulfil it, by a life, whether long or short, of entire unwearied cheerful consecration to Jesus and to his cause; and at length, when he comes to be glorified in his saints and admired in all them that believe, we shall occupy a place, however unworthy, among his glorified ones, and shall receive the reward of the good and faithful servant, who enters into the joy of our Lord. This leads me to remark—

Thirdly:—*That our present spiritual safety and progress, together with our eternal well-being, depend upon our devotedness to Christ.*

In uttering this assertion, we do not wish to be understood that we are making a Saviour of our devotedness, putting it in the room of Christ as the meritorious cause of our salvation. Nor do we make it a substitute for faith, which is the instrumental cause of salvation. Much as we value and advocate devotedness, we would not, for a moment, put it in the place of either the one or the other of these. Our meaning is, that unless we, who are not merely private christians, but public ministers of Christ,

commissioned to hear the word at his mouth, that we may warn, counsel, exhort, persuade, and teach, the people from Him, yield ourselves daily, yea hourly, to Him, to be used and qualified by him, there is a danger of our piety declining, and a possibility of our ultimate lapse from grace. If we follow Christ afar off, there is an awful danger of one day denying him altogether. Our safety consists in close, constant fellowship with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ,—a walking in the light as he is in the light. Brethren, our profession or position, honourable though it be, will not suffice to save us. And have we not peculiar temptations as ministers, temptations before which many, who were once promising and useful, have fallen and been cast away? Are we not, for instance, in danger of reading and studying the solemn truths of God's word, not for ourselves, but for others, and thereby losing the saving and sanctifying effects which they should have upon our hearts? so that while we are endeavouring to feed others with the bread of life, we starve ourselves? Are we not in danger of preaching from some other motive, than the desire to glorify God in the salvation of sinners, and in the edification of saints? Is there not a possibility of maintaining all the appearances of true piety, while we are lamentably destitute of the reality, and have a name to live while we are dead, a form of godliness while we deny the power? Does not our safety, both in private and in public, in the church and in the world, consist in maintaining close uninterrupted intercourse with God, that, in answer to frequent, fervent, believing, prayer, we may draw down upon our souls fresh supplies of spiritual influences? These are needed to qualify us for the numerous and varied duties which we have to perform, for resisting the numerous, varied, and often powerful temptations with which we are assailed, and for conquering the enemies with which we have to contend. An unsaved, an unsanctified, ministry must be a dreadful curse to a community. A minister in hell, is a most melancholy reflection. Do we not stand aghast at the bare possibility? How should it startle us, and awaken us up to greater watchfulness, and to greater earnestness, and to more thorough devotedness to the work of the Lord! It is only in the way of such devotedness, that we are safe, and have the approval of our Master, and can hope to hear at last the much-to-be-desired eulogy, "Well done thou good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things, enter thou into the joy of thy Lord."

Fourthly,—*The edification of saints and the conversion of sinners depend very greatly upon our devotedness to Christ.*

A minister whose heart is not in sympathy with the heart of

Jesus, may have extensive knowledge and splendid talents; he may deliver eloquent discourses, and attract great audiences, and be useful in many ways to the community of which he is a member; but he will not be very successful in accomplishing either of the two great objects which, as ministers, we should have in view—the edification of saints, and the conversion of sinners. The reason is obvious. He recommends a remedy, the efficacy of which he does not himself know. He invites others to a feast, of which he is not himself a partaker. He points others to a Saviour, into whose hands he has not committed his own soul. He warns others to flee from the danger, to which he himself is still exposed. Such a ministry God will never countenance or extensively bless. He cannot do it. “He that entereth not by the door into the sheepfold; but climbeth up some other way; the same is a thief and a robber.” If on the contrary, we are not only converted to Christ, but fully consecrated to him; thinking, according to our capabilities, as he thinks; willing, as he wills; feeling, as he feels; acquiescing in all his arrangements; rendering implicit and child-like obedience to all his requirements; we are then raised to a spiritual altitude, whence we have a clearer view and a deeper sense of spiritual realities. “We look not at the things which are seen and temporal, but at the things which are unseen and eternal.” It is by beholding these in all their infinite magnitude and importance, that we are qualified to make a deep and permanent impression on others. It is only when our own minds are illumined with light from on high, that we can enlighten others. It is only when our own hearts are warmed with the love of Christ, that we can expect to warm others. A painted fire will never burn. Affected heat will never warm. Brethren, would we be like John the Baptist, burning and shining lights? not the one without the other, but both combined? Then spiritual knowledge and holy love are necessary. And these can be acquired and maintained only by a life of continued consecration to Christ. Would we have the unspeakable satisfaction of seeing the pleasure of the Lord prosper in our hands? sinners saved and saints sanctified,? We must feed them with knowledge; make known faithfully the whole counsel of God, and in such a tender loving spirit, as shall convince them that we ourselves are born of God, and that we are baptized with the Spirit of him who, when he beheld the city, wept over it, and said “Would that thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things that belong to thy peace, but now they are hid from thine eyes.” Did we realize, as we ought, the all but infinite value of immortal souls; the tremendous danger to which, while unconverted, they are exposed; the immensity of the price which has been paid for their redemption; with what earnestness would we pray and labour for their con-

version! We would, certainly, be ashamed at the coldness and apathy which we too frequently manifest. And while sinners may be prepared to doubt all our arguments, or to treat them with unconcerned indifference; they will find it exceedingly difficult to resist the eloquence of a holy, loving, earnest life, or that which proceeds from a heart overflowing with compassion for their welfare. All past history clearly teaches that those ministers have been most successful, whose whole souls have been most in sympathy with the soul of Christ, and who, feeling that they were ambassadors for Christ, besought men, as though God did beseech them, praying them in Christ's stead to be reconciled. Such a ministry must be more or less successful, and cannot fail to have souls as its joy and crown of rejoicing. It is no doubt essential to success, that we preach "the gospel of the grace of God," and not a counterfeit. This is of primary importance. But next to it is the earnest, heavenly, Christ-like spirit, in which it is proclaimed, whether in the pulpit or in private intercourse with others. What feelings, what earnestness, must have characterized the ministry of Paul at Ephesus, when he was able to say, "Therefore watch; and remember that by the space of three years I have not ceased to warn every one night and day with tears." What tender emotions he must have cherished toward the Thessalonians, when he said, "We were gentle among you, even as a nurse cherisheth her children: so, being affectionately desirous of you, we were willing to have imparted unto you, not the gospel of God only, but our own souls also, because ye were dear unto us." Other gifts and qualifications, besides this affectionate concern for the salvation of men, are necessary to our success; but this we believe to be also indispensable. And it can only be possessed when we are thoroughly consecrated to the service of Christ. For lack of it on the part of some ministers, too many souls, we fear, have been lost forever. Let us by all means strive and labour and pray that soul-blood may not be found upon our skirts. Ah, what devotedness is needed, ere we reach the eminence attained by the apostle, when, addressing the elders of the church at Ephesus, he could truly say, "I take you to record this day that I am pure from the blood of all men; for I have not shunned to declare unto you all the counsel of God."

Finally:—*Habitual devotedness has a most happy effect upon our own minds here, and will be richly rewarded by Christ through all eternity hereafter.*

Never, I presume, are we so happy in our own souls, never so nobly occupied, never so like our Lord and Saviour, as when we are wholly engaged in his service. This habitual devotedness to the work will make us diligent, active, and industrious; so that

we shall have no time to lose or to waste in idleness, or mental dissipation. It will be all too little for the work we have to do.

For at back we always hear  
Time's winged chariot hurrying near,  
And onward, all before, we see  
Deserts of vast eternity.

Habitual devotedness will make us conscientious in the discharge of all our duties, both to God, to ourselves, and to our fellow-men. It will have the very best effect upon our reading and studies, upon our preaching, upon our visits to the sick and dying, upon our intercourse with our fellow-men, upon our entire life and conduct. A life consecrated to Christ, spent as in his presence, always under his omniscient and holy eye, cannot fail to be useful. It must tell for good upon others, as well as be most advantageous to ourselves. "Give attendance," is the divine command to us all, "to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine; meditate upon these things; give thyself wholly to them, that thy profiting may appear unto all. Take heed to thyself and to the doctrine. Continue in them, for in doing this thou shalt both save thyself and them that hear thee." What satisfaction, what pleasure, what joy, do we experience, even now, from the testimony that we are pleasing God! And what delight shall we experience, when, from the summit of the hill which divides time from eternity, we look back on a life, however brief, spent in the service of Christ, and by the grace of God are enabled to say, "The time of my departure is at hand, I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith;" or when, with the holy Payson, we are able to exclaim in triumph, "The battle's fought, the battle's fought, the victory's won, the victory's won forever." Where is the mind that can conceive, the pen that can describe, or the tongue that is able to express, the joy, the heavenly rapture, which we shall experience, when Jesus, in his capacity of judge, shall publicly acknowledge us as his servants, and shall with his own hand place upon our heads the immortal crown? Even then, we shall feel deeply our unworthiness to receive it, as having been most unprofitable servants. But how shall we magnify the grace, which not only plucked us as brands from the burning, which not only washed us from our sins in his own blood, but also counted us faithful, putting us into the ministry, and then so richly rewards us for our feeble and imperfect labours. Being teachers, shall we not shine as the brightness of the firmament, and, turning many to righteousness, as the stars, for ever and ever. Brethren, amid discouragements and trials, some of them severe enough, known only to God and yourselves, have you not motives, many and infinite, to consecrate yourselves unceasingly to Jesus and his cause?

You will never regret it. But strong in the strength that is in Christ, you will be more than conquerors. And may "the God of peace, who brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus Christ, that great Shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well-pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen."

A. C.—A.

#### IF A MAN LOVE JESUS,—WHAT THEN ?

"If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him."—JESUS. (John xiv. 23.)

"IF a man love me," says Jesus. "If." He seems to speak as if it were possible that some men should not love him.

Is it possible? Is it actual? Are there some men, somewhere or other, who do not love Jesus?

Whom should men love, or what should they love, if they refuse to love Jesus? Should a man love his father? Why should he? Has his father done as much for him as Jesus? Our fathers have not done for our happiness so much as a thousandth part of what Jesus has done. Should a man love his mother? There is no mother in the universe who has done for her son, and suffered for him, and cared for him, and loved him, as Jesus has done, and suffered, and cared, and loved. A mother's love is great: but it is as the small drop, left in the bucket after it has been emptied, compared with the love of Jesus.

Whom then should a man love, or what should he love, if he does not love Jesus? Should he love his brother? Why should he? Is his brother a nearer relative than Jesus? That is impossible. Jesus made us, and made us in his own image. And thus, he is himself our nearest Relative? Why then should a man, who does not and who will not love Jesus, love his brother? Is his brother more brotherly and loving than Jesus? That cannot be. Jesus "sticketh closer than a brother;" and brothers are good brothers only in proportion as they imbibe something of the brotherly spirit of Jesus. Why then should a man love his brother if he does not love Jesus?

Or why should he love his sister? Is his sister lovelier than Jesus? That cannot be. Jesus is "the chiefest among ten thousand," and "altogether lovely." There is not in any sister's

character anything like such loveliness, and there is not in any sister's heart anything like such love, as are in the character and heart of Jesus.

Or why should a man love his wife? Is it because she is lovely? Christ is more so. Is it because she is good? Christ is better. Is it because she loves him? Her love is coldness, compared with the love which Jesus bears to him. Is it because she is serviceable to him, and supplies some of his wants? In so far as she is useful, she but ministers to him in the way of handing Christ's favours to him.

There is then no reason why a man should love any being, if there be not a better reason why he should love Jesus.

And as to things, as distinguished from persons, any man who thinks calmly and consistently, will admit that there is nothing, either on earth or out of it, that should be compared with Jesus. Should a man, for instance, love money more than Jesus? Or should he love houses and lands, more than Jesus? Should he love food and drink, more than Jesus? Should he love fame and power, more than Jesus? Can it really be the case that any one, acknowledging himself to be a creature, and a sinner, and yet immortal, should prefer any mere things,—which either perish with the using, or from which death must snatch us,—to Jesus? Is the world of right and wrong turned so entirely upside down, that any can be regarding that as uppermost which should be undermost, and that as undermost which should be uppermost?

Surely it is no evidence that the human world is in its right place,—it is evidence that it has gone out of its course altogether, and that it is away from the pathway of prosperity and bliss,—when we find that there are men, millions of them, loving multitudes of things far more than they love Jesus. Alas! the masses of men do not love Jesus at all!

Jesus, then, had too much reason to use an "if" when he spake of love to himself—"if any man love me." But what then?

I. "He will keep my words." Although it is a comparatively rare thing, in the present anomalous condition of the world, for a man to love Jesus, yet there are some who do love him, and all these "keep his words."

It is assuredly natural that they should. For what are Christ's words? "The words that I speak unto you," says he, "I speak not of myself." "The Father, which sent me," says he again, "gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak." Christ's words, then, are just God's words. Christ's words are divine. They are the expressions of divine thoughts. They represent to us divine wisdom and divine love.



And those of them that have especial reference to our duty,—that mark out for us the way in which we ought to go in all our circumstances and amid all our temptations,—are pre-eminently words of infallible divine wisdom and of ineffable divine love. Never did lips utter wiser or kinder words than those, for example, which the lips of Jesus uttered when he enunciated that perfect and most glorious rule of life, which we designate the moral law. The words are these,—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbour as thyself.” Sublimier words regarding man’s duty never can be spoken, and never can be conceived. They are the essence of all else that can be said, either by men or by God, in reference to men’s duty. They represent to us the whole excellency that distinguished and ennobled and made godlike Christ’s own life upon the earth. They are the substance and the sum of all the wisdom and of all the love, which the divine mind and heart find it possible to condense into a rule to regulate the entire demeanour of man. It is not only wise to love God supremely and to love our neighbours as we love ourselves; it is the highest attainable wisdom. It is not only benignity and benevolence to bid us thus love our God and thus love our fellow-men;—it is such perfect benignity and benevolence, that if we should suppose that God had made the rule of our life aught else, we should have been constrained to come to the dreadful conclusion that his law was not so benignant and so benevolent a thing as it might have been.

The words of Christ, then, which embody the golden rule of life, are the wisest possible,—the kindest possible. They are perfect, because perfectly divine. And what wonder, therefore, that “if a man love Jesus, he should keep his words”? What words should he keep, if he did not keep them? What wonder that he should keep them in his thoughts, and think of them? What wonder that he should keep them in his heart, and love them? What wonder that he should keep them in his will, and choose them for the rule of his inner and his outer life? He that keeps these words, and he only, has regard to what is wisest, to what is most for his good, and to what is most for Christ’s honour and God’s glory. And is it to be expected that he who loves Jesus would cast away from him such precious words, which are not only endeared, as coming from the Jesus whom he loves, but which are also, by their own essential nature, intrinsically fitted to be dear to every one, who is willing on the one hand to give God credit for wisdom and benevolence, or who is able on the other, by his own independent judgement, to distinguish the inestimably valuable from the valueless. If we greatly love anybody, we delight to keep his words in our memory and to conform

our conduct to his expressed desire. But when we know that the words of the being whom we love, are words of perfect wisdom and of the sublimest benevolence, surely there is additional reason for keeping them. It was right, then, for Jesus to say, "if a man love me, he will keep my words." And if there be a man in any country under heaven who says he loves Jesus, and who yet does not keep Christ's words of commandment in his thought and heart and will, he is either imposing upon himself, or he is trying to impose upon his fellow-men. He does not love Jesus.

II. But Jesus makes a promise in reference to those who love him and keep his words. "My Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him."

"My Father will love him." The promise sounds delightful, for it is a promise of love from that heavenly Father whose love is better than life. But what means it? Is it not true that the great heavenly Father already loves all? Is it not true that his tender mercies are already over all his works? Is he not good unto all? And has he not so loved the whole world of men that "he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life"? Is it not the case, then, that God already loves every man? Is it not the case that he loves even the unlovely and the unloving? And is not the fact of this universality of the divine love, the very glory-spot of the gospel, the very essence of the power that is in it to reclaim the wandering and the wicked? All this is the case. Why, then, does Jesus promise to those who love him and keep his words, that his Father will love them? Why does he not rather say,—“If a man be a man, and whether he loves me or not, and whether he keeps my words or not, my Father loves him”?

The ground of our Saviour's promise is the great and glorious reality that there are degrees in God's love. Were there not such degrees, God would not love man more than he loves the butterfly that flutters in the summer's breeze. God does love butterflies, and moths, and all living motes; and he has made them in benevolence—made them for happiness. But in so far as man is above these creatures in his structure, and assimilated in his spirit to the infinite divine Spirit itself, thus far is God's love toward him greater than his love to inferior beings. But as there are beings whom God loves less than man, so there are beings whom he loves more. He loves Jesus more. He loves himself more. He ought to love himself and Jesus more than he loves men. Assuredly he ought, if it be the case that he loves men more than moths and motes. As the heavens are higher than the earth, so is God higher than men; and so is Jesus too;

and therefore they ought to be more highly loved. It is on the same principle, that there is in the love of God for men a possibility of exhaustless increase. And the more that a man becomes good and godlike, the more does he become fit to be an object of the divine love. God, indeed, loves man as man. And this is a vital element in the gospel. But God loves a good man more than he loves a bad man : for in the good man he not only finds the man's manhood to love, he also finds the man's goodness. Manhood and goodness combined, are better than mere manhood without goodness, and far better than the union of manhood and badness. And as manhood and goodness combined are better than manhood and badness combined ; so manhood and much goodness combined are better than the combination of but a little goodness and manhood. In proportion then as a man becomes good, in the same proportion does he become an object of the love of God. In this, an all-important principle in the divine administration of the world comes into operation—" he that hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundantly ;" whereas, he that makes no improvement of what he has, from him shall be taken away even that which he had and has. If, then, any man love Jesus and keep his words, God will love him. Not only will he love him as he loves all men ; he will love him more than he loves the despisers and neglecters of the Saviour. Not only will he be benevolent toward him, and have complacency in him, he will also confer upon him greater favours than he could in wisdom confer upon ungodly men.

The Saviour indicates wherein some of the favours consist, which will be conferred on him who loves Jesus and keeps his words :— " and we will come unto him and make our abode with him."

" We will come unto him." What means the favour ? Is it not the case that Jesus has already come to men ? Is it not the case that the Father, too, has through Jesus already come ? Surely he is not merely a God afar off and not at hand ? He has come ; and come mercifully. He has manifested himself ; and manifested himself most graciously. What means the Saviour then when he says,— " we will come to him who loves me and keeps my words " ? His meaning is sublime ; and it proceeds on the principle which we have already indicated,— " he that hath, to him shall be given," that is, " he that improves what he hath, to him shall more be given." Christ has come already to every living man ; and he has come bearing with him a blessing for every man—the blessing of atonement. But only some receive his blessing. Some refuse it. And Christ acts

towards them accordingly. To those who receive his blessing of atonement, he comes again bringing the blessing of pardon and peace and hope and joy. Then they love him more, they love him as "the chiefest among ten thousand;" and they keep his words and do his will and live as he lived. And then he comes again to them—he and his Father come together, bearing a new blessing—the blessing of still more satisfying and elevating happiness. "And we will come unto him," says Jesus, "and make our abode with him."

Jesus promises that he and his Father "will make their abode" with him who receives his atonement with gratitude, and requites the gift with love, and keeps his words. What means the promise? Of course it cannot be meant that Christ and the Father leave other places in the universe, to be here on earth. Neither can it be meant that they leave other persons on earth, to be present with him who loves because he is loved, and who keeps Christ's words because they are wise and good. Neither can it be meant that God will be nowhere but with him who loves Jesus and keeps his word. God is everywhere; and the whole universe lies in the hollow of his hand. What then is meant?

The meaning is, that Christ and his Father will confer upon the believer, who brings forth in his life the fruits of his faith, the high blessing of abiding companionship with Themselves. God will stoop down to hold fellowship with the believer in Jesus. He will commune, and that not merely occasionally, but abidingly, with the believing soul; and thus the believing soul will dwell in the light of God's countenance, and be blessed in learning ever more and more of the thoughts of God, and in entering ever more and more into the feelings of God, and in becoming assimilated ever more and more to the will of God. Happy are they who thus become intimate with God,—with God in Jesus,—and with Jesus in God. Happy they who every morning awake with God,—who every evening fall asleep in God,—who every day "walk with God," and live "as seeing him who is invisible,"—live as looking up to the Father's eye which is on them, and to the Saviour's eye in which they see their Saviour's heart. Happy all such! Their heaven is begun on earth. They have foretastes of glory. And they are made meet for the fulness of it.

They may indeed have many trials. They may suffer many bereavements. They may meet with many disappointments. Their bodies too may grow frail; and the frailty of their bodies may cast a temporary eclipse over their intellectual powers. But in their consciousness they will have peace, and in the heart of their heart they will always be happy. They will live happily, and they will die in peace.

Bishop Beveridge died in 1707, in the seventieth year of his age. He had long proved himself to have been a lover of Jesus, and one who kept the Saviour's words. And long had he experienced the blessedness of living with Christ and with God in Christ. Christ and the Father loved him and came unto him and abode with him. But when he was on his deathbed, the failure of his bodily energies beclouded his otherwise clear and vigorous intellect, and the links that had consciously tied him to the earth seemed to be almost all unconsciously snapped asunder. His friends were pained to see him apparently so insensible to all persons and things around him. And as they crowded around his couch, one clergyman, who had been on familiar terms with him, said to him, "Bishop Beveridge, do you know me?" The dying man heard the sound and followed the question, but looked wistful, and asked, "who are you?" The name was then called out. The bishop again looked wistful, and said, "No, I don't know you." Another friend, expecting that the dying man might recognise him, stepped forward, and said to the bishop, "Do you know me?" The bishop heard and followed the question, but did not identify the voice or face, and asked him too,—“Who are you?” On being informed, he looked puzzled and replied—“No. I don't know you.” The friends were sorry. The bishop's wife then went up to him, and in accents that must, one would think, have thrilled into his inmost soul, said, “Do you know me?” But earth's dearest links seemed severed. And he asked as before, “who are you.” On telling him that she was his own loving wife,—the dying man seemed to lose the thread of recollection even in reference to her, and said, “No, I don't know you.” It was a sad scene. But one friend who was present touched a different chord, and turned the sadness into exceeding great rejoicing. “Bishop Beveridge,” said he, “do you know the Lord Jesus Christ?” The old man's countenance seemed in a moment to be electrified and irradiated, and all at once he exclaimed—“O yes, I have known him these forty years. Precious Saviour! he is my only hope.” Jesus and the Father abode with the worthy bishop to the end. And they will abide with all who keep the Saviour's words.

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#### CALVINISM

#### WEIGHED IN ONE OF ITS OWN BALANCES AND FOUND WANTING.

FROM the heading of our article, it will be seen that the position we have selected is not the defence of our tenets, but aggression on the dogmas of our theological opponents. The system of

these dogmas we intend to weigh in a balance which must be above suspicion, being of Calvinistic manufacture; since it might be alleged, were we using our own instruments, that no good thing cometh out of an Evangelical Union Nazareth. Were any of our own tests or methods of reduction to be used, on this particular occasion, in the demolition of systematic Calvinism, we could not but labour under the irksome thought that we might be as one that beateth the air; but when we take the professed reed of the master-builder of Geneva wherewith to measure the city and citadel of religious fatalism, the responsibility of the result lies with those who furnish the means of mensuration.

It is not our intention to enter on any minute or detailed description of what Calvinism proper is, although it might not be void of use at a time when this system has as many shades as the rainbow has colours, and when differing sects clamour as loudly for the honour of having Calvin as their father, as the rival ancient cities for the honour of having Homer as their child. We are not without the conviction, that, were the spirit of that eminent theologian permitted a view of the degenerate modern varieties of his school, and then granted liberty to invade the dreams of the mortals who wear his name, he, like the spirit that made the hair of Eliphaz stand up, would administer one of those rebukes for which he was so famous in this lower world. Howbeit, the word Calvinism is sufficient to bring before the mind of every thoughtful person a system of religious thought held in one way or other by the larger denominations of Scotland. This system represents God as foreordaining every event that comes to pass. It limits the possibility of salvation to only a certain number of the human family. It fixes the possibility of the efficacy of Christ's atonement to this certain number. It holds that with this certain number alone does the Spirit strive with saving intention, so that they may exercise saving faith; while for all others outside this elect circle there is no exercise of his saving influences. And finally, it holds that there is no possibility of these elected ones, atoned for by Christ, and irresistibly influenced by the Spirit, ultimately falling away and being lost. Such is Calvinism, generally speaking, as it presents itself broadly to the popular mind on the mention of its name, and as it crops out, less or more, in the religious creeds of our country.

We know of three methods of assault on this system, the purely scriptural, the purely philosophical, and the amalgamation or coincidence of both. If we take the first, the purely scriptural, we at once lay ourselves open to the charge of one-sided interpretation; if we take the last, the mixed method, the spirit of suspicion will follow us still; but, if we take the middle one, the purely philosophical, and receive from Calvinism itself some

special test, we are, at once, above suspicion, in the region where self-evidence is the basis of all procedure, and where we may and must see all things in a clear and truthful light. Is there any claim put forth by Calvinists for the philosophical inviolability of their system? Any reading man can answer this question by telling us that the philosophic bulwark of religious fatalism is reckoned as invulnerable as the body of Achilles. The proud boast we meet with, is most frequently based on philosophical self-consistency. Our readers have only to look into the sketch of Calvin by Principal Tulloch in his "Leaders of the Reformation," where the philosophical symmetry of Calvinism receives full eulogy, to find the argument of self-consistency of system as a mark of truthfulness, urged with all the bewitching fascinations of style and riches of language. Out of that sketch we quote but three or four lines. Says its author, "Viewed as systems—as exhaustive logical generalisations of christian truth—Calvinism is the natural victor of Arminianism in this very thoroughness and higher consistency of system which it presents." We may have some difficulty to accept Calvinism as self-consistent, for we think that its practical and theoretical sides are as inconsistent, and contradictory to each other, as their units, respectively, are consistent among themselves. Nevertheless, we grant the systematic self-consistency, hoping to be able to show that it is hollow nevertheless. While again and again the specious reason has been advanced, too seldom does even the thinking mind terminate on the fallacy that lies beneath the fine talk about "higher consistency of system."

It is our aim in this article to show that self-consistency is attainable by any system either true or false, since this is more a matter of logic than truth; and that, therefore, it is no test or sign whatever of the truthfulness of Calvinism. Let it be remembered that the balance is not ours, and that if the system be found wanting when weighed in it, we are not accountable. The method we shall adopt is forced upon us by the nature of the case. It will consist of a series of propositions, related to each other, and self-evidently related to truth, rolling themselves up round the argument of our opponents and crushing it as the boa-constrictor crushes its helpless victim.

I. *That a system may be self-consistent, it is not necessary that there be any more than one radical or generative thought from which other thoughts logically spring.*

We think this is self-evident. Thoughts are germinative and terminative, suggestive and exhaustive; the stretch of doctrine between a leading thought and the last thought of which it is logically capable, being essentially a self-consistent

system. It is not necessary that the leading thought be wholly, or even largely, a true thought. If it be pregnant, it must bear fruit of its own kind, and the result will be an inseparable cluster of offspring thoughts, or, logically speaking, a system. Granting a leading thought to a logical mind, the inevitable result will be the elaboration or logical exhaustion of it. It is impossible for that mind to exercise itself upon it without deducing the doctrines it involves, and giving them some formal unity or systematic arrangement. And what is this arrangement of thoughts drawn from the leading one by the hand of logic, as the material for the silk that rustles on our promenades is drawn from the worm by itself, but a system that must be self-consistent, since constructed of homogeneous thought? Logic takes the thought presented to it as the hopper of a mill takes the material to be ground, without making any inquiry as to the thought or premiss being true, and, by doctrinal generation—the rigid process of deduction—gives the only conclusion natural to the premiss; asking not after its truthfulness to reality, if satisfied of its true correspondence to its premiss, whatever it be. The system thus elaborated must of necessity be at peace with itself, though it does not therefore follow that it is not at war with truth. As root and stem, and cluster and grape, are generically one, and all latent and incipient in the seed; so premiss, and steps, and conclusion, are one, and all in germ in the leading thought; so that one pregnant thought, whether true or false, is all that is necessary to give any system, whether in religion or philosophy, self-consistency.

Take a real case for illustration. We must necessarily look into the past for one. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, ere the successors of Luther, Calvin, and Melancthon have sunk into the shadow of death, gone down like stars behind the mountain peaks at night, a restless youth, who has distinguished himself in a French college of the Jesuits, seeks some resting place among the systems of the schools, illustrious with historic names and venerable with hoary age, but in vain. Every scholastic sum of knowledge disappoints him, as the mirage deceives the thirsty traveller. He gives up science for himself. He lays aside the oracle of the ancient Stagyrice and the formulas of mediæval scholastics, for the more sure word of consciousness, certain that at last, by a process of doubting every dogma, he has come to the purest oracle and found its simplest and most radical deliverance,—that thinking is at once the evidence of existence and the organ of philosophy. Our readers know that we are writing of Descartes. Formerly men had been

Dropping buckets into empty wells,  
And growing old in drawing nothing up.

But now he had found a sure instrument for a new philosophy ;



only, he must find some radical thought ere the generation of a system be possible. Barring the existence of God, his first fundamental principle is,—the essential difference of spirit and matter. Logic, applied to this thought, drew from it the doctrine:—Having no affinity, spirit and matter can exert no influence on each other. (It is quite evident, however, that in the mind of Descartes the major premiss, that all substances having no affinity cannot act upon each other, was assumed by his logic.) This step necessitated another, and the great man argued, that since, notwithstanding his prior doctrines, there was an exact correspondence between the inner world of spirit and the outer world of matter, there could be no other explanation of it than the doctrine of an unceasing concurrence of the divine energy with the material and spiritual appearances, so as to secure their infallible uniformity. These were the steps of Descartes: but afterwards they received more prominent logical development in the doctrine that our minds and bodies have no influence on each other, the divine Being alone wielding the influence supposed by others to be exerted by each. This was the doctrine of occasionalism. It, in turn, received its logical climax in the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. Here, then, was a system, perfectly self-consistent as such; surely not because it was true, for the theory is worth no more than this paper on which it is printed, but because logic and ingenious philosophy took hold of its leading thought with an assumed premiss, and afforded birth to a systematic offspring. *What if the self-consistency of Calvinism be worth only as much but no more?*

## II. *Every self-consistent system represents so much truth.*

If this is not self-evident, a little reflection on the history of systems, will make it, at least, clear. Any one who has read and studied Cousin's "History of Modern Philosophy" (and who should not study it?) must have been convinced by the master of eclecticism of the truth of our proposition. A system of philosophy or theology is a formal expression of human thought, and must, therefore, have some relation to consciousness; for the true laws of thought demand that there should always be one or other of the real or necessary elements of thought present to the mind in its constructions. Thus every error has necessarily some colouring of reality to secure its acceptance by its author, no less than his audience. The ruins of the past are not without their lesson. They were not always ruins. As accepted systems, they had once the smile of genius and the homage of royal men. How the innumerable collections of systems which have held sway among men could have obtained the human credence they commanded, without some admixture of truth, is a conception as miraculous

as it is baseless; for, should any arrangement of thoughts, worthy the name of a system, be found without some proportion of truth, we should be far from ever apologizing for asserting that its fond author had given higher proofs of full mental status than it. As sin, in all its nakedness, is repulsive even to the sinner, and is forced to put on the woollen sandals of pleasure ere she can pass the detective ear of conscience, so theoretical error is incapable of finding acceptance with the intellect if she has overlooked the precaution of first prepossessing the judgement by a bribe of truth. Man can never be deceived by all error and no truth, though he can be, and often is, deceived by much error and little truth. His worship of the idols which Bacon has classified, and against which our own Reid has warned us, does not at all indispose him to "welcome errors of whatever size," if only sufficiently draped with the garments of truth. We adduced the system of the father of modern philosophy to illustrate our first doctrine, but no less does it bear record to the doctrine that all theories have some proportion of truth to give them currency. Its leading doctrine of the essential difference of mind and matter is, by itself, an impregnable truth, but placed in alliance with the other doctrine assumptively connected with it,—the doctrine that the one cannot act on the other,—it gave influential patronage to a system of error which could no more have existed without it than the dark body of the moon could be seen without the borrowed light of the burning sun. The erroneous was accepted only on the credit of the true; and logic, making the true and the false proposition a compound premiss, filled, by the force of its own laws, each consequent of the premiss with error:—

As in an organ from one blast of wind,  
To many a row of pipes the sound-board breathes.

The mythologies, astrologies, cosmogonies, and theologies of the old world, had respectively grand lines of truth running through them, as veins of gold through barren deposits; and careful Ruths will find many gems among the shapeless heaps of speculative dross. Most of the ancient systems of repute, like the image of Nebuchadnezzar's forgotten dream, had heads of fine gold, and hearts and arms of silver, though their nether parts were brass, iron, and clay, and, therefore, doomed to the shattering blow of the stone cut out without hands from the mountain of pure truth. Men of adventure explore the hidden palaces of Pompeii, conscious that treasure will reward their energy and pain; so literary excavators, assuming that truth has always been justified by some children of the past, that men of old could not live intellectually and spiritually on unmixed error any more than now, lay open the veins of past thought, and rescue many a trophy for the shrine of truth. Since, then, the false lives by the true, every

system finding acceptance among men, represents, at least, some truth. *What if Calvinism, as a system, has found acceptance with a number of men, only because it represents, not the whole, but merely so much of the essential truth?*

III. *Calvinism, to be a self-consistent system, needs no more than a leading generative thought which represents so much truth.*

This is the combination and practical application of our previous propositions. The leading thought of Calvinism, from the human side, is the doctrine of entire and original depravity; and, from the divine, the doctrine of absolute sovereignty. Of these two the latter is chief, and representative of so much truth. God is sovereign over man. All admit and hold tenaciously to it; and hence all hold a general truth. But as soon as we ask what the special nature of the divine sovereignty is, different and opposite answers are given, and specific error begins to exist. The Calvinistic definition is, we think, the result of a formidable intellectual temptation, and leans more to a physical than a moral solution of things. Man, feeling himself a weakling in the midst of a vast circle teeming at all times and points with marks of immense power; being over-awed by the far-stretching crowds of stupendous worlds all over and beyond him in the mysterious arch that hides behind it the omnipotent arm that moves all things; perplexed by the signs of arbitrary omnipotence in the irresistible storm, the ruthless hurricane, the merciless earthquake, the destructive volcano, the terrifying lightning, the sudden death, or the social pestilence; and baffled each day in his domestic, social, and commercial designs by some powerful providential hand which he can neither resist nor see; bows his head in acknowledgement of an awful power with which he cannot contend, asks himself the humiliating question, what is man? and, ignoring the purely moral and intuitional teachings of his own consciousness, falls headlong on the doctrine of an absolute sovereignty—God controlling all men and things physically rather than morally. This doctrine is the seed-plot of Calvinism, and by the law of doctrinal or logical generation, is soon surrounded by others after its own likeness. All these form a homogeneous doctrinal cluster, and represent so much truth.

The leading feature of Calvinistic sovereignty is *power*, rather than justice, energy rather than motive, force rather than persuasion; although it is strenuously maintained by its advocates that God is as just as he is powerful. There is not a little of Hobbism in the sovereignty of Calvinism, for the subtle English sceptic maintained that God's authority was based not in justice, but in omnipotence. Calvinism will make an appeal to a material analogy as readily as to the oracle of consciousness. Psychology

is made to occupy the place of servant to natural philosophy which is the detective and expositor of force. Its conversions are miracles. It would not discourse on the conversion of the jailer with the warmth that would be raised in the handling of the conversion of Saul. Its nature of motives is best explained by the image of the needle and the pole. Its protecting grace is best pictured in the sea-walls of Holland. It rejoices in the figure of dead men as literally expressive of the real state of the unconverted: and its divine influences are best typified by the irresistible currents of the invisible hurricane. It has a correct idea of what omnipotence is, but has erroneous notions of what omnipotence does. It has a true doctrine of the nature of omnipotence, but possesses no true theory of its application and sphere. To it, the divine will can accomplish anything, a doctrine which implies that God can contradict himself; and because only that which has come to pass in the universe has come to pass, it is assured that the sovereignty of God left no alternative, and that nothing else or less or more could have happened.

The root-doctrine of Calvinism, then, is sovereignty as omnipotence. But it cannot stand alone. From the doctrine of sovereignty, as held by the true Calvinist, to the dogma of universal foreordination, is but one, and that a very easy step. Decree is the child of sovereignty. Here then is the stem from the root:—"God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." But logic cannot rest with premisses, and she argues that if any soul be saved or lost it is because God wills and wishes it. She may be terrified to utter the doctrine she has deduced; but making an excursion out to facts, and finding that vast crowds go down to the pit, she at once asserts it; and hence the doctrines of unconditional election and reprobation are logical necessities, stealing authority from facts she has had no terror to misconstrue. This doctrine of election is inseparable from the nature of sovereignty maintained, and the area of foreordination marked: and the certain number saved or lost have no more to do with their salvation than the worlds with their wheeling or the ships with their sinking. Who, with these thoughts, can help holding the dogma of Christ bleeding for some only? Who, with any respect for systematic self-consistency, can resist adding to this the limited and irresistible influences of the Spirit? And how shall these chief, and the subordinate doctrines they imply, acquire a logical finish or run themselves off into a symmetrical spiral point without the corollary of the perseverance of the saints? Calvinism is a logical unity, and cannot spare one of these any more than it can dismiss them all. To quote the words of the author of the article "Calvinism," in *Chamber's Encyclopædia*—an article from the pen of Principal Tulloch, if we

are not mistaken—"The divine will, apprehended as decretive and predestinating is necessarily *irresistible* in its efficacy, *select* in its objects, and *persevering* in its results. The characteristic of Calvinism, therefore, is that it is a speculative christian system, springing from a single great principle, carried out rigorously into all its logical consequences." A more striking unity of thought cannot be found any where. Open the lid of this theological Pandora's box, and we must take all its contents or none. We dare not shudder though the weird apparition of fate beat its hollow march in the ghostly corridors of our logic: with our intellectual choice we must take our intellectual fate. When we have laid the foundation of our theological house, we must build without fear. It is not necessary to the building of a house, that you build it on a rock. Foundation is another question, as the parable of the Wisest shews. Pantheism is a house, but not on a rock. Atheism is a house, but not on a rock. Fatalism is a house, but not on a rock. All these are systems consistent with their radical thought, and representing some aspects of truth, however meagre, in the midst of terrible errors. *What if Calvinism, too, be a house, but not on a rock? It is self-consistent. It has some truth, but what if only some truth?*

IV. *Self-consistency is not the test of truth, for any system, however self-consistent, not wholly based on truth, will suffer by coming into contact with reality or the verities of consciousness.*

Self-consistency is not a standard. Our first proposition demonstrates this. It, therefore, cannot be a test. It may be urged by those unwilling to lose its testimony, that it is the product of reason. Not so. Systematic self-coherence is the product of a leading thought or premiss, which may correspond with truth or error, and is indebted to reasoning only for being drawn out. The premiss may be formed by prejudice or imperfect induction, and reason, or rather reasoning, like the ancient Jews, must make bricks out of whatever raw material comes to its hand. The premiss is one thing, and all the same to the purely logical faculty; but the process is another. Or, if it be said that reason enters into all the processes, both of making premiss and elaborating system, we would reply that reason, specially as the logical power, must not be confounded with reason as generally characteristic of the species as intelligent. Reason on the inductive is not identical with reason on the deductive side, any more than reason as conscience, looking law-ward, is identical with reason as consciousness, looking self-ward. Self-consistency in a system, then, proves nothing but elaboration. *It proves neither the truth nor the error of a system.* It is perfectly consistent with either systematic truth or error. It has no function.

It is a creature of logical circumstances. It gives no judgement ; and cannot. It forms no opinion, and cannot. It has no test of truth, and cannot. It is only a theoretical state. As applied, then, to any system tentatively, it is, and must be, void of result.

But further, our appeal is to history. Let any man, if he have courage enough, turn over the heavy tomes of Cudworth, or consult the sparkling pages of more genial histories of philosophy, such as Cousin's, and he will witness a sea of theoretical waves coming on in fatal succession to break and scatter on the impregnable rock of the verities of consciousness. "With a heart for any fate," systems, unrivalled for symmetry, when their intellectual creators had gone into the mysterious shades where the true light is said never to dim, have marched on in the universal impulsion to their fatal collision with the truth they had eschewed. What are the systems,—which in the days of the pyramids were as fresh as the appearance of a new star, and as influential in common life as the lily-lined streams that propel our bulky machinery,—but eccentric monuments of rich but mistaken genius? Though once the symbols of intellectual sway, are they not now obnoxious to the tender play of modern ridicule? How have the champions of the modern myth-school passed by the camel of Thales's water world, the Manichean poetical duality, the vortices of Descartes, the lumbering mechanism of Leibnitz's pre-established harmony, and strained out the gnat of scripture verities? Were they not powers, just as now they are brilliant fragments of history? But nearer; what Johnson now needs to kick his foot against a stone to disprove the idealism of Berkeley? How many mental philosophers would risk their reputation by the unreserved adoption of Edwards's limited and fatalistic classification of our powers and faculties? How many well-spun theories of cosmogony had been based on partial views of the Bible's opening chapter by men who did their best in the dark, till geology, the youngest of the sciences, said "Let there be light," and exposed the fond foolishness of theorists? Did not all these systems boast of self-consistency? But were they therefore true? The ages are against the reckless affirmer. Self-consistency, having no mission, cannot guarantee immortality to any system; and hence the sifting inquiries of restless thought brought these into fatal collision with the verities of consciousness and true knowledge, and wrote their doom on the shell of intellectual ostracism. Submission to intellectual temptation incurs the penal exposure awarded by a searching posterity, who owe their superiority to the intellectual imperfections of their forefathers. If all the systems we have alluded to had been based wholly, as they were partially, in truth, they might have come into strife with the

prejudices of men, but never with the intellectual necessities of the individual or the inviolable common sense of the race. Truth is in alliance with justice. Let any system fail to recognise and incorporate some essential truth in its induction, and it cannot fail to reveal here or there in its history the compensating operations of faithful justice; for as soon as it endeavours to meet what it never anticipated, it necessarily precipitates itself on the unrecognised element with penal effect. The vengeful shade of Cæsar always meets Brutus at Philippi. A theory can stand only as long as its inconsistency with truth is not discovered. Its consistency with self will not save it, if truth do not. Is our proposition not the truth on this matter? Will any system defy the voices of history and reason, and point to the remnant of coherence as a reason for honourable existence? Is a suffering system not a dying or a dead one? Does Calvinism possess more lives than one? If she accept our doctrine in this division,—and she must when she sees it,—her real life will be worth no purchase. Will she risk a comparison with consciousness, and not suffer? We fear the issue.

*V. The Calvinistic system suffers by coming into contact with the verities of consciousness, and therefore, notwithstanding its self-consistency, is not wholly based in truth.*

This proposition is the doctrine of our article. We have wrought two lines—the nature and history of systematic self-consistency; and the outcome in the practical application of them to the theological system of Calvin, is the unflattering doctrine logically forced on us in our examination of the fallacious utterance of his learned eulogist. We have said that Calvinism, looking at it on the purely abstract side, is self-consistent. It is a speculative unity when looked at away from the plane of duty which it dreads. It is safe with itself in some supernal floating Laputa, far above the arena of impartial sifting and practical application. It would seem to be the furtive construction of some Ishmael faculty, for it is disowned when let down into the common family of consciousness. It is not only a stranger, to which no hospitality is shown, but an enemy, incurring the expulsive hostility of all the native forces of mind. Its appearance in consciousness, as introduced by perception, is the signal for mental struggle; nor do the accustoming years reconcile the native thoughts to the irksome sway of the invader. The years of fortification reveal the weakness and unnaturalness of the position; and the feeling of true security against the common sense and consciousness of mankind never comes. In consciousness the physical idea of Calvinistic sovereignty has no counterpart; on the contrary, there is the unsparing condemnation of the submission to

the intellectual temptation of using a misleading analogy to assist in the strict definition of the nature of the divine government of men. The Calvinistic doctrine of universal foreordination excites awkward questions in the reason, which has daily intelligence of events painfully contradictory to its intuitive and indestructible idea of a pure and holy God. It may use the shibboleth of another system to gain the acceptance it doubts on its own right, but the obnoxious, spurious sibilant will find it out. Its doctrine of moral inability is as incompatible with our irresistible sense of responsibility, as the ascription of palsy to the man who is conscious and observant of his strength, would be false. Its Edwardsian auxiliary may press its strongest motive as the true power in the chain of philosophical necessity; but the consciousness of will, as inviolable as it is ultimate, stands back in surprise from the subtleties of intellectual play; and laughs to scorn the last plea of a weakened cause—the forged passport of systematic self-consistency. The abstract system of Calvinism, breathing necessity in every part of its circle, is logically destructive of all individual and social ethics, which, from our very sense of personal freedom, dependency, and accountability, we are forced, in some shape, to form. There is no living Calvinist who dare assert that he would not wish his theory and his consciousness to be on better terms than they manifest to himself; and who does not feel the meanness and cowardliness of ever ultimately resorting to that weakest and yet most unassailable of all arguments, a postponement of the debate till eternity throws light on its tangled meshes. To us, though we regret the necessity, that may be appealing from Calvinist blinded to Calvinist seeing. Consciousness, however, eager with the sense of missionary relations, cannot afford to wait, or to insult her Maker with the presumptuous proposal, but fills the sails of action with the impelling breath of the imperative sense of duty. A system that is at war with duty, though at peace with doctrine, makes duty a misnomer. It leaves no room for the *moral* use of the word law, but merges it into its physical definition, to the offence of our moral consciousness—our conscience. If Calvinism be doctrinally right, what *is* law, and what *can* be the guarantee of duty? Have we not a collision—not between the power of the logic that makes this system, and the front of duty, for these are compatible in friendship—but between the premiss of the system put into the hands of logic, and the element of practical duty? between, in short, systematic self-consistent Calvinism, as the evolution of the partial premiss, and the whole moral and practical man? Some dreamers have believed man to have two souls. Should not this have been the presumption of Calvinism? Psychologists tell us of that abnormal state of mind known by



the name of divided or "double consciousness," a morbid mental state consisting of the consciousness of a double identity, and double and differing trains of thought. Does Calvinism, as an applied system, not seem an abnormal and inconsistent duality of thought and enforced practice. It is sublime, if not awful, in ideal; but it is weak, if not utterly impracticable, in reality. It is twain, but the twain are not one flesh, and shew neither harmony nor strength in their engagements. It cannot meet a fully developed psychology—the whole science of consciousness. It is therefore, in the practical world, without a wedding garment, and speechless. Does the system not tremble like Felix at the bar of consciousness, and speak of the convenient season of the future? It suffers. But it is self-consistent! Useless plea! It is mean to beg immortality from self-consistency, when only unmixed truth, clear in heaven and on earth, can give it. We must appeal to Cæsar. Have we not made out our case? Any system, however self-consistent, if it suffer by coming into contact with verities, is not wholly true: Calvinism does suffer by contact with true thought, and is therefore, despite its symmetry, and "higher consistency of system," not wholly true. Our case is clear. Calvinism is not *the* system—not *the* truth.

Calvin, instead of using the lamp of self-inspection, "fed," as Tulloch says, "on Augustine." Calvinism is neither biblical nor psychological, but Augustinian. It is a mere premiss with a heart for any fate but ethics. Hence Mrs. Stow's Napoleon and Cromwell are constitutional and not moral heroes, as, on the same principle, her Legree must be a constitutional, and not a moral, monster. Not until Calvinism rises from the tricks of self-consistency to handle the true test of truth, will she yield a *bona fide* respect to herself, or have *bona fide* confidence in exacting it from a searching humanity.

J. S.—T.

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#### DOCTRINAL QUERIES.

##### QUERY 1. THE CHURCH THE FULNESS OF CHRIST.

"In Eph. i. 23, we read the words,—'the fulness of him that filleth all in all.' Do these words simply mean that Christ's fulness is complete when he has all his members? If not, what is their meaning?"

M. S.—A.

ANSWER. Many able critics contend that the fulness spoken of is not the fulness acquired by Christ, but the fulness derived from Christ; the fulness, that is to say, which is subjectively characteristic of the

church. The church, they think, is represented by the apostle as *full of him who fills the universe*. We are disposed, however, to think that the idea is, that Christ, as *Saviour*, would be incomplete without *the saved*. The church is thus the complement of Christ, even as the bulk of the body is the complement of the vitalizing and imperial head. And thus the glorious paradox is realised,—that He, who, in his divinity, fills the universe, comes in his humanity to a little part of his universe that he may obtain his own fulness. Such honour does he confer on men: who are not only complete in him, but in whom he also is complete.

#### QUERY 2. REDEMPTION, JUSTIFICATION, SANCTIFICATION.

“Are the following definitions complete and satisfactory, that is, scriptural?—

“*Redemption*. We are redeemed from the penalty due to our sins by the *blood of Christ*. (Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14.)

“*Justification*. We are justified by the *blood of Christ*, (Rom. v. 9), of which fact Christ’s resurrection is *the proof*, (Rom. iv. 25); while *faith* is the self-appropriating medium of the benefits accruing therefrom. (Rom. iii. 30.)

“*Sanctification*. Christ is made unto us sanctification, (1 Cor. i. 30); our personal sanctification must be imperfect in this life, (Rom. vii. 15, 17).”

W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** Redemption has sometimes reference to deliverance from the penalty due to our sins, and sometimes it has reference to other items of the great sum-total of our spiritual deliverances, as for example, the deliverance from “our vain conversation received by tradition from our fathers.” (1. Pet. i. 18.) When the term is employed in this latter reference, as well as when it is employed in the reference indicated by our correspondent, it denotes a blessing which is obtained on the ground of the blood of Christ. The blood of Christ is the price of the redemption. In other and more technical terms, it is the *meritorious cause* of the deliverance. The Father is the *Efficient Cause*. Faith is the *instrumental cause*, or the *causa sine qua non*, or the immeritorious condition, on which the actual deliverance is suspended.

In like manner, as regards justification, the work of Christ is the ground or *meritorious cause*; the Father is the *Efficient Cause*; and faith is the *instrumental cause*, or the *causa sine qua non*, the immeritorious condition, on which, however, actual justification is suspended. Actual justification did not take place on the accomplishment of the work of Christ; but it occurs when the sinner believes in the Lord Jesus Christ. (Rom. iii. 26, etc.) For God is an ever-acting agent.

Christ’s work is also the ground on which we receive the sanctifying Spirit; and it is likewise, when realized, the grand motive-principle which constrains believers to live not unto themselves, but unto Him who loved them and gave Himself for them. It is through faith, however, that God actually “purifies the heart.” (Acts xv. 9.) And as faith increases, so does purity.

**QUERY 3. CHRIST THE FIRST-BORN FROM THE DEAD.**

“How are we to understand the assertion that Christ was ‘the first-born from the dead?’ The daughter of Jairus, the widow of Nain’s son, and Lazarus were all raised from the dead by Himself prior to his own death.”  
W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** The expression “the first-born from the dead” occurs in Col. i 18. (Comp. Rev. i. 5; 1 Cor. xv. 23; Acts xxvi. 23.) It is applicable to Christ, because he was in reality the first, who passed out of death into the world of interminable life. The resurrections referred to by our correspondent were temporary, and parenthetical, and only evanescent earnestness of the true and complete resurrection. Jesus was the first who so rose from the dead, that he should no more return. And besides, his resurrection was the logical antecedent, as well as the archetype, of every other resurrection.

**QUERY 4. CHRIST THE FIRST-BORN OF EVERY CREATURE.**

“How are we to understand the statement that Christ was ‘the first-born of every creature?’”  
W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** The expression occurs in Col. i. 15, and is variously interpreted. The old Arians deduced from it that our Saviour was a creature, though the primal one. To this interpretation the Trinitarians replied, that, had such been the idea of the apostle, he would have said “the first-created of every creature,” and he would not have added, in the following verse, “for by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that all in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him and for him.” Theodoret says that the expression, instead of meaning that the Lord “has the creature for his sister, was begotten before every creature.” Chrysostom and Theophylact take the same view. So does Ambrosiaster. So do Bengel, and Meyer. Pelagius supposed that the term “first-born” has reference, not to time, but to honour: just as Israel is called God’s “first-born.” (Ex. iv. 22, etc.) So, too, we read in Heb. xii. 23, of “the church of the first-born.” We think it probable that Jesus is designated “the first-born of every creature,” because he is, as invested with our human nature, exalted to be “the Filial Head of the whole creation.” “All power in heaven and on earth” has been given to him. And this exaltation, in the economy of propitiation, is built upon his natural pre-eminence in the prior economies of creation, preservation, and gubernation.

**QUERY 5. ALL THINGS RECONCILED TO GOD THROUGH CHRIST.**

“Are we to understand that the effects of Adam’s transgression extended to beings in heaven? (Col. i. 20.) Or was it the fall of Satan that is referred to in the above Scripture?”  
W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** The passage referred to runs thus:—“And, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto

himself; by him, *I say*, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven." It is not unlikely that the word "reconcile" is used pregnantly, and thus involves an idea that overlaps that of strict reconciliation. The work of Christ had relations, not to men only, but to the intelligent universe at large. Its influence began, so to speak, with men, but extended outward and upward. As it began, it was of the nature of conciliation, but as it stretched out beyond the sphere of men, into the regions of the unfallen, it sublimed itself into something of the nature of confirmation and increasing assimilation. In its origin, a reunion of the sundered was sought; in its progress upward, a closer union of the unsundered was realized. And thus, in the ultimate issues, things, as well as persons, may be attached for ever to the will of God.

We do not think, therefore, that we require to regard the statement of the apostle as referring directly either to the influence of the fall of Adam on the one hand, or to the influence of the fall of Satan on the other. Neither would we, in contrariety to the express terminology of the apostle, take the view of those interpreters, both ancient and modern, who suppose that the reference is to the reconciliation to *one another* of the various portions of the intelligent universe. The apostle's expression is, "to reconcile all things *unto himself*."

#### QUERY 6. GOD'S WINKING AT SIN.

"How are we to understand the apostle's statement that God *winked at sin*? (Acts. xvii. 29, 30.)" W. L. W.

ANSWER. The expression referred to is,—“and the times of this ignorance *God winked at*; but now commandeth all men every where to repent.” The vulgate translates the expression,—*despising* (despiciens). Wolf approves of this version, but explains it as meaning,—*despising with indignation, hating* :—“God, hating the times of ignorance, now commandeth all men every where to repent.” Kuinöl renders the clause thus,—“God *permitted* the times of ignorance.” Tyndale translates it thus,—“and the tyme of this ignorance God *regarded not*.” Luther renders the verb,—“*overlooked*,” which is undoubtedly the correct translation of the original. God overlooked the times of ignorance; “The beams of his eye,” as John Howe expresses it, “did in a manner shoot over them”; not absolutely, of course, but to such an extent as to let many things transpire, which were exceedingly offensive to his infinite reason and heart. Mr. Dodwell, however, certainly wrung out of the expression what is not in it, when he maintained that it teaches us that God did not require the heathens, during the time of their ignorance, to worship him.

#### QUERY 7. IN ADAM ALL DIE.

“Rom. v. 12. Surely the death here spoken of cannot be the death of the body, but that of the soul? The words of the almighty to Adam “*dying thou shalt die*,” and the words of our Saviour and his apostles in numerous instances appear to place the point beyond doubt: Mat.

viii. 22; ix. 24; xxii. 31, 32; John xi. 25, 26; Eph. ii. 1; Col. iii. 3; 1 Tim. v. 6; etc., etc.”

W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** There is indeed a death, which is predicable of the soul,—a much direr thing than the death of the body. But whether it be to this death that the apostle refers in Rom. v. 12, is another question. The expression in 1 Cor. xv. 22, “in Adam all die,” which seems to be in some respects kindred to Rom. v. 12, undoubtedly refers to natural death. And if those “who sinned not after the similitude of Adam’s transgression,” (Rom. v. 14,) be infants, then, apparently, it must be natural death which is referred to. The exegesis of Rom. v. 12 is far from being free from difficulty in a scientific point of view. But, so far as we can see at present, we apprehend, that death natural is referred to.

**QUERY 8. SHOULD WOMEN PREACH IN PUBLIC?**

“Is it scriptural for a woman to preach the gospel to a public and promiscuous audience assembled in the church?”

Gulielmus.

**ANSWER.** It is difficult to draw decisive, and universally applicable, lines of distinction, in a matter of this kind: so as to mark off, to a nicety, the respective spheres of the sexes, and the respective circles which enclose what is distinctively private and what is distinctively public. Sometimes extraordinary circumstances arise, which call for extraordinary actions; and which call forth extraordinary persons. Deborah was an extraordinary woman, and lived in extraordinary circumstances, and did extraordinary things. The woman of Samaria was, for a season, the object of extraordinary influences, and thus surrounded by extraordinary circumstances, which impressed a sanction upon some extraordinary public acts. Joan of Arc was an extraordinary woman, and placed in extraordinary circumstances. The church of Corinth was for a season moved by an extraordinary outpouring of spiritual power, and women “prayed and prophecied” in connection with its meetings. Queens are placed in extraordinary circumstances; and our queen addresses parliament, and has the power of proclaiming war and of making peace. Quaker ladies frequently feel impelled,—and, as they believe, by the special influence of the Divine Spirit,—to give public addresses. But assuredly, in all ordinary circumstances, the more private walks of life are the seemliest spheres of woman’s sympathies and activities. And individuals should not be rash to conclude that they are charged with extraordinary missions. Surely too, the apostle’s injunction contains the rule for the general regulation of female effort:—“Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak.” (1 Cor. xiv. 34.)

**QUERY 9. THE CLOUD OF WITNESSES.**

“Of what nature were the witnesses, to whom reference is made in Heb. xii. 1?”

A. W.

**ANSWER.** Doubtless of human nature. They are the worthies who are spoken of in the preceding chapter. Perhaps there is a kind of sacred

play in the use of the word, by which they are designated. They may be called *witnesses*, partly, because they are, from on high, spectators of our christian career; but, principally, because they themselves bore witness to the things unseen and eternal, which are the objects of faith.

QUERY 10. PSALM XC. 3.

“What is meant by the passage which says, ‘Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return ye children of men?’” A. W.

ANSWER. The passage occurs in the psalm of Moses, Psalm xc. 3. It indicates that death, as well as life, is the appointment of God; and that there are therefore good reasons why men are mortal.

QUERY 11. EVERY MAN SHALL BEAR HIS OWN BURDEN.

“If it be true that every man has to bear his own burden, how is it that the Lord will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, even unto the third and fourth generation?” A. W.

ANSWER. The passages referred to are Gal. vi. 5, and Ex. xx. 5, and are not at all inconsistent. It may be the case, for example, that evil influences descend for generations, and that yet every evil-doer has to bear the burden of his own condemnation. A man may be alone to blame for the evil, which he does, and may alone be blamed by God, while yet the evil which he does may shed its malignant influence upon multitudes who are around him, and other multitudes who come after him.

QUERY 12. SALVATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

“Wherein are salvation and sanctification essentially distinct?”—J.L.

ANSWER. The former refers properly to relative state, the latter to moral character. The former, as experienced by men, is realised in deliverance from the penalty of sin, and in the enjoyment of the reward of righteousness; the latter, is deliverance from sin's pollution, and is assimilation of the character to the moral image of God.

QUERY 13. PARDON, JUSTIFICATION, AND SANCTIFICATION.

“How can pardon and justification be the means of producing sanctification, seeing that sanctification flows from the belief of the truth as well as pardon and justification?” J. L.

ANSWER. Pardon and justification affect the attitude in contemplating the great realities which are embodied in the work of Christ, and exhibited in the truth of the gospel. There will, for instance, be less self-seeking, after self's urgent necessities have been satisfied. There will likewise be greater gratitude for blessings conferred, blessings added to blessings. There will also be a more elevated standpoint of experience reached, and thus the soul will see farther and more clearly.

QUERY 14. SALVATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

“If salvation and sanctification are like the two ends, respectively, of an erect pillar, will not the difference between the two be merely positional and not essential?” J. L.

ANSWER. It is the soul that is both saved and sanctified: and therefore salvation and sanctification are realised in a unity of being. But yet, as the capital of a pillar is essentially distinct from its base, so that which is relatively first, may be essentially distinct from that which is relatively last.

QUERY 15. SALVATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

“If the term Saviour may denote the author of our sanctification, may not the term salvation include sanctification?” J. L.

ANSWER. Not necessarily. The term Saviour denotes, for instance, the author of the propitiation; but it does not therefore follow that the term salvation means propitiation, or includes propitiation as a part of its import.

QUERY 16. SALVATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

“May not present salvation include pardon, justification, and sanctification?” J. L.

ANSWER. It might, if we were at liberty to affix what import we please to the terms we employ. But if the scripture-usage of terms be inquired after, it seems to us that salvation is pardon and justification, and is distinct from sanctification.

QUERY 17. SALVATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

“May not final salvation include pardon, justification, and sanctification, with glorification?” J. L.

ANSWER. The question is answered under Query 16. The realities of pardon, justification, sanctification, and glorification, form, when viewed from one standpoint, a unity. When viewed from another, they form a plurality. We do not think that salvation is the strict and proper term for the plurality viewed as a unity.

QUERY 18. SALVATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

“Can a sinner believe the truth, that God so loved him as to give Jesus Christ for him, without loving God instantly, as well as having an instant sense of pardon and justification? And, seeing that love to God and man is the sum of the whole law and the prophets, has not the individual, who was a sinner, now become good, and will he not remain good so long as he believes the Truth?” J. L.

ANSWER. He who believes the truth of the gospel, is just he who by faith receives the gift of eternal life, or the gift of salvation, or the gift of pardon and justification. And receiving such a gift he instantly loves the Giver.

## QUERY 19. THE MORAL LAW AND PENALTY.

“In what consists the element of penalty said to be in the Moral Law?” J. L.

ANSWER. It is that element which annexes threatening to injunction, and thus makes provision, in the event of transgression, for the experience of *pain*, the *pain of punishment*.

## QUERY 20. THE MORAL LAW AND PENALTY.

“Is not the penalty incurred by breaking the moral law distinct from the Law?” J. L.

ANSWER. The suffering of it is, but the threatening of it is not.

## QUERY 21. THE MORAL LAW AND PENALTY.

“Is not penalty a consequence of the breach of the Moral Law, rather than an element of the law.” J. L.

ANSWER. The suffering of it is; the threatening of it is not. A law without a penal element would be mere advice.

## QUERY 22. “I AM CARNAL.”—PAUL.

“How could Paul be a Christian at the time that he was carnal?”— J. L.

ANSWER. Because there are degrees in christian sanctification. If Paul, a Christian, could become progressively more and more spiritual, he could become progressively less and less carnal.

## QUERY 23. CAN A CHRISTIAN BE CARNAL?

“Seeing that a Christian is not under the dominion of sin, what state is the man in who is carnal?” J. L.

ANSWER. He is in that state in which sin has lost its dominion but not its existence. Iniquity is driven out of the citadel; but it still lurks, if not in the highways, at least in the byeways of the soul.

## QUERY 24. CAN A CHRISTIAN BE CARNAL?

“Seeing that ‘the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus’ had made Paul ‘free from the law of sin and death,’ how was he, at any time, or in any mode or relation, carnal?” J. L.

ANSWER. As regards state, he was free from the penalty of the law of sin and death; but as regards character, he had not yet attained, neither was he already perfect. He experienced that certain moral inconsistencies are possible.



## QUERY 25. CAN A CHRISTIAN BE CARNAL?

"What amount of carnality existed in the man, who counted all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus his Lord?" J. L.

ANSWER. We have no footrule wherewith to measure. But we may safely say,—Not so much as exists in the man, whose spark of spiritual life is "ready to die", but more than exists in the man whose soul is a seraphic flame, as he stands before the throne "holy and without blame, in love."

## QUERY 26. IS SIN POSSIBLE TO A BELIEVER?

"Can a child of God sin?"

J. L.

ANSWER. If he cannot commit sin, he is not a free-agent. If he cannot commit sin, Adam could never have fallen. If he cannot commit sin, Paul would never have had to rebuke Peter to his face. If he cannot commit sin, it would never have been written by a child of God to children of God, "in many things we *all* offend." But there is, nevertheless, a glorious sense in which the child of God "cannot sin." (1 Jo. iii. 9.) The *saint* cannot be a *sinner*, in the emphatic and contrastive import of the terms. In that respect *saints* are *saints*, and *not sinners*. They are not to be classed with the "woman who was a *sinner*," and with "publicans and *sinners*." Sin is far from being their predominant characteristic. On the contrary, opposition to sin is the distinguishing trait of their character.

## QUERY 27. "I WILL POUR OUT MY SPIRIT."

"Might not the second and third clauses of Prov. i. 23 be properly rendered in the present—'I am pouring out my Spirit'—'I am making known my words'; thus declaring what God was in the meantime doing rather than promising something for the future? In verses 20, 21, the verbs rendered 'crieth,' and 'uttereth' are, in the original, in the same tense as those referred to in verse 23." G. W.

ANSWER. We think that our correspondent has seized the idea of the inspired writer. The standpoint of the Hebrews, in relation to *tenses*, was not coincident with our English standpoint. They had not, in their paradigms, *past*, *present*, and *future*, as we have; but only *past* and *future*. Hence, in denoting a present action, or state, they had to look at it either as that which is the outcome of the past, or as that which is pregnant with the future. In Prov. i. 20, 21, accordingly, the expressions, "wisdom *will cry*," and "will *utter her voice*," mean, "wisdom *persisteth in crying and uttering her voice*." And in v. 23, the expressions, "*I will pour out my spirit* unto you, *I will make known my words* unto you," have the same import, "*I continue to pour out my spirit and to make known my words*." There is not, indeed, a determinate and exclusive reference to time present, according to our occidental notions of the tense. But there *is* a reference to it, though from a peculiarly prospective standpoint.

## QUERY 28. "LOVEST THOU ME, MORE THAN THESE?"

"In John **xxi. 15**, what may be regarded as the proper supplement to the words 'more than these'? Does 'these' express the objects loved, or the subjects loving? that is, 'more than thou lovest these?' or, 'more than these love me?'"

G. W.

ANSWER. The meaning undoubtedly is,—“Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me, *more than these, thy fellow-disciples, love me?*” Peter had professed, before our Lord’s betrayal, that, “although *all* should be offended, yet would not he.” (Mark **xiv. 29**; Mat. **xxvi. 33**.) He had thus intimated that his attachment to his Lord exceeded that of all the rest. The Saviour’s question seems to have been intended to convince him of the folly of thus flatteringly comparing himself with his fellow-disciples. And the humbled penitent was too self-conscious to say in reply, that he loved his Lord more than his fellow-disciples did. He simply, but ingenuously and most touchingly, says, “yea, Lord: thou knowest that I love thee.”

Whitby has a strange notion regarding the import of our Saviour’s question. He says, “Christ here inquires whether he (Peter) loved him more than (he loved) *these nets and fisher-boats*, about which he was now employed; and saith, that if indeed he did so, he should leave them, and wholly employ himself in *feeding his sheep and lambs*.” Not to mention the many other objections to this interpretation, it is enough to notice that it leaves utterly unaccounted for the omission of the comparison in Peter’s reply.

## QUERY 29. THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD.

“If God can be called the Father only of such beings as in some sense partake of his nature, how are we to account for his being called ‘The Father of lights,’ or ‘luminaries,’ in James **i. 17**?”

G. W.

ANSWER. If “the lights” spoken of in James’s epistle, be, as most modern expositors suppose, the heavenly luminaries,—referred to as manifestations and emblems of purity,—then it must be for rhetorical license, or *catachresis*, that God, their originator, is called their “Father.” Compare Job **xxxviii 28**,—“Hath the rain a father? or who hath begotten the drops of dew?” Collate also Job **xvi. 14**,—“I have said to corruption, Thou art my father; to the worm, Thou art my mother and my sister.”

## QUERY 30. ADAM BEGAT SETH IN HIS OWN IMAGE.

“Are the words in Gen. **v. 3**, ‘and begat a son in his own likeness, after his own image,’ a legitimate proof-text for ‘original sin’? If they are, why are they used at Seth’s birth and not at Cain’s, Adam’s first-born?”

Inquirer. W.

ANSWER. We cannot regard the statement of the inspired writer as a declaration of original sin. If the reference be not simply, and generically, physiological and psychological, we may suppose that the

expression was intended to point, proleptically, to the special resemblance that subsisted between Adam and Seth, as distinguished from the dissimilarity which was realised between Adam and Cain.

QUERY 31. ARE ALL MEN PARDONED ?

“To the Editor of the *E. Repository*.—Dear Sir, Whether I listen to Episcopalians, Presbyterians, or Dissenters, on one point, they all, with one solitary exception—an Episcopalian—teach alike, and, in so doing, appear to me to depart from the teaching of the Spirit as recorded in Scripture. I request, therefore, that you will favour me with your views in the next number of the *Repository*.

“*They call upon man to believe IN ORDER that his sins may be pardoned.*

“The Bible asserts that Christ died for the sins of the whole world ; such necessarily includes every individual.

“Again, Christ’s resurrection from the dead is proof to a demonstration that his death perfectly satisfied the divine requirements in connection with atonement for sin.

“As a necessary consequence, therefore, every man, in the sight of God the Father, must be a pardoned sinner. There appears to me no escape from this conclusion, but by denying, or explaining away, which amounts to the same thing, the death of Christ.

“Take for instance 2 Cor. v., wherein the Holy Spirit distinctly asserts that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself,—(the world can never mean believers,)—that the apostles were sent as ambassadors, in Christ’s stead, to beseech men to become reconciled to God, and that on the score that God no longer imputed their trespasses unto them, he having made Christ a sin-offering for them. The teaching of Rom. v. and Col i. is to the same purport.

“According to the Scripture, therefore, man, if condemned at the final judgement, will be so, not because he was an unpardoned sinner, but because, being pardoned, being in possession of the free gift of God, the great salvation, he refused to believe the same, and thus neglected to avail himself of the resources—the fulness of God—placed at his disposal, to enable him to walk with God as a dear child.

“In keeping with the above view, our Lord tells us, John iii. 17, 18, that he came not to condemn the world but to save it ; that those who believe in him are not condemned, while those who believe not are condemned already.

“What then is the point, the belief or disbelief of which carries with it such momentous consequences ? The simple, but all-important fact, that his blood *has* washed out my sins. For if it be not a truth that Christ’s blood has done so, no amount of faith on my part can convert that which is not into that which is. Neither, by parity of reasoning, can my disbelief in that which is not a fact, condemn in the sight of a truth-loving God.

“To preach the gospel is not to *offer* salvation, as too many suppose, but to proclaim a fact, namely, that the death of Christ satisfied for the sins of the world : just as to preach the resurrection is to proclaim the

fact, that all will rise from their graves, not to give men the option of doing so.

"If the question be asked, how, the sin of the world having been washed away in the blood of Christ, can any finally perish? the answer will be found in the consideration, that the doors of a prison are thrown open to no purpose in the case of any who will not believe in, and act on, the pardon sent from the Home Office. The supreme authority has certified their pardon, in writing, but as they will not act upon the same, they remain in jail.

"It strikes me, therefore, that the preachers, before alluded to, should call upon their hearers to believe in the pardon already secured to them by the death of Christ, and believing, to praise God for his unspeakable mercy, and walk accordingly, that is, as pardoned sinners, and not as sinners seeking pardon.

"Apologizing for the length of this communication,—I am, Dear Sir, yours very faithfully,—W. L. W."

ANSWER. If we interpret *pardon* as meaning *the remission of the penalty due to sin*, it seems to us that we cannot regard all men, unbelievers and believers alike, as being pardoned. For (1.) He who is pardoned, in the sense explained, is *safe*, and is thus, in the scriptural sense of the term, *saved*. He is no longer in *danger of the penalty due to his sins*. (2.) If pardon were not conditioned on the sinner's state of mind, the petition in the Lord's prayer would seem to be inapplicable:—"Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors." (3.) Peter said to Simon Magus,—“Repent of this thy wickedness; and pray God, if perhaps the thought of thine heart *may be forgiven thee*.” (Acts viii. 22.) It is implied that the thought of Simon's heart was unforgiven. (4.) The apostle Paul, in describing the blessedness, which is consequent on faith, and which is realised when “faith is counted for righteousness,” says,—“Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, *Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered*.” (Rom. iv. 5-7.) The argument seems to require that we identify *the forgiveness of sins* with *the counting of faith for righteousness*. (5.) Pardon and justification seem to go together;—the one delivering from the penalty of unrighteousness, and the other conferring the reward of righteousness. (See Acts xiii. 39.) But justification is “by faith,” (Rom. iii. 26, 28, 30; v. 1; Gal. iii. 8, etc.,) and therefore we may conclude that the other and twin blessing is also “by faith.” (6.) Paul was commissioned to go to the Gentiles, “to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, *that they may receive forgiveness of sins and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith, that is in Christ*.” (Acts xxvi. 18.) It was “by faith, that is in Christ,” that the Gentiles were to “receive forgiveness of sins” and “inheritance among them which are sanctified.” The expression, indeed, implies that both the blessings are free to sinners. But though the blessings are free, it would apparently be as incorrect to say that all are *actually forgiven*, as that all are *actually heirs*, that is, *heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ Jesus*. It is,—“If children, then heirs;” and we become “the children of God, by faith in Christ

Jesus." (Gal. iii. 26 ; Rom. viii. 17.) (7.) In 1 John i. 9, we read, that "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to *forgive us our sins*, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." The forgiveness of sins is represented as conditioned on confession, which is involved in repentance and faith. (8.) In James v. 15, we read,—“And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; *and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him.*” Forgiveness is spoken of, in this case, as future, not past. (9.) Our Saviour says, “forgive, *and ye shall be forgiven,*” (Luke vi. 37), “but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, *neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.*” (Mat. vi. 15). It cannot be meant, we should suppose, that Christ would refuse to die for the sins of those who do not forgive others. But if not, and if he died for the sins of all, while yet there are some sinners whom the Father will not forgive, then it cannot be the case that all are forgiven. (10.) If forgiveness on earth is a mere prolepsis and earnest of full final forgiveness, we cannot well conceive that all are forgiven.

We believe, indeed, that God has made a free gift of forgiveness to every individual, even as he has made a free gift of salvation and eternal life. (See 1 John v. 13.) But as it is not involved in the free gift of salvation and eternal life, that all are already saved and partakers of eternal life, so it does not seem to us to be involved in the free gift of pardon, that all are already pardoned.

When it is said in 2 Cor. v. 19, that “God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them,” it seems natural to suppose, that, as it is through the intermediacy of faith that he is reconciling the world unto himself, so it is through the intermediacy of the same faith that he is not imputing their trespasses to men. Without faith in the sinner, reconciliation to God is impossible; and so, it would appear, is the non-imputation or forgiveness of sins; though this latter blessing is undoubtedly the precursor and condition of the former.

If “he who believeth not is condemned already” (John iii. 18), he is surely unpardoned. His unbelief, at least, is unpardoned; and that is one of his sins.

It seems to us to be of great moment to realize the distinction between *propitiation* and *pardon*. Propitiation terminates on God; pardon on men. And the former is the ground, or meritorious cause, of the latter, even as it is the ground, or meritorious cause, of salvation or eternal life.

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#### BOOKS.

*History of the Reformation in Europe in the time of Calvin.* By J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D.D. Vols. i. ii. London: Longman, & Co. 1863.

THIS instalment of the History of the Reformation,—so far as its connection with Calvin is concerned,—is both of very great interest and of very great value. It deals chiefly, indeed, with the events which pre-

ceded the advent of Calvin on the public stage of things. But these it investigates profoundly and comprehensively from original sources. And it depicts them with that graphic power, which makes us feel as if we were almost their contemporaries. There is nothing of the peculiarities of theological Calvinism, as distinguished from other phases of evangelical doctrine, brought into view. It is only Calvin, as a reformer, and as he appeared in the first upward movements of his spirit, who is exhibited. There are, indeed, general estimates thrown out of the peerless pre-eminence of Calvin as a restorer of Christianity, with which we do not sympathize. But we can easily, as these pass before us, make what deduction from their exorbitance, we may deem necessary; while we freely and thankfully avail ourselves of all the facts which are recorded. We shall be thoroughly satisfied if we find our author adhering to his own representation of the atonement,—in so far as it was the subject matter of “the meditations of elect souls in many a secret chamber, in the sixteenth century,” and in so far as it had to do with “the way in which the reformation was accomplished.” “That sacrifice,” says he, “is of universal comprehensiveness; no one is excluded from it; and yet no one receives the benefit of it, except by a personal appropriation, by being united to Jesus Christ, by participating, through faith, in his holy and imperishable life.” (Vol. ii. p. 584.) We pray that the distinguished historian may be spared to complete this, the most important of his histories.

*The Gospel Roll: or the facts and glories of the Gospel unfolded in a series of Discourses, comprising an exposition of the leading gospel texts of Scripture.* By Francis Johnstone, Edinburgh. London: Nisbet. 1863.

THERE is much in this handsome volume, which we like exceedingly. The author has liberal and decisive views of the universality of the atonement; and hence he sees clearly that all the great blessings, which make up salvation, or which are involved in it, are free to all mankind. “The world,” referred to in John iii. 16, is, he says, “beyond all gainsaying the family of Adam, the genus man, the race which in distinction from all other races is called mankind. You may divide and classify this big word *world* as you please. You may quarter it into continents, and call its inhabitants Asians, Europeans, Africans, and Americans; or you may group it according to features, and call them Caucasians, Mongolians, Malaysians, Ethiopians, and American Indians; or you may divide it into families and conditions, and call them Jews and Gentiles, barbarians, Scythians, bond and free; or you may range them according to the two grand distinctions which will be owned in the last day, and will stand to all eternity, godly and ungodly: in short classify men as you may, this word *world* holds them all. As they are all inhabitants, and all sprung from one parent stock, they are mankind, they are the world which God loved.” (p. 55, 56.) We rejoice to read such sentences. The right kind of ring is in them. And the following, too, are much to our mind:—“The belief of the truth is not the fruit of regeneration, but regeneration is the fruit of the belief of the truth.” (p. 302.) “Election and adoption are blessings in Christ:

being in Christ, as Christ is free, they also are free." (p. 303.) Indeed, the theology of the whole volume, so far as we have been able to examine it,—is, in general, and as regards the substance of the views, much to our mind.

So much then, for the *substance* of Mr. Johnstone's book. It is truly excellent. But as regards its literary *form*, we desiderate not a little, and would expect in Mr. Johnstone's next publication a marked improvement. The leading title of his present work is not happy,—“The Gospel Roll.” There is mist in it, and even ambiguity. The pretension, involved in the remainder of the title, is not happy,—“comprising an exposition of *the* leading gospel texts of Scripture.” The author might have been contented to say “of *some* of the leading gospel texts.” The pretension, however, is iterated in the preface,—“But my plan reaches much further, namely, to open up and expound *all* the leading Scriptures where the gospel is most fully and pointedly stated.” (p. 4.) And yet only a few texts are taken up; and there is no exposition of any of the verses of Isai. liii., for example,—that glorious Old Testament evangel. There is more pretension still:—the author “hopes that his book will continue, many days after he has left this vale of tears, to make known the gospel of the glory of the happy God, and be the means of leading not a few to enter into the faith and joy of the love of God in the mediation of his Son.” (p. 5.) It is a natural hope: but there was no need for formally informing the reader that he entertained it. The formal information looks pretentious. So is the criticism which he passes on his own performance,—“Many, if not all, of the statements made are of the deepest interest, and, in my judgment, tend greatly to a clearer and fuller apprehension of the meaning of the Scriptures expounded.” (p. 5.)

In alliance with this pretentiousness, there is a tinge of what some would characterize as a kind of pedantry. Mr. Johnstone seems to have a crotchet in his head about the best English homologue for the letter  $\phi$  in Greek; and hence he invariably writes “*projet*” instead of *prophet*,” and in like manner, *filanthropist*, *filanthropy*, *Efesians*, *Filippians*, *Efracim*, &c. Now, we would not have the slightest objection to *f* as a substitute, in such cases, for *ph*, provided we had anything to do with fixing or modifying the usage of the language. But, when we have no such mission, it does look to us, to be something like finical, to depart from the established usage in a matter of such exceedingly trivial moment. Were the author, moreover, to apply the same crotchet to the corresponding Hebrew letter, he would land himself in inextricable orthoepic perplexities, in consequence of the *dagessation* of which the letter is susceptible. We do not know whether or not he has some similar crotchet regarding the orthographical laws that should regulate the conformation of compound terms; but we notice that he invariably writes “*allmighty*” instead of “*almighty*.” And yet we have not remarked that he ever writes “*allways*” instead of “*always*.” How he can account for this apparent whim we know not.

There is an occasional tendency, too, to exaggeration; as when he says:—“We may try to reach the heights of this love, and we should try; but when we do our utmost, just as a traveller climbing the Alps,

the Andes, or the Himalayas, finds the higher he gets, mountain piled upon mountain, peak upon peak, *so that he cannot reach the summit*; in like manner, we can never reach the lofty heights of the mount of everlasting love." (p. 68.) What we have italicised is putting the case rather too strongly. Again he says;—"To perish or to be destroyed, is, for the materials of which any body is composed to be loosened down and separated from one another, so that the body, as such, ceases to be. Thus a ship perishes at sea, etc." (p. 76.) But certainly a ship may perish at sea, although its "materials are not loosened down and separated from one another." He says again,—“To each man there can be nothing so precious as himself, for if the man is lost all is lost.” (p. 96.) But if it be the case that “to each man nothing can be so precious as himself,” he must prefer himself to his family, to his country, and to his God. Then, too, there could be no such virtue as self-sacrifice. But finite man, we suppose, really needs, for his complement, something beyond himself; and this something he may esteem to be as precious as himself, and even more so.

Mr. Johnstone makes pretty frequent reference to Greek; but sometimes, we are sorry to say, inaccurately. He remarks that “every one” would be a more literal rendering of the word translated “whosoever” ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ ) in John iii. 16. But he ought to have known that it is not one word which is rendered “whosoever.” It is two ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$   $\acute{\iota}$ ): and *every one who is just whosoever*. He says that the expression,—breviloquently translated “what” in 1 Cor. xv. 2, “if ye keep in memory *what* ( $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$   $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$ ) I preached unto you,”—should be rendered “some word.” He has altogether mistaken the pronoun which is used. It is the interrogative used indirectly; and therefore it must be translated not “some” but “what.”

But there is, notwithstanding these and other blemishes, much vigorous writing, as well as much admirable doctrine, in Mr. Johnstone’s volume. And we doubt not that the great Master, to whom the author has doubtless dedicated his book, will own it, and make it a blessing.

*The Song of Songs. A revised Translation, with Introduction and Commentary.* By Joseph Francis Thrupp. Macmillan. 1862.

MR. THRUPP maintains strenuously the strictly Messianic reference of the Song of Songs; and supposes, moreover, that the Bride is not the individual soul, but the collective church. The spirit of the work is everything that could be desired. And the work itself, taken as a whole, is an able and valuable contribution to our available helps for the interpretation of one of the most intricate poems of Scripture.

*The Power of Faith: or, Faith in its relation to christian experience and christian effort.* By S. M. Haughton. London: S. M. Haughton, 19 Paternoster Row. 1863.

A DELIGHTFUL and heart-stirring little book, written in the spirit of one who expects great things *from God*, and wishes to do great things *for God*. The spiritual buoyancy that pervades it, is animating.



*Mick Tracy, the Irish Scripture Reader; or, The Martyred Convert and the Priest. A tale of facts.* By W. A. C., of Canada West. New and revised edition. London: The Book Society, 19 Paternoster Row. 1863.

A THRILLING book, which would not let us go till we had finished it. Not indeed, in virtue of any complicated plot. There is nothing of the kind. Nor, because the spell is felt of highly accomplished literary and artistic skill. There is nothing of this description. But there is a faithful and vivid representation of Irish character, in all its native sprightliness and wit, as that character is manifested, at once, when under the exalting influence of the gospel, and when coming under it, and when pertinaciously and determinedly resisting it.

*A Bible Dictionary; being a comprehensive digest of the History and Antiquities of the Hebrews and neighbouring nations; the Natural History, Geography, and Literature of the Sacred writings.* By the Rev. James Austin Bastow. New edition. London: Longman & Co. 1859.

WE feel regret that we were not acquainted, at an earlier period, with this volume. It is an admirable book; of nearly the size of Dr. Eadie's *Biblical Cyclopædia*, and kindred in its aim and character. The author has evidently devoted himself, with genuine literary enthusiasm, to the preparation of the volume, and, in this new edition, to its normal development and improvement. He has brought to his task, moreover, no ordinary amount of learned research—research ramifying itself into multitudinous nooks and corners, from which materials may be derived for the illustration of the sacred volume.

We are delighted to find that under the words, which bear upon doctrinal controversies, he takes, in general, that view of things which coincides with the theology, which is characteristic of the *Repository*. Under the word "Election," for example, the author says, "The personal election of individuals to be the children of God and the heirs of eternal life, is an act of God done in *time*, and is also subsequent to the administration of the means of salvation. The *calling* goes before the *election*."—"Hence this personal election unto salvation is through personal faith in Christ." The contrast-word "Reprobation," again, is thus explained:—

"This term is equivalent to being *rejected* or *cast away*. Rejection always implies a cause: 'Reprobate silver shall men call them, because the Lord hath rejected them'; (Jer. vi. 30; 2 Cor. xiii. 5-7; Tit. 1. 16;) that is, they are base metal, which will not bear the proof. Conditional reprobation, or the rejection of men from the divine favour because of their impenitence and refusal of salvation, is a Scriptural doctrine; (Rom. 1. 28; 2 Tim. iii. 8;) but the notion of unconditional, absolute reprobation, is altogether inconsistent with the glorious perfections of the Most High."

This is all that could be desired. And equally satisfactory is the statement made under the word "Perseverance":—

"Whether true believers necessarily persevere to the end of life, or whether they may fall from their faith, and forfeit their state of grace, is a question in which we are not left in doubt. The Scriptures decidedly teach that the regenerate may lose true justifying faith, forfeit the state of grace, in which they are placed by the opera-

tion of the Holy Spirit, and die in their sins. Indeed, the nature of the present state of men, which is a state of *probation* or *trial*, must necessarily imply it. The Scriptures, in the various exhortations to faithful perseverance, and in the multiplied warnings against defection from the faith, evidently teach that apostasy from the highest degrees of grace is possible; and that those who stand high in the favour of God, may sin against him, lose his favour, and perish everlastingly. 'Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall.' (Ezek. xxxiii. 13; Mat. 1. 22; xxiv. 42, 46; Luke xii. 43; 1 Cor. x. 11, 12; Eph. vi. 18; Heb. vi. 5, 6; x. 29; Rev. ii. 10)"

We commend Mr. Bastow's *Bible Dictionary*. Ministers, students, and private Christians will find it to be a truly pleasant and instructive companion.

*Bible Christianity a matter of common sense: modern Experimental Religion a strong delusion.* By Mark Allen. Geneva, U. S. 1862.

A PIECE of the most unmitigated nonsense, from beginning to ending, which it has ever been our lot to peruse. The author holds that christianity is just "a great political question." (p. 16.) "The gospel," says he, "is good news of that kingdom, the location of which is to be in Palestine, the throne of which is to be David's, on Mount Zion, in Jerusalem; whose king is to be Jesus of Nazareth; its rulers the glorified believers of that gospel; and its subjects the gathered tribes of Israel, and the left of the nations of the earth." (p. 20.) The great promise, according to our author, which was made to Abraham, and to every believer, is, "land, real and substantial land, which could be walked upon, viewed by the eye, measured and bounded, having both a location and a name on this planet earth." (p. 10.) There is not "a single intimation that they shall ever inherit realms of bliss beyond the sky." (p. 10.) This would be only the paltry "anticipation of immaterial ghosts peopling immaterial realms," and "singing psalms of praise to an immaterial God, having neither body, parts, or passions." (p. 5.)

And yet Mr. Allen must assume to be a learned man. He quotes Greek largely, though he does not know the genitive case as distinguished from the nominative, (p. 4.) and cannot spell correctly the simplest Greek verb. (p. 7.) He quotes Latin too, and speaks of "*per dium* or *per annum*." (p. 22.) In other words, he does not know a single declension in the language. And he quotes Hebrew also: but most grotesquely mis-spells every word which he "sports." (pp. 9, 10, 12, &c.) When a superlative degree of ignorance goes hand in hand with a superlative degree of self-conceit, the conjunction is exceedingly ill-starred.

*Romanism and Rationalism as opposed to pure Christianity.* By John Cairns, D.D. Berwick. London and Edinburgh: Strahan. 1863.

AN excellent Lecture, in which the distinguished author seeks to steer his way between the Scylla of rationalism on the one hand, and the Charybdis of superstition on the other.

*A Reply to the Strictures of the Rev. J. H. Hinton, M.A., on some passages in Lectures on Christian Faith.* By John H. Godwin. London: Jackson & Co. 1862.

WE had not seen this Reply at the time that we published our review of Mr. Godwin's volume on Faith. The spirit displayed by the author is most beautiful. But the doctrine is not satisfactory.

*John Leifchild, D.D. His public ministry, private usefulness, and personal characteristics. Founded upon an Autobiography.* By J. R. Leifchild, A.N. London: Jackson, Walford, and Hodder. 1863.

A READABLE and somewhat racy book, concerning one who stood high in the roll of pulpit orators. Dr. Leifchild was constitutionally a speaker,—a speaker, in whom vigour and dignity strove for precedence. He was eminently manly in his mental as well as in his material make, free from all tendencies to weakness in any direction, and endowed with intellectual and moral attributes, which constantly bore him up, self-reliingly and aspiringly, toward the excellent, the graceful, the powerful, and the noble. We take him to have been a man of masculine and magnanimous soul; fervid withal, and capable of kindling into an intense glow of solemn earnestness. He seems, moreover, to have had the crowning excellency of being a truly good man; and hence he was a workman, whose ministry was signally blessed to the conviction, conversion, and salvation of many immortal souls.

We desiderate in his biographer,—the Doctor's only son,—some of the elements, in the direction both of the deep and of the lofty, which would have been requisite to do full and yet impartial justice to his subject. But he has certainly reared a monument of genuine affection and admiration to a great and worthy parent, who left his impress, wherever he stepped.

As Dr. Leifchild was so eminent as a preacher, we feel persuaded that ministers and theological students, as well as others, will be pleased and profited by the perusal of the following sentences from his autobiographical sketches:—

“From the first I determined to be a *good preacher*, and I have never seriously aimed at anything else all my life. A good writer, or speechifier, or lecturer, I might occasionally have wished to be; but I never suffered attempts of this kind to interfere with my great business and object—preaching. I early read all I could find upon the subject, as ‘Claude’s Essay on the Composition of a Sermon,’ and I heard various preachers, with a view to ascertain their modes of influencing their hearers.

“I have always thought it advisable to make my introductions short, and my divisions simple. Of late years, I have thought it best not to give out the divisions or heads of my sermon before-hand, as I once did, and as some ministers still do. Such announcements forestal curiosity, and sometimes make our hearers impatient when they begin to reflect how much has got to come. I have, also, latterly shortened my sermons, as well as what is called ‘the long prayer,’ which, indeed, for many years, I have made much briefer than ordinary, never allowing it to exceed ten or twelve minutes. I have also determined to dispose striking thoughts in different parts of the sermon, in order to sustain attention. I have not employed much illustration, though I have admitted pertinent anecdotes. What I have strenuously laboured to avoid was *monotony*, that bane of all impression. The speaker’s tone at the end of his sentences should be varied, and the pitch or key of his voice should be varied in different points of his discourse. The less there is of gesticulation the better, in my opinion. Better than this, is a direct look at the people, which secures their attention.

“I would urge on young ministers that pathos should be cultivated. We may be too drily intellectual, and this arises from the artificial character of our style, words, and method of discourse. The arrangement is often too elaborate, and the memory is put to too severe a task. Hence people are not looked at: not directly, feelingly, personally addressed. Can you wonder that they are not interested? In one word, transfuse your heart into your sermon, and familiarise yourself with it before you go into the pulpit. This will give a propriety to your manner not to be obtained by any mere directions.

"Have the substance of your sermons for the ensuing Sabbath well in your mind *before* the Saturday. Revising them and going over them, after a day's intervention, will allow the judgement to have cooled on some points, and to be capable of correcting others. This will also promote the more spirited delivery of the sermon, by the omission of those lengthy details which are unavoidable in the first elaboration of the thoughts in their entire series, but which are not necessary for your hearers."—pp. 209, 210.

In accordance with these sagacious, practical remarks of Dr. Leifchild, his son says, in a subsequent portion of the volume,—

"Thus his whole interest lay in preaching. Like a retired soldier, he anxiously watched the warfare, criticised the order of the troops, grew animated at the charge, and became indignant at defeat. If a young minister came to converse with him, his conversation was like that of an old general, who again fought his battles, and again charged at the head of his troops. He gave valuable and pithy advice, encouraged those who were distressed in spirit, and not unfrequently stimulated those whom he considered sluggish or faulty. 'Determine,' he would exclaim, 'to succeed. Say to yourself, "I *will* be a preacher: nothing shall hinder me. By God's help they *shall* hear me." If one style will not do, try another; only be sure to preach the truth. Don't murmur, 'the fault is in the people.' There are always people to hear a man who can interest them. It all lies in that. If you can interest them, good; if not, good-bye to you."—pp. 392, 393.

The volume is, in an especial manner, an admirable study for young preachers and students.

*Memoir of the Rev. James Sherman; including an unfinished Autobiography.* By Henry Allon. Second Edition. London: Nisbet. 1863.

WE have greatly relished this memoir. The subject of it seems to have been an eminently lovable man, who always carried his heart about with him, and, when he opened his mouth, spoke from the heart to the heart. He was full of the "consolation which is in Christ," and of the "comfort of love," and of "the fellowship of the Spirit," and of "bowels and mercies." As a minister of the gospel, he was "gentle" among his people, "even as a nurse cherisheth her children. So, being affectionately desirous of them, he was willing to impart unto them, not the gospel of God only, but also his own soul, because they were dear unto him." He affectionately "warned every man," and, literally, "with many tears." The power of pathos was in him, and was found to be emphatically "mighty through God." Hence his ministry was eminently successful:—the more especially as all the elements of natural gracefulness were characteristic at once of his person and of his manners. With tenderness in his heart, "a tear in the very tone of his voice," and a mild majesty moulding his entire demeanour, he found ready access to multitudes of souls, who would have remained closed to spirits of sterner stuff. And he improved his opportunities of entrance for introducing Christ.

The memoir of such a man cannot but be welcome to very many, and useful to the majority of ministers and students of divinity.

It is written, moreover, by one who is every way equal to the task. Discriminative, broad, genial, appreciative, Mr. Allon has done the fullest justice to his subject, and produced a charming volume.

*The Exodus of Israel: its difficulties examined, and its truth confirmed. With a reply to recent objections.* By the Rev. T. R. Birks, M.A. London: Religious Tract Society. 1863.

*The Pretensions of Bishop Colenso to impeach the wisdom and veracity of the compilers of the Holy Scriptures considered.* By the Rev. James R. Page, M.A. London: Rivingtons. 1863.

*Considerations on the Pentateuch.* By Isaac Taylor. London: Jackson, Walford, & Co. 1863.

*The Incredibilities of Part II. of the Bishop of Natal's Work upon the Pentateuch. A Lay Protest.* By John Collyer Knight. London: Bagster. 1863.

*An Examination of Bishop Colenso's Difficulties with regard to the Pentateuch; and some reasons for believing in its authenticity and divine origin.* By the Rev. Alexander M'Caul, D.D. London: Rivingtons. 1863.

THE above are a few stray straws from the ever-increasing sheaf of Replies, which Bishop Colenso's book has elicited. Indeed, the sheaf has grown into sheaves. And the sheaves promise to become, ere long, "stooks" and "stacks;"—so that the individual straws will be, by and by, almost innumerable.

The bishop is indebted to his bishopric, rather than to his book, for the attention which his utterances have received. And we conceive that he has, for all popular purposes, been sufficiently answered. As regards certain profundities and altitudes of the subject involved in his critiques, these must be reserved for calmer, cooler, and more learned research and discussion. Meanwhile, we recommend, especially, the first and last of the Replies, which, as happening to be lying on our table, we have specified above.

*The Thoughts of God.* By the Author of "Morning and Night Watches," &c. London: Nisbet. 1863.

AN elegant little volume,—imbued, in its spirit, with a deeply reverential and devotional feeling. This emotional element neutralises any disposition we might otherwise entertain, to read with the eyes of our critical faculty wide awake. And yet there is occasionally such a peculiar intercoiling of the doctrinal and devotional, that we cannot avoid opening the door outward for our thoughts, as well as opening the door inward toward our feelings. The author would almost resolve all things whatsoever into "the thoughts of God." He says "every little apparent contingency, as well as every momentous turn and crisis-hour, forms part of that plan—a *thought of God.*" (p. 48.) He says again,— "How blessed to think that each separate occurrence that befalls one is a *thought of God*,—the fulfilment of his own immutable purpose." (p. 56.) "All events are predetermined and prearranged by Him." "Over every occurrence in nature and in providence, he writes, *I the Lord do all these things.*" (pp. 56, 57.) "O blessed assurance, *precious thought of God*,—that the loom of life is in the hands of the great Artificer; that it is he who is interweaving the threads of existence, the light and

the dark, the acknowledged good and the apparent evil. The chain of what is erroneously called *destiny* is in His keeping. He knows its every connecting link; he has forged them on his own anvil." (p. 59.) But this is surely running a good and glorious truth out of breath. It is running it to death. And as it lies in its last gasp and gives up the ghost, error starts in its place, and is caught hold of by the author, and is hurried along as if it were the original truth. It is not true, we conceive, that every event is a thought of God, and a link of things that has been forged on God's own anvil. God himself thinks otherwise, we imagine. He runs an antithesis between His own thoughts and man's thoughts. "My thoughts are not your thoughts." And there are things which come to pass, "which he commanded not," and which "came not into his heart." (Jer. vii. 31.) "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man, that they are vanity. (Ps. xciv. 11.) They cannot therefore have been "predetermined and prearranged by Him":—otherwise He would be the Author of their vanity. "The thoughts of the wicked are an abomination to the Lord." (Prov. xv. 26.) They cannot then have been "forged on His own anvil"; otherwise He would be at variance with Himself, and devising for Himself his own abominations. To run such abominations up into the purposes of God is to make them partakers of a divine character. It is, in short, to pantheize. It is, in the last analogy, to annihilate the distinction between good and evil.

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LETTERS FROM AN ABSENT PASTOR TO HIS FLOCK.

XXXIV.

BERLIN, *March* 13, 1856.

*To the Independent Church and Congregation assembling for the Public Worship of God, in N. D. ——— St. Chapel, G. ———.*

MY BELOVED BRETHREN AND FRIENDS,—My last letter, as you will remember, was dated from Wittenberg,—the scene of the most important labours of Luther and Melancthon, and the centre whence radiated the light and vitalizing warmth of the Reformation over Germany and a large proportion of Europe. From Wittenberg I went to Jüterbog, a small but ever-memorable town. It had a singular connection with the Reformation. It was visited in 1517 by the notorious monk, John Tetzel, one of the most successful retailers of the Pope's saleable "Indulgences." It was Leo X. who then occupied the papal chair, and, both for the prosecution of the building of St. Peter's in Rome, and for the maintenance of his expensive personal "indulgences," he had recourse to the expedient of farming out for sale spiritual indulgences or pardons. These papal pardons were alleged to be drawn out of the accumulated stock of the supererogatory good works of the various saints of the church;—over which stock the pope was said to be invested by the adorable virgin, the mother of God, with full power. In order to drive a lucrative business with this convenient and conveniently inexhaustible overplus of the holiness of the holy, Leo made an arrangement for North Germany with Albert, Archbishop and Elector of Mentz; and Albert employed Tetzel,—who had on a former occasion acquired great experience in the trade,—to dispose of the spiritual wares as advantageously as possible. Tetzel was a master in the business entrusted to him. Wherever he went, he caused, by authority from the archbishop, the church bells to be rung, and got the priests and monks and teachers and scholars, and people, to meet him in procession. Thus heralded and attended, he entered the principal church of the place with every circumstance of pomp. The pope's commission was borne before him on a velvet cushion, and osten-

tationally set up in a conspicuous and convenient part of the sacred edifice. He then took his position in front of it, and had beside him a large box, which was to contain the money which the people, in consideration for pardon to themselves or their deceased relatives, were willing to dedicate to the construction of the vast Roman temple, and the consequent adornment of the capital of christendom. The size of the box indicated the amount of liberality which the monk expected. He left no means untried—at least, no means that appealed to the inferior principles of human nature—in order to stimulate liberality. He asserted that the indulgence-commission, before which he stood, was more powerful for salvation than the cross of Christ itself, and that he had saved more souls by means of it than St. Peter had by the preaching of the gospel. He assured the crowds that gathered round him that they could at once, and without penance or pain or trouble, get by his indulgences the pardon of all their sins, and not only of their past sins, but also of the sins which they might commit in future! A definite price was fixed for the pardon of every kind of sin. As regarded the souls of their deceased relatives in purgatory, he had a rhyme with which he wound up his appeals. It was to this effect,—

The moment the money in th' indulgence-box rings,  
That same moment the soul into paradise springs.

The poor ignorant people, dazzled by the prospect of getting for the sins which they had committed, or wished to commit, an acquittance without spiritual mortification, and actuated by a benevolent desire to confer upon their departed fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters and sons and daughters and husbands and wives the greatest of all boons, made every possible sacrifice to buy the indulgences. And very large instalments were drawn from the supererogatory merits of the saints.

Tetzel was as successful at Jüterbog as he had been in other places. His sales were numerous and lucrative. Crowds flocked to buy the "wine and milk" of everlasting pardons "with money and with price." Many went from Wittenberg to purchase the inestimable blessings. Not a few even of those, to whom Luther stood in the relation of confessor, joined in the pilgrimage to Jüterbog; and, on returning, signified to their spiritual adviser that they were now, by the authority of St. Peter's vicar himself, released from the necessity of submitting to the customary penances. Luther's earnest, devout, and honest mind was startled by the prodigiously unspiritualizing tendency of the indulgences obtained by his disciples; and on studying the whole subject, he came to the conclusion that the traffic was most unscriptural and most prejudicial to souls. He carried his views to the pulpit, and at length embodied them, in a more ripened and developed form, in his famous ninety-five theses, which he nailed to the door of the castle-church of Wittenberg, on the 31st of Oct., 1517. Tetzel stormed; denounced Luther as a heretic; and, kindling a fire in the market place of Jüterbog, publicly burnt the theses, and threatened to bring their audacious author to a similar end. He issued counter-theses,—which in their turn were burned by Luther's students in Wittenberg. Thus fire kindled fire; and the mind of Luther caught fire; and the minds of the people were set on fire; and from that date the fire of the Reformation swept unintermittingly onward.

You will easily see that I could not but be interested in visiting Jüterbog and its market place, and the church of St. Nicholas where Tetzel exhibited his commission and sold his wares and filled his money-chest. But there is something visibly and tangibly present in Jüterbog which rendered it peculiarly interesting, and which helps to recall vividly to the mind the relations of the place to the first developments of the Reformation. *The money-chest of Tetzel is preserved in Jüterbog*, and in the very church of St. Nicholas where it was filled with "the mammon of unrighteousness," the proceeds of the numerous indulgences sold. A certain robber-knight, of the name of Hans von Hacke, having previously purchased an indulgence for any sins which he might commit, waylaid Tetzel,—from whom he had purchased the indulgence,—in a wood a few miles out of Jüterbog, and robbed him of his immense box filled with treasure, but suffered the ecclesiastical salesman himself to escape with his life. By and by, the box was deposited in the church of St. Nicholas, as a memorial; and there it still is. I was astonished at its magnitude. It could hold easily two men stretched at full length, and three or four children besides laid at their feet; and then the remaining space would hold more treasure in gold and silver than would suffice to build churches for all the congregations of the Evangelical Union. It is as massive as it is large, being made of thick planks of oak, strengthened and ornamented by multiplied belts of iron; and it has three distinct locks attached to its lid. It gives

one a very large idea of the amount of business transacted by the monk, and of the enormous sums of money required, and expected, and obtained. Great is the debt which we owe to Luther for his successful crusade against the enormously demoralizing traffic.

From Jüterbog I went to Berlin, where I now am. Berlin is, as you are aware, the capital city of Prussia. Its situation is far from being fine. It lies in the midst of a barren, sandy plain; and the stream—the Spree—which passes through it, and which is absolutely indispensable for its physical purity, is, unhappily, neither large nor rapid. In spite, however, of these great natural disadvantages, the city is one of the finest in Europe, and it contains about half-a-million of inhabitants. The street called “Unter den Linden” is very generally supposed to be the finest in the world. There runs along the centre of it a promenade which is lined on either side by lime trees. On both sides of this promenade are spacious carriage-ways, along which again there run broad footpaths by the sides of the buildings. Many of these buildings are royal or public, and are among the most massive and ornamental edifices in the city; while at the one end of the street is the palace, the cathedral, and the museum, and at the other is the magnificent Brandenburg gate, containing five distinct archways, and surmounted by a noble piece of art in bronze,—a car of victory drawn by four horses. The university is one of the great public buildings which adorn this street. I have been almost a daily visitor within its halls, and I have had the pleasure of seeing and hearing several of the distinguished German theologians and literati, with whose names, and with whose works, in part, I have been long familiar. I refer to Hengstenberg, and Twisten, and Nitzsch, and Vatke, and Ranke author of the “History of the Popes,” and Bopp, one of the most scientific and accomplished of the German linguists. Another of the great public buildings on the “Unter den Linden” street is the royal library, containing 600,000 books. It is scientifically arranged, and contains many literary rarities. Among these is a beautiful copy of Gutenberg’s first Bible, printed in 1450–55,—one of the first books on which moveable types were employed. There is also the manuscript of Luther’s translation of the Psalms, with his corrections of it in red ink. There are likewise early copies of his version of the Old and New Testaments, with his autograph emendations; and there is besides a Hebrew Bible which he used, containing some of his notations. The Bible which King Charles I. carried with him to the scaffold, and which he gave before his death to Bishop Juxon, is also preserved here. There are, moreover, several old Indulgences, and many other literary curiosities and memorials. As to the Museum, I cannot say that I greatly admired its stores of statues and paintings. Most of the latter, especially, are of only third-rate excellence, and the vice of deficiency in moral taste, in addition to defect in intellectual conception, pervades the collection as a whole. Among the many representations of Christ that are attempted, none are ideally good; and almost all are degrading and revolting. Art does not realize in Berlin its high mission; and though, under its direction, many objects are beautifully executed, very few are grandly conceived. I worshipped in the cathedral on the morning of the Lord’s day. It is not an imposing building for the chief church of a great capital, but the congregation was large, the choir-singing was peculiarly fine, the organ music was delicately performed, and the sermon was remarkably practical and evangelical. The preacher combated vigorously, though not profoundly, the dominant scepticism of the age. There was a large proportion of males in the assembly; and the males and females sat promiscuously, as in Britain. The people stood during the prayers and the reading of the Word. At the close of the service the Lord’s Supper was administered, and about two hundred communicated. Many of the communicants were males. The morning service was from ten to twelve o’clock; the second was at six in the evening. At six I went to a magnificent new church, called Friedrichswerder Church,—a far more imposing building than the cathedral. The audience was extremely small. But the sermon was pre-eminently earnest, practical, affectionate, and devout,—more so than any other discourse I have heard in Germany, with the exception of one in Schmalkalden. The text was “Behold the man!” The preacher received very marked attention from the congregation, as did also the morning preacher in the cathedral. In the Roman Catholic church there is a service both in the morning and in the afternoon before the time of meeting in the Lutheran churches. I attended at both opportunities, and heard two able and earnest and useful discourses—with only a very little tinge throughout from the peculiarities of Roman Catholicism. The church,—(it is called the church of St. Hedwig, and built in imitation of the Pantheon in Rome,)—



was well filled on both occasions. There must have been more than a thousand persons present; and there were apparently more males than females. On Wednesday evening there was a Lutheran service in the cathedral. I attended it, and was cheered by seeing a considerable assembly, and by hearing an earnest evangelical discourse. I liked the look of many of the people. It seemed to bespeak a spiritual and devotional element. Aye, the seeds of revival are no doubt being sown here and there in Berlin, and throughout Germany; and, by and by, though after many undesired and unexpected upheavings and upturnings, and overturnings too, a great harvest will be gathered in to the glory of our adorable Redeemer, who so loved the world that he gave himself a ransom for all.—I remain your loving pastor,

J—— M——.

XXXV.

MÜNSTER, March 20, 1856.

MY BELOVED BROTHERS AND FRIENDS,—My spirit is once more filled with desire to communicate with you; and as I am now in the peculiarly interesting city of Münster, and just about to set out on my journey to Holland, I embrace the opportunity of writing my weekly epistle. My last letter was written in Berlin,—one of the great cities of Europe, but a city that has no particular claims upon our interest on the ground of its ecclesiastical relations. The military element of its being predominates over the ecclesiastical: and it was in perfect harmony with this predominance that I had the opportunity of witnessing a grand and imposing review in the magnificent street "Unter den Linden." The king stood in front of the statue of Blücher,—a name intimately associated with that of our own Wellington,—and the troops, moving downward from the great monument erected to Frederick the Great, defiled before him. The king was surrounded by the princes of the royal family and by some hundreds of officers. The spectacle was brilliant; but to the eye of reason, which is not so easily dazzled as the eye of sense, it had some aspects that were shady as well as some that were bright. It was a high benevolence that dictated the ancient prayer,—*"Scatter thou the people that delight in war."*

On leaving Berlin I went to Potsdam, the Versailles of Prussia, and looked at its various royal palaces, surrounded with exquisite pleasure grounds, which are lavishly adorned with beautiful ponds, picturesque pavilions, temples and pagodas, and multitudes of marble statues. I looked with peculiar interest on the palace of Sans Souci, the humblest structure of them all, but memorable as the favourite residence of Frederick the Great. It is to Frederick the Great that Prussia owes its present political greatness; and he was in many respects a truly great monarch and man. But he was not great throughout; and it was one of his littlenesses that he stooped to be in many things, moral and ecclesiastical, the disciple of Voltaire. Prussia is reaping to this day the melancholy fruits of this littleness; and when one sees the apartment of Voltaire in Sans Souci, one is naturally led to philosophize on the connection between religion and political prosperity, and between irreligion and hosts of political adversities.

I was a Sabbath in Potsdam,—last Sabbath. I was by no means comfortably circumstanced in my hotel; but I got refuge from my discomforts, at least for part of the day, in the church of St. Nicholas. This is the principal church in Potsdam; and it is a truly noble ecclesiastical building;—finely conceived, finely constructed, and finely finished off. On the roof of the lantern that surmounts the lofty dome, is a beautiful representation of the symbolic dove, which seems to hover over the assembly beneath. Behind the communion table, and on a golden ground, are gorgeous, but not successful, paintings of the Saviour, the Four Evangelists, and the Twelve Apostles; and the glorious words are inscribed,—*"God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life."* On a richly painted border of an arch are portraits of the great reformers; and, among them, an admirable likeness of our British Wiclif. There are many objects in the ornaments of the building which harmoniously conspire with the grand whole to lead the thoughts upward, Christward, Godward, and goodnessward. And yet the congregation was extremely small, and by no means select; and though I could gather food from the discourse, yet it was, in conception, aspiration, and expression, strangely out of harmony with the grandeur of the building.

The good cause *must* be at a discount in Potsdam. The seeds which Frederick and Voltaire combined to sow have sprung up in luxuriance. But it is tares, tares, chiefly tares, that luxuriantly cover the field.

From Potsdam I went to Magdeburg—one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. It suffered grievously during the thirty years war, and, when it was at length carried by assault, it was most barbarously sacked by Tilly. He himself, in his despatch on the occasion, says, "Since the destruction of Jerusalem and Troy, there has not been such a victory." I saw the church of St. John, in which many hundreds of females sought refuge from the ruthlessness of the victorious soldiery. But Tilly caused its doors to be nailed up, and then, setting fire to it, perpetrated a sacrifice more diabolical than those which were offered up of old by heathens and heathenizing Jews to Moloch. Magdeburg has a link of connection with the early history of Luther. After having attended school for some time in Mansfeld, near Eisleben, he was sent to a school of a higher grade in Magdeburg. But, as his father was at that time very poor, the sturdy little fellow was obliged to eke out his means of subsistence by singing ecclesiastical rhymes before the windows of the rich. The assistance thus obtained, however, was so precarious and scanty, that he was frequently in great want; and hence, after about a year, his parents removed him to Eisenach, where his mother had relatives. In Eisenach too he had to sing for his bread, thus continuing to "bear the yoke in his youth." But at length a rich lady, a connection of his mother's, and a lover of music, was captivated with his appearance and bearing and spirit, and took him into her house. From that day his pecuniary struggles in the pursuit of his education were at an end: and on that day too commenced, under the guidance of his patroness, his scientific acquirements in sacred music. Music had ever, thenceforward, a mighty influence over him. It was his recreation after study, his solace in times of trial, the outlet of his heart in times of joy, and his delightful companion both in society and in solitude. I think that I forgot to mention in my letter from Erfurt, that at the time when his fellow-monks had to break open the door of his cell and when they found him lying on his pallet almost senseless and lifeless, it was the sounds of his beloved violin that first of all aroused him into self-consciousness.

From Magdeburg I went to Wolfenbüttel, where there is a peculiarly fine old library. It is exceedingly rich in editions of the Bible in many languages. There is an apartment entirely filled with Bibles, many of them extremely rare and exceedingly beautiful. There are likewise preserved in the library numerous interesting memorials of great men; and among the rest there is a copy of the Psalms in Latin which had belonged to Luther when a monk, and which has all its margins and vacant spaces filled with beautifully written autograph observations of the future Reformer. Among the Bibles there is one of Luther's own version, on the inside of the first board of which he has written these words, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me;" but long before the time that he made this inscription, his handwriting had ceased to be beautiful. When the monk grew into the Reformer, he had much to write; and beauty, though often embodied in the matter of his thoughts, rarely returned to the manner of his penmanship.

From Wolfenbüttel I walked to Brunswick, the capital of the Duchy of Brunswick. It is a fine city, with a magnificent palace, many very ancient and remarkably picturesque houses, and noble churches. Numbers of the churches have double spires. The cathedral was founded by Henry the Lion, a prince of the house of Guelph, and a brother of our own Richard the Lion-hearted. He founded it on his return from a pilgrimage to the Holy Land; and his remains were buried within its walls. There also lie the remains of the unfortunate Queen Caroline, the consort of King George IV.

On leaving Brunswick, I paid a flying visit to Hanover, also an interesting capital city, with many very antique and peculiar houses. It was long the residence of Leibnitz, the contemporary, and the rival, and in some respects, though only in some, the superior of Sir Isaac Newton. He was far surpassed by Sir Isaac in physical science; but on the other hand, Sir Isaac was far surpassed by him in mental and moral philosophy. In some intermediate regions of research, and in general intellectual power, they were rivals. It is pleasing to reflect that both of these extraordinary thinkers were profoundly penetrated with convictions and aspirations in reference to the Bible and immortality and God. There is a grand Square in Hanover called Waterloo Place, on one side of which there is an elegant monument erected to Leibnitz. It contains his bust, and bears the simple inscription, "To the genius of

Leibnitz." The bust is almost ideally fine. I visited the Royal Library, which may be said to have been founded by Leibnitz. It contains an immense number of his manuscripts: and there is preserved in it the chair in which he used to study, and in which he died. The reigning king of Hanover prolongs the line of the English Georges. He is George V. I had the good fortune, while walking through the streets of the city, to meet him and the queen and the whole royal family.

After leaving Hanover, I re-entered the Prussian dominions and journeyed to Münster, where I now am. It is the chief city of the province of Westphalia, and was formerly under the jurisdiction of archbishops, who were independent princes. It is still ecclesiastically, though of course no longer politically, Roman Catholic. To-day there are services in all the churches by way of preparation for the peculiarly solemn services of the morrow, which is Good Friday—the memorial day, in the Roman Catholic and in some other calenders, of the accomplishment of the propitiation. I have been in the cathedral and the other principal churches. All of them were crowded. At the hours of meeting, the people are summoned, not by the ringing of bells, as on ordinary occasions, but by the knocking of hammers on boards. Bell-ringing will, I presume, be regarded as too joyful a signal in connection with so mournful a memorial as that of the crucifixion of our Lord. And yet there is no event in the history of our world that is the source of so much real and pure joy as that same death, "accursed" though it was, of "the Lamb of God." It was an event in which the extremes of joy and of sorrow met together and "kissed each other."

Most of you will remember that, soon after the commencement of the Reformation, Münster was the scene for a season of most extraordinary fanatical excesses. The Anabaptists, headed by John of Leyden, who was a tailor to trade, seized the reins of government, and took possession of the revenues and the public buildings. Not content with such assumptions, they would have Münster elevated to the political supremacy of the world. They proclaimed that it was the New Jerusalem; and John of Leyden, professing to be the earthly representative of the heavenly King of kings, got himself elected king, and lived for months in magnificent state. But other lusts, besides that of vanity, got the mastery of the infatuated man, and he introduced and sanctioned and practised polygamy. There was in consequence a fearful rending of the best bands of society, and amid extraordinary professions of superior sanctity, the most horrible wickednesses were secretly and publicly perpetrated. Meanwhile the city was besieged by the army and allies of the archbishops; and, after a long and obstinate resistance on the part of King John and his subjects, famine drove many to desperation, and the heaped-up crimes of the mock-monarch and his accomplices and dupes recoiled on the criminals. The city was taken, John of Leyden and his associates were captured, and vengeance was poured out on them. After being subjected to fearful tortures with red-hot pincers, King John and his two chief ministers, Knipperdolling and Krechting, were hung out in iron cages from the summit of the tower of St. Lambert's church, and by and by executed. The iron cages still exist, though it is more than three hundred years since they were used. They remain on the tower. The pincers by which the torturing was effected are also preserved; and there is likewise kept in a box the right hand of John of Leyden, which was cut off previous to his execution. On seeing these and other memorials of the grotesque fanaticism which grew, as an unsightly excrescence, on the early development of the Reformation, I was led to many reflections on the mental perils that beset those who live in a period of intellectual and moral excitement. There are perils also, though of a different sort, that lurk beneath the smooth surfaces of stagnation. In all conditions, the feeble mind of man is exposed to dangers; and it is hence our wisdom to take heed to our way, to walk circumspectly, and to watch and to pray lest we enter into temptation. O may our life be a life of faith on the Son of God who loved us and who gave himself for us: and may our faith be simple yet illumined, childlike yet mature, confiding and yet more and more thoughtful.

Farewell at present, my beloved brethren and friends. My face is now set homewards, and I delight to realize that, if all go well, I shall soon be once more amid you. God, in his great mercy, grant that I may be able to labour among you long and effectually. I remain your affectionate Pastor,

J ——— M ———.

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HEAVEN A HOME.

HEAVEN is a home. It is not, indeed, merely a home. Delightful as the word *home* is, it is not sufficiently delightful to exhaust the fulness of the great reality. There is more in heaven than a home. And, hence, Scripture presents us with very various and many-sided representations of "the exceedingly exceeding and eternal weight of glory," amid which God manifests transcendently his celestial presence, and with which he crowns for ever all the godlike around his throne. Numerous as these representations are, they are yet, without doubt, even when gathered together into their sum-total, only very partial delineations and adumbrations. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him." Nevertheless, it is true, and not only a very precious portion, but also a considerable proportion of the whole truth on the subject, that heaven is a home.

The term *home* is eminently expressive; and very dear, withal, to almost every individual who knows its meaning. It is not simply equivalent to the term *house*. There is many a house that is not a home. The Houses of Parliament, for example, are not homes. Our houses of exchange are not homes. Our banking-houses are not homes. Our mills, and warehouses, and shops, and workshops are not homes. Our great public halls are not homes. It is clear, then, that a home is not merely a house. A house may indeed be a home; and our Father's house on high, in which there are many mansions, is a home. But the word *home* means something more than a mere house. Its meaning *comes home* to us, and especially does it *come home to our heart*, in a way that far transcends the influence and the import of the word *house*.

A home is a *family house*. That is the idea that lies at the root of all that is peculiarly significant and peculiarly delightful in the word home. He who has no place in some family household, has no proper home. He may have a house, or many houses. He may have an abode, where he commonly stays. He may have a lodging; and his lodging may be either hired or bought, just as it may be either humble or magnificent. But he has no proper home.

The man's place of residence may, indeed, by courtesy be called his home. Perhaps it was once a true home,—the centre of a family circle. But death may have entered it, and snatched first one, and then another, and then another still, till only one is left surviving. The place thus was a home. And the old dear name may cling to it in the mind of the desolate inmate. For the place is associated with multitudes of memories, which lead him to view it from a standpoint in the past. But it has really ceased to be a home. And if its lonely occupant be wise, he will look around and say,—“No: this is not my home.” He will look up, and exclaim,—“It is heaven that is my home.”

Another person may be living in a house, which he expects to make a home. And perhaps in full prophetic confidence, he gives it the name of home. He looks at it from a standpoint in the future. And he is to be excused for his proleptic liberty. But his house is really not yet a home. It is only a home that is to be.

There must be something of a family relationship in a home. And thus in the word home there is the suggestion, more or less definite, of a peculiarly intimate and tender and endearing relationship. In a true home there must either be one or more of such relations as husband, wife; father, mother; son, daughter; sister, brother. And hence the cell of a monk, or the haunt of a hermit, or the mere lodging of a man among strangers, is no real home.

It is because there is a family relationship on high;—it is because there is in heaven a Father, a perfect Father, a most fatherly Father, and a large and happy family of sons and daughters, who are brothers and sisters indeed, and headed by an Elder Brother;—it is because there is such a family in heaven,—that heaven is a home.

A home, then, is a family abode. And thus it is an abode where love is given and gotten. Every true home is a dwelling-place of love. In every true home love has its home. A home for the heart is found wherever there is a genuine home. And hence it is just in proportion as a home is a home, that there is intercommunion of hearts within its precincts. A home without sympathy

would be a home only in name. It might be a house. It might be a dwelling-place. It might be a palace. It might be a haunt, or a resort, or a den. But it could be a home only in the same sense in which a hypocrite, who has "a name to live while he is dead," may be a true disciple of the Lord.

A home is a place of sympathy; and thus it is invariably, to a greater or less extent, "sweet home." Where there is no sweetness, there is really no home. And hence it is that there is only one home in eternity. The other everlasting abode is an abode, indeed, but no home. There is no real love in it; no intimate fellowship; no sympathy; no family feeling; no sweetness. And hence, too, there is no real repose in it; no rest. "There remaineth" only one "rest." And it remaineth "to the people of God." Nowhere so truly as at home can a man get repose and rest. He may sleep elsewhere. He may lounge elsewhere. He may be idle elsewhere. He may get release and relief from his ordinary avocations and toils elsewhere. But if his home be a true home; if it be a family house; a house that is consecrated by the family feeling and to family purposes; a place of intimate fellowship, and sympathy, and love; if it be a "sweet home;" nowhere else will he find such genuine rest and delightful repose. Is it not the case, then, that heaven is emphatically a home?—the truest, the best, and the sweetest of homes?

It is all this. For (1) it is *God's own home*. We do not mean that God is nowhere else. He is everywhere. But he is not everywhere at home. He cannot feel everywhere at home. He cannot feel at home, for instance, in the dens of rioting and drunkenness. He cannot feel at home in the haunts of unholy voluptuousness. He cannot feel at home in those palaces or cottages in which his sacred name is taken in vain. He cannot feel at home in those places where there is hate, and quarrelling, and enmity. He cannot feel at home amid the yells, and shouts, and screams, and imprecations, and savagery, of the field of battle. Neither can he feel at home in the hearts of the earthly and sensual, who never think of him at all, or who, when they do think of him, turn away from him in dislike and disgust. God cannot feel at home in such places. And hence he cannot feel at home in that place where there is everlasting rebellion, and everlastingly triumphant selfishness, and everlasting gnashing of teeth. Ah no. It is heaven that is God's home. It is there that he not only is, but is at home. Nowhere else is he perfectly at home. And nowhere else does he feel at all at home, unless it be in those hearts and other terrestrial homes, that are types and miniatures of the great heavenly home. It is only there, and in

heaven, that, as a father with his child, or as a father with the whole circle of his holy family, he can feel sweetly at home.

But (2) *heaven is Christ's home*. It is his Father's house; and Jesus feels at home in it, because he is, emphatically, his Father's Son. On earth, indeed, Jesus, as a Son, had true fellowship with his Father. He "walked with God." He was a truer Enoch, than was Enoch himself. He loved the company of his Father. He kept by his Father's side. He talked with God; and God hearkened and heard and rejoiced. He lifted up his desires to God; and as his desires—his prayers—ascended, his whole being got wrapt up in God. His life was hid in God. The mountain side was holy and heavenly ground to him, while he joyfully realized that he was One—in thought and feeling and purpose and nature—with God. Nevertheless, he was not at home while he was on earth. Except at glimpsing intervals, amid perhaps the silent darkness of night, he felt the presence around him of much that was unhomelike and unheavenly. And hence he could not but feel that he was away from home; in, as it were, a far distant country; amid a people that should indeed have known him, and welcomed him, and gathered round him, but that received him not. They treated him as an intruding stranger; for they had estranged themselves from his Father and theirs. They were his enemies. They despised and rejected him. They hated him without a cause. They cried "away with him, away with him, crucify him, crucify him." The True Light shone in the darkness; but "the darkness comprehended it not." No wonder, then, that Jesus did not feel at home upon earth. He stayed for a season to work for us, and to suffer for us,—to make atonement for our sins. But he sighed for his home which was on high, his Father's house, and cried, "O Father, glorify thou me, with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." Heaven, then, is Christ's home. It was thither that his heart turned while he was on earth. It is there that he now is. It is there that he enjoys his mediatorial reward. It is there that he wears his crown. It is thence that he extends his gospel sceptre—the rod of his royal power. It is thither that he gathers his people. It will be, and even now it is with them, when they are perfected in heaven, and with his well-pleased Father, who is in their midst, that he feels most sweetly and delightfully at home.

But (3) *heaven is not only God's own home and Christ's home, it is likewise the Christian's home*. Fellow-believer in Christ, heaven is thy home, and it is my home. It is ours because we are Christ's, and Christ is God's. It is ours because

in Christ,—who, on the one side of his nature is the Son of God, and on the other side is the Son of man,—we, the sons and daughters of men, are reconstituted the sons and daughters of God, and thus the heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. By union with Christ—our brother Christ—God’s Son, we cry with him “Abba, Father,” and can say, each for himself, in borrowed but appropriate phraseology—“in my Father’s house are many mansions” :—“in my Father’s home, there is a home for me.”

We may indeed have happy homes on earth. Some have. But they are happy, only in so far as they are types of the heavenly home; only in so far as true love is in them, and true fellowship of soul with soul, true sympathy, true family feeling; only, in short, in so far as Christ is in them, and the Heavenly Father,—in relation to wit to the consciousness of the inmates. And yet these happy homes are not perfectly happy. There is a sweeter home still :—a home, where there is perfect oneness of thought and feeling and purpose: a home, where there is never a jar in the pervasive and interpenetrative sympathy: a home, where heart is for ever linked to heart, and hand is joined to hand: a home, where death, unwelcome visitor, never intrudes his presence to separate the otherwise inseparable, and to snatch from our embrace the objects of our love: a home, where all tears are for ever wiped away from all eyes, and joy and everlasting rejoicing vibrate for ever from the chords of all hearts, and make music finer far than the music of the spheres: a home, where Christ, and God in Christ, are “all in all.” It is heaven, that is our home.

The amiable tabernacle of the church may, indeed, be another kind of home to us, while we continue on earth. It is a sweet ecclesiastical home; a sweet spiritual home; and holy and happy are many of the meetings within it of a united congregational family. But it is not a perfectly holy and happy home; for the family, though united and mutually endeared, is not perfectly happy and holy. We must look higher still—to the antitypical, the archetypal home, our Father’s house,—in which there are many mansions, mansions for all the members of the family, and in which there will be the perfection of fellowship and sympathy and love, the perfection, in one word, of moral oneness, and the everlasting absence of all that can engender alienation and distrust. Aye: It is heaven that is our home :—heaven alone.

How delightful to have it to add,—that there is not one of our readers to whom it would be wrong to say,—Heaven *may* be



yours, your home. It *should* be yours, your home. And if, through Jesus, you go in spirit to God and exclaim, "my Father,"—it *will* be yours, your home. The moment you feel at home with Jesus as your Saviour, and with God as your Father, that moment heaven is your home. And the happinesses you may thenceforth experience on earth, will be but the foretastes of the joy unspeakable that is to be everlastingly realized in the ultimate and all-perfect Home.

How delightful it is that we can add, still further, that our departed little ones, whose presence was as sunbeams in our terrestrial homes, and whose innocent and gentle laughter yet rings sweetly in our ears, are not lost, but only gone before. They are "at home." And all others, dear to us, who have fallen asleep in Jesus,—all these are now "at home!"

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#### THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

FREEDOM of the will we regard as essential to moral character.

It is not indeed the one essential condition, on which the existence of moral character depends. Reason is equally essential; reason, that can apprehend the fitness of things, and that can thus distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. It is probable that emotion, too, is indispensable; and that it is in emotion that the principal part of that element is found, which requires to be regulated by free-will, when free-will itself is guided by reason. It is in the regulation of the emotional element that the crowning glory of the divine moral character is realized. "God is love." And in our finite moral natures,—made after the image of the Infinite,—it is when we will to regulate the emotional element of our being according to that standard of rectitude, which is either discoverable *in* our reason, or *by* our reason, that we become godlike in goodness. It is when we love, somewhat as God loves;—when we love those who are lovely, and love them according to the degree of their loveliness;—it is when we love the Lord our God with all our heart, with all our soul, with all our strength, and with all our mind, and love our neighbours as we love ourselves;—it is then that we are possessed of right moral character.

Freedom of will, then, is not the only element of being, which is essential to moral character. It is not on it alone that the possibility of morality is suspended. It is merely one of several indispensable elements.

Neither would we claim for it pre-eminence among the indispensable elements. It is not the culminating point of a moral nature. It is underneath that point. And hence, as we suppose, it may have existence in beings which are not capable of morality. It may have existence in beings which are allowed to choose freely within a certain limited sphere of sensuous things, but which have not such endowments of reason as fit them for recognizing God, and for apprehending that will of God, which is to moral creatures the rule of moral conduct. It is reason, manifestly, which holds the sceptre among the elements of our moral being. It is reason, which is the imperial power in all moral natures. But reason apart from free-will, and perhaps, too, apart from emotion, could never constitute a moral being.

When we speak not merely of will, but of free-will, we use a compound designation, which is justified only by the fact that the will's freedom has been made matter of dispute. Had it not been for this dispute, it would never have been requisite, in fixing the nomenclature of the elements of our moral being, so to analyse the nature of will, as to educe from it the epithet "free." Freedom is of the essence of will, just as truly as intelligence is of the essence of reason, and as sensibility is of the essence of emotion. To those, therefore, who understand the distinctive peculiarity of will, it is a redundancy to call it free-will. Nevertheless, as the redundancy is analytically explicative of the real nature of will; and as, moreover, the will's freedom has, in consequence of certain controversies on things moral and theological, been denied; it is not amiss, that, at least now and then, we interchange with the more simple expression "will," the compound designation "free-will."

The freedom, which is referred to, when we speak of free-will, is, it must be observed, *in* the will itself. It is not merely a freedom in the moral being,—a freedom in the man for instance, or in the angel, or in God. It is a freedom in the moral being's will. It is not merely a freedom that is in harmony with the moral being's will. It is a freedom which is in the very essence of his will. Freedom in other respects he may have, on the one hand, or he may want on the other. But if he were destitute of this freedom, he could not be morally free; and, if not morally free, he could not be possessed of the constituent elements of moral character.

A man may have freedom in many respects. He may have freedom, for instance, in his corporeal relationships; or he may want it. He may be able to move his hand, when he wills to move it, or to move his tongue, when he wills to move it, or to

move his feet when he wills to move them. He may be able to move these corporeal members in whatsoever way he chooses. If so, he is, to a very considerable extent at least, corporeally free. Or he may be suddenly struck by paralysis; and if he be, he will find, that even when he wills to move the organs which were formerly under his control, and in reference to which he was free, he is unable to accomplish his purpose. In that case he is fettered by disease. He is no longer corporeally free. And yet if he is free in his will, he has a sublime freedom still. He is morally free.

Another man may, or may not, be possessed of civil freedom. He may be free to go in and out, and hither and thither, in the enjoyment of all the privileges of citizenship, and in the prosecution of his avocation, whatever it may be, as a citizen. If so, he is possessed of civil freedom. Or, on the other hand, he may be, either lawfully or unlawfully, seized, pinioned, and imprisoned; and then he is no longer free in his civil relationships. Nevertheless, if of sound mind, he is still free in his will. He is free to will. And because he is thus free, he continues to be morally free, and thus capable, even in prison, of building up for himself, in concurrence with the grace of God, a sublime moral character.

Besides corporeal freedom, and civil freedom, there is another species of freedom, which may be designated political. Men who live under tyrannies have little or no political freedom. Men who live under constitutional governments, like that of Great Britain, have much political freedom. But men in both sets of circumstances have an inner freedom, which monarchs can neither confer nor destroy. They have freedom of will. And thus, even in spite of the most galling political bondage, men are able to choose to be good. They have it in their power to choose that "good part," which assimilates in moral character to the likeness of God. They are morally free.

Even the slave, who suffers, most of all, under political and social bondage, is morally free. He may not, indeed, be free to choose his own trade or profession. He may not be free to take any part, by vote or otherwise, in modifying the governmental action of the nation to which he belongs. He may not be free to seek redress for political, civil, or social wrongs. He may not be free to trade. He may not be free to hold property. He may not be free to stay at home, or to call any place on earth his home. He may not be free to hold his own wife, and to keep around him the circle of his own children. They may be torn, one and all, from his eager embrace. The man, in all these respects, may be destitute of freedom; for freedom is multiform. He may be a servant of servants. He may be the most enslaved of slaves. Nevertheless, there is a high and glorious sense in which he has

freedom. He has freedom of will ; and he is thus morally free. He is free to love the Lord his God with all his heart, with all his soul, with all his strength, with all his mind. He is free to love his neighbours as he loves himself. He is free in all that is essential to the outworking of a good and godlike moral character, a character that makes meet for everlasting bliss.

Freedom of the will, then, is freedom in the will. It is a freedom of which no slave-driver, with his lash, can ever deprive his poor fellow-mortal. It is a freedom, which can never be crushed into annihilation under the heel of any despot, although he should be assisted in his despotism by crowds of myrmidons or dragoons. It is a freedom which is too near the very heart of our being, to be at the mercy of any of our fellow-men.

The freedom of the will is thus the innermost element of the multifiform freedom of the man. Every man lives and moves and has his being in the midst of numerous concentric circles of freedom. But the freedom of the will is the innermost of these circles ; and it is so far in, that no fellow-man can reach it, so as to snap it asunder, or so as to lift us out of it, and leave us at the mercy of the circumstances of our outer spheres of being, or of fate.

Freedom of the will is freedom to choose. It is freedom to choose what we shall do ;—what we shall do, in the direction of thought, and of the objects of thought ;—or what we shall do in the direction of feeling, and of the objects of feeling. Freedom of the will is thus not that mere outer element of the many environing elements of our freedom, which consists of freedom to do as we will. It is that far more inward element, which consists in freedom to will what we shall do. It is not freedom to act as we choose. It is freedom to choose how we shall act.

It is strange that such freedom of the will should ever have been disputed and denied. And yet under the influence of moral and theological controversies, it has been disputed and denied by many. Some have imagined that, though free-will belongs to God and to holy angels, yet it cannot be ascribed to man as he is, seeing he is fallen. Others have thought that the possession of free-will by any creatures is inconsistent with the Creator's absolute sovereignty. And others still have thought that to be free in will is a metaphysical impossibility at once in creatures and in the Creator Himself. The controversy on the subject has got to be perplexed, and has often got embittered by feelings of bigotry. But as the question lies almost at the very basis of every thing that can assume to itself the designa-

tion either of morals or of religion, it is befitting that we should consider it, and that we should, in reference to it, be prepared to take our stand, amid light, on a sure foundation.

What then is the evidence that substantiates the freedom of the will ?

It is almost boundless in its extent and variety. But it will suffice for our present purpose, that we seize upon a few prominent details.

And (1.) *consciousness attests that there is freedom in our will.* When we read our own consciousness, we find that we are free to will. We find that we are free to choose. We are free to choose, both in things great and in things small. Let us instance in things small. We are free to choose whither we shall sit or stand. We may not, indeed, be free to sit, even when we choose to sit. Or we may not be free to stand, when we choose to stand. But yet we are assuredly conscious to ourselves that we are free to choose that we may sit, or to choose that we may stand. The consequents of our volitions are not always in our power. But our volitions themselves are under our control. So consciousness informs us.

And that we read our individual consciousness aright, seems to be attested by the observations and instinctive exclamations of men in general. When a criminal, for instance, commits some very flagrant crime, he is instantaneously and instinctively and universally condemned. And when we inquire why it is that he is condemned, we find that the public sentence proceeds on the ground that it was wrong in him to abuse his freedom of will, in the way of choosing to do what he did. When any one is suddenly maltreated, he instantly exclaims against the villany. He denounces the villain. And he does this under the irrepressible conviction that the perpetration of the injury was the consequence of a wilful choice. It is too because of this universal consciousness of the freedom of choice, that those legislative acts are approved of, which condemn criminals to the endurance of punishments,—punishments which are graduated according to the enormity of the crimes which are committed. If men were not regarded as free to choose whether they shall commit or abstain from crimes, the public conscience would never sustain the legislative enactment of penalties.

(2.) That man is free to will, or to choose, is evidenced by *Scripture commandments, and remonstrances, and threatenings.* It is said in Scripture, "Choose you whom ye shall serve." The injunction implies a power to choose or refuse; and such an alternative power is freedom. It is said again, in language that

is intended to exhibit imperative duty and obligation, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy strength, with all thy mind;" and "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The meaning is, "Thou art commanded to choose thy God as the object of thy supreme love, and to choose thy fellow as the object of such love as thou bearest to thyself." The commandment would be meaningless were there not an alternative power to choose or to refuse. When, again, the wicked are thus addressed, "Why will ye die?" the remonstrance is equivalent to this, "Why should ye wilfully choose a course of life, that leads retributively to everlasting death?" Freedom of inward choice is implied. And when the impenitent are threatened with the terrible wrath to come, the threatening would be utterly unaccountable, were it not that it is intended to be an inducement to men to avail themselves, ere it be too late, of the freedom which they possess, to turn from their evil ways, that they may live.

But (3.) were men not free to will what, in their innermost relations to God and to their fellows, they shall do, *there would be no possibility to them either of religion and morality on the one hand, or of immorality and irreligion on the other.* Were there no legitimate scope for moral commendation or praise, there could be no possibility of morality and religion. And were there no possibility of morality and religion, there could be no possibility of immorality and irreligion. But it is evident that if there be no alternative freedom, there could be no legitimate scope either for moral approbation or for moral disapprobation. What is absolutely necessitated could never have been otherwise. And what could never have been otherwise, should no more be praised or blamed, in a moral manner, than the reciprocal relations of numbers, or the axioms and demonstrated verities of mathematical science.

(4.) If men were not free to will, *the occurrence of the Adamic fall would be utterly unaccountable: and so would be the occurrence of all subsequent sins.* For if men are not free to choose what they shall do, their actions must be necessitated. And if their actions be necessitated, the cause of the actions must be sought beyond themselves. And if the cause of men's actions be sought beyond themselves, it must, when we go to the end of the chain of things, be sought and found either in the will of God, or farther back still. If, however, it were to be found in God's will, then how could that will, choosing and causing such evil things as the fall and all other sins, be infinitely good? But if it were to be sought and found beyond the divine will, it must be traced either to the divine desires, and their home—the heart of God, or to the divine wisdom—the great storehouse of the motives which

guide the will of God. Or, if it must be traced further back still, we shall be landed in some dreadful kind of Fate, which binds not us only, but even the Deity itself, in adamantine chains. In the conception of such a Fate, however, we land ourselves in a thought which undefies the Deity. It is downright atheism. We cannot rest there. And yet, were we to find the ultimate cause of human sins in the divine wisdom, it would either be folly to be wise, or it would be no folly to devise and originate sin. Divine wisdom would not be what it is,—wisdom, and divine. We cannot go there for the reason of human sins. Nor, assuredly, can we go to that infinite heart, which is the home of infinite holiness. Such a fountain, we may be certain, will not send forth both sweet waters and bitter.

No. We cannot find in God the source of human sins. And if men, therefore, have no freedom of choice in the matter, no freedom to choose or to refuse, no freedom to originate their own volitions; the occurrence of sins, as a matter of psychological genesis, and as a phenomenon of the nature of moral rebellion, will be utterly unaccountable.

(5.) But again, if moral beings are not free to will, and thus to act as causes of events, *we shall never be able to find a legitimate place, in any logical system of thought, for the idea of an efficient cause.* Nowhere but within ourselves can we find the rudimental conception of an efficient cause. And until we have the rudimental conception of what an efficient cause is, it is impossible for us to apply the conception to any being without and beyond ourselves, or to elevate our notions into the enunciation of the great principle of causality. But if our wills are not free,—if they are not, in other words, the efficient causes of our volitions or choices, or, in other words still, if we ourselves in the will-element of our nature be not the efficient causes of our own volitions, determinations, or choices, nowhere else can we find the rudimental conception of an efficient cause. It is motives only,—that is to say, final causes,—which we find in our thoughts, or in ourselves as regards our thinking element, and in our feelings, or in ourselves as regards the emotional element of our being. And if, therefore, we be not free in will, if we be not originators and efficient causes, and, in a little finite sense, creators, of our choices, we are left without the vestige of any rudimental ideas that will enable us to reach the conception of a Great First Cause. God is for ever removed beyond the sphere of the possibility of our thought. And if so, religion is an utter chimera; and the notion of an absolute and absolutely immutable morality an unfounded conceit and delusion. But as such consequences are destructive of all that is most sublime in thought, and of all that is most blissful to our feelings,—of all that can afford a refuge and a home

for our hearts, we must renounce the idea of necessitation as applied to the choices of the will, and rest in the assurance that the will is free.

Resting in this assurance, we find ourselves in the midst of a light which irradiates many of the subjects which occupy the theological thoughts of men, and which have been turned into the arenas and battlefields of dispute.

(1.) For example, if men be free in their will, *it cannot be the case that God purposes or foreordains whatsoever comes to pass.* He will no doubt purpose or foreordain what he himself brings to pass. But he will not purpose or foreordain what he does not do or bring to pass, but what man himself, as a true Efficient Cause, brings to pass.

(2.) Again, if men be free to choose or to refuse, and if believing men,—men who believe in Christ Jesus,—continue to be thus free, *it must be a possibility to cease to persevere in faith.* The doctrine of free-will does not teach us that any believers will actually fall away from Christ. But it certainly does teach us that they are free to choose that which shall constitute a lapse.

(3.) If the freedom of the human will be a reality, *it cannot be the case that the converting influence of the Holy Spirit is irresistible.* If it were irresistible, it would be necessitating. And if it were necessitating, man could not be free to choose or to refuse his own submission to it.

(4.) It is only in the light of the freedom of the will, that we see *the consistency of the universal call of the gospel, as combined with the threatening of a sorer punishment, if the call be rejected.* If men universally were not free to choose or to refuse compliance with the call,—if they were not the efficient causes of their own choices on such a matter, it would be hard to vindicate to the satisfaction of our moral sense the ways of God, or to clear his procedure from the imputation of terrific severity.

(5.) It is only in the light of the indestructible freedom of the human will, that we can understand how it is *that God has pledged himself to his believing children to grant whatsoever they ask in prayer.* If men's wills were not indestructibly free,—if their volitions were necessitated,—then when any two or more believers agree to ask that all the unconverted should be converted and saved, God seems to be bound to convert and save the whole world of mankind; otherwise he would appear to be unfaithful to his promise. On the principle of necessitation, we never can account for the fact that the prayers of apostles and other holy beings for universal man have not been answered in the actual salvation of all. But if men's wills are indestructibly free, then when we pray for the conversion of the unconverted,



we really do not, or at least should not, mean to express a desire that an unfrustrable or irresistible influence should be used. The real heart of the prayer is, that an influence should be vouchsafed which will operate on the soul in a constraining motive-way. And doubtless more and more of this hallowed influence will be shed down, the more that the souls of holy men and women rise up,—in earnest, ardent, wrestling desire,—to God.

Is it objected to this doctrine of the freedom of the will, (1) *that it is inconsistent with divine grace*. We reply, that we do not see any inconsistency. There appears to us to be ample scope for divine grace to do all her work, and to gain for herself all the laurels of her real glory in illuminating the understanding; in touching and stirring the heart; and in thus mediately besieging, with all her artillery of love, the embattled hostility of the obdurate will.

(2) Is it objected that the freedom of the will is *inconsistent with the divine foreknowledge of all future events*? Again we say that we do not see the inconsistency. We admit the universality and infallibility of the divine foreknowledge. And thus there is a sense in which it is *certain*, that the events will take place. But in the case of the choices or volitions of free-agents, the *certainty*, which is predicable of their futurity, is not the certainty of objective necessitation. It is only the certainty of subjective knowledge. It is true that the events *will* take place. *God is certain that they will take place*. That is the whole certainty that is in the case.

(3) Is it objected that free-will is *consistent with the declaration of the apostle, that it is God who "worketh in us, of his good pleasure, both to will and to do"*? Still we see not the inconsistency. For the apostle does not mean that it is God who is the efficient Cause of our volitions. He only means that it is God who, by his creative and sustaining energy qualifies us for willing and for doing what is essential for our everlasting salvation; and hence we are responsible for "*working out our own salvation with fear and trembling.*"

While, then, it is granted that there are many respects in which men are not free, it must not be doubted that they are *free in will*.

## THE FOREORDINATION OF CHRIST'S DEATH.

THE doctrine of universal and absolute foreordination is the chief pillar upon which the system of theologic thought, commonly called Calvinism, rests. It is the germinal idea out of which springs the fruitage of unconditional election, with its twin doctrine of unconditional reprobation, as also limited atonement, and irresistible grace. These are its legitimate offspring. And thus, if we test its truthfulness, we virtually decide the truthfulness of all. This has been felt by those master-minds who have, in past ages, defended the peculiar doctrines of the Genevan divine. If, said they, we prove this, we prove all that we contend for. And those among them who saw farthest, as strenuously affirmed,—Deny this and you will be compelled, if you think out your own thoughts to their logical terminus, to deny all that is distinctive of the unconditional scheme. With the citadel, every rampart must be surrendered. With the foundation, the whole superstructure must crumble into a shapeless mass of ruins.

To avoid this catastrophe, not a few modifications of the old doctrine have been attempted. One of the most common of these is to the effect, that while it is true that God hath foreordained all the thoughts, feelings, and actions of all men, it is nevertheless true, that man is left to the freedom of his own will, and is therefore responsible for all that he does. These seeming contradictions, it is contended, should both be believed; for, though mysterious to us, they will be fully revealed as harmonious, when we see them in the light of the world to come. And besides, it is farther asked, are not both doctrines clearly taught in the words of the apostle, when he says, "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." Dr. Bonar, in a book that is more widely circulated, perhaps, than any other modern defence of Calvinism, asks in reference to these words, "Is it possible to pervert this passage so as to prove that it has no reference to predestination? Yet does it make God the author of the deed referred to? Must God be the author of sin because it is said that Israel and the Gentiles 'were gathered together to do what his counsel had determined'? Let our opponents attempt an explanation of such a passage, and tell us how it can be made to harmonise with their theory." (*Truth and Error*, pp. 28, 39.) And again, he says, "Pilate and Herod, etc., are said to have done what God's hand and counsel had predetermined." Indeed, he goes the

length of affirming that the above words of the apostle "Teach us plainly that our world's history, in all things great and small, is a history of events preordained by God from eternity, yet at the same time coming to pass by the free agency of man." (68, 69.) Thus we see that the controversy, which bears on the truthfulness of universal foreordination, is now to a great extent centered around the death of Christ, as that death is represented in the passage quoted. It is argued,—If God preordained the death of Christ in such a manner that wicked men did freely what he determined eternally they should do, and were guilty of the most crimson sin for thus acting, while he is altogether holy; might he not in the same way decree all the actions of all men, and yet the moral quality of the actions belong to the creature only, and in no sense or degree to the Creator? But that neither the premiss nor the conclusion has any foundation in the passage named, and on which they are professedly founded, will be made manifest by a brief survey of the truths it unfolds.

Let the reader then turn up his New Testament and read carefully the whole of the fourth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. Specially would we direct attention to the following verses, in which the disputed passage is found:—"And when they heard that, they lifted up their voice to God with one accord, and said, Lord, thou art God, which hast made heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all that in them is; who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, why did the heathen rage, and the people imagine vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers were gathered together against the Lord, and against his Christ. For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy council determined before to be done. And now, Lord, behold their threatenings: and grant unto thy servants, that with all boldness they may speak thy word." (verses 24-29.)

Leaving, aside, meantime, the various interpretations which have been given by others of these deeply-interesting and doctrinally-important words, we would note.—

(1.) That they form part of a prayer. In prayer, the earnest soul burns with the intensity of a furnace, in reference to the blessings prayed for. As it stands consciously under the eye of the all-knowing Jehovah, and feels that it is in his more immediate presence, all that is light and superficial in the inner man is dispelled, and the thought of the mind is then most profound, and the feelings of the heart most holy and sublime. Such, doubtless, was the experience of those who lifted up their voice

with one accord, and poured out the desires of their grateful and faithful hearts before the throne of grace in the words before us.

(2.) Let us inquire into the circumstances in which the praying party were placed; for a correct apprehension of these will throw considerable light on the meaning of the prayer itself. Pentecost, with its wonders and blessings is now past. The apostles, after long waiting, had received the promise of the Father; and, like spiritual giants refreshed with new wine, they stood forth in the midst of the city which contained the murderers of the Messiah, and preached to its blood-stained inhabitants, Jesus and the resurrection. In the name of Him, who not long ago hung weak, dying, and dead, on the centre-cross of Calvary, they wrought, at the beautiful gate of the temple, a wonderful work of God. An impotent man had been made whole, so that he did leap and sing for very joy. This marvel, Peter declared, was not wrought in his own name and strength, but in the name and by the power of the Prince of Life, whom his hearers had killed, but whom God had raised from the dead. On the principle that those who do evil hate the light, violent hands were laid on Peter and John, and they were forcibly put in hold until the next day. On the morrow they were brought and arraigned before the sanhedrim, and examined as to the power and the name by which they had wrought this notable miracle. To the discomfiture of those who sat on the bench, it was discovered that the name of power was none other than the name of Jesus, whom they had mocked, and scourged, and crucified. For a moment their cowardly hearts sank within them with a paralysing fear; and hence, instead of punishing the noble apostles, who feared God rather than man, they only threatened them, and commanded that they should henceforth speak to no man in this name, and then they let them go. Being let go from the hands of their persecutors, who sought to crush in the bud the work and the word of God, the servants of the Saviour went to their own company, and having reported to the assembled brethren the treatment received and the threatening given, they with one voice and with one accord appealed from men on earth to the great God who dwelt in heaven. To none other could they have so reasonably turned in the circumstances in which they were placed.

(3.) Still farther, let us observe the designation which in prayer they gave to God. They said, "Lord, thou art God which hast made heaven and earth and the sea, and all that in them is." Though Jesus had taught his disciples, when they approached God in the attitude of prayer, to call him "Our Father," it was not by that endearing name that, at this time, they prayed to the Being in whose hands were all their ways. On other occasions they would have delighted to have recognised God

as their heavenly Parent, and themselves as his children through faith in his Son. But in this peculiar crisis of their history it was not the fatherly so much as the governmental relations of God that filled the horizon of their souls. From the creatures of a day, weak, fallible, and dependent, they rose in thought to the Infinite Creator who is infallible and independent. From the rulers of the Jews, they turned to the Lord of lords, whose kingdom ruleth over all, and who doeth his will in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth. Let it be noticed, that in the designation given to God the fact that he is the Lord of all, because the Creator of all, is the principal idea expressed. This is a truth too often forgotten by those who dwell in this probationary scene. They have no doubt that God, as Lord, dwells and reigns in heaven,—that he has power over the angels above. But at the same time they seem to think that he is far removed from earth, and that he has no part in anything which is done under the sun. These unbelieving and thoughtless ones forget the existence of what is called providence. They realise not that God's agency has to do, and has much to do, with the historic evolution of nations, the circumstances of families, and the well-being and ill-being of individual souls. True, we hold as a doctrine not to be gainsayed, that some things which come to pass are not the results of God's action in creation and providence. The divinely constituted, sacred freedom of the will of moral creatures is left inviolate and free from all direct or indirect causative interference on the part of the Creator who gave it being. Within this sphere of will, man acts and alone acts. He it is, and not God, who determines what he shall do, and what he shall not do; and by thus determining his own inner actions, he builds up his unseen but lasting character, shapes his future destiny, and fulfils, or fails to fulfil, the glorious end for which he was made. But outside of this sphere of freedom, enjoyed by man in common with all accountable moral creatures, and given and protected by Divinity, all things done in heaven and earth are the outworkings of the will which

“Shapes our ends, rough hew them as we may.”

The Lord rules in all nature with an irresistible sway, and though he does not cause, he nevertheless overrules, the volitions of all men, be they good or be they evil; and by doing so he advances the highest interests of humanity and makes even the wrath and the sins of man to praise his most holy name.

(4.) The prophecy of David, and its fulfilment, as stated in the prayer, now fall to be considered. David had said, “Why did the heathen rage and the people imagine vain things? The kings of the earth stood up and the rulers were gathered together against the Lord and against his Christ.” These words are found

in the second Psalm; and though they will have their full embodiment only when the latter days shall dawn, still they had their initial fulfilment in the combinations of the peoples around the cross of the Saviour. "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the children of Israel, were gathered together." Around Jesus as a common centre, and against him as a common foe, were gathered the representatives of the nations of the earth. Their mutual distrusts and animosities were lost sight of for a season. Herod forgets his enmity and embraces Pilate, that unitedly they might make a stand against the Lord. The Jew forgets that he is the son of Abraham, that he might, along with the Bibleless heathen, oppose his own Messiah. The favoured people to whom were committed the oracles of God go in league with the Gentiles whom otherwise they despised, that together they might rage at the gospel, and harbour in their sullen souls vain things against Heaven's Anointed. For one purpose were all these various persons and agencies gathered together. By one strong, and all but overmastering impulse were they swayed. Towards one grand end all their machinations tended. And that purpose, impulse, and end, were not on the side of right, of goodness, and of God; not in harmony with the will, the decree, or the wish of the Most High; but against the Lord and against his Christ—his only begotten and well-beloved Son.

(5.) What then, let us ask, was the specific design for the carrying out of which these various persons were gathered together? Whatever it was, it was hostile to the law and will of God; and yet it was the very thing which God had decreed before to be done. Their design was unlawful and unholy in its origin and in its end; nevertheless it terminated on an object which it was right and righteous, yea merciful to the guilty world of man, for the Lord by his hand and counsel to foreordain that it should come to pass.

This being indisputably implied in the words of the prayer, it will be needful to look a little more narrowly into the sacred volume, that we may discover the one aim which the enemies of the Saviour entertained, and which swallowed up in itself all minor details. Neither need we look far to discover the idea which the Jews sought to work out, by the delivering of Jesus into the hands of the Roman Pro-Consul. That design was none other than to take away the life of the Lord. The mode in which this was to be accomplished, was to them a matter of trivial moment, indeed of no moment at all. If his life could be taken—if the earth were once rid of his presence, their desires would be satisfied and their plans would be fulfilled. Gladly would they have cast the Son of man over the brow of the hill,

that his body might be so mangled by the fall that it could serve no longer as a dwelling-place for the soul. With right good will did they take up stones to stone him to death, that they might hear his words and see his face no more. And their object in bringing him early in the morning to Pilate was not to get one mode of death, which they had determined on, executed, rather than another, but to get authority to take away the sacred life in any way that the Roman listed. From the narrative, it is evident that the mode of the death formed no part of the determination originally formed. Crucifixion was an after-thought, suggested to the mind of the murderers by the mention of the robber Barabbas. He, as a robber and a murderer, was doomed, according to the Roman law, to suffer its capital penalty by dying on a cross. This was known to those degenerate children of Abraham who clamoured before the civil tribunal for the condemnation of Jesus. No sooner therefore had Pilate said unto the multitude, headed and goaded by the chief priests and elders, "Whether of the twain will I release unto you?" than they said, "Barabbas." "Pilate said again unto them, What shall I do with Jesus who is called Christ? They all say to him, Let him be crucified;" that is, let him be the recipient of the punishment due to the robber. "Away with him, away with him, crucify him, crucify him." From these facts we are warranted to come to the conclusion that the death itself, and not the mode, was the one determined, guilty end, for the accomplishment of which the kings, the rulers, and the people, were gathered together. Now this same end was the end that God in a by-past eternity determined should be wrought out in the earth. He designed and ordained that Christ should die, and thereby make atonement for the sin of the world. The Father spared not his only begotten Son, but gave him up to the death for us all, that through death he might destroy our enemy, and set us free from the condemning power of sin. Once then at least, in the history of the world, wicked men have wickedly designed to do what God righteously determined should be done. Both determined from different motives and for ends wide as the poles asunder,—but still, both determined that the Son of man and of God should bow his head in death.

(6.) The important question here rises, and demands our careful consideration, who accomplished the one end which both God and man determined? Calvinistic commentators generally maintain, that the wicked men actually carried out the design, for the fulfilment of which they were gathered together. Again and again have we read, in the writings of the school referred to, that the verses commented on clearly prove that God determined what the crucifiers of the Saviour actually did in reference to the tragedy

of Calvary. Dr. Bonar, as we have seen, distinctly says that "Pilate and Herod, etc., are said to have done what God's hand and counsel had predetermined." Without examining at present what is said elsewhere in Scripture, we have no hesitation in expressing our humble conviction that this portion of sacred writ, neither implicitly nor explicitly gives countenance to any such thought. That the enemies of Jesus were gathered together with a hostile intent, the text definitely asserts. And that they were assembled together to do what God's hand and counsel determined before to be done, is equally plain. But that they carried out that design is not asserted. The very opposite idea is the one that seems to us to be most in harmony with the context, and the entire circumstances of the case. If God had decreed that the wicked men mentioned, should hate and seek to kill his own well-beloved Son, and thereby violate his holy law; how could David or Peter have declared that their actions were against the Lord, and against his Christ? They must have been in accordance with the deepest and most innerly purposes and desires of the Infinite mind. Besides, if the people who raged around the cross, and before the judgement seat of Pilate, really achieved the end on which their heart was set, how could it be said of them that they imagined vain things? The things which they imagined could not have been vain and empty if they were fulfilled and realised. Still further, as the death of Christ was the sacrifice for the sins of the world, the Jews or Gentiles would seem to have acted the part of high priests for the race, if they were the efficient causes that operated to take away the life of the victim Lamb. How, moreover, are we to account for the phrase, "God's hand and counsel," if what he determined before was wrought out by the hands of Bibleless heathens, and not by his own loving arm? And on what ground, if those persons who assembled together against the Lord, wrought out what they desired and schemed, can we explain why the words were used in the prayer at all, and formed part of the voice that rose to the ear of the prayer-hearing Jehovah? But over and above all these considerations, there are others as weighty which are suggested by other portions of the word of God. In John x. 18, Jesus says, "No man taketh my life from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down and have power to take it again." These solemn utterances would be bereft of half their meaning to us, if we failed to perceive that Jesus here claims a power of laying down his life different from that possessed by any mere man, be he patriot or martyr; a power akin to that by which he took it again when he rose from the dead. And they would be stripped of all meaning, if it were true that men did, as a matter of fact, succeed in taking away the life of Jesus. Suggestive, too, is the theme that occupied the



attention of Moses, Elias, and Christ, when they talked together on the mount of the "decease which Jesus should accomplish in Jerusalem." And not less so are the words addressed to the desponding disciples, "I go to prepare a place for you." The external facts, too, that were related to the death of Christ appear to us to corroborate the view we seek to maintain. On almost all sides it is admitted that crucifixion, though fitted if prolonged to accomplish the end for which it was used, was, nevertheless, not the physical cause of the death of the Saviour. Nor can we look upon the words, "reproach hath broken my heart," as other than metaphorical, for Jesus, before he exclaimed "it is finished," had past through his deepest agony and emerged from the densest gloom into the sunshine of his Father's smile restored. As it has been observed, "he received after his keenest sorrow the refreshing drink, not however to protract his life, but because it was his Father's will that he should not assume the appearance of languishing and thus involuntarily giving up his life." And, being invigorated by the vinegar, all being accomplished that was given him to do, he cried with a loud voice and said, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit," and having spoken thus, he calmly, consciously, and freely, bowed his head and yielded up the ghost. No wonder that the centurion who saw the sight smote his heart and exclaimed, "Truly this was the Son of God." Viewing the death of Christ thus, we are impressed with the conviction that it was as miraculous as his birth, and accomplished by the same divine agent. By the Holy Ghost the Saviour was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and through the Eternal Spirit he offered himself without spot unto God; purging our consciences from dead works that we might serve the living God.

(7.) We come now to consider the reason why the apostles, in the circumstances in which they were placed, adduced in their prayer to God, this fact which is recorded. That they had a reason which warranted them to do so is clear, from the character of the men as well as from the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, which, as apostles, they enjoyed. Could that reason be the one, that is in harmony with the Calvinistic interpretation of the words employed? "We trow not." If Peter and John believed that God had determined, by an irresistible decree, the thoughts, feelings, and actions, of those who crucified the Prince of Life, and that the thoughts, feelings, and actions of all judges were in like manner necessitated by the Almighty will, how could they, how dared they say "nay" to the sanhedrim, before whose bar they stood that morning? If Pontius Pilate and the rulers of the people were doing what the Heavenly King foreordained them to do; so must Annas and Caiaphas and John and Alexander. And it

was the duty of the apostles to have yielded to their authority, and obeyed their will, which, ultimately, was none other than the will of God. How too, on the necessitarian theory, could it be right to hearken unto God rather than unto men, who only utter the words which God determined they should utter in the given circumstances in which they were situated? What consolation, moreover, could the persecuted followers of the Lamb have derived from the idea, that those who plotted evil and executed their designs, thereby fulfilled the secret pleasure of the Most High? If such a thought as this had found a lodgment in their souls, it would have enervated their wills, blighted their faith, and quenched in blackest night the hope that cheered their hearts. Very different would be the results that would flow into their experience from the ideas maintained in this exposition. The prayer was uttered to express no confidence in the works or the designs of men, but to express full and unwavering confidence in God and his government. Under the shadow of his wing they were safe, though they were scourged and imprisoned by those who abused the authority placed in their hands. He who led the devotions of the assembled brethren, in effect said, "Once men rose up against thy law and thy Son, O Lord. They formed themselves into a league hostile to his person, that they might annihilate his cause. They met together that they might take away his life and his influence for ever. In doing this, however, they were outwitted and imagined vain things; for the very things they determined to do, thou, O God, hadst before determined to bring to pass by thine own hand as the executioner of thy counsel. In this manner, thou, by thy Spirit, didst open up a way of escape, full of light and glory, for thy Holy Servant. And now, Lord, behold the threatenings of these same men. They have risen up, not against the Master, but against us thy servants. Open up thou our way, and grant unto us that with all boldness we may speak thy word." Such is the import and logical relation of the various parts of the prayer. Those who joined in it had the spirit and the heroic faith that have animated all the warriors of the cross and the martyrs of the church. They held firmly to the truth, which is as immoveable as the everlasting hills, that, if God be for them, no man, or body of men, can be successful against them. In his own wonder-working way he will defeat all contrary purposes. Sometimes he will accomplish the designs of the enemy without the enemy's agency, and sometimes, though for different ends, he will allow the enemy's agency to proceed to its legitimate issue. And he will make all things work together for his people's temporal and eternal wellbeing in body and in soul.

It is true, indeed, that it is said of the Jews, that they "killed the Prince of Life," and "crucified the Lord of Glory." They

“slew and hanged Jesus on a tree.” But there is really no dispute as to the crucifixion of Christ. The Lord of Glory was crucified under Pontius Pilate, on the hill called Calvary, between two malefactors. And on the cross he died. All that is contended for, is, that crucifixion was not the physical cause of the death, and that consequently no man took away the life of Jesus; but that on that accursed tree he laid it down of himself, having power to lay it down and power to take it again. On this principle we can explain why the soldiers and Pilate, who knew the length of time that the torture of the cross took to issue in dissolution, marvelled that our Lord was already dead. And though the Jews are directly charged with the crucifixion and death of the Saviour, yet it was not on the ground that with their own hands they nailed him to the tree. This they did not do. It was the Roman soldiers who acted the part of the executioners; and the Jews and their rulers stood by. The reason, therefore, why the Jews were, in the sight of God and angels and men, guilty of the death of the Messiah, is found in the fact that they designed and plotted it, and urged with all the vehemence of their natures the Roman Governor to accomplish it. They were murderers in intent. Let us take care, lest, by unholy purposes on our part, we constitute ourselves guilty of re-murdering and crucifying afresh the Lord of Glory.

W. A.—P.

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THE DARK SIDE OF THINGS—AN EXPOSITION.

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“Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves.”—Rom. i. 24.

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ON this important verse, big with portentous import, and yet indicative, though on the dark side of things, of a wisdom that cannot err, and that is ever combined with an incommensurable benevolence, we would offer the following exposition:—

(1.) “Wherefore,” or, as Wiclif renders it “for whiche thing.” The reference is to the dishonour done to God, in withholding from him the glory and gratitude due to him, and in substituting, in his place, creature-objects of adoration, such as the images of men, and even of birds and beasts and reptiles. (See verses

21-23.) The essence of the sin consisted in the exaltation of the creature above the Creator. Its form would be modified by the idiosyncrasies and circumstances of peoples and persons.

(2.) Immediately after the word "wherefore," there is in the original the word "also." It is omitted in some of the most important MSS, (such as A B C), and hence is rejected by Lachmann. Griesbach too thought it apocryphal. And the Vulgate does not acknowledge it. But it is recognised in a majority of the uncial MSS, (viz. D E G K L), and by the Greek Fathers—Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius. It is easier, moreover, to account for its arbitrary or careless omission, than for its arbitrary or careless intromission; and hence we are disposed to regard it as genuine. It occurs in the same manner, after a "wherefore," in Rom. xv, 22; 2 Cor. v. 9; Phil. ii. 9. It is naturally used to introduce that which is the counterpart of what is stated in the immediately preceding context. And here its import may be thus represented:—"Wherefore, as they, on their part, gave up God, God *also*, on his part, though in a sense somewhat different, gave up them."

(3.) "God gave them up to uncleanness." The word "uncleanness" is a euphemistic term for acts of unchastity or obscenity. The verbal companionship of the word, in other Scripture passages, is ominous of its exceedingly evil import. (See 2 Cor. xii. 21; Gal. v. 19; Eph. iv. 19; v. 3; Col. iii. 5.) In the passage before us, there is no doubt that the apostle is already looking forward to the detestable practices which he specifies in the 26th and 27th verses. But he cannot, all at once, give expression to them. His soul feels revolted; and it has to pause for a little to gather up its resolution.

In saying that "God gave them up" to those impurities, he indicates more than a mere permission to perpetrate them, (so that the translation of Castellio must by no means be accepted,—"*Deus eos permisit animi sui cupiditatibus.*") There must, indeed, have been divine permission; for God "in times past *suffered* (*i.e. permitted*) all nations to walk in their own ways." (Acts xiv. 16.) Not that he gave them legislative permission to sin; or passed a law that conferred a licence and warrant to do evil. By no means. But, in the original idiosyncrasy of the soul, he divinely implanted a constitutional freedom of will. And in his government of the nations, he has ever had regard to this freedom. And, moreover, he for long postponed the culmination of those mediatorial and remedial arrangements, which centered in the life and death and resurrection of Christ Jesus, and which are eminently fitted

to sway the soul toward the choice of that which is good. "All nations," consequently, were both constitutionally and providentially permitted by God to act morally, either toward the right hand or toward the left. It is hence the case that they were permitted to choose indulgence in "uncleanness." But there must be more than permission involved in the expression "God gave them up."

And yet there must be less than the necessitation of the choice of uncleanness. For the necessitation of a choice is the annihilation of that element in it which really constitutes it a choice. It is the annihilation of divine permission on the one hand, and of human liberty on the other, liberty in the heart of our being, liberty to will. It is the destruction, consequently, of accountability, and therefore of culpability, and hence of the most fundamental assumptions of the scripture-revelation in general, and of the writings of Paul in particular. His expression, then, is by no means, as Koppe supposes, an exemplification of a common Hebrew custom of *attributing to the agency of God whatever is done upon the earth, whether it be good or evil.*

It was in opposition to this idea of necessitation that the old Greek expositors lifted up a stout protest. "The soul is not turned by necessity," says Origen, "otherwise there could neither be culpability on the one hand, nor virtue on the other." (*Neque necessitate in alteram partem anima declinatur: alioquin nec culpa ei, nec virtus posset adscribi.*) He regarded the apostle's expression as denoting the retributive "dereliction and desertion of the soul:" (*derelinquetur sine dubio et deseretur.*) Chrysostom says, "*he gave up is here he permitted.*" But the illustrations which he gives of his idea, shew that he meant more than mere permission, and only used that term in antithesis to the notion of necessitation or of incitation. He compares the action of God to that of a general, who retires from the field, while his soldiers are engaged in battle, and thus deprives the army of his assistance; or of a father, who leaves a profligate son to himself, "that he may learn from experience the excess of his madness." What else, asks he, could God have done? Could he have resorted to necessity and force? That would not, he remarks, have been to make them virtuous. Theodoret gives a similar explanation of the expression. The apostle, he says, "has put *he gave up* for *he permitted.*" But he explains this permission as amounting to the deprivation of assistance. And he compares the condition of the men "given up" to that of an abandoned ship. Theophylact compares it more happily to that of a disobedient patient, who is left by his physician. Oecumenius too says, though rather more spiritedly than wisely, "He did not himself give them up: by no means: but he ceased to care for them, seeing they were

unworthy of solicitude : and then Satan, having received them, gave them up to those things to which they were given up. It is thus the permission of God, which is called *giving up*."

There is more, then, in the divine abandonment to uncleanness, than mere permission ; but there is less than necessitation. There is some positive action. But whatever this may be, it is without, and not within, the volitional element of our nature. Haldane is certainly wrong, when he says that "the abandonment is a negative act of God, or rather a negation of acting." But Peter Martyr is much further wrong when he contends that, in giving up men to uncleanness, God "inclines or impels their wills." (*Inclinat aut impellit voluntates*.) Augustin before him committed the same mistake. (*voluntates facit inclinari. De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. c. 20, 21.*) Calvin had evidently the same idea, though he does not express it with the same philosophic precision and explicitness :—"God, by a just judgment, so arranges, that, at once by their own lust and by the devil, are men led and borne along into madness of that kind. The apostle thus uses," he adds, "the word *give up*, according to the constant custom of Scripture ; which word they too violently twist, who think that we are led into sin by the mere permission of God. For as Satan is the minister, and, as it were, the executioner of God's wrath, so it is not by the connivance, but by the command, of the judge, that he is armed against us."

The formula of thought, in which this theory of the divine necessitation of the human will, in relation to uncleanness, embodies itself, in the technical phraseology of theologians, is the following—(*peccata peccatis puniuntur*) *God punishes sin with sin*. (*Aliqua peccata esse paenas aliorum peccatorum :—Augustin.* Seneca expresses it thus, "Sceleris in scelere supplicium est." *Epist. 97.*) But the apophthegm is most objectionable, if it is to be regarded as a precise philosophic axiom. Sins are invariably, in their last analysis, volitions. And human volitions must be human creations, unless the freedom of the will be a mere myth. But if they be human creations, they cannot be divine punishments. Their efficient cause,—whatever may be their occasioning causes,—must be sought in the will of man, and not in the will of God. Any other conception of the facts of the case lands us in universal necessitation, and thus in fate, and consequently in the utter negation of accountability, and the utter impossibility of religion. The true formula of the case is, that God punishes certain sins by *his abandonment of the sinner* to other sins. God's abandonment of the sinner is his own act ; and it is invariably right, righteous, and righteously punitive.

The old Lutheran theologians, who came after the reign of Melancthon, were correct in maintaining that, when "God gives up men to uncleanness," his act is not *effective* (in the sense of *necessitating*), nor yet merely *permissive*, but *judicial*. Melancthon himself held by the *permissive* explanation. "He gave them up," says he, "that is, he permitted them to rush by their own will, or as impelled by the devil: for this signification of permission is extremely frequent in the Hebrew verbs." (Id est, permisit eos ruere sua voluntate, aut impulsos a diabolo. Nam haec significatio permissionis usitatissima est in verbis Ebraeorum.) He adds, "This simple and true grammatical interpretation removes the labyrinths of multitudinous questions. And the apophthegm in Hosea, *From thyself is thy perdition, only in me is thy help*, is to be held as most true. Sin is neither desired, nor approved of, nor effected, by God. This true idea is to be held most tenaciously." (Nec vult, nec adprobat, nec efficit peccatum Deus. Haec sententia firmissime tenenda est.) Hemming of Denmark echoes the opinion of Melancthon. "The word *give up*," says he, "signifies permission, and not efficacious impulse." (vocabulum *tradendi* permissionem significat, et non efficacem impulsionem.) But the divine abandonment is, nevertheless, more than merely permissive. It is judicially retributive. And doubtless it consists in that positive agency of the divine Being, which is ever at work in the execution of the moral laws of the world of mind. For neither in the world of matter, nor in the world of mind, is God otiose amid the laws he has ordained. His laws are not self-acting entities. They are not living agents. They cannot, therefore, execute themselves. When they are transgressed, they cannot impersonate themselves, and act the part of vindicators of their own majesty. It is God who is the ever-present, ever-living, and ever-active Agent, who conducts the executive of his own government, within the worlds both of matter and of mind. And thus, when we say that evils are the natural and necessary consequences of certain moral acts, we really mean, if we correctly analyze our own expression, that He, who is the great Guardian of law, so acts in reference to transgressors that they experience punitive consequences. One of these consequences is "abandonment"—"abandonment to uncleanness."

But wherein consists the "abandonment"? And why is it "to uncleanness"? In answer to the former question, we may rest assured:—

(1.) That it does not consist in a total desertion, a total letting alone. God did not say of any Ephraim, howsoever "joined to idols," "I will let thee alone." (See Hos. iv. 17.) If he were utterly and absolutely to desert, there would be instantaneous

destruction from his presence and from the glory of his power. There would be instant transference to final woe, or rather, indeed, to annihilation.

(2) Neither it is not implied in God's abandonment, that there is a total withdrawal of compassion. He is "good unto all (on earth), and his tender-mercies are over all his works." (Ps. cxlv. 9.) He is "not willing that any should perish." (2 Pet. iii. 9.) Even among the nations whom he has "suffered to walk in their own ways, he has not left himself without witness, in that he does good to them." (Acts xiv. 17.) It is only in the world of retribution that his "mercy is clean gone for ever," and that he utterly "forgets to be gracious." (Ps. lxxvii. 8, 9.) Regarding all peoples on earth, even those of them who provoke him with vanities, there is doubtless something of the feeling which he expresses toward idolatrous Ephraim,—“How shall I give thee up? How shall I deliver thee? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together.” (Hos. xi. 8.)

(3) We are not to suppose, consequently, that in God's "abandonment to uncleanness," there is a complete withholding of the influences of the Holy Spirit. If there were, there would be an absolute impossibility of repentance. The question "why will ye die?" would not be unanswerable. (Ezek. xviii and xxxiii.) Probation would be ended. It would be no longer true that "now is the day of salvation." (2 Cor vi. 2.) The invitations of Isaiah lv. 6, 8, would be no longer applicable. The Spirit and the Bride could no longer unite in saying "Come." (Rev. xxii. 17.) But undoubtedly the Spirit does "strive with man," as long as he exists upon the earth. (Gen. vi. 3.) And it is not till the moment that impenitent souls sink into eternity that he ceases to stir within their consciences, and to draw them upward with "the cords of a man." Hence it is that prayer is befitting in behalf of all on earth. The "sin unto death" is not fully developed in any souls, while they are on this side of everlasting retribution. (1 Jo. v. 16.)

Wherein, then, consisted the divine "abandonment"? *Doubtless in the judicial withholding of some measure of grace,—in the withdrawing of some portion of the influence of the Holy Spirit.* Not that there would be arbitrariness in this curtailment of the outgoings of mercy. "God forbid." Not that there would be too little in the residue, to render emergence from vice a possibility. "God forbid." There were many individuals among the idolatrous heathens, who yielded to the vouchsafed solicitations of the Great Convincer, to such an extent at least, that they did not give themselves up to the abominations of sensuality, to which



the apostle refers. He only seizes a broad feature of the "unrighteousness" which prevailed. But notwithstanding of this residue of the Spirit,—it is evident that there is much more in reserve. For there are divers channels, through which the sweet influences from above flow down upon the human soul. And it is manifest that when those God-ward exercises, which embody the earnest glorification of God as God and more especially his glorification by thankfulness, are wilfully abandoned, there are conduits of grace cut off; and thus there is less of the volume of the out-flowing river of grace that will reach the soul. Amid the many channels of God's mercy, those must not be overlooked, which consist in the ascending exercises of the soul. These upward-going exercises become veins and avenues for downward-coming blessings. Prayer, for instance,—effectual fervent prayer. Praise too, the praise of the heart. Adoration in general. Thankfulness in particular. Meditation. Self-consecration. As in all these exercises, something goes up toward God; so a way is opened in them, or in connection with them, for something to come down. And consequently when they are abandoned, it becomes the Judge of all the earth, who ever does what is right, to withhold such influences of his Spirit, as in wisdom he has conditioned on such acts of human will. God does "draw nigh to them who draw nigh to him." (James iv. 8.) But he "forsakes them who forsake him." (2 Chron. xxiv. 20.) "The Lord is with us, while we be with him: and if we seek him, he will be found of us: but if we forsake him, he will forsake us." (2 Chron. xv. 2.) And the amount of his abandonment of us, will be according to the measure of our abandonment of him. The influences, therefore, which it is wise to suspend on the voluntary acts of men, are wisely withdrawn when these acts are withheld. And thus, when godliness is given up, and ungodliness and idolatry are taken in, it is becoming in God to "give up" too, and to keep in somewhat that was poured out before. "Wherefore also God gave up."

But why was it to sin that he gave the heathen up? Because there was no alternative. "When we fly the light," says Bullinger, "it is necessary that we remain in darkness." There are just two possibilities, as regards moral conduct, open to men. They must choose between holiness and sin; between the service of God himself, and the service of Satan. When men, therefore, refuse holiness, and decline the service of God, there is no other alternative left, if they are to be "given up" at all. It must be to sin and Satan. Not that God desires them to sin, and to serve Satan. "God forbid." He cannot oppose and deny Himself. He is "holy, holy, holy." He is Love. But

when he feels judicially constrained to an act of abandonment, there is nothing else to which to abandon, but sin and sin's consequences. If he is judicially constrained to withhold certain gracious influences of his Good Spirit, which, if granted, would have mightily restrained from sin, the result of the withholding cannot possibly be ought else than a deeper immersion in iniquity. The bathos of such a state is realized in the world of woe.

But why was it to "uncleanness," in particular, that the idolatrous heathen were abandoned? The fundamental reason is to be found in an institution of special beneficence. Divine love has so ruled in the formation of our nature, that it is possible for us to derive a very large amount of the purest enjoyment from that conjugal relationship which is the centre of the circle which binds into families. In the susceptibilities for this relationship there is great provision for our bliss. And much of the real character of persons and peoples must necessarily take its shape from the presence of these susceptibilities. They need, however, for their regulation, a ruling principle, out of, and above, themselves. And indeed this ruling principle needs, for the full development of its operations, the continuous consciousness in the soul of the presence of a divine Guardian and Guide. It is by living and loving, "as seeing him who is invisible," that men learn to live and love aright, in all the phases of their being. And thus when God is abandoned, the Guide and the Guardian of human loves is lost, and men rush blindly and madly on to unregulated indulgences, to voluptuousness. They become "unclean." And as, when "given up," it must be to sins of some kind; it is not to be wondered at, that prominent among these sins, and indeed exceedingly prominent, should be that of sensual impurity. It is also to be borne in mind that at the very time the apostle was writing, there was a prodigious outbreak of all kinds of obscene abominations in Rome. And probably, therefore, Chrysostom is right in supposing that in giving such prominence to "uncleanness," he had specially in view the circumstances of the recipients of his epistle.

(4.) Reiche says (on ver. 23) that he differs from the apostle as to the origin and consequences of idolatry! He does not think that the idea of holiness is derived from the idea of God! He does not think that the heathens lost the true idea of God, in consequence of withholding from him the glory and the gratitude which are his due! He does not think that their abandonment to special uncleanness was the penal consequence of the dishonour which they did to God! The Apostle, he thinks, did not exercise any independent reflection at all on the causes of the idolatry and un-

righteousness of the heathen! (Wir sind der Meinung, der Apostel reflectire gar nicht nach eigner Ansicht über die Ursachen des traurigen Phänomens.) In his opinion it is no more the case that sin hinders the development of the idea and belief of the one true God, than that it disappears when the idea and belief are reached. But, for our part, we should think it abundantly evident that cherished sin must raise up within the mind a repugnancy to the consideration of those particular truths which draw deep in their moral relationships, and especially in their antagonism to evil. And although we do find that sin has not disappeared from those peoples, amid whom the idea of one living and true God is established as an axiom; still the immorality which prevails is but a remaining heathenism of manners, consequent upon a persistently heathenish determination to withhold from the known God the glory and the gratitude due to him. And were it not, indeed, for the fact that monotheistic society is besprinkled with the salt of genuine and practical christianity, there would be but little security even for the universal retention of the axiom—That there is one living and true God, the Creator of the universe, and the Rewarder of them who diligently seek him. It is one thing to have God present in the hereditary creed; and quite a different thing to have him present with us in our every-day life, by realizing and reverent thought.

(5.) But the apostle says of the heathen,—“God gave them up to uncleanness *through the lusts of their own hearts*. It suffices that the pronoun be rendered “their,” instead of “their own.” As to the preposition, others, besides our translators, have rendered it instrumentally,—“through.” Boehme for instance, and Krehl, and Glöckler. The latter represents the lusts as the officers of justice, who conduct the ungodly into the uncleanness, to which they are judicially given up. The Vulgate renders the preposition “into” (or *unto*, or *to*),—“God hath delivered them up,” as the Rheims translation gives it, “vnto the desires of their hart, into vncleannesse.” Tyndale’s version corresponds, “vnto their hertes lusts, vnto vnclennes.” The Geneva is the same. Castellio’s corresponds. And so does Beza’s. The translation is obviously unnatural. The preposition undoubtedly bears its customary import,—“in.” It is equivalent to “in accordance with.” “God gave them up, *in accordance with the lusts of their hearts*, to uncleanness.” The expression indicates why it was to acts of obscenity that God judicially gave them up. There were in their hearts antecedent lusts, tending toward the acts. These lusts would have got reins put upon them, had the men “glorified God as God, and been thankful.” The desires would, by means of the Spirit-influences, which would have descended

through the ascending adoration of the Heavenly Father, have been repressed. In all likelihood the will would not have chosen to comply with the foul solicitation. But when men removed themselves from the influx of the celestial power, the passions naturally felt uncurbed, and rushed headlong into fruition. It was "in accordance with" these lusts that God gave them up. It was while the will was "in the element" of the lusts, that they were abandoned. The will then complied: and thus they "abandoned themselves." "They gave themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness." (Eph. iv. 19.)

(6.) The Apostle adds, "to dishonour their own bodies between themselves." Instead of "their own bodies," it is better to read "their bodies." The verb which is rendered in our version "to dishonour," was regarded by our translators as being medial. The Syriac and Vulgate translators were of the same opinion. So was Theophylact; Luther too, and Castellio, Beza, Grotius, etc. But the word is not elsewhere found in the middle. And the passive import is better, as it more appropriately represents the punishment which *was judicially brought* upon the transgressors. The word is taken passively by Koppe, Reiche, Rückert, de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi, Tholuck, Meyer, Ewald, Alford, etc. And thus, according as the entire clause may be understood as expressing *design* on the one hand, or *result* on the other, it will be translated, either, "so that their bodies were dishonoured," or, "that their bodies might be dishonoured."

There are some, indeed, who recognize the passivity of the verb, and yet regard the entire clause as expressing, neither design on the one hand nor result on the other. Instead of considering it as an accessory statement, dependent on the proposition "God gave them up to uncleanness," they look upon it in the light of a complex genitive, in apposition with, and epexegetical of, the word "uncleanness." "God gave them up to uncleanness—the uncleanness) of having their bodies dishonoured." It is thus that Fritzsche construes the passage. And so, essentially, did Winer before him. (*Gram. Part iii. § 44.*) Meyer and Tholuck, in their later editions, give in their adhesion to this interpretation. But it is unnatural. It renders the clause a cumbersome adjunct of the word which properly designates the object, unto which the heathen were positively "given up." It too closely identifies, also, the "uncleanness" and the "dishonour of their bodies;" while the latter was rather the consequence of the former. The word "uncleanness," moreover, is not a term that naturally requires a complemental genitive, (as does "readiness" in 2 Cor. viii. 11; "need" in Heb. v. 12; "desire" in

Rom. xv. 23; "opportunity" in Luke xxii. 6; "power" in 1 Cor. ix. 6; etc.) When we speak of an object's "uncleanness," we do not naturally ask "of what is it unclean?" And then, besides, the article is wanting. Winer appeals, indeed, to the anarthrous condition of analogous expressions, in Rom. xv. 23, and 1 Cor. ix. 6. But he overlooked the fact that in these expressions, the genitive exhibits the object, and not the specific nature or consistence, of the governing noun; and hence, in both of them, the definite article may be omitted in English as well as in Greek. But it is otherwise with the expression before us.

We must needs, then, regard the words as an accessory clause in connection with the preceding proposition, "God gave them up, in the lusts of their hearts, to uncleanness." And we must take them as denoting either the result of the action affirmed in the principal proposition, or the object designed. Koppe, de Wette, Umbreit, Alford, and others, understand them as designating result,—“so that their bodies were dishonoured.” But it is questionable if the form of the construction (the infinitive with the genitive of the article) is ever to be interpreted, at least in the New Testament, as merely indicating result. (Certainly Acts iii. 12; vii. 19; 1 Cor. x. 13 are not instances in point.) And at all events it is certain that when it occurs in an accessory clause, the idea of design is the natural implication. See Mat. ii. 13; iii. 13; xiii. 3; xxiv. 45; Luke ii. 27; xxi. 22; xxii. 31; Acts iii. 2; xxvi. 18; etc. In the passage before us the expression is doubtless to be understood according to the ordinary and natural import of the construction employed. God judicially gave up the idolatrously impious to uncleanness, “that their bodies might be dishonoured.” And it was assuredly right that he should intend their dishonour. It was right, since they persisted, at once, in dishonourable acts toward himself, and in dishonourable feelings in reference to one another. We are to distinguish, therefore, between the acts of uncleanness, into which they longed to rush, and the dishonour which was their legitimate and penal consequence. Their dishonour had relation to the judgment of others, or peradventure to their own subsequent judgment, in reference to the acts which they perpetrated. For “marriage is *honourable*, and the bed undefiled.” (xiii. 4.) And it is alike the duty, the interest, and the privilege of every person “to possess his vessel (the vessel of his body) in sanctification *and honour*.” (1 Thess. iv. 4.) But disgrace is the due of all uncleanness. And it is wise and benevolent in God, who is ever shedding down from above the pure sun-light of his own glorious procedure, to make the black shadow of dishonour the invariable consequent of every foul deed of uncleanness. This interpretation of the expression, which embodies

design, is given in the Syriac and Vulgate versions; and by Castello, Beza, and Grotius; by Rückert too, Philippi, Van Hengel, and many others.

The apostle adds the words, "between themselves." They are literally "in themselves." Chrysostom and Theophylact understood them as denoting exclusion in reference to others. "Note the very striking emphasis," says Chrysostom; "they did not need others to dishonour them; but the very things which enemies might have done to them, they perpetrated on themselves." Van Hengel, and some of the older expositors, taking substantially the same grammatical view of the expression, suppose that it modestly refers to the crime of self-pollution. In either case the phrase is equivalent to "by means of themselves." "Through themselves" is the rendering of Paulus and Glöckler. "Of their own accord"—"no one forcing them"—is the interpretation of Grotius and Rosenmüller. It is better, however, to regard the phrase as meaning "among themselves," in a reciprocal sense; that is, as our translators have freely given it, "between themselves," or, "mutually." "Among themselves" is the translation in Cranmer's Bible. "Mutually" or "reciprocally" is the rendering of Erasmus, Rückert, Fritzsche, de Wette, Meyer, Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius, and many others. It is an admirable translation, for the apostle is looking forward to the dreadful reciprocities which he feels constrained to specify in verses 26 and 27.

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#### THE DELIVERED AND RAISED UP CHRIST.

A RIGHT understanding and a due appreciation of the principles fundamental to the christian religion, become to man as life from the dead. His spiritual freedom is secured thereby, and his spiritual nature regenerated.

It is with christianity, however, as it is with any other system; error concerning its foundation-truths, will necessarily lead to error concerning its minor and outstanding details. Hence, the importance of forming true and proper conceptions of the basis on which the superstructure is reared. And as these are to be obtained from the written word alone, the theological student should be animated by the most sincere desire to arrive at scriptural ideas and conclusions. In the sequel of this paper, we shall endeavour to lay before the reader, as clearly as we can, the radical import of the following passage of holy writ:—

*“Who was delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification.”* (Rom. iv. 25.)

The connection of the words with what precedes is obvious. Justification by faith, in contradistinction to justification by deeds of law, ceremonial and moral, is the grand key-note which the apostle sounds throughout the chapter. In opposition to the Jewish idea of the method of acquittal at the bar of God, it is asserted that “To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted to him for righteousness.” And the apostle having adduced Abraham as an example, who against hope believed in hope, and thus gave glory to God, and had righteousness imputed to him, proceeds to state that this was not written merely for his sake, but for the sake of men in general, who shall have righteousness imputed to them if they “believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead.” Abraham’s faith terminated on God. He was fully persuaded of the fidelity and truthfulness of God. He rested assured that what God had promised, he was able also to perform. And this, his faith, at once received righteousness, and produced righteousness, and by it he was justified.

Arguing from the unchangeability of the essential principles of the divine moral administration, we must conclude that the method of justification in the present is identical with what it was in the past. The principles of God’s moral government are like himself, eternal. They are an emanation and picture of his own infinite mind; and, when expressed, are an external manifestation of his own perfections. We cannot but regard them as given in accordance with the dictates of infinite intelligence, and the apprehensions of infinite wisdom. Being such, they must remain unalterable, transcending the limits of time and creation, and extending illimitably into eternity. In this light were they viewed by Jesus and his apostles. “Heaven and earth shall pass away; but the word of the Lord endureth for ever.” And hence it is that faith in God’s word of promise, is the condition of justification now, even as it has all along been in the eras of the world that have passed away. So says and argues the great apostle of the Gentiles. Abraham had a direct, specific promise given to him, which he believed. We have a direct, specific promise given to us, which we are required to receive with unreserved confidence. And if we receive it, righteousness shall be imputed to us, as it was imputed to Abraham. But God’s promise to us is based upon an accomplished fact, and points directly to Jesus, “who was delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification.” On this expression we would notice four particulars.

## I. THE DELIVERING UP OF CHRIST.

Several questions naturally suggest themselves under this particular. In what sense can it be said that Christ was delivered up? By whom was he delivered up? And to what was he delivered up? In his divine nature, Jesus had existed with the Father from all eternity. Co-existence, co-equality, and co-agency with the Father, are affirmed of him, by himself and by his apostles. The one divine person was not before or after the other. Priority or posteriority, in the order of time or nature, cannot be predicated of any of the persons of the Godhead. Were not this the case, the unity of the Trinity would be destroyed. Unity of nature, operation, and glory, essentially belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. We say, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. But this nomenclature, it should be understood and remembered, distinguishes nothing regarding the essential nature, it only points to the offices, of the persons of the Godhead. The terms are economic, given in view of the scheme of human redemption. If supremacy or subordination, superiority or inferiority, priority or posteriority be ever, on the inspired page, affirmed of any of the Three, it will be found that it is in relation to redemption. And on this principle we reconcile the seemingly contradictory statements, that fell from the lips of Jesus, himself:—"I, and my Father are one,"—"My Father is greater than I."

Hence it is in view of the salvation of humanity that Jesus is said to be "delivered up." And in looking at Scripture we can have no hesitation in answering the question—by whom was he delivered up? He was delivered up by the Father. "I am not come of myself," said Jesus, "the Father hath sent me." "The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." "He was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son." There is thus authority in the one divine person, and subjection and submission in the other. There is supreme power and rule on the one hand, and ready and willing obedience on the other.

In answer to the question, to what was Christ delivered up? we have only to appeal to the recorded facts of the case. God the Father gave up the Son to humiliation, suffering, and death. As a Son, Jesus had to "learn obedience by the things which he suffered." "The word was made flesh and dwelt among us," and was thus clothed in humility, being found in fashion as a man. Coming into the human condition, he had to endure all the suffering and ignominy which the assumption of human nature and human circumstances involved. And what that was for One who was "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners," it is not for us to say or adequately to conceive. Having supreme



sympathy with God in his purity, holiness, and rectitude, and having the most intense compassion for man in his impurity, sin, and turpitude, his bosom must have been the seat of an agony inconceivable to mortals. To those who saw him in his private life, he might appeal and say, "see if there be any sorrow like unto my sorrow." It was true, indeed, that "never man spake like this man"; but it was likewise true, that "never man sorrowed like this man." He was the "man of sorrows and acquainted with grief." To all this he was surrendered by God. His sorrow and suffering might doubtless partially arise from the immoral atmosphere by which he was enveloped; but they had a divine aspect as well. "It pleased the Lord to bruise him; He put him to grief." To all the unrestrained hostility, the bitter and relentless persecution of the Jews;—to all the fiery assaults, the malignity and hate, of the great emissary of sin;—to all that mysterious soul-sorrow of Gethsemane's garden which drew forth the prayer, "Father, if it be possible let this cup pass from me;"—to all the overwhelming agonies involved in the hour and power of darkness on Calvary,—the agonies which wrung from his righteous soul the bitter exclamation, "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?"—to all this, a height and depth, a length and breadth, of distress and sorrow known only, perhaps, and that too but partially, to the finally lost, was the Lord Jesus delivered by the Father. "He who knew no sin was made sin." He was "made a curse."

## II. THE DESIGN OF THE DELIVERING UP OF CHRIST.

He was delivered up, says the apostle, "for our offences." This is the only satisfactory explanation of the sorrows of the man of sorrows. Apart from this, the suffering of him who did no sin is utterly inexplicable. All our liabilities and responsibilities were laid to his account. In the matter of obedience, he met in his representative character, the requirements of perfect righteousness. And may we not say, that in the matter of penalty, he met the demands of the dishonoured law, and exhausted the fulness of its curse? In this way Jesus magnified the law and made it honourable, in its two-fold bearing upon man.

Man is an offender. He has violated God's holy, just, and good law. He has sinned. Sin is a little word, but conveys an idea, in and around which, inhere and encircle some of the most important principles of psychology and theology. The law, as the evolution of the divine mind, is the very quintessence of rectitude. The penalty attached to its violation must be in harmony with the divine nature, perfections, and relations; and necessary for the highest interests of the moral universe. Law,

universally, has its sanctions. The moral law is not without them. If it had no sanctions, it would cease to be law. What then is the sanction of God's righteous and holy law? We enter into this inquiry, for it is necessary in order to understand the design of the delivering up of Christ to sorrow and death.

In the external and Sinaitic promulgation of the law, God revealed himself in awful majesty and solemn grandeur. There were unfolded to men some of the most glorious attributes of Jehovah's character;—his august sovereignty as governor, and his boundless power to carry into execution his government. He was seen to be supreme in authority, glorious in holiness, and terrible to the soul which is out of his holy places. At the time when the law was thus given, there was no specific penalty expressly appended to it as the result of sin or disobedience. And we only reach the fact and nature of the penalty by inference, implication, and induction. But it may be represented and summed up in such words as these,—*the endurance of God's displeasure or wrath*. It is not merely the negation of blessing, but the enduring of cursing. (2 Chron. xiv. 16–18, and xxix. 6–10; Ezra vii. 23, and viii. 22; Job xxi. 17–20; Rom. ii. 1–5; Eph. v. 6; Gal. iii. 10; Col. iii. 6; Heb. iii. 11; Rev. xiv. 10.) An inspired prophet has embodied the dreadful reality in the words,—“The soul that sinneth it shall die.” (Ezek. xviii. 4.) Not only, then, does the law reveal the eternal and immutable distinction between right and wrong. It also indicates what shall be the reward of the one, and the award of the other. The revelation is made by the very radiance of heaven itself, in both the editions of the moral law, the edition without and the edition within.

Law has been violated by man. And thus mankind are rendered obnoxious to its penalty. And hence, if any are to be liberated, it must be needful that something be done, on the ground of which God may be just, and may be seen to be just, as the righteous moral governor of the universe, while he extends pardon and life to the guilty. This would appear to be needful, for we have every reason to believe that the fundamental principle of the law is the very principle on which the moral order of the universe is suspended. And hence, were pardon and life extended to the guilty, without a display of the divine detestation and abhorrence of sin, it would be at the expense of public justice, and at the risk of universal anarchy. But who then shall bear the penalty? Who shall bear it in such a way, and to such an extent, as to deliver the guilty from condemnation? Neither man nor angel was competent. He who would endure it, and yet live and triumph, must represent Deity on the one hand, as well as humanity on the other. He must be both God and man. Such an one, however, would be sufficient. Christ is he. The exi-

gencies of the case are fully met in the appearance and work of Christ, God's Anointed One. God gave him up to the death for us all. He laid upon his incarnate and only begotten Son "the iniquities of us all." He delivered him up as a sacrifice, the just for us the unjust, "for our offences," on account of our violations of his holy law. The apostle thus presents before us the expiatory and vicarious aspect of that work of Christ, which human offences and the unchangeable rectitude of the divine law rendered necessary. Christ was the sacrificial Lamb of God, bearing and bearing away the sin of the world. His sacrifice "put away sin." It opened the door of forgiving mercy. Sin has been "condemned in the flesh," and shewn to be "exceedingly sinful." God has been manifested as glorious in holiness, and as a just God, even when he justifies the ungodly who believe the gospel of his grace.

### III. CHRIST RAISED AGAIN.

Christ's humiliation and submission to death were the indispensable and necessary antecedents of his resurrection to life, and his exaltation to glory. Having assumed our nature for the purpose of revealing God and answering to him for our liabilities, it follows that suffering and death were unavoidable, inasmuch as they are inevitable consequences of human transgression. As our Saviour himself said to his doubting disciples, "O fools and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken, *ought not the Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory.*" The suffering of "these things" seems to have been the only avenue, through which, as the redeemer of sinful men, he could pass up to glory, and open it for our admission. But when he had once endured "these things," death had no longer power over him. All to which he was delivered up, culminated in his death on the cross; and all to which he is raised again culminates in his exaltation to the right hand of God, where angels, principalities, and powers are made subject unto him. The same hand that delivered him, raised him again. And the resurrection of Christ and his exaltation to "all power in heaven and in earth" is the central fact in the gospel commission; for it involves complete propitiation, and possible pardon, and free everlasting life in heavenly glory. It looks backward to the offered and accepted sacrifice for sin, and forward to life and immortality,—to the "inheritance which is incorruptible, undefiled, and which fadeth not away."

Jesus having in his own person abolished death, and conquered him who had its power, entered triumphantly, like a mighty conqueror, upon his reward. Never was hero, returning from the scene of war, and bearing with him the trophies of victory, so greeted by his fellow-citizens, as was Jesus, the victor of death

and hell, when he entered the Holy of holies, the scene of God's transcendental glory. It was then said, "lift up your heads, O ye gates, and be lifted up ye everlasting doors; and the King of glory shall come in." He was "the King of glory, the Lord mighty in battle." It was likewise said, "let all the angels of God worship him." He is no longer the "wounded and bruised" of the Father. He is the glorified One, the object of the acclamations and worship of angels. He shall never more be put to grief. Never more shall his soul be made an offering for sin. He is for ever invested with power, and honour, and worship, and dominion, and glory, and praise. He is now to see his seed, and to prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. As we cannot form an adequate estimate of the depth of his humiliation, so we cannot form an adequate estimate of the height of his exaltation. We have but faint and imperfect glimpses, even with the written word in our possession. But of this we are sure, He has the reins of universal government in his hands, and will reign until the consummation of all things, until every enemy is put under his feet, and the kingdoms of this world become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ. "His name shall endure for ever; his name shall be continued as long as the sun: and men shall be blessed in him: all nations shall call him blessed."

#### IV. WHY IT WAS THAT CHRIST WAS RAISED AGAIN.

The antithesis of the apostle's expression would be unlawfully pressed, were we to say, that the fact of "our offences" bears precisely the same relation to the death of Christ, as does the fact of "our justification" to his resurrection. There is no necessity for supposing so precise a co-relation. Our offences were the *meritorious cause* of the mediatorial sufferings. But assuredly it is not our justification which is the *meritorious cause* of the Saviour's exaltation to glory. Such an idea would be almost an inversion of the glorious reality.

Perhaps the apostle's meaning might be paraphrastically exhibited, thus,—“Christ was delivered by God to sufferings and death on account of that which condemns us, namely, our offences; and he was raised again on account of that which justifies us, namely, his own spotless righteousness.” This paraphrastic rendering makes the word “justification” metonymical. But if we supply an answer to the question, What is the ground of man's justification? we shall, at the same time, find an answer to the question, What is the ground of Christ's exaltation? It is Christ's righteousness, which is the ground at once of man's justification, and of Christ's own exaltation. As the imputation of

our sins to Christ was the ground of his condemnation, so the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us is the ground of our justification. As death is inseparably connected with sin; so life is inseparably connected with righteousness. And, such being the case, we come to the conclusion, that Christ was raised up from the dead by God the Father and exalted to his own right hand in virtue of his sinless obedience. The estimate God puts upon sin is seen in our Saviour's ignominious and cruel death on the cross. The estimate he puts upon righteousness is seen in the glorious resurrection of the same Saviour from death, and his exaltation to life and glory. The New Testament writers constantly represent the resurrection and glorification of Christ as the consequent of his obedience. "He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the father." The elevation of Jesus to the throne of the universe was thus the reward of his obedience. Just as sin alone merits condemnation and death, so righteousness alone merits justification and life. Sin, the sin of others, is the explanation of the humiliation, suffering, and death of Christ; righteousness, his own perfect, spotless, righteousness, is the explanation of his exaltation to heavenly glory. And it is on the same ground, and through the same medium, that all believers are justified, and shall be raised up with him, and be made to sit together with him in heavenly places.

J. M.—D.

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PRACTICAL EXPOSITION OF THE  
FIRST CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS:—CONCLUDED.  
VERSES 10-14.

THE first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews is an exhibition of the glorious pre-eminence of Jesus. Even among those higher orders of beings who are eminent in glory, he is gloriously pre-eminent. Angels and archangels are far inferior to him. Considered in themselves, indeed, or in relation to such beings as men, and, still more, when viewed in relation to beings which are inferior to men, these angelic principalities are very glorious. But, when brought into juxtaposition with Christ, they become eclipsed, like stars in the presence of the sun, and their glory seems

to be no glory, by reason of "the glory that excelleth." And yet this Christ is *our* Christ. He is *our* Saviour. He is *our* elder Brother. He is most intimately related to us, and we are most intimately related to him. He has come very near to us, in order that he might lift us up to be very near to him and to his own peerless glory. He is the Son of man as well as the Son of God.

The inspired writer has, in the preceding part of the chapter, quoted several important passages from the Old Testament Scriptures, to shew the vast superiority of Christ to the highest created beings. And he continues to expatiate in the same quotational way, to the close of the chapter.

Verses 10, 11, 12. *And, thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands:*

*They shall perish, but thou remainest: and they all shall wax old as doth a garment;*

*And as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail.*

These words,—with the exception of the first, the conjunction "and,"—are a quotation from the 25–27 verses of the 102nd Psalm. The conjunction "and" links the quotation to the passage adduced from the 45th Psalm. It is as if the inspired writer were to say,—“The 45th Psalm does not stand alone in the testimony which it bears to the high pre-eminence of our Saviour. It is only one out of many kindred passages. *And* I would add to it the following from the 102nd Psalm.”

This 102nd Psalm was evidently regarded by the inspired penman as Messianic. He would not otherwise have quoted it, as affording Old Testament evidence of the transcendent superiority of Jesus to all mere creatures,—angels included. Doubtless his idea of the Psalm is correct. And hence it is probable, that it is Jesus who is the "afflicted" and "overwhelmed" One, who "pours out his complaint before the Lord" in the body of the Psalm. It is thus probable, too, that it is Jesus who says,—“Hear my prayer, O Lord, and let my cry come unto thee. Hide not thy face from me in the day when I am in trouble; incline thine ear unto me: in the day when I call, answer me speedily. For my days are consumed like smoke, and my bones are burned as an hearth. My heart is smitten, and withered like grass; so that I forget to eat my bread;” and so on to the middle of the 24th verse. In the first clause of that verse we read,—“I said, O my God, take me not away in the midst of my days,” or, as it might be more literally rendered,—

"I say, O my God, do not take me up (do not cause me to ascend) in the midst of my days." It is the cry, apparently, of the human nature of our Lord. And perhaps it is the expression of the instinctive shudder, which that sensitive nature could not but feel, at the approach of the terrific circumstances of his decease. If this was, in reality, the import of the deprecatory exclamation, "O my God, do not cause me to ascend in the midst of my days," then the remainder of the verse, and the remainder of the Psalm, will contain the thoughts of consolation and confirmation, which the divine Father, by means of his own intimate communion and inspiration, poured into the "overwhelmed" soul of our Saviour, and thereby "strengthened" him.— "Thy years are throughout all generations. Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands: they shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end. The children of thy servants shall continue, and their end shall be established before thee." In these animating words the divine Father stirs the human thought of our Saviour, to stretch itself out at once to the far future and the far past. In that future he shall for ever be, and be glorious, even as in the past he had been for ever, and had gloriously wrought the wonders of creation. Essential immortality, and thus essential immutability in being and well-being, belonged to him. In his divine personality, he was infinite, imperishable, and inaccessible to aught that could lessen the joy and glory of perfect existence.

Such seems to be the structure and import of the Psalm. Stier takes the same view of it. And if such be its structure and import, we see, at a glance, how appropriate is the quotation that is made by the inspired correspondent of the Hebrews.

"Thou, Lord, in the beginning didst lay the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are works of thy hands." Jesus is "Lord,"—Jehovah, equal with the Father. This word, indeed, has dropped out of the Old Testament text, in our present editions. But it was doubtless in the Psalmist's autograph.

"In the beginning" of creation, it was Jesus, who, in his divine personality, reared the goodly fabric of the universe. "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made." And "by him all things consist."

Yet, "they shall perish." They shall perish, in some such sense as the old "world, being overflowed with water, perished." (2 Pet. iii. 6.) They shall be dissolved, so far as their present form is concerned. The earth, in its present form, is not what it once was. Geology teaches us this. Its old form has perished.

The moon in its present form is not what it once was. Astronomy teaches us this. It once was, to all appearance, a molten flaming mass: it is now a cinder. It shall not, however, continue a cinder for ever. The planetoids were not always planetoids. They seem to be the splintered fragments of a world that has been blown up. We have reason, indeed, to believe that every part of the solar system was once altogether different from what it now is. And we have the same reason to believe that every part of it is hastening on to some wondrous transformation. "The heavens and the earth, which are now, are kept in store, reserved unto fire." "The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat: the earth also, and the works that are therein shall be burnt up." "Nevertheless we look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." (2 Peter iii. 7-13.) The law of progression is written on the entire physical universe; and thus everything that is "shall perish," as regards its present form.

"But," says the divine Father to the Son, "thou remainest":—"from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." The heavens, which seem so stable above us, "shall all wax old, as doth a garment; and as a mantel shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed." They shall be laid aside, like a garment that has served its purpose, and is worn out. There will be a change; as it were, of raiment. But our Saviour himself is "the same, and his years shall not fail." He is "the same, yesterday, to day, and for ever." (Heb. xiii. 8.) He shall never wear out. He shall never become antiquated or obsolete. He shall be for ever, in all essential glory, what he now is.

How delightful! How grand! And all of the sons and daughters of men, who believe on him, cling to him, and love him, shall be partakers with him of his endless glory. He is the Head, and they are the members. He is "in" them, and they are "in" him. Their life is "hid with him." (Col. iii. 3.) They have "risen with him." (Col. iii. 1.) They have been made to "sit together in heavenly places." (Eph. ii. 6.) His bliss is theirs. They are partakers with him of "the beauty of his holiness," and of his "pleasures" which are "for evermore."

Verse 13. *But to which of the angels said he at any time, Sit on my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool?*

The passage quoted is taken from the first verse of the 110th Psalm,—a psalm which is more frequently referred to in the New Testament, and applied to Christ, than any other portion of Old Testament Scripture. It is manifestly a Messianic Psalm, and was so understood by the ancient Jewish commentators. It is



inapplicable to any other than Jesus. But to him it is beautifully and sublimely applicable, inasmuch as he is both a king and "a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec," and is worthy to take his seat on his Father's throne, at his Father's right hand, and thence to administer, in a transcendent way, the transcendent affairs of his glorious kingdom, until all opposition is annihilated, and his enemies become his footstool.

The Psalm has reference to that portion of our Saviour's history, which succeeded the completion of his atoning work. The scene is laid in heaven. It represents the welcome which was accorded to him, when the "everlasting doors" of glory were thrown open to receive the Conqueror of sin and death and hell. The moment that the Captain of our salvation appeared within the court of heaven, "the Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool." The Hero of heroes was welcomed to the highest position of honour and glory. It was not said to him, Stand thou there at the head of the long line of angels and archangels. But it was said "Sit on my right hand":—"In that now glorified humanity of thine, come up hither. Take thy seat beside me on my throne. Be sharer with me of my honour. Reign and judge. All power in heaven and on earth is given unto thee. For I am infinitely well pleased with thee, and with the work thou hast accomplished. Sit thou here, until I make thine enemies thy footstool." It is implied in this last expression, that even after the completion of the atonement for sinful men, some would hold out and would have none of it. Alas, there are many such. They hate Christianity. There are many such. But by and by the world shall be weeded of all these enemies. As we learn from the 5th and 6th verses of the Psalm, all the obstinately rebellious shall be "stricken through," even though they be "kings." The "Heads over many countries shall be wounded." The earth shall be swept clean with "the besom of destruction." And what, if the beginning of the end be at hand!

God the Father co-operates with God the Son, and He will yet make the enemies of the gospel as a footstool to the Saviour. "Sit at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool."

The language of the entire verse is highly hieroglyphic. But its signification and significance are obvious:—Christ as our saviour, in the possession of the highest honour, and by the co-operation of the Father, will be ultimately victorious in putting down in this world of ours, all that opposeth either himself or his people or his cause. It matters not who or what it is, that is in opposition to him. Is it kings? is it queens? It matters not: they shall be put down. Is it emperors, or presidents, or czars? It matters not: they shall be put down. Is it dukes, or marquises,

or earls, or other lords? It matters not: they shall be put down. Is it millionaires? They shall be put down. Is it statesmen, or parliaments, or congresses? They shall be put down. Is it monarchies or republics? The fiat of omnipotence is against them, if they are against Christ. They shall be put down. Is it philosophers, or poets, or historians, or litterateurs? They shall be put down. Is it heathenism, or mahomedanism, or popery, or some hollow or haughty forms of protestantism? They shall all be put down. Every thing that opposeth him, "whose right it is to reign," shall be "overturned, overturned, overturned," and turned into Christ's footstool. He is supreme; and his supremacy must be acknowledged. This assuredly, is honour far above that of angels.

Verse 14. *Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?*

Christ sits on the throne. Angels stand before it, veiling their faces with their wings; or, they fly hither and thither to fulfil his behests, and the behests of his Father. They are "ministering spirits,"—God's ministering spirits; executing his pleasure; and, according as their services are required, they are sent forth by him "to minister in behalf of them who shall inherit final salvation." In the days of Christ's flesh they ministered to Him. They got "charge over him to keep him in all his ways." (Ps. xci. 11.) They "strengthened" him. (Luke xxii. 43.) And there is no reason to doubt that millions of them yet walk the world unseen, and are the guardians, as far as possible, of all who belong to the Saviour. They desire to look into the things of the great salvation, in which is exhibited "the manifold wisdom of God." (Pet. 1. 12: Eph. iii. 10.) They "encamp round about them that fear the Lord," and often "deliver them" in the time of their extremity. (Ps. xxxiv. 7.) They have much to do, as we learn from the book of Revelation, with the evolution of divine providence, and are agents in conferring rewards or in pouring out the vials of divine wrath. Those of their number who have charge of little ones, "do always behold the face of the Father in heaven." (Mat. xviii. 10.) And who knows how much we are indebted to them for seasonable suggestions, and for constant opposition to the principalities and powers of spiritual wickedness, with whom we are all called to wrestle to a greater or a lesser extent. (Eph. vi. 12.) There is a wonderful interlinking of the visible and the invisible. There is a wonderful association of brotherhoods of being. And the man, who is for Christ and for Christianity, for God and for goodness, and against all that is ungodly and ungracious, is one of a glad and glorious chain of be-

ings, whose first link is on the throne of the universe. And thus when he dies, angels will convey him, even as they conveyed Lazarus of old, into glory. And when in glory, he shall enjoy their glad companionship for ever and ever.

“Say ye to the righteous, that it shall be well with him.” He is on the winning side, and will be blessed to the full.

### WORK.

MAN is a worker. Activity is the law of his being. Time is the period for its exercise: eternity for gathering its fruits. All work is prospective;—while done in the present, it regards the future. The link of antecedent and consequent binds the limited here to the illimitable hereafter. As each moment hurries back into the everlasting past, the record of its deeds speeds forward into the everlasting future. And thither do the deeds speed too, not to rest in endless oblivion, but to await at judgement the spirit’s arrival, and to meet it either with a welcome of joy or a ban of terrible woe. Actions never die, but live eternally, either as angels to bless, or as fiends to curse.

Carlyle says;—“All true work is religion; and whatsoever religion is not work may go and dwell among the Brahmins, Antinomians, spinning Dervishes, or where it will; with me it shall have no harbour. Admirable was that of the old monks, ‘*Laborare est orare*, work is worship.’” Albeit the source is not the most christian, the words have a real christian ring—utter a real christian truth much needed in these days. Right thoughts and right feelings are indispensable to religion, but they are worthless unless translated into right actions. Listen, reader, while we expatiate for a little on the text,—*Work is worship*.

Work may be defined as, *the wise employment of time*. Perhaps this definition is more comprehensive than immediately appears. The right is wise; the wrong unwise. And hence, to employ time wisely is to employ time rightly,—to act in a right spirit and from right motives. Work is duty to God and man, going forth in action. There cannot be true work *for* God without love *to* God. There cannot be true work *for* man without love *to* man. The christian minister who spends his strength in proclaiming the everlasting verities that save the soul; the mechanic who puts forth his ingenuity and skill in his daily labour; the seamstress who toils weekly over her ill-requited task;

the statesman who administers a nation's laws and controls its destinies,—may all really, in their respective occupations, work in a manner and spirit equally acceptable to God. Wherever and by whomsoever time is wisely employed, there is work done with which God is well-pleased.

Real work, as now defined, is very rare. Time is seldom wisely employed,—often foolishly squandered. Not only are hours wasted; but years, yea, whole lifetimes, are frequently thrown away for nought. Existences are spent, but lives are not lived. Thousands uncloseth their eyelids in the morning, but continue to slumber throughout the entire day. Multitudes could write in their diaries from year's end to year's end, without the slightest hyperbole, the exclamation of a world-famed Roman prince,—“I have lost a day.” There goes back into the irrevocable past a dread register of misused hours, which might and ought to have been consecrated to the sublimest ends of a creature's life. But, though numbered among the things that were, the memories of these days only sleep; they never can be non-existent. Their spectres shall haunt the time-prodigal; and shall rise one day to mutter over him the bitterest curses. Hours may be sinned away, and then thought gone. But,

“Gone? They never go. When past, they haunt us still.  
The spirit walks, of every day deceased,  
And smiles an angel, or a fury frowns.”

Such idleness must be wrong; activity must be right. Duty, like a finger-post of the Eternal, points man to “work while it is called to-day.” God has framed the human constitution so as to condition enjoyment on activity. The idle man is, and must be, miserable. External luxuries he may possess in abundance; internal peace he must lack. It seems as if a curse, enduring and irrevocable as Cain's, had been uttered against the sluggard; for whoever allows indolence to warp the activities of his nature, frustrates an end purposed by the Creator,—an end, too, which the human spirit must fulfil ere it can taste happiness. Deep among our instincts lies this,—“I have been created, not simply to be, but to do.” “Man,” writes the burning pen of an earnest soul as now lives, “son of earth and of heaven, lies there not in the innermost heart of thee, a spirit of active method, a force for work? and burns it not like a painfully smouldering fire, giving thee no rest till thou unfold it, till thou write it down in beneficent facts around thee.” O then, my brother, whosoever thou art, work bravely, work manfully, during thy terrestrial span; and thy own nature shall rise up and call thee blessed!

Work, then, like all God's appointments, is merciful—it is a blessing full-breasted, and well-favoured, and enjoyable. Many sons of labour envy, doubtless, the sons of ease. Regarding

only the external pomp and magnificence, which wealth and rank delight to throw around their favourites, it is imagined that the hearts beating beneath the fair exterior must be joyous indeed. But could the gilded halls be entered; could the care and canker that eat into the languid mind be seen; sufficient ground would be discovered for a considerable reversal of opinion. Let not the artizan imagine that his lot is the hardest. His weekly toilings are ennobling, not debasing. The possessor of the hard, horny hand is among the most honourable of earth's sons. Every drop of sweat that glistens on the labourer's brow is a brighter gem than ever glittered in the crown of England's Queen. Hers is but man-made and man-admired; his is, at once God-formed and God-honoured. His Creator ordained that that wreath should encircle his brow, as the insignia of honest labour; and heaven never bends with intenser interest over any class of mortals than over the right feeling, right thinking, right acting children of industry. Look up, then, my toiling brother, and behold the approving smile of thy God!

Man is a worker—there is also work to do. Time can be wisely employed. There are two spheres, distinct yet interpenetrative, in which man can labour,—the religious and the secular. Each affords abundant scope for his varied activities; and he can move in both under the constraining power of the Sun of righteousness. The two orbits do not conflict. The same law rules both. Duty is as real in the secular as in the religious world. Every man, simply because he is a man, has many secular duties. Society has real claims on every individual. Civil rights imply civil duties. Each man is bound to qualify himself for social usefulness,—not only to avoid being a social pest, but to be a physician able to remedy social ills. It is as real a sin to make no effort to right a wrong, as it is to do a wrong; and no less a sin to allow personal qualities to develop which will be injurious to society, either as incompetencies or as depravities. Individual duties are really social duties. The completest, most faithful, most royal man, is the greatest public benefactor; and a public benefactor each man, as a social being, is bound to be. To cultivate the mind and store it with empirical and speculative knowledge; to train the moral nature, the conscience, to just decisions and keen discernment, the will to right determinations and resolute action; to study and practise assiduously the best means to develop and solidify a healthy physical frame; to adopt and pursue a business that will afford scope for native energy, and secure adequate remuneration; to protect and educate those intimately related to, and immediately dependent on, us; to assist in promoting the welfare and maintaining the

harmonious ongoing of society,—are duties incumbent on every man as a man. But in addition to these incumbencies, there are many duties peculiar to certain individuals, arising out of their particular spheres and circumstances. Household-heads have their specific duties. Every husband and father lies under certain imperative obligations; so does every wife and mother; and God and man alike expect and demand their fulfilment. Again, every community is so constituted that many of its members must pursue widely different occupations. The judge is needed to administer justice; the thinker to excogitate and expound truth; the mechanic to construct the engines that link cities together and become media of communication; the merchant to retail the cloth that covers us, the food that sustains us; and the sons of those countless other trades and professions that minister to our social wants, and promote our social well-being. Each has its peculiar duties. Conscientiousness, diligence, faithfulness, attention to whatever would farther individual development, or widen the usefulness of the trade or profession pursued, are duties due to self and society. Extensive and manifold as man's relations, is the sphere of work which unfolds before him in the secular world.

Turn next to the religious sphere. Here man's duties are legion. They begin with himself. "Physician heal thyself," is in this case the aphorism of common sense. A diseased spirit administering to another diseased spirit the remedies it has never applied to itself, appears almost like a farce. Self is the centre of influence; and self must be the first rectified. Our own wounds must be upbound ere the bleeding sores of humanity be touched. Our own disorders must be remedied, ere experiments be tried on others. And when we have become living attestations to the effectiveness of our cure, let us go forth to anoint others with the same infallible medicament. When healed, a wide and ever widening sphere of duties is disclosed. They speak with imperial voice. They refuse to be disregarded. They demand obedience. The renewed soul must hear. Conversion unstopped his closed ears, and lets in the voice of duty, which is the voice of God. He hears it with kindling affection, and in the blessedness of a newly experienced filiation hastens to obey. He glances round on his fellow participants of hope, and sees in each a brother to love—a soul to bless. Turning to the outermost circle, a world careering in wickedness meets his sorrowing gaze. To arrest some of those madly rushing to destruction, becomes now a sovereign desire. He may be unable to persuade with wisdom of words; but, still better, he can convince by wisdom of deeds. And thus by the eloquence of a life,

which may move when the tongue is powerless, Christ's truth may be proclaimed. Such, O brother! be thy work and mine!

Here let us pause to dissipate a wide-spread and disastrous error, viz., that business and religion are incompatibilities. They may become so in the confusions of a wasted life; they are not so in the divine economy. Our knowledge of God's character forbids the belief that he would situate man in a position so contradictory, as to make his temporal interests necessarily war with his eternal. God never bids the human soul reconcile the irreconcilable. He has not created the present and the future, the secular and spiritual, everlasting enemies, and then set man to play the mediator's bootless task. The religion he has revealed does not frown on daily business, but rather greets it with a smile. Christianity is the friend of commerce; the foe of knavery. A soul influenced by christian principle, enlightened by christian truth, may engage in mercantile or professional transactions fearlessly. There is nothing in them essentially wrong. On the contrary, they are just and right. All labour is honourable and equitable, in itself. It is only working on false principles, and for wrong ends, that can make it an instrument of oppression and crime. But let the false principles and wrong ends be banished, let the true and right be introduced instead, and labour will become dignified into a manifestation of religion and a proclamation of truth. The workshop might, and should be, as favourable to christian development as the study; the exchange, as the closet; the desk, as the pulpit. The highest and holiest One that ever lived was no stranger to toil. Yet, while engaged as the carpenter, he was as good and as heavenly-minded, as when about his Father's business. Surely, then, my toiling brother, if Jesus could reconcile daily work with daily religion, you need not feel their reconciliation impossible.

Man was intended, as his constitution testifies, for both the secular and spiritual spheres. Withdraw him from either, and the balance of his nature is destroyed. Its activities, as well as its devotional susceptibilities, must find an outlet in one direction or another, and if the channel be not good it must be evil. Total prostration or else total corruption must result from inoperation in either. Eradicate the business habits, and the individual will become either a simpering sentimentalist or an utter imbecile. Eliminate the religious element, and he will become either a grovelling earth-worm or an utter atheist. The evil consequence is inevitable. Bind the healthiest bodily limb into an unnatural posture, and it will speedily grow useless and withered. Deny any native faculty its intended object, and its power shall soon cease. And so man, to preserve his being's equipoise, must employ

alike his secular and spiritual natures. Here, then, be it observed, our text receives verification;—*Work is worship*. Every native capability exercised, every God-created faculty used, is really creature-service rendered to the Creator. A nature rounded and finished on its every side, is most honouring to God. More real homage could not be offered than a being developed into faultless activity; into the harmonious play of its powers. It is God's mirror: a glass in which the Infinite's glory may be seen. For he combines untiring activity with unblemished holiness.

“God is a worker,  
He has thickly strewn infinity with grandeur.”

And he has most of the divine image who is most holy in his activity, most active in his holiness.

A word on *the spirit in which we should work*. Willingness and energy should characterize the worker. Necessity is a sad and unnatural mother of labour; its offspring is always weak and deformed. Willing work gives nerve and sinew to the soul. Energy is the measure of ultimate success. A purposeless and nerveless soul can never do real good. On himself, on his dependants, on society, his influence must be evil. His moral nature, his intellectual powers, his physical frame, run to waste. Grim-featured want may urge him forward, but indolence, rising in resistance, embitters the temper, and makes miserable the life. The disposition, soured towards man, cannot have a serene flow of affection towards God. Malice and envy are generated in the heart. Earth and heaven are seen through a discolouring medium, until each wears the infernal hue of the soured mind. And thus those seeds of unwillingness to labour, first sown in the mind, finally effloresce in a virtual estrangement alike from God and man. Surely, my brother, these disastrous consequences verify our text—*right work is real worship*.

So too with spiritual work. Without willingness and energy it is impossible. It may be a semblance, it cannot be a reality. Activity in religion must be heart-activity, or it will be irreligious. Unwilling hands cannot serve God.

Let us now glance at a few motives to work. And first, *time, not eternity, is man's work-season*. “Why do you never rest?” Nicole once asked Arnauld. “Have we not all eternity to rest in?” replied the indefatigable philosopher. What a motive to work! How powerful to give sinew to the arm and purpose to the heart! Earth the arena of our labours; threescore years and ten their limit; then an eternity to rest! O surely it is “high-time to awake out of sleep.” But, alas! how many blank, aimless lives are spent,—lives that look terrible in the light of eternity.



Squandered hours and opportunities are not buried in an everlasting grave. Mortal hands could not dig their tomb. Up to the Judge's bar each moment flies, carrying its record of good or evil. Thither, to confront the congregated life-records, all sweep; for

“ Our lives are rivers, gliding free  
To that unfathomed, boundless sea,  
The silent grave !  
Thither all earthly pomp and boast  
Roll to be swallowed up, and lost  
In one dark wave ! ”

Again : *Man's actions in time determine his character in eternity.* According to the deeds now done the everlasting destinies shall be awarded. He who here sows to the flesh shall hereafter reap endless corruption. He who now sows to the spirit shall then reap life everlasting. Character, now changeable, becomes then unalterably fixed. The irrevocable word goes forth—“ He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still; and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still; and he that is holy, let him be holy still.” Work, then, O man, rightly, ere immutable destiny shapes thy character into its endless form. Be good, do good, while thy probation lasts, and when it ends, thou shalt go to “ be for ever with the Lord.”

Again : *Man has work to do in time that he cannot have to do in eternity.* There will, doubtless, be true work hereafter. Heaven cannot be the abode of idleness. “ The spirits of just men made perfect ” cannot live in the invisible world like Epicurean gods. But the work there must be very unlike the work here. It cannot be the philanthropist's, the reformer's, or the evangelist's work. Souls cannot be converted, bleeding hearts staunched, care-burdened spirits lightened, angry foes reconciled. These, and similar great and noble and christian works, are peculiar to earth. Here, and here only, can they be performed. O then, my brother, gird up thy loins, do thy duty right manfully, and God, even thy God, shall bless thee, and anoint thee with the oil of gladness among thy fellows.

A. M. F.—B.

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A HINT TO YOUNG PREACHERS OF THE GOSPEL. It is in vain to expect to do good to souls by saying to them in public and in the mass, or saying before them, what you would never think of saying before them and to them, if you were seeking to win them to Christ *in private*.

THE EVANGELICAL INFLUENCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.  
A LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

[*The Notes are by the Editor of the Repository.*]

REV. AND DEAR SIR,

The evangelical doctrine of the influences of the divine Holy Spirit is exhibited in Scripture in a variety of forms. In some instances the exhibition is literal, in others it is symbolical.\* Perhaps the principal representative of this latter class is the baptismal ordinance. In this there is a twofold symbolism. There is the symbolic water, and there is the symbolic action of pouring it on the recipient subject. The beauty and significance of this double symbol are apparent. There is a charm in the administration of the ordinance, to every believing mind; and doubtless this is largely due to the significant aptness of the divine emblem. It will be admitted, however, that significant and beautiful though it be, it is not to be regarded as a full exhibition of the truth of the great doctrine; and this will be admitted on the general ground, at least, that all symbolical representation, however striking, is yet imperfect. Do you admit this? In other words, is it your opinion that the symbolic exhibition of the doctrine of the evangelical agency of the divine Spirit is purely popular and not at all philosophical?† If this be your opinion, permit me to inquire whether a philosophy of this great doctrine be possible.

As to the wisdom and benevolence of the choice of the popular, rather than the philosophic, form of exhibition, I have only the most decided conviction; as indeed every real believer must have. But this conviction is not at all incompatible, I suppose, with this other conviction, that it may be profitable to ascertain the philosophic reality which the popular exhibition is intended to adumbrate.

Is a philosophy, then, of the doctrine of the divine agency, in the great evangelical scheme, possible? Can we penetrate so far down into the great reality as to bring up such an approximate explication of it as may be entitled to be called its philosophy?

Of course, it is implied in the doctrine, that man needs the divine agency. This is obvious. But it is not so obvious whether

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\* In others still, and indeed in the great majority of instances, it is analogical.

† Undoubtedly the baptismal symbolism is not a philosophy. It is a hieroglyph. It is a picture,—a sensuous picture.

the necessity be metaphysical or moral, or partly both. And it may be that the apprehension of the truth at this point may help to educe subsequent developments of the whole truth. What then is the real character of the implied necessity ?

Stated in what is to my mind its most general form, the doctrine of the evangelical influence of the Holy Spirit is the essential dependency of the finite mind on the Infinite Mind.\* So I am led to think it. For if we push our thoughts sufficiently deep, we reach, I fancy, the ultimate belief that it is in the underived existence of the supreme Creator that we find our own.† And this is just the idea of our absolute dependence on the Infinite Independent.

As to the nature of our dependency ; I know not whether anything more can be said than that it is essentially absolute.‡ It is in Him that we live and move and have our being. Is not this the ultimate idea which lies at the bottom of the evangelical doctrine ?§ If my being, itself, is possible only as a sustained effect of the infinite Personal Cause, it is no longer difficult to believe that the modes of my being must be accessible to the same divine agency.

It would not be correct to say that my being is a mode of the Infinite Being, for this would be to pantheise in thought. Still, as my being is absolutely dependent on the Infinite Being, the possibility of the Evangelical doctrine is therein involved. So I am led, at present, to think.

Looking a little longer at the subjective side of the matter, is it not correct to say that it is less in "the substantive substrate" of the finite being, than in one or other or all of its psychological modes that the evangelical influences of the divine Holy Spirit are realized ?|| Without doubt, if the substance of my being be subsistently dependent, the several faculties which inhere in it, must also be sustained in their functional operations. But it is not this merely that is implied in the Evangelical doctrine.¶ It

\* This essential dependence of the finite mind on the Infinite, is, to our view, rather the ground-work, than the essence, of the Evangelical influence of the Spirit.

† It is, at all events, in the existence of the Creator, that we find *the source* of our own existence as creatures. When we speak of personal existences, we speak of individualities.

‡ If we philosophize strictly, we must not, we presume, regard our dependence as so absolutely absolute, as to exclude distinct individuality; and some kind of self-control, and capability of rebellion.

§ It undoubtedly lies *at the bottom* of the evangelical doctrine ; but it does not interpenetrate it to the top.

|| This is getting nearer to the reality of the case. ¶ Assuredly not.

may, perhaps it must, imply essential subsistence,\* but it implies more. At any rate, I conceive it to imply this much more, that as the modes of my spiritual nature, only, and not my nature itself in the abstract, are under my voluntary control,† it must be in them exclusively that the sphere of the Divine Evangelical Agency is found.

Now the modes of my being are at any rate three-fold. It has the thinking mode, that is to say, it thinks. It has the emotional mode, that is to say again, it feels; and lastly, it has the volitional mode, that is, it forms and executes volitions.‡ Is it in one or other or all of these modes that the Evangelical agency is realized? And if the doctrine of the Spirit's influence implies some kind of impotency which has been superinduced as the result of the extraordinary moral relations of man, is the impotency to be predicated of one or other or all of these modes?

To be simpler, is the Evangelical agency of the divine Holy Spirit, an agency that exalts the thinking and emotional and volitional faculties, and is it in such exaltation that it is exhausted?|| Of course, I understand that this mode of the divine agency has peculiar relations to the great moral ends aimed at in the propitiatory scheme. But this is not exactly the aspect of the subject which I have before me. It is rather, as you will see, its subjective than its objective relations.

Now if this be the sphere of the operations of the Evangelical influence of the divine Spirit, it may not be possible to distinguish in consciousness the line, which separates the ordinary from

\* "Essential subsistence"? Does not our correspondent mean "essential dependence," namely of the psychological modes?

† Only some of the modes of our spiritual nature seem to be under our voluntary control,—those modes, namely, which consist of acts, and the results of acts.

‡ It at least forms volitions. We know not that the volitional mode has anything to do with the execution of volitions.

|| It will depend on the meaning of the word *exaltation*. If it be an *exaltation of mere power* that is referred to, we question if that is the aim and issue of the evangelical influence of the Spirit. Burns manifested wonderful exaltation of power in some of his unholiest poetical outpourings. Aristotle, in a larger circle of things, was also the subject of remarkable exaltation of power. But these exaltations could scarcely be ascribed to the evangelical influence of the Holy Spirit. If the exaltation, referred to, be *moral*, it will involve a peculiar interblending of the intellectual, emotional, and volitional elements, and it will perhaps result in a certain relation of the subjective to a certain aspect of the objective. This relation is doubtless the grand proximate aim of the evangelical influence of the Holy Spirit.

the extraordinary among its phenomena. I had thought otherwise, however. I had thought that the two classes of facts could be introspectively distinguished. But I could think this only so long as I believed that the results of the advent of the Great Agent would necessarily be the suspension of the mind's constitutional laws.\* But if no such suspension takes place, and the divine Agency is limited to the exaltation of the faculties and susceptibilities, the results of the gracious intervention must be only those of degree. And if so, then they will be only higher evolutions of the normal processes, and insusceptible, therefore, of scientific differentiation.

Nevertheless the testimony of consciousness is concurrent with the testimony of Scripture as to the reality of the gracious operations of the divine Spirit. Every believer's consciousness is the seat of these high experiences. For though it may not be possible to say where the human ends and the divine begins, it is possible to say, that such and such results in the soul's activities are the effects of the gracious exaltation. Particularly, may not one be conscious of divinely bestowed illumination in the intelligence, and of tenderness and purity in the sensibility, and of resolution in the will? And if one can, then may one be conscious of the gracious agency, although it may remain true that the point of union between the human and the divine may be incognizable.

Now if it be in the modes of mind that the divine agency is realizable, is there one of them more than another, which is, in point of time, the subject of it? Perhaps this question is best answered in the light which psychology sheds on the relation which subsists among the modes. There is then a highly important relation between the thoughts of the intelligence and the feelings of the sensibility; and the function of the intelligence is, besides, exclusively the apprehension of truth. It is to see the true, as it is the function of the heart to feel the pure, the holy, the blissful. If there be then this relation of subordination of the heart to the intelligence,† and if both are ministrant to the will in the way of yielding reasons and motives to it, ‡ may one thence

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\* Such a suspension need never be assumed; although in certain extraordinary cases, miraculous influences must be admitted.

† The relation is, in one sense, a "relation of subordination;" but, in another, a relation of pre-eminence. The intelligence exists for the heart; not the heart for the intelligence. We know, that we may love. Knowledge is a means—love is the end.

‡ The reactive or reciprocating ministration of the will in relation to the intelligence and the heart, is its highest function. Will is put into us to minister, still more emphatically than to be ministered to.

infer that the exaltation of the function of the intelligence, that truth may be reached, is one of the primary, if not one of the principal results of the divine gracious agency?\*

Now, contemplating the baptismal symbol again, one is apt to run off with the idea, that as the symbolic element is poured out on the subject, there must be some spiritual element which is literally poured into the soul.† The idea is crude, however, and perhaps I have not given it exact statement. But that there is some such idea in the minds of many, cannot be doubted. Now, though the symbolic element infers some element which is symbolized, is it not materialism in idea to suppose that it is poured out as water is poured out?‡ If it is, what is further implied than what I have just tried to educe?||

Subjectively considered, I have endeavoured to construe to my mind what the doctrine of the divine agency implies. I have now to ask, what does it imply objectively considered? Does it imply that the Great Agent seeks to pour pure influences on men by the embodiment of the thoughts, that is, of course, of the truths of his infinite understanding, in the great systems of material nature and administrative providence?§

Be so good, Rev. dear Sir, as to let a streak or two of illumination fall on this and related topics. Meanwhile I am,

Rev. Dear Sir,

Yours very truly,

INQUIRER.

\* Doubtless; in the sense, already indicated, of the term "exaltation." And hence, it is to be borne in mind that the intelligence may be divinely stirred through the sensibility, and by the intermediacy of the will.

† This never occurred to us.

‡ Doubtless.

|| Perhaps all that is possible is just such divine agency as reaches the penetralia of our individuality—the sphere of our choices,—through our intelligence alone, or through our intelligence and sensibility interblending and interacting. As, however, sensibility always moves in an element of intelligence,—for sensibility is conscious,—intelligence, in one form or another, is never pushed aside, on occasion of the ingress of divine agency. It is always acted on. And it is certainly *in* it and *through* it that the converting and the sanctifying influence takes effect.

§ The influence investigated, is the *Evangelical* influence of the Spirit. The gospel is taken up, or given out. The objective is thus, inseparably connected with the subjective; and it doubtless resolves itself into *testimony*,—whether verbal or otherwise symbolical,—testimony regarding the propitiousness of Jehovah. This testimony culminates in the Bible, which exhibits "Christ the crucified," in whom sin is exposed and condemned, and righteousness exemplified, provided, and bestowed.

## BOOKS.

*Prayer and the Divine Order: or, The Union of the Natural and the Supernatural in Prayer.* By Thomas Hughes. London: Hamilton & Co. 1863.

WE were somewhat disappointed with the composition of this work. It wants concinnity. And the thinking is not so comprehensive, as the author would seem, himself, to regard it. But there is freshness,—and very refreshing freshness—at once in the matter and in the manner of the work. The dews of heaven have fallen on it. And light from on high sparkles on the drops.

*Sketches from Life, with occasional Thoughts and Poems.* By Robert Gemmell. Glasgow: Hutcheson Campbell, 64 Argyle Street. 1863.

WE have perused Mr. Gemmell's *Sketches* with interest and delight. They indicate that the author is possessed at once of a cultured intellect, and an amiable heart. A delicate and almost feminine gentleness pervades his writing. Yet his sympathies are expansive. He has an eye to observe the beauties of nature. He loves the lovely in every thing, but especially as it is embodied in moral character. He is, above all, ravished with christianity and Christ. And from all these peculiarities combined, a charm, unpretentious and homely indeed, but yet genuine and pure and elegant, pervades his volume, and will constitute it a delight, not only to his children, to whom it is dedicated, but to many others, who, animated with chastened aspirations, are capable of enjoying right principle and good taste.

*An Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans on the principles of Scripture Parallelism. With an Introduction,\* and an Appendix containing an Arrangement of the Epistle in parallelism in the Original Greek.* By John Howard Hinton, M.A. London: Houlston & Wright. 1863.

THIS volume, as the estimable author informs us, “may be regarded as, in some sense, the work of his ministerial life.” He says,—

I was young in the ministry when Jebb's *Sacred Literature* fell into my hands; and I have never departed from the direction which the perusal of this (to me) invaluable work gave to my efforts at Biblical interpretation. It was not long before I applied this method of scripture parallelism to the explanation of the epistle to the Romans; and on this method I have, in the course of a ministry of forty years, three times expounded it, once at Reading, and twice in London.”—pp. v. vi.

He adds:—

“I am well aware that even long and oft repeated consideration affords no proof that my judgement as an expositor has become either sagacious or mature. If, however, such latent hope in this direction as I must confess to the existence of, should not be confirmed by the opinion of the best qualified judges, I shall, at least, have the satisfaction of having presented to them the result of no cursory or superficial reflection.”—p. vi.

This is modestly said. And we are among those who feel constrained to cherish unfeigned esteem for the excellent author. But, nevertheless,

we fear that his experience will turn out to be chiefly valuable for the illustration, which it affords, of the danger of building the work of a life upon a narrow and insecure foundation. The maturity of our author's powers has not, we apprehend, been directed to the impartial and comprehensive examination of the principles of his biblical exegesis. These principles, we should imagine, were early and somewhat hastily adopted. And the subsequent efforts of the author's literary labour, so far as exegesis is concerned, have been, we apprehend, devoted to the labour of applying them, and of reconciling them to their application. If the principles, indeed, had happened to be broad and sound, the life's work of such a man would undoubtedly have resulted in an *Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans*, which would have been a valuable addition to the student's Biblical Helps. But with the principles, which he actually assumed, we fear that his *Exposition*, notwithstanding all the elaboration which he has expended upon it, is almost good for nothing, and is all but an entire hermeneutical failure.

Mr. Hinton has been so possessed with the one, and one-sided, idea, that parallelism is "the key of knowledge," wherewith the theological treasures of the *Epistle to the Romans* are to be unlocked, that he has unjustifiably neglected to make himself competently acquainted with the language in which the apostle wrote, and with the history of the exegesis of the writing. Hence, in the course of his volume, he incessantly annoys the critical reader with critical crudities, of which he never could have delivered himself, had he expended in wider researches a fair proportion of the energy and zeal, which he has squandered in working out his extreme parallelistic hypothesis. He has, in truth, substituted ingenuity and fancy for scholarly investigation and acquisition. And thus, to one who is aware of the extremely trifling results which have been contributed to the sum of scientific theology by mere fancy and inerudite ingenuity, there is but little prospect of Mr. Hinton's efforts culminating in a "possession for ever."

To illustrate the character of Mr. Hinton's exegesis, we would refer to the way in which he tries to elucidate the apostle's reasoning in chapters ii. and iii. He says:—

"In tracing the construction, we begin with the first verse of chap. ii., which stands in connection, not with ver. 2, but with ver. 24, thus:—

1. Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whoever accuseth,  
For wherein thou accusest another thou condemnest thyself,  
For thou who accusest another doest the same things.
24. For the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles through you.

"After this the apostle immediately adds, "As it is written;" a phrase certainly giving occasion to no little difficulty. To what is it to be applied? If we say, to the sentence immediately preceding, then it is to be replied that there is no place in all the Bible where this "is written," or anything like it. The result is the same if we refer to the sentence following. We are, consequently, driven to the conclusion that it must refer to something else—to some passage or passages probably, which the apostle was going to quote, but from the actual quotation of which something it the course of his thoughts at the moment turned him aside. If this conjecture is correct, we shall in some other place find the passages in question. Now the missing passages are actually to be found in the third chapter, as follows:—

- III. 9. What then? Have we any religious prerogative?  
None whatever.
10. For we have already proved that all, both Jews and Gentiles, are sinful;  
As it is written—



- There is not a righteous person,  
Not even one.
11. There is not one who understandeth,  
There is not one who seeketh after God:
12. All have gone out of the right way,  
Together they have become perverse,  
There is none who worketh righteousness,  
There is not so much as one.
13. Their throat is an open sepulchre,  
They have deceived with their tongues:  
The poison of asps is within their lips,
14. Their mouth is full of cursing and bitterness.
15. Their feet are swift to shed blood,
16. Destruction and misery lurk in their ways,  
17. And the way of peace they have not known;  
18. There is no fear of God before their eyes.
19. Now we know that what the Scripture saith, it saith concerning those who  
are instructed by it.  
So that every person must be put to silence,  
And the whole world be acknowledged guilty before God.

“On looking closely at this passage, two things become evident. The first is that the beginning and the end of it are closely connected, thus:—

9. What, then, Have we any religious prerogative?  
None whatever.  
For we have already proved that all, both Jews and Gentiles, are sinful.
19. So that every person must be silenced,  
And the whole world be acknowledged guilty before God.

“In the next place, it is evident that all between these two clauses is irrelevant, since it consists of quotations from the Old Testament tending to prove, not what he now asserts, but what the apostle says he has “already proved.” In truth, they are the very passages wanting at chap. ii. 24; and they ought, in the due course of the argument to be placed there.”—pp. 31, 32.

This is positively astounding. And so far from being what might have been expected from a man of Mr. Hinton's sobriety of judgement and honest reverence for the word of God, it positively outdoes the most licentious criticism of the German anti-supranaturalists. It turns the text of Scripture into what amounts to a mere “nose of wax,” which may be twisted hither and thither, this way and that, into any phantastic shape whatsoever. The apostle, according to Mr. Hinton, was going to quote some passages, after what he says in the 24th verse of the 2nd chapter. But “something in the course of his thoughts turned him aside at the moment from the actual quotation.” And then, instead of forgoing his quotations, or making a manuscriptural correction, and putting them in where they ought to be, he actually stuck them in, by a blunder, at a subsequent part of his epistle, in which they were “irrelevant.” And yet, according to Mr. Hinton, the apostle was a man of sense! And he wrote, moreover, as he was moved by the Holy Ghost! On the same principle every other critic would be warranted to make any other jumble of the inspired words, which would suit his own peculiar notions of logical or theological relevancy. That which is first with the apostle, might thus be made last by the critic; and that which is last with the apostle, might be turned by the critic into the first. The head might be exchanged for the tail; and the hand substituted for the heart. In short, everything or nothing might be made out of anything. This is the natural result of Mr. Hinton's principles; and yet it is,—need we say it?—the perfect anarchy of criticism, and, ultimately, the total triumph of ignorance over knowledge.

If Mr. Hinton had but studied the text and language of the Epistle,

a little more carefully and comprehensively, he would easily have discovered, we should imagine, that his extreme parallelistic notions were leading him, in this instance, astray. The 24th verse of the 2nd chapter runs thus:—"For the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles through you, as it is written." And there is really nothing at all of the overwhelming exegetical difficulty, which our author supposes, and which several other critics have felt. Although Calvin, Glöckler, Haldane, Hodge, Alexander, Ewald, Bishop Colenso, and some others, have supposed that the apostle is quoting from Ezek. xxxvi. 20-23, yet, undoubtedly, the great body of commentators, at once ancient and modern, are correct in maintaining that he is referring to Isa. lii. 5. "Now, therefore, what have I here, saith the Lord, that my people is taken away for nought? They that rule over them make them to howl, saith the Lord, *and my name continually every day is blasphemed,*" or as the last clause stands in the Septuagint, "*because of you my name is continually blasphemed among the Gentiles.*"

It is true, indeed, that in this passage of Isaiah, the prophet is denouncing the Gentiles rather than the Jews, and representing the divine name as blasphemed because of the political servitude of the chosen people. There is thus no direct reference to the transgressions of Israel, as the occasion of the blaspheming of the holy name. And hence Jowett, in accordance with his latitudinarian principles, feels himself warranted to say that "the spirit of the passage is different from the spirit in which it is quoted." And Krehl, too, says that the apostle has availed himself of the liberty of applying Scripture language, "without giving himself any concern regarding its proper import," (*unbekümmert um den eigentlichen Sinn*). And it is in such ominous companionship that Mr. Hinton says, "there is no place in all the Bible where this is written, or anything like it." And yet it is really as clear as sunshine that the opprobrium which was thrown by the Gentiles upon the name of Jehovah, as if he were a weak God, inferior in power to the gods of the victors,—this opprobrium, or blasphemy, originated in the unrighteousness of the Jews. For it was because of their unrighteousness that their land was commanded to disgorge them, so that they became "scattered among the heathen, and dispersed through the countries." And thus the prophet's idea is, to a nicety, coincident with that of the apostle. The Jews, although "boasting of the law," yet, by "breaking the law, dishonoured God,"—and thus "*the name of God was blasphemed among the Gentiles through them.*"

It was wrong, indeed, for the Gentiles to judge of the character of Jehovah, by the standard of the character of the Jews, or to estimate the power of the God of Israel by the measure of his people's prosperity. In thus judging, they committed, as Grotius logically remarks, the fallacy of *non causa pro causa*. And Ambrosiaster is right in saying that "they did not advert that the Jews were delivered up to them because of their transgressions." Nevertheless their inadvertence led them to do real dishonour to Jehovah's name. And thus the sins of the Jews were the undoubted occasion of the defamation of the name of God, which is referred to by the apostle.

Mr. Hinton, it is obvious, has been far too hasty and superficial in his investigations into this matter.

And he has been equally hasty, we fear, as he is undoubtedly very inaccurate, when he alleges, as a reason for holding "that all between the 9th and 19th verse of the 3rd chapter is irrelevant" to the apostle's aim, seeing that the intermediate verses "consist of quotations from the Old Testament *tending to prove, not what he now asserts, but what the apostle says he has 'already proved.'*" For, if he had studied the inspired phraseology with a little more of an exact and discriminating, not to say scholarly, spirit, he would have seen that he was attaching a wrong idea, altogether, to the apostle's expression "already proved." He supposes that it refers to logical demonstration; whereas, as has been carefully noted by such critics as Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, and others of their stamp, its reference is to forensic accusation. The term, as Day, in his fine old English Commentary remarks, "is a law term, and is usually said of those, which are accusers, who accuse or charge the defendant with what they have to say against him." The apostle's expression is thus equivalent to this:—"for we before accused both Jews and Gentiles, of being all under sin." The proof comes after the accusation. And thus it is in its appropriate place. And that same place is, consequently, the appropriate place for the verses which Mr. Hinton dislocates and extrudes. But the real beauty of the apostle's phraseology, and the propriety of the translation of the clause, which we have given, can be appreciated only when the preceding clause receives a far more thorough investigation than Mr. Hinton has given it, and is found to yield a sense altogether different from what he imagines it to contain, when, in striking antagonism to the import of verses 1 and 2, he makes it mean,—"*What then? Have we any religious prerogative? None whatever.*" On this subject, however, it is not our intention at present to enter.

We have only to repeat that we are sorry to have it to say that we are disappointed with Mr. Hinton's contribution to the Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans.

*The New Theology.* By John Smart, Rector of the Neilson Institution, Paisley. Glasgow: Bryce. 1863.

AN earnest attempt to grapple with a great theme. But the theme, we apprehend, was too great, and the grappling too immature.

*Martyrland. Or, the Perils of the Persecution, relating chiefly to what befall in the Moorlands in the South and West of Scotland in what is called "the Killing Time."* By the Rev. Robert Simpson, D.D. Sanquhar. Glasgow: Murray. 1863.

It has done us good to read this book. We prize our civil and religious liberties all the more. We prize our Protestantism all the more. We prize the glorious gospel all the more; as we find it to be the power of God to sustain under the severest trials, to which flesh can fall heir. The spirit of a "martyr" must be in every man, who puts Christ upon the throne of his heart. And in whomsoever it is, there are along with it some of the insignia of heaven's own nobility. This spirit dwelt in the worthies, whose sufferings for conscience sake are sketched by Dr.

Simpson. And eminently fitted is the author to pourtray at once the sufferings inflicted, and the sublime heroism that endured them and triumphed over them.

*Jesus Christ the only Foundation. A Sermon preached at Castlemaine on November 26, 1862, in connection with the Half-Yearly Meeting of the Congregational Union of Victoria.* By Alexander Gosman, Minister of the Dawson Street Congregational Church, Ballarat. Ballarat: S. L. Birtchnell. 1862.

It gladdens our heart to think that there is such a man as Mr. Gosman among the Congregationalists of Australia. If one may judge of him from his sermon, he is of noble type. His motto seems to be "None but Christ." And in Christ he has evidently discovered such riches of goodness and greatness of grace, that all the higher aspirations of his nature are kindled into enthusiasm. He soars. And his very style of composition is characterized by a chastened dignity and elevation, which eminently befit his favourite theme.

We quote the following paragraphs from near the conclusion of the discourse. They are calculated to be as useful in the old country as in the new :—

"The end of the christian ministry is to bring men back to God. Where this purpose is accomplished, the ministry may be said to be a success; where this purpose is lost sight of, or kept out of view, the ministry will inevitably be a failure. The main instrument for the conversion of men, is the preaching of the gospel; the declaration of Christ as the Saviour of sinners; the laying bare, as it were, the only foundation men have to build on for eternity. The most successful ministers are those who most intelligently apprehend that aim, and who most steadily and skilfully wield that instrument. It was the determination of the great apostle of the Gentiles, to know nothing among those for whose spiritual welfare he laboured but Jesus Christ and Him crucified; and although he knew this exposed him to almost universal contempt, he felt he could not turn aside from his object. 'God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.' Look also at the definite and concise instructions of the Master himself: '*Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature.*' But how frequently is this end lost sight of; and how frequently, where it is apprehended, is the instrument of conversion—the preaching of the simple gospel—despised. There are some preachers who seem to have no higher end than pay and position. Their flesh-hooks are constructed on the principle of securing the largest joints; and they would cease to serve at the altar, if it were disreputable to wear the garments of a priest. There are others, whose sole ambition is to exhibit themselves, and truly they have their reward. Their antics, contortions, gesticulations, and other absurdities of the outward man, with the strange mixture of crudities they serve out as food for the soul, succeed wonderfully in calling forth the admiration of those who are as destitute of intelligence as themselves, and whose tastes are too frequently formed amid the glare and false glitter of third-rate theatrical performances. Fortunately for the church, such ignorant assumption and vanity are ultimately detected, and visited with merited punishment. But even among those who, in some measure, realise the great end of preaching, how often is the declaration of the gospel as the proper instrument, either neglected or despised! In this age of ours, which is supposed to have attained an unusual pre-eminence in enlightenment, we have no lack of poetry in the pulpit, no lack of history, or of science, or of philosophy, or even of religion; but we have a mournful lack of the gospel. In many sermons, Christ is conspicuous only by his absence. No wonder the pulpit of the day is said to be waxing feeble. If it has not forgotten God, it has failed to testify sufficiently of Christ. The power of the pulpit is at its height when Christ crucified is the chief theme; its power and influence are gone, when Christ is lost sight of, or concealed from view. If to preach Christ be feebleness, it is divine feebleness, which is stronger than human power; if it be folly, it is

divine foolishness, which is wiser than human wisdom. Without Christ there may be a kind both of power and wisdom; but they cannot be the power and the wisdom of God unto salvation. If it be treason for an ambassador to forget his mission, and not only fail to carry out the instructions of his prince, but betray him and his people; what shall we say of him who is sent forth to preach the gospel, and who, while professing to preach it, has little or nothing to say about Christ?

The Congregational pulpit has always been conspicuous for the prominence it has given to the preaching of Christ. Our best and most successful preachers are those who give most frequent and distinct enunciation to the testimony of God concerning his Son, namely, that he was delivered up to death for our offences, and raised again for our justification; and that whosoever believeth in Him shall not perish but have eternal life. And what, my dear brethren in the ministry, is the chief theme of the Victorian Congregational Pulpit? There seems to be an impression in some minds, and a lurking suspicion abroad, that although we preach Christ, it is not with that *power, freedom, frequency, and fervour*, which the state of our churches and the wants of the colony demand. Surely, my brethren, we have not yet forgotten the solemn charges that were laid upon us by our reverend fathers in the old land—charges all the more solemn that the voices of some of those that delivered them have been hushed in death—when we were set apart to the ministry of the gospel by the laying on of hands! Have the multiplication of duties, the changes, fermentations, trials and peculiar temptations of colonial life, so blunted our spiritual faculties as to make us in some measure forget the main purpose of the ministerial office—to seek by the preaching of Christ to bring men back to God? It is absolutely necessary that as christian pastors we feed the flock of Christ;—that we build up God's people in their most holy faith. But to do so to the almost entire exclusion of the preaching of the gospel, is to endeavour to build without reference to the only foundation, and to forget that the very *life and nutriment* of the pious soul is Christ. Our churches, I trust, will never dispense with thoughtful, profound, original, scholarly, and even philosophical preaching. I hope they will never be led away with loud-mouthed shallowness; or whining sentimentality. I hope they will never sympathize with the ravings of fanaticism, or the babblings of pretentious ignorance. But true to their spiritual instincts, the churches will refuse and reject that teaching, which however learned or profound, however imaginative or intellectual, does not depart from, and return to, the foot of the cross. Brethren, let us no longer lie under the suspicion that we do not give sufficient prominence to the gospel of Christ. Let our pulpits henceforth ring with the invitations of the gospel; let them be luminous with that divine light, which alone can scatter and dispel the moral darkness that broods over this fallen world of ours. Let us in our several spheres of labour be conspicuous, chiefly for the prominence we give to the doctrine of Christ as the only foundation. Let us exhibit to the eyes of men a naked cross, and a suffering Saviour; and let us beware of concealing either the one or the other by the drapery of poetry or the cloak of philosophy; for the doctrine of Christ as the only foundation should be the chief theme of the christian ministry."—pp. 26–29.

This is at once right thinking and fine writing.

But there are spots in the sun. And there are occasional blemishes in composition, which we could wish Mr. Gosman carefully to avoid. He says, for example,—“We have poured out our hearts in prayer in obedience to our spiritual instincts, and given expression to our deepest convictions and wants, *in the consciousness of being heard and answered.*” (p. 3.) The expression which we have italicised is certainly very objectionable. The word “consciousness” is altogether out of place in such a relationship, whether the term be used in its ordinary British latitude or in its wider German range of application. Mr. Gosman must mean, we presume, “conscious assurance.” He says again, “By his sacrifice, as moral and responsible creatures, we are placed in a new position in relation to the government of God; a position of contingent salvation or condemnation, as we avail, or neglect to avail ourselves of the only foundation—Jesus Christ. *On him we must either build or perish.*” (p. 6.) It is not meant, we should suppose, by this

last expression, that any who are "on Christ" can perish. Still less is it meant that all who perish, do perish "on Christ." Mr. Gosman, we imagine, intended to say, "We must either build on him, or perish." And if he will look again at the commencement of his observation,— "By his sacrifice, as moral and responsible creatures, we are placed etc.," he will notice that the relative expression, "as moral and responsible creatures," is awkwardly introduced. Another awkward and awkwardly perplexed sentence is the following,— "It is of the Christ of history, who was also the Christ of God, it is said that he is the only foundation." All the awkwardness would have been avoided by casting the observation into some such shape as the following,— "It is the Christ of history, the Christ of God, who is said to be the only foundation."

The punctuation of the sentences is, also, at times unaccountably inaccurate; as in the following instance:—"It would therefore have been better, had some one been chosen, well qualified to instruct you. Who would have been able, etc." (p. 4.)

These specks, indeed, are but specks. Nevertheless it would be an advantage to be without them. And it will be easy, we should imagine, for Mr. Gosman, by a little care and attention, to wipe them all away.

"*What mean ye by this Service?*" A Sermon by Rev. W. Aitken, Minister of the Canada Presbyterian Church, Smith's Falls. Montreal: Becket. 1863.

An excellent discourse on *the Lord's Supper*. The author regards the ordinance as a "shewing,"—

1. Of the fact of Christ's death.
2. Of the manner of the Lord's death, as a death of cruel violence and bitter anguish.
3. Of the character of the Lord's death as a voluntary, vicarious, and atoning sacrifice.
4. Of the Lord's death, in respect of the mode in which a personal interest in the blessings which flow from it, is to be secured.
5. Of the Lord's death as uniting the recipients in a sacred fraternity, under common obligations of love and obedience to the divine Redeemer.
6. Of the Lord's death in relation to his final advent.

*Lost and Found; or God and the Sinner: being a brief Exposition of the Parable of the Prodigal Son, as contained in Luke xv. 11-32.* By the Rev. David Drummond, Bellshill. Airdrie: Lawson. 1863.

A most delightful little book. It opens up, in a peculiarly suggestive and felicitous way, some of the richest veins of thought which lie imbedded in that wonderful parable, which is its theme. The author has a peculiar tact, or intuition, that leads him very directly to the staple ideas of his subject. And then he has this other admirable characteristic,— he never hunts down any one thought. He never runs it out of breath. Instead of doing that, he starts a new one; and then another; and then another still. Thus all tendency to tedium is avoided.

*Louis Napoleon, the Destined Monarch of the world, and Personal Antichrist, &c.* By the Rev. M. Baxter, of the Episcopal church. Philadelphia: Martien. 1862.

This is, in several respects, a remarkable book,—touching, as it does, on more sides than one, our faculty of wonder, and kindling it up sometimes into amazement.

The author is in downright earnest; and is firmly persuaded that the world is on the eve of its most momentous crisis,—its final transfiguration. The King of kings is just, he supposes, about to appear “in the air,” that, after a brief and bloody prelude, he may take into his own hands the reins of universal rule, and establish millennial peace, purity, and glory, from pole to pole.

He thinks that such writers as “the Honorable Gerard Noel, the Rev. Drs. J. Cumming, A. Keith, G. S. Faber, S. H. Tyng, G. Duffield, Bickersteth, etc.,” have “demonstrated the coming of Christ to be about the period from 1864 to 1869.”—p. 5.

He thinks that the text,—“Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father,” (Mark xiii. 32), does not, in the least, interpose any barrier in the way of approximatively determining the period of the second Advent. The text, he says, was “evidently spoken, in the present tense, to the then existing generation.” It is not therefore applicable to the men of the present time. “And under any circumstances, the concealment of the day and hour could not necessarily prevent,” he supposes, “the discovery of *the month, or even the week, of Christ’s advent.*”—p. 6.

Moreover, “it has long been concluded,” he says, “that although many antichrists have arisen, such as the Pope and Mahomet, yet there is a particular and individual antichrist to arise, just before Christ’s advent, who is generally called the personal or infidel antichrist, and who is to be worshipped as God in the temple at Jerusalem, and is utterly to deny the existence of Jehovah and Christ.” The exploits of this antichrist are “fully described in Daniel xi. and Revelation xvii., and also in the literal-day fulfilment of Daniel vii. viii. xii., and Revelation ix. xi. xiii, although the year-day fulfilment of these chapters relates to Popery and Mahometanism.”—p. 7.

The grave conclusion to which Mr. Baxter,—along with several other writers whom he names, such as Frere, Verner, Purdon, Scott Phillips, Shimeall, &c.—has come, is that the Emperor Louis Napoleon is the great personal antichrist, and that he “is consequently very soon to acquire supreme ascendancy over the whole of Christendom, and for three and a half years is ruthlessly to slay nearly every one who will not acknowledge him to be God.” Our author adds:—

“Christendom will then become a slaughter-house, or shambles, in which tens of thousands of Christ’s sheep will be butchered, and scarcely any one will escape the awful ordeal of being put to the test, whether they will confess Christ and be killed, perhaps with dreadful tortures, or whether they will acknowledge Napoleon to be God, and thus purchase temporary safety at the cost of eternal damnation. Those who choose the latter alternative will be branded in their forehead or hand with Napoleon’s name, or the number 666, or some particular mark, just as cattle have stamped upon them the name of their owner. (Rev. xiii.) This exterminating perse-

cution is the leading feature in the three-and-a-half years' great tribulation. There will, however, be superadded unparalleled wars, earthquakes, pestilences, and famines. Such is *the temptation which shall come upon all the world, to try them that dwell upon the earth.*"—p. 7.

Such is the sum of Mr. Baxter's belief. His volume is divided into *four* chapters. The *first* contains "ten proofs that Louis Napoleon is the antichrist, and destined monarch of the world, and eighth, or last head of the Roman Empire." The *second* exhibits "twenty coming events, that are foreshewn to occur during the final seven years and two and a half months of this gentile dispensation." The *third* contains "evidence that the antichrist (Napoleon) is to make a seven-years' covenant with the Jews, seven years and two and a half months before the end of the dispensation, as shown by about thirty writers." And the *fourth* contains "ten reasons proving that the advent of Christ in the air, and the resurrection of the righteous, and ascension of the wise virgins, precedes the final three-and-a-half years of great tribulation or Napoleonic persecution, and is about five years before the end."

Such is Mr. Baxter's programme. And he is honestly convinced that it is of the greatest moral moment that men should embrace his views. For although, as he supposes, "salvation from hell-fire may be obtained by the new birth and true faith in Christ's atonement, yet salvation from the shame and misery of being left on the earth at Christ's coming can only be obtained by real belief in the immediate nearness of his advent, and by faithful confession of that belief." "The distinction drawn," he adds, "between the wise and foolish virgins, and between the faithful and evil servant, who is cut off and left to endure the great tribulation, as well as other scripture statements, such as Heb. ix. 28; 2 Tim. iv. 8; Rev. xvi. 15; etc., plainly shows that many who are true children of God, but unbelievers in the nearness of the advent, and in a backsliding and lukewarm state, will not be caught up to meet Christ at his coming in the air, before the three-and-a-half years' great tribulation, but will be left to endure the awful woe of the tribulation, and if they survive, will be caught up in the second translation, *after* the three-and-a-half years."—p. 9.

We shall not enter upon a detailed critique of Mr. Baxter's ideas. We think that from beginning to ending they are based on misapprehensions. The author is but one of an uninterrupted succession of prophetic students, who have, from century to century, since the commencement of the christian era, been predicting the instantaneous advent of our Lord. And we think that he is no nearer the mark, so far as his interpretations of Scripture are concerned, than any of his numerous predecessors. In the time of the first Napoleon there was the greatest assurance among multitudes of like-minded investigators, that he was the antichrist. And, although Mr. Baxter, taught by the actual course of events, thinks that "Satan was but experimenting when he raised up the first Napoleon as a great destroyer," and that "he has taxed his powers to the utmost to produce his most finished masterpiece, the third Napoleon, who will be unapproachably the greatest of all destroyers" (p. 59), and the true Abaddon or *Apollyon* of the Revelation (p. 35); yet we do not see that the superstructure of his opinion rests on any



broader basis, than what supported the equally unwavering belief of his precursors. Indeed there is by no means, in the opinion that accords to Napoleon III. the bad pre-eminence, such an amount of *prima facie* and imposing verisimilitude, as there was in the conjecture that his mightier and more brilliant uncle was the apocalyptic Apollyon.

The mistake of such a great and cautious biblical critic as Bengel should be a beacon to students of prophecy. After the most elaborate researches into the principles of biblical exegesis and of the apocalyptic chronology, he fixed 1836 as the year of the inauguration of the millennium. That year has long gone by. Jung Stilling, however, a man of splendid genius, maintained that the great event must not be so long postponed as till 1836. He insisted that the millennium must commence in 1816. Sander, on the other hand, thought that Bengel's era was too early; and he fixed on 1847. But that year too has gone by. And so, for aught that Mr. Baxter has adduced to the contrary, may 1870, and leave the glory of the latter days to be still a futurity.

Mr. Baxter's scheme of Apocalyptic interpretation will speedily be put to a somewhat critical test. The personal antichrist, he says, "is to be revealed seven years previously, by making a covenant with the Jews." Only a few months remain for this important preliminary transaction. And if these few months go past, without the fulfilment of the predicted event, we know not how Mr. Baxter will be able to apologize for his unbounded confidence.

Auguries of Mr. Baxter's incompetence to read the real signs of the times are not wanting. They are strewn, indeed, in thick numbers over his volume. And they may be fairly represented by one particular instance. He mentions that he learns from a New York newspaper, that a Mr. Parrish of Philadelphia has applied to the United States government to assist him in recovering three million dollars, to which he claims to be entitled under a contract with the French Emperor. Mr. Parrish, it seems, says that he discovered a valuable gold mine in Senegal, Africa; information of which he communicated to Napoleon, who promised him a given share in the proceeds. The adventure, it is alleged, has been extremely profitable to the Emperor. And as Mr. Baxter finds that the amount of gold coined in France, in 1855-7, was about sixty one million pounds sterling, whereas in England, during the same period, only twenty million pounds sterling were coined, and in the United States only twenty-nine-and-a-half million pounds sterling,—he jumps to the conclusion that "the mines of Senegal seem in fact to have yielded more than both California and Australia added together."—p. 49. He might as well have jumped to the moon, at once. For if he had known anything about the real state of affairs, he would have found that it is because of a change in the currency of France from silver to gold,—a change intimately connected with the balance of European commerce in China and India,—that there has been, in the years specified, such an extraordinary coinage of gold in France. In 1855, for instance, there were £7,880,000 of silver *exported* from France. In 1856, there were £11,360,000 *exported*. In 1857, there were £14,480,000

*exported.* And almost all of this exported silver was paid for in *Australian and Californian gold*, and is now in the east. Mr. Baxter's story about the prolific mine of Senegal is, we should imagine, at least so far as the Emperor is concerned in it, a mere myth. And his notion about its comparative yield is assuredly the very climax of that kind of wild though honest imagination, that not only inverts, but invents, history and facts.

We fear that we must look elsewhere for a true interpretation of the Apocalypse.

*Calvinism at war with Conscience, Reason, and Scripture: being the substance of a Lecture delivered in the School-room, Armadale.* By the Rev. A. M. Fairbairn, Bathgate. Armadale: Gray. 1863.

We heartily thank Mr. Fairbairn for this lecture. It is distinguished by controversial ability of no ordinary type; and gives abundant augury of greater things to come.

*The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man, with Remarks on Theories of the Origin of Species by Variation.* By Sir Charles Lyell. London: Murray. 1863.

We shall not enter, at present, into the subject which Sir Charles Lyell investigates in this volume. The investigation is, as yet, only initial and tentative. But if by and by it should be ascertained, that there is scientific evidence of an indefinite antiquity of the human race, we see a way how the result may be thoroughly harmonized with the teaching of the word of God. The works and words of God must agree: though, mayhap, when we get to understand the words aright, we may see the works in a new light; and, conversely, when we get to understand the works aright, we may see the words as we did not see them before. The works may be a commentary on some aspects of the words, even as the words are a commentary on some aspects of the works. We wait for the results of scientific research: and we shall continue to pursue our impartial investigations into the real meaning of the inspired record.

*The Mystery of Being: or, are Ultimate Atoms Inhabited Worlds?* By Nicholas Odgers, author of "A Glance at the Universe." Redrath: Doidge. 1863.

THIS is a work of great ingenuity, and besprinkled here and there with some magnificent thoughts. The secondary title, indeed, strikes us as unhappy; for it seems to be a contradiction in terms to speak of "ultimate atoms" as "inhabited worlds." Peopled worlds must, from the very fact that they are worlds and peopled, be individually complex. And it would be absurd, therefore, to suppose that each of them could be an ultimate or irresolvable atom. Mr. Odgers, however, as his readers learn in the course of his work, does not look upon what are called "ultimate atoms," as being "ultimate." He thinks it probable that these so called "ultimate atoms," "though incapable of being resolved by human chemistry, or of being divided by human mechanism, are not to be regarded as homogeneous in their nature." He looks upon them as being, rather, "composed of various kinds of substances,

in a manner somewhat analogous to the composition of the earth and other planets."—p. 104. "Each atom," he conceives, may be "a world, where the glorious attributes of Deity are adumbrated, and where his infinite perfections are displayed in all the exquisiteness of an excellent economy, and where the eternal thoughts of the Godhead are embodied in mechanism the most wonderful and delicate."—p. 110. And after thus picturing forth, to his mind's eye, the constitution of "ultimate atoms," he adds,—“is it reasonable to believe that such scenery exists without an intelligent eye to witness it, or mind to appreciate it, or soul to feel with gladness the Maker's presence in the abundance of his works?”—p. 110. The ultimate atom must, he concludes, be inhabited.

And, conversely, he deems it probable that "the entire universe, visible to human beings," forms only "a single atom of a larger and more extended economy."—p. 140. Relatively to this "more extended economy," the universe, of which our solar system is an insignificant fraction, will, Mr Odgers thinks, be nothing more than an "ultimate atom," which, to the gigantesque inhabitants above, will, by reason of its extreme minuteness, be undiscoverable even by the aid of the most powerful microscopes which it is possible for them to invent and construct.

All this may be so, perchance; at least in the ascending direction. We would grant, meanwhile, that it may be so; although we have the idea that the notion may have as much in it of the gigantesquely grotesque as of the probable. But let us grant that it may be so. Still, what then? Even Mr. Odgers must admit, that somewhere or other in the descending direction, atoms that are really ultimate must be reached. And what is he to do with them, when they are reached? Must they too be probably "inhabited worlds"? If not, he has but shifted a little the relative position of his ultimate atom, and got to the limit of his possibility of speculation. And, as far as we can see, it is just as likely, to say the least of it, that what is to us, in this world of ours, an "ultimate atom," may be the real irresolvable article after all, as the thing which is "ultimate" to the infra-microscopic Lilliputs who inhabit our "ultimate atoms."

We are disposed to think that Mr. Odgers's conception of the nature of an ultimate atom is immature. He supposes that it is a *solid*. We should like to see how he would attempt to work out his idea, on the more generally received hypothesis, among modern physicists, that our ultimate atom is a *force*.

Many of his interrelated notions partake, we conceive, of the same immaturity. The very first sentence, for instance, of his work runs thus:—"As far as human observation and knowledge extend, every part of the universal dominions of Jehovah, is, either space, matter, or spirit." He specifies *space*, as well as *matter* and *spirit*. And yet, so far as we can perceive, he has no more warrant to specify "space," as a part of Jehovah's dominions, distinct from "matter and spirit," than he has to specify "time;"—which, however, he omits. And then, notwithstanding this specification, he proceeds, though with additional inconsistency, to say, in the second paragraph of his work,—“Space is

that infinite void in which all beings dwell." How can it? we ask. Does God dwell in it? If he does, must it not contain God? If it do, must it not be greater than God?

But Mr. Odgers's inconsistency does not stop here. He goes on to say of this same space,—“It must not be regarded as a creation of God, neither must it be considered to have an actual existence in the same sense as matter and spirit have.” “It is neither a property nor a substance.” And “therefore, it must be simply a *nonentity*.”—p. 6. A “nonentity”! and yet a “part of the universal dominions of Jehovah,” and the dwelling-place, too, of God and all other beings! How all this can be, will puzzle, we presume, even Mr. Odgers to explain.

This subject of space, and the kindred topic of time, which Mr. Odgers picks up into his speculations as he goes along, have evidently perplexed him not a little. And hence he returns to the encounter at a subsequent stage of his investigations, and says:—

“Time and space are alike self-existent. They depend not on any being—they were not created, neither can they be destroyed. The annihilation of all created beings is possible; but the annihilation of these is impossible. Were there no God, the beautiful fabric of creation would for ever have remained in its primitive nothingness; and no atom to move, and no spirit to think would ever have passed the impassable barrier; but one still, profound, midnight darkness and solitude, would be the everlasting heritage of infinity;—*but still, space would exist throughout all its amplitudes, and time would sweep on its silent moments, useless and unseen.*”—p. 19.

The italics are ours. But, assuredly, the notions which are broached in this paragraph must be extremely immature. Space is now said to be “self-existent,” and yet it has formerly been made out to be a “nonentity,” and yet again a “part of Jehovah's dominions.” How can these things be? How can there be self-existent nonentities? How can there be, moreover, such self-existent nonentities, as, notwithstanding their nonentity, are “parts of Jehovah's dominions,” and notwithstanding their self-existence,—an attribute of infinity and an incommunicable characteristic of Deity—are subject to Jehovah? There is surely some extraordinary jumble in Mr. Odgers's mind. And to imagine, moreover, that though there were no God, there would yet be space and time, is really, so far as the logic of the imagination is concerned, tantamount to a transference of divinity from God, and to the attribution of it to space and time. It really makes space and time to be diviner than the Divinity. The imagination, moreover, is, in another respect, as inconsistent, as it would be to suppose that though there were no mind in existence, there might still be thoughts and feelings and volitions.

Until Mr. Odgers perceives that space and time are modes of infinity, modes of infinity of Being, *modes*, in short, of the infinite Being, and no more separable from that being, than length is from long beings, and breadth from broad ones, he will never be able to extricate himself from speculative perplexities on the subjects which occupy, and interest, at once his intellect and his heart.

On many other points do we think Mr. Odgers at sea. He says, for instance, “that the presence of matter can only be made manifest to mind either by actual touch, or through some material medium;” and “hence,” as he supposes, “arises the necessity for creating compound

intelligent beings."—p. 17. "Pure spirits," he says, "could not possibly form any conception of any of the known qualities of matter; hence, had such beings been created, the splendid and magnificent scenery of all corporeal things, would to them have remained an eternal blank."—p. 18. But if this be the case, the most serious consequences will be the result. Will it not follow, for example, that the presence of the material universe will be altogether and for ever hidden from the observation and cognizance of God? For God is a spirit, a pure Spirit, an unembodied Mind. And not only will the material universe be a blank to God, it will be a blank to every spirit that is incarnated, as well as to every spirit that is unincarnated. For in "compound intelligent beings," the body, as Mr. Odgers himself will grant, is not to be regarded as mixed with the spirit into some third sort of thing, distinct from both body and spirit. And if it be not, he will find, within the limits of the complex personality of these very beings, as real a gulph between matter and spirit, as there is between an angel standing in the sun and the apex of the Alps shooting up from the earth.

From these notions of Mr. Odgers regarding matter and spirit, he naturally supposes that he has got the key for understanding the philosophy of the resurrection. And in expatiating on this subject, he says,— "Notice the peculiarity of the Apostle's language, *the spirits of just men made perfect*. He does not say, *just men made perfect*. The spirits are perfect, but the men are not." There is a "physical imperfection attaching to them, until the resurrection."—p. 19. But, unfortunately for M. Odgers's notions, or at all events for the scriptural authorization of them, the very thing which he thinks the inspired writer does not say, is that which he does say. For if Mr. Odgers would only open his Greek Testament, he would see, at a glance, that it is not the "spirits" that are said to be "perfect," but the "men."

There are many other remarks of Mr. Odgers which are equally liable to criticism. But we have said enough. And we have merely to add that we rejoice sincerely to find our author trying to construe "the Mystery of Being," and making the trial in all becoming reverence of spirit. We doubt not that by and by he will see further up, further down, further in, and further round and round.

*Seven Years' Street Preaching in San Francisco, California; embracing Incidents, Triumphant Death Scenes, &c.* By the Rev. William Taylor, of the California Conference. Edited by W. P. Strickland. London: Tresidder.

ALTHOUGH we do not quite admire the taste of this publication, we confess to a high appreciation of the christian zeal, and of the rare energy and tact, of Mr. Taylor.

*Synonyms of the New Testament. Part the Second.* By Richard Chenevix Trench, DD. Cambridge: Macmillan. 1863.

THIS is a worthy companion to the preceding volume on New Testament Synonyms by Dr. Trench, now archbishop of Dublin. Ripe scholarship, felicities of discrimination, and a gentle, earnest, evangelic spirit, render the work a precious little treasure to biblical students.

*The Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.* By the Rev. William Anderson, Member of the General Council of the University of Aberdeen, Pastor of the Congregational Church, Tooting, London. London: Ward & Co. 1862.

MR. ANDERSON, though an Independent in ecclesiastical principles, claims to belong, nevertheless, to the "Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church." And hence the title of his work. There is also, on the cover of his book, in literal visible symbol, a conspicuous cross:—in reference to which he says;—"Let no sound Protestant be alarmed at the sight of the cross. The pestilent heresies of Papists and Puseyites excite my most cordial horror. I point saint and sinner to the living cross, the gospel cross, the saving cross. At the same time, it is neither sense nor piety to be ashamed of the sign of the cross, because blinded men worship it. Besides, the title-page may induce some of these to read the book; and if I can win them in no other way, I shall be glad if, like Paul, I can win them 'by guile.'"

The reader will see from this extract that the author writes racy, and does not mince with his feet as he goes along. He dashes onward. And if there be occasionally a little too much haste,—a mode of energy not always the most convenient when there are puddles in the pathway,—it is compensated by the honesty of his purpose and the earnestness of his zeal. We think, however, that he is wrong in supposing that Paul sought to win any "by guile":—though we admit that in holding such an opinion, he speaks under the shadow of great authority,—the authority of our authorised version of the Scriptures.

*Reason and Revelation. Two Charges delivered to the Clergy of the Archdeaconry of Middlesex, at the Visitations held at St. Paul's, Covent Garden, in 1861 and 1863.* By the Venerable John Sinclair, M.A., F.R.S.E., Archdeacon of Middlesex, Vicar of Kensington, &c. London: Macintosh. 1863.

Two very seasonable Charges; having special reference to the ecclesiastical infidelity which is festering in the church of England, and bursting irruptively out in such plague-spots as the *Oxford Essays and Reviews*, and Bishop Colenso's *Examination of the Pentateuch*. The Archdeacon's mind has, pre-eminently, the character of decisiveness and firmness, and possesses withal considerable grasp and power. Its range, too, in the scholarly, and more especially in the classical and anecdotal direction, is wide. And thus he not only treads self-reliantly, and with an air of authority, as he walks before us, in the arena of the press, but he scatters around him on his pathway some very pleasant and important facts. One of these is contained in a note, and will be interesting to those of our readers who are admirers of the late Sir William Hamilton. He says:—

"When Sir William Hamilton applied to the Town Council of Edinburgh for the professorship of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of that city, he requested me to give him testimonials. I had no hesitation in assuring the Council that they could not possibly appoint a more learned metaphysician. Immediately before the election, however, I received a visit from a member of the Council, Mr. Bruce, who informed me, that he and several of his colleagues were dissatisfied with Sir William's

testimonials, and had made up their minds to vote in favour of the candidate recommended by Dr. Chalmers, unless I should succeed in convincing them that Sir William was not addicted to sceptical opinions. This was an unexpected responsibility. I had frequently conferred with Sir William on all subjects, philosophical and religious, sometimes during walks of many miles into the country: but it was his practice for the sake of argument to oppose any opinion which I happened to advance. At one time he would defend popery, and neology at another. Almost the only doctrine which he consistently denounced was Calvinism; for he considered unconditional decrees and philosophical necessity incompatible with human responsibility and future retribution. I had seen and heard many evidences of his orthodoxy. He had always zealously opposed phrenology as leading to materialism and infidelity; he had assured me, that if my chapel had not been at the furthest extremity of the town, he would regularly attend it; and he had recommended to me Dr. Price on Morals, as not only 'the best book on the subject in the English language,' but also as teaching 'a moral philosophy peculiarly in accordance with the moral philosophy of the Bible.' But before committing myself to the Town Council I determined to obtain from Sir William himself a more distinct confession of faith. Accordingly I hastened to his residence in Manor Place, and stated to him the reason of my visit. He was at first much annoyed that I did not, at once, consider myself justified in answering for his orthodoxy. By degrees he got into better humour, and said, 'Surely you ought to know that *I maintain no heresy but the Arminian*. You ought to know, that my philosophy has given great offence to the free-thinkers on the continent, because it peculiarly harmonizes with Christianity. You ought to know,' &c. He made further appeals to my knowledge of his views; all of these I carefully noted down, and communicated to Mr. Bruce and his friends, who declared themselves satisfied, and voted in favour of Sir William."—pp. 16, 17.

*What is Sabbath-Breaking? A Discussion occasioned by the proposal to open the Botanical Gardens of Edinburgh on Sunday Afternoons. With an Appendix of Notes and Illustrations.* Edinburgh: Edmonston & Co. 1863.

A THORNY subject, in some aspects of it. But, assuredly, if the idea of the sacredness of the Sabbath-day were to be broken down, the day itself would soon become swallowed up among the other days of the week, as an ordinary work day. It is, we apprehend, the idea of its sacredness alone, which guards it against the appropriating force of manufacturing pressure and commercial competition.

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## DOCTRINAL QUERIES.

### QUERY 1. SORROW FOR SIN, AND THE HAPPINESS OF HEAVEN.

"If the spirits in heaven have a knowledge of us on earth, must not the sin and unbelief which they behold, be a source of much sorrow? If so, is heaven a place of perfect rest and felicity?" R. S.

ANSWER. The existence of some degree of sorrow does not seem to be inconsistent with felicity. We know this from our own experience. We know it from the experience of those holy men of old, who were "sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing." (2 Cor. vi. 10.)

Even though "the spirits in heaven had no knowledge of us on earth," yet we must assuredly suppose that they have some knowledge

of one another, And if so, they will miss some who used to be near and dear to them. And therein will they find occasion for some degree of sorrow,—perhaps as much so as in the sins that can be witnessed on earth, or of which they can get information.

And if we should suppose that the spirits of the glorified have no knowledge of one another, then we would be forced to the conclusion, that, in missing all their former associates, they would be subject to considerable sorrow.

And what shall we make of the humanity of Jesus? Must we not suppose it to be cognizant of what is transpiring on earth? If it were not, how could it intercede? But if it be, must there not be sorrow over the inconsistent and the impenitent?—some such sorrow as drew tears from the eyes that wept over Jerusalem?

And what of God himself? He says,—“How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together.” (Hos. xi. 8.)

How then can happiness in God and in man be complete? Because the reasons for joy immeasurably transcend the reasons for sadness. They are infinitely greater. All that God finds in himself affords reason for joy. And in himself he finds an infinity of things. All that he finds in his material universe affords reason for joy. All that he finds in the good among his moral creatures affords reason for joy: and the good, we are warranted to believe,—when we take the sum total of creation into account,—will form such an overwhelming majority, that the evil will be but as three or four drops relative to millions of oceans.

The spirits of the holy in heaven will doubtless see light in God's light. They will look at things as he looks at them. And if they do, they will have the same reasons for gladness that God has. And even when sin and woe are thought of and mourned over, there will interblend with the thoughts and the sorrows, such views of the wisdom and love of those arrangements, that render sin a possibility and woe a conditional necessity, that the gladness will far, far, immeasurably far, transcend the sadness.

#### QUERY 2. “IN CHRIST”—WHAT IS IT?

“In what respect is it true that believers of the gospel are “in Christ”? Is it in the sense of having entered, by thought, into the contents of the heart of Christ?”

J. T.—E.

ANSWER. We think, not. It is true, indeed, that believers of the gospel have come, in thought, “to” Christ. It is also true that in coming “to” Christ, they do not, in their thought, pause and stop at the outside of Christ. They go “in.” And it is in proportion as they apprehend the glory which is within, that they know the Great Personal Reality, which is called Christ, and understand what he is, and what he did and is doing. All this is unquestionable. But it is not, we apprehend, in relation to this part of the experience of believers, that the expression “in Christ” is used. The expression has reference to a representative scheme of things,—the vicarious element of the christian economy. Believers are “in” Christ in some such sense as all men were “in” Adam. And hence the analogy that is run in Rom. v. 12–21.



Believers are "in Christ," in such a sense that they are "dead with him,"—"dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God." (Rom. vi. 8–11.) They are "quicken together with him," are "risen with him," and "made to sit together in heavenly places." (Eph. ii. 5, 6; Col. iii. 1.) They are "complete in him." (Col. ii. 10.) They are "in" Christ, as members of his mystical body. (1 Cor. xii. 12–27.) They are "in" him, as regards their whole personality, so that their very "bodies" are "members of Christ." (1 Cor. vi. 15.) They are "in" him in such a sense, that they are treated for eternity as if they had been workers with him in the great work he accomplished,—as if they had worked out with him the great righteousness, which he brought in. Hence in their union with Christ they realize the mightiest motives to devotedness and holiness. They "put on Christ," and are "new creatures." (Gal. iii. 27; 2 Cor. v. 17.) "The love of Christ constrains them to live not unto themselves, but unto him who died for them and rose again." It is, of course, by faith on their part, and by the baptism of the Holy Spirit on the part of God, that they are united to Christ. "By one Spirit are they all baptized *into* one body." (1. Cor. xii. 13.) And "so many of us as were baptized *into Jesus Christ*, were baptized *into his death*." And, being united to him in his death, we are united to him in all that follows.

#### QUERY 3. BELIEVERS' SINS AT THE JUDGEMENT DAY.

"When it is said that God will bring every work into judgement, with every secret thing, whether it be good or bad, are we to understand that all the evil acts of believers, both before and after conversion, will be exposed at the judgement?" G. W.

ANSWER. Perhaps the idea of an open and public "exposure" of minute details may be paring too closely a pictorial and popular representation. But, undoubtedly, the degree of the believer's glory will be determined by the degree of his moral meetness for enjoying it. And the degree of the believer's moral meetness for glory will be realized in the actual development of his character. And the actual development of his character will be the result of the sum total of his acts—good and bad. Every act, therefore, will be taken into account by the Judge.

In another respect,—and so far as pardon and a title to glory are concerned,—the thick "cloud of transgressions will be blotted out," and the iniquities will be "cast behind the back," and, as "into the depths of the sea."

#### QUERY 4. THE SPIRIT LIKE THE WIND.

"What thought, in the mind of Nicodemus, did Jesus intend to correct by the illustration contained in John iii. 8,—'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit':—and what relation does the last clause of the verse bear to the illustration, and to the subject under consideration?" A. J.—K.

ANSWER. May not Nicodemus, rabbi though he was, have had a difficulty in apprehending how it is possible that such an event, as the

new-birth, should take place? When he says in verse 4,—“How can a man be born when he is old (as I am)?—can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born?”—he as it were says to Jesus, the new-birth, of which you speak, cannot, surely, be a literal new-birth: what then is it? Our Saviour explains; and then, to meet, apparently, Nicodemus's difficulty as to how a man can attain to the experience of the indispensable regeneration, he adds the words of verse 8.

As to the last clause of the verse,—“so is every one that is born of the Spirit,”—the emphasis hinges on the particle “so.” And the idea conveyed may perhaps be thus expressed,—Every one, who is born of the Spirit, is the subject of an influence, the *whence* and the *whither* of which he cannot fully understand, but which gives evidence of its existence in many ways, and, in particular, makes itself heard in the glad “sound” of the gospel of God's grace.

#### QUERY 5. GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE AND CONTINGENCIES.

“How can Edwards's first argument from the divine foreknowledge to prove the necessity of events, specially human volitions, be most satisfactorily met? The argument is this: ‘A thing whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already has or has had existence,’ must necessarily come to pass; ‘divine foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, is a thing which has, and long ago had, existence,’ and as such is now necessary; and as God's ‘foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents’ is full, certain, and infallible, there is ‘a certain, infallible, and indissoluble connection between these events and that foreknowledge:’—hence the events are necessary.

Now how can an argument, apparently so formidable, be most effectively met? Edwards does not assume that foreknowledge is *causative*—that it does anything towards the production of the event; but merely that the connection, infallible and indissoluble, proves that the event foreknown cannot but be. Suppose we maintain that the foreknowledge does not determine anything as to the nature of the event, or the manner of its occurrence, is the difficulty thereby removed or relieved? Does not the infallible and indissoluble connection remain? And are not the nature and manner of the event, foreknown as well? and, as such, are not they also infallibly and indissolubly connected with the foreknowledge?

Suppose we deny that the connection between the knowledge and the event is infallible and indissoluble; would it not then follow, either that the event was uncertain, or the knowledge less than perfect?

Again. Suppose we maintain that Edwards confounds subjective certainty with objective necessity,—that there may be the certainty without the necessity,—how stands the matter? The foreknowledge is non-causative: granted. But here comes the question,—since God foreknows that certain events will happen, can they fail to happen? If they can, is God's foreknowledge absolute and universal? If they cannot, are they any longer contingent? Is an event, which God certainly foreknows will happen, an uncertain event? If so, what ground is there for God's certainty? If not, can it be an event which may and yet may not happen?

Suppose, again, we argue,—that events do not happen because God foreknows them, but God foreknows them because they will happen; are we any better? Edwards does not hold that foreknowledge is causative, any more than after-knowledge. The question simply is,—Can events happen otherwise than God foreknows them? If they can, is his foreknowledge perfect? If they cannot, are they contingent? Does not the divine foreknowledge, as a past fact, prove that the events cannot but happen?

Such an answer, as you think the above queries deserve, in your *Repository*, will much oblige, yours,  
AN INQUIRER.

ANSWER. The answer is, as we conceive, obvious. The events referred to *can* happen otherwise than God foreknows they *will* happen. And yet, they *will* happen, as God foreknows they *will* happen. The whole controversy resolves itself into the difference between *can* and *will*, or the compatibility of objective contingency with subjective certainty.

The phraseology of the objection may be varied thus:—"Must not events happen as they are foreknown. If they *must*, they are not contingent. If they *may not*, the divine foreknowledge may turn out "to have been fore-ignorance." The answer to the objection, under this phraseology, is the same. It is not the case that all events *must* happen as they are foreknown. We can only say, they *will* happen as they are foreknown. And it is because God foreknows that they *will* happen, not because they *must* happen, or because he foreknows that they *must* happen, that he is infinitely removed from the incidence of fore-ignorance. *Must* implies objective necessity; *will*, subjective certainty.

If it be asked what is the ground of the subjective certainty, we reply that it is nothing in the event itself, but something in God. His own infinite perfection is all the ground that is required.

#### QUERY 6. FIXEDNESS OF HEART IN PRAYER.

"I feel a difficulty in fixing my mind during secret prayer, though I have comparative fixedness and fulness and fluency when leading prayer in the presence of others. I am distressed about it, and long for a higher experience: how might I reach it?" D—r. P.

ANSWER. There are some, in whom the social element is so strong, or to whom the need of society is so great, that they are every way better in society, than when alone. This is not wrong. And freedom in social prayer is not to be reprehended unless there be a consciousness either of insincerity, in the way of praying at people instead of praying to God, or of vanity, in the way of desiring more credit from man for devoutness than can be indorsed by the conscience, and the God of the conscience.

In order to acquire fixedness of heart in secret prayer, there must be the cultivation of conscious companionship with God—a "walking with God," and there ought to be premeditation of the petitions which should be presented. Then let the inner words be few and well-ordered. Say what needs to be said, and look up with childlike confidence, and without any slavish fear.

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PRACTICAL EXPOSITION  
OF THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.  
VERSE 1.

VER. 1. *Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest at any time we should let them slip.*

When the inspired writer says “therefore,” he acts the part, and he would have each of his readers to act the part, of a practical logician. He glances back upon the import of what he had established in the preceding chapter. And he takes this retrospective glance for the purpose of adducing and enforcing the practical lesson, which is infolded in the doctrine which he had propounded and supported.

That doctrine,—the sum of the contents of the first chapter of the Epistle,—is this—That God hath revealed Himself in these last days through his Son, Christ Jesus, who is transcendently superior to the highest angelic beings in the universe. “*God, in these last days, hath spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds; who, being the Reflection of his glory, and the Express Image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by Himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they.*” This is the sum of the doctrine of the first chapter of the Epistle. It is “None but Christ”—“None but Christ.” Christ is higher than the highest of all creatures, greater than the greatest, grander than the grandest, better than the best. And in him

God hath revealed himself, as a God who is most desirous, indeed, to forgive every sinner, but who will by no means pass by any sin.

“*Therefore,*” says the inspired writer, “we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard.”

“We ought,” or, as the word (*δεῖ*) literally means, “it is necessary.” It is necessary for our safety, as well as for all the higher attainments which should be aimed at in our existence. It is indispensable for our weal in time, and especially for our weal throughout eternity. It is not indispensable that we should be rich. It is not indispensable that we should be learned. It is not indispensable that we should be scientific. It is not indispensable that we should be beautiful in features, or cultured in manners. But it is indispensable,—indispensable to our present and everlasting weal,—that we should “give earnest heed to the things which we have heard.”

“It is necessary,” says the inspired writer, “to give *the more earnest heed*”;—“the more,” seeing it is the case that Christ Jesus is so great by nature, and so greatly exalted in consequence of the completion of his work on earth. Had he not been so great, and so greatly exalted, the duty would not have been so urgent. But his greatness, and the greatness of his exaltation, are the measure, as it were, of the divine interest in the case. They are the measure of God’s estimate of our extremity; the measure of his estimate of the importance of the crisis; the measure, consequently, of his estimate of the privilege which is conferred upon us, and of the correlative duty which is devolving on us. Had it been angels only, whom God had employed to mediate between Himself and us; had it been through such highly exalted creatures only, that he had been pleased to reveal himself to us; the case would not have been so urgent. The interests at stake would not have been so momentous. But since he has actually spoken unto us,—revealed Himself to us,—by his Son, Christ Jesus, who is now at his right hand in glory, the superlative of privilege has been conferred, the superlative of duty has been imposed, and “*therefore* it is necessary for us to give *the more earnest heed* to the things which we have heard.”

We must particularly notice what it is, to which “we ought to give the more earnest heed.” It is to “the things which we have heard,” or rather and more simply, to “the things heard” (*ταῖς ἀκουσθεῖσιν*). The inspired writer does not mean that we ought to give earnest heed to *all sorts of things which we have ever heard*. This cannot be our duty. For among the many

things, which we have heard, not a few are frivolous, not a few are contradictory, not a few are obviously fitted to bewilder and perplex, not a few are flagrantly foolish, not a few are flagrantly wicked. It is not all sorts of things, then, which we have heard, to which we ought to give the more earnest heed. Neither is it all the things which we have heard from the professed and accredited preachers of the gospel. These preachers often contradict one another in the things which they say. They sometimes contradict themselves. And the best of them are but mere men at the best; and are imperfect in their views of things, as well as in their feelings, and in the other elements of their character. No. It cannot be to the things which we hear from them that we are bound to give, because of the transcendent pre-eminence of Christ Jesus, "the more earnest heed." We would accord honour, indeed, to the human messengers,—honour, but not homage. We would tender a respectful hearing to their utterances, when they give evidence of being devoutly devoted to their Master, and tolerably competent for their ministry. But there is a higher duty than "hearing the church," or hearing the church's evangelical angel or messenger. There is the duty of hearing the church's Head and Lord. It is our duty to listen to the voice of the chief Shepherd of the sheep. We must push aside the crowd of ushers and tutors, and get to the feet of the great Teacher Himself. And "he that hath ears to hear," must "hear him." "The soul that heareth him shall live." There is life, life eternal, in his words. "The words that he speaks unto us are spirit and life." "He that heareth the voice of the Son of God shall live." "He that heareth his word, and believeth on Him who sent Him, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death to life."

It is, then, "the things heard" *through Christ Jesus Himself*, to which "it is necessary to pay the more earnest heed;"—for "God, who in sundry portions and in divers manners, spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son."

But what means the inspired writer? Does he mean that we are to push aside, not only uninspired teachers and preachers, but also inspired prophets and evangelists and apostles, and go to Jesus himself, that we may hear him? If this be his meaning, how, we would ask, are we to get to Christ Jesus?—If we push aside inspired prophets and evangelists and apostles, would we not require to push aside the whole Bible, which is their utterance? and how then could we get to Christ Jesus at all, so as to hear him? No: we must not push aside the Bible; for there is a true and sublime sense in which it is emphatically "the word of God." We must not push aside inspired prophets and evan-

gelists and apostles; for they were inspired to speak to us that which is, in a true and sublime sense, "the word of God." The burden of their words is this—"None but Christ; none but Christ." We must not then push them aside.

And yet they stand aside. They stand aside in double file,—a file on this side of us and a file on that,—every man of them in his place, and every one speaking to us indeed, but pointing us to go past them, and onward and upward, right to Christ Jesus himself. We must not stop and be arrested at any one of them. Higher still. We must go, in spirit, to Jesus Christ Himself, and hear God through Him.

Hear God through Him! What is meant? Is it meant that in the parables and other discourses of our Lord we find a higher type of doctrine, and a more developed and important side of truth than is to be found in the utterances of prophets and apostles? Is it a descent when we step from the parables and sermons of Christ to the speeches and epistles of Paul? Is the gospel dimmed in the representations of the apostles? Is it eclipsed? Or is it more partially exhibited? Is there more of the human in the representation, and consequently more of the imperfect? Is the truth as it is in Jesus less fully orb'd in the epistles than in the gospels? And is this the reason, why we are "to give the more earnest heed to the things heard (through Christ)"? If this were the reason, it would be strange that the epistles should ever have been added to the gospels, and that the apostles should have done ought else than merely act the part of commentators on the words which fell from the lips of Jesus. It would be stranger still, and indeed utterly unaccountable that Jesus himself should have intimated that he had many things to say, which, however, his disciples could not bear, while he was yet with them in the flesh. And it would likewise be strange and unaccountable that he promised to give them his Holy Spirit to lead them into all the truth, that thus they might be thoroughly furnished for proclaiming the fulness of the gospel to mankind. No: we must not come to the conclusion that we have a higher phase of christian truth in Christ's own parables and sermons, than in the sermons and epistles of the apostles. The sermons and epistles of the apostles succeeded the completion of the work of Christ; and they are therefore the culmination of Christ's teaching, and the highest development, indeed, of christian doctrine.

What is meant, then, when it is said, hear "God through Christ"? And why ought we to give the more earnest heed to the things heard through Him? Why ought we gently to push aside,—if they did not of themselves, as, however, they do, stand aside,—all prophets and all evangelists and all apostles, and go up,

through the midst of them all, to Christ himself that we may hear God through Him ?

The reason is this:—Christ himself is “the Truth.” He is not only the great teacher and preacher of “the truth.” He is the very Truth itself. And thus it is not so much to what he *speaks* that we are to listen, as to what he *is*. Just as truly as He is “the Way,” the Way to God; and “the Life,” the Life of God, by which and in which we are to live to God and with God for ever; just so truly is he, in his glorious personality, “the Truth,” the Truth of truths, the Truth of God, the Truth about God, the Truth about what God is, and is to us. And hence it is that we are to give earnest heed to hear God through Him.

The Bible, indeed, is truth. It is truth about God. It is truth about God as he is, and as he is to us. It is the volume of the book, in which is written *the truth*. This is emphatically the case. But it is still more emphatically the case that Jesus is “the Truth.” He is the living Truth—the Truth alive. And it is just because the Bible exhibits him as such, that it is, in any important sense at all, the written truth. But the written truth it is, for it does exhibit Jesus as “the Truth” unwritten, the Truth incarnate, the Truth of God, the Truth about God. It is the one great business of the prophets thus to exhibit Jesus. “The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy.” It is the one great business of the evangelists thus to exhibit Jesus. And hence their exhibitions are “gospels.” It is, too, the one great business of apostles thus to exhibit Jesus, for they all accorded with Paul, who “did not determine to know anything among men but Christ the crucified.” All these worthies spake “the truth:” and hence they were worthies, and their words are worth. They are men to be listened to, and revered, and very highly prized. For in speaking and writing “the truth,” they pointed, as with their fingers, to Him who, in a way far superior to anything that can be effected by mere sounds and syllables, is Himself “the Truth” of God.

The words of these worthies constitute the Bible. And the Bible is “the word of God.” In a high and sublime sense it is “the word of God.” But in a still higher, a still sublimer sense, Jesus is “the Word of God.” “His name is called, the Word of God.” And “in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” He is to the mind of God, what our word is to our minds. He is the Great Revealer of the mind of God. He is more. He is himself the Great Revelation of God. In him God is exhibited to the life. So that “he that hath seen him, hath seen the Father.” He that comes to Him, comes to the Father. He that hears Him, hears the Father, who “in these last days *spake to us by his Son.*”



And hence it is that we are bound "to give the more earnest heed to the things heard (through Jesus),"—heard not from his lips merely, but still more emphatically from his life, and from his death, as that life was lived on earth, and as that death was accomplished at Jerusalem; and as both are exhibited and expounded to us by the pens of prophets and evangelists and apostles.

"We ought," says the inspired writer, "to give the more earnest heed to the things heard (through Christ Jesus) *lest at any time we should let them slip*," or rather (μήποτε παραρυῶμεν) "*lest peradventure we should be swept away*"—"lest peradventure we should be floated past and away." Such seems to be the correct translation of the original phrase,—a somewhat difficult expression. The idea is, that there is danger of not arriving at last, at our right destination. There is danger of not entering, with full sails, the haven of heaven. The gulph currents of the world have a mighty sweep, and are treacherous. If we allow ourselves to be borne along by them, without constantly consulting our chart, and giving earnest heed to the things which are revealed by God through Christ, we shall doubtless be carried far out of our right homeward and heavenward course, and drifted at last upon the ragged reefs of utter and everlasting destruction. There is no alternative. There would be no possibility of escape.

But if we do give earnest heed to Jesus, who is the Word of God, the Truth, and the full Revelation of what God is and is to us, all will end well. We may encounter storms. Most likely we shall. We may be buffeted by stress of weather. Most likely we shall; and then we may suffer a little in our tackling, and our smaller timbers. We may be sometimes caught in deceitful calms. Alas that we should! We may be attacked by pirates, and have their red-hot grape poured pelt-ingly upon our sides. But we shall never founder. We shall never be taken captive. He who rules both wind and waves is on our side. He is with us, indeed, as our Pilot. And we cannot perish with Him on board. But after we have weathered all our storms, and fought and gained all our battles, we shall float gallantly into the port of heavenly glory, and cast our anchor in the still waters of everlasting life.

### HOW TO PREACH THE GOSPEL WITH VARIETY AND FRESHNESS.

THE position occupied by the regularly acknowledged preacher is one of immense importance. To have the opportunity of addressing even fifty persons, and still more, the opportunity of addressing hundreds, twice or thrice each week for a succession of years, is a privilege, the importance of which it is not easy to estimate. To improve such a privilege thoroughly is worthy of the loftiest ambition;—to fail to improve it must bring, in the end, the direst regret. But such a privilege cannot possibly be improved unless the preacher is successful in giving constant variety and freshness to his regular ministrations. Sameness and staleness in anything, are utterly incompatible with hearty acceptance on the part of man. That which is characterised by such qualities may be endured, but can never be enjoyed, nor can it call forth the spirit of the human being to that for which Jehovah has designed it. The variety of nature, of providence, and of revelation, is endless. The mind of man has been so constituted as to depend in no small degree for its enjoyment and stimulus, on this variety. The unceasing change in which something new is perpetually turning up for us, meets a demand of our spirits, and its supply is essential to everything like happiness and progress. Man must have something fresh, and that continually, or he flags, becomes miserable, and dies to all that makes existence truly desirable. This is just as true in relation to the gospel, when it is preached to men, as it is true of any thing else on which their prosperity depends. Hence the very great importance of knowing how to secure both variety and freshness, in the preaching of that gospel.

It may be necessary to remark here, that while every preacher is more or less aware of the necessity for variety and freshness in his public teaching; all are not aware that these qualities may characterise their constant preaching of the glad tidings of Christ. Some, at least, imagine that what is, strictly speaking, called the gospel, must occupy only a small portion of the field of public ministrations, if their pulpit-work is to be strongly characterised by variety and freshness. They consequently seek to give these qualities to the instruction which they communicate, by taking up a vast number of subjects, and by preaching, in general, on things, which, as they view it, are wide away from the momentous truth that actually saves the soul. A preacher who embraces, and follows out, such an idea as this, is in great danger of sacrificing the truly gospel-element in his preaching, at the shrine of variety and freshness. He is like a man who should, in a great measure, refrain from giving his children that food on which life and health must be sustained,

for the sake of giving them always something new. He will perhaps be very much surprised (though he ought not to be surprised at all,) to find that, after years of such preaching, his ministry has been a failure. The variety and freshness which are of real value, are those which belong to the preaching of the gospel, the glad tidings that save the guilty man. It is when the preacher keeps most closely to the grand essence of the gospel itself, and yet gives a constant variety and freshness to his teaching, that he is a truly successful preacher of Christ. In view of this, it is not so important to shew how variety and freshness may be given to public teaching, generally considered, as it is to indicate how these qualities may be made to characterise the preaching of that truth, or cluster of truths, which is properly styled *the gospel*.

To preach the gospel is, no doubt, to speak of one Saviour only. So far as the number of Saviours is concerned, no variety is possible. That glorious One, of whom all true preaching of the gospel must tell us, is "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." To whatever extent we give variety to our preaching of the gospel, that preaching must tend to inform the hearer of this Living One, or it ceases to be the preaching of the gospel of Christ. But it is impossible to give any information of value regarding Jesus without giving information regarding the Father and the Holy Spirit too; while it is impossible to teach truly regarding these subsistences in the Divine One, without also showing their relationship to the Son, and his saving work. Here, then, is a field in which variety at once presents itself to the preacher of the gospel, in the strictest sense of the term. If he has really acquired that knowledge of a three-one God which is essential to his fitness for regularly preaching to his fellowmen, and if he is prepared to "follow on to know the Lord," so as to keep the supplies of his mind adequate to the expenditure which his work demands, he can be at no loss for variety of theme. That ocean of truth, from the wide waves of which he may tell of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, will furnish him with an endless stream of subjects for pulpit instruction, all differing from each other, while every one of them will naturally lead to a direct preaching of the soul-saving gospel. There is indeed not one thing that we can know of either Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, which is not intimately connected with that Divine Love to mankind, and that justice propitiated for man, which form the grand essence of the evangelical truth; and it cannot, for a moment, be doubted that there is variety enough, in what may be ever increasingly known of Jehovah. Suppose, for example, that a preacher takes up the subject of the creation of this

globe on which we live,—how can he show the grand design of the Creator, as the eternal Father of mankind, without opening up that very love which gave Jesus as a sacrifice for the immortal children, for whom the earth was so wondrously prepared as a dwelling? No doubt, one who knows nothing of that love (and, perhaps, cares as little as he knows) will dwell on the construction of the habitation, and fail to think of the intention, or heart, of the Divine Architect and Builder of the world. But such a man lacks the first essential qualification for preaching the gospel. To go to the opposite extreme for another example, let us suppose a sermon on the last judgement,—how shall any one rightly tell of that sublime consummation without preaching Jesus, who shall then sit enthroned as Judge of all? And how shall he preach Jesus without, in some degree, preaching the gospel? How can he tell the true character of the Judge, the true principles of the judgement itself, or describe the memories of that dread day, without going back to Calvary, and speaking of the grounds of pardon now, and of condemnation then? But the preacher, desiring to give variety to his instructions, does not need to confine himself to those vast fields that are found in the heart and working of Jehovah. He can range over all that can be known of heaven, of hell, and of earth, with their inhabitants. All this is ever closely connected with vital gospel preaching. How shall he adequately describe an angel's mind, without speaking of the sympathy of the angelic heart with that of God as it burns with compassion for fallen man? How shall he truthfully declare how the "spirits of the just made perfect" feel in glory, and keep away from the burden of their new song? And how shall he preach on that song without preaching the gospel? Then if he descend to the dreadful regions of woe, how shall he say anything to the purpose regarding them, without showing that it is the rejection of Christ and the gospel, alone, that could bring men to an equality in guilt with the angels who fell? It is true that a man may speak of all these great subjects in such a way as to leave the gospel out of sight. It is true that many actually preach even of Christ's crucifixion itself, and yet seem to be ignorant that it has any connection with the righteous ransoming of guilty man. But such preaching instead of being natural, is unspeakably the opposite.

If, again, the preacher looks to the field of thought which is furnished by this world, and by the experience and history of man, he has variety—an endless variety—of subjects all inseparable from the gospel, except by the most flagrant oversight on the part of the preacher. Two things only are required,—first, that he shall avail himself of the endlessly varied subjects which the fields of divinity and of humanity present—and

second, that he shall see the natural relation in which the gospel stands to each of these subjects. He does not require to *lug* in the gospel truth. It is already there, if he will only see it. He does not need to *blend* that truth with his theme. It is already blended with all that affects God and his intelligent creation. He has only to speak of the case as it stands, and whatever that case may be, he will have something precious to say of the love from Jehovah's heart and of the ransom of Jesus. Suppose, for example, that he preaches on the brevity of human life in this world,—what interest can there be in his subject apart from that knowledge of God in Christ which is "life eternal"? Or, if he should take up any point of human duty, what can he say that will secure its discharge, if he supply not the all-powerful motives of the gospel? Or, if he should select for his subject any sin, in what light will he place it, so as to show its hatefulness, if not in that of the cross of Immanuel? Or, if he preaches on any human trial, how shall he avoid tantalizing his hearers if he furnish not gospel-consolation drawn from the life and death of the man of sorrows? The preacher who is alive to the value of variety in his preaching, and who at the same time feels the solemn reality of the "woe" which must abide on him who preaches, but does not preach the gospel, can never be at a loss if he keep the relationship which we are thus illustrating in view.

The quality of freshness in pulpit instruction is very distinct from that of variety. A preacher may secure endless variety of subjects, and yet totally fail to give freshness to the discourses which he delivers. He may never take the same theme twice, and yet there may be a staleness about all he says, which will effectually defeat the great ends of his ministry. He may never fail to preach the gospel in connection with the topic on which he dilates, yet he may so preach it, that he will fail to feel, even himself, as if he were doing anything else than saying over an old, and oft repeated, set of words, to a listless auditory. Variety has to do, in a great measure, with the objects presented to the people, or with the aspects in which these objects may be held up to them. Freshness has more to do with the intellectual position of the preacher and the people themselves. A discourse, in order to be fresh to the people, must, in some of its features, be new to them, and in order to be fresh to both preacher and people, it must in some degree be new to both. The preacher should have something new to tell, or, at least, he should have been making progress in the knowledge of his subject since he last spoke on it, so that he may have something to say which will be really in advance of the people's thoughts on the theme on which he addresses them. Stagnation is fatal to freshness. So is a per-

petual repetition of that which is already familiar to the ear and mind. Consequently, the preacher who imagines that he already knows all gospel truth, and who never looks out for any fresh discovery in that field, is not likely to preach the gospel with any feeling of freshness in his own mind. Just so, the preacher who imagines that his hearers already know all about the gospel, can scarcely be expected to exert himself so as to give them anything fresh, of an evangelical nature. The spirit of discovery, and the enthusiasm of him who relates his own discoveries, are essential to freshness in all preaching. The man, who comes to the pulpit feeling sure that he has got something to tell which he did not know before, and which few if any of his hearers know now, will hardly fail to preach with freshness,—he will certainly enjoy a feeling of freshness in his own mind, and he will be far behind indeed, if he does not communicate something fresh to most of his hearers. He who goes to the pulpit to repeat a carefully prepared composition, the substance of which he feels as if he had always known, and as if everybody else had always known as well, may, no doubt, very energetically deliver his recitation, but he will feel nothing of the bracing sea-breeze of truth, which is essential to a fresh feeling in his own soul, and just as truly essential to that feeling on the part of the great mass of society. This suggests to us a vital element in the preparation of a really fresh discourse. Suppose a preacher sits down to study, even after having prayerfully and carefully chosen his text. He has no idea of discovery. His first thought is about a suitable "introduction." That is got together in the shape of a few sentences, such as most of the people have heard, for the thousandth time perhaps, on the "connection" of the passage in hand. Then he is concerned about the "division." He has some "skeletons" at hand on the shelf, and he consults the anatomy of the text, so far as the bones go, in the light of these old and very dry constructions. Still no vision of any thing new flits across his mind. He is not seeking something fresh, but only endeavouring to put together an orthodox and passable sermon. He has at length got his bones, and now for words so far to clothe them. These he gathers from the most commonplace quarters. Then he must have some illustrations. And he has recourse to incidents, or figures, all as familiar to his own mind, and to the minds of his hearers, as the stalest matters of memory can possibly be. By and by he has "got up" his discourse, and he must commit it to memory:—so he turns over and over the body he has formed, as if a sufficient amount of such a revolving process could ever make it fresh or fruitful. He goes up to the pulpit at last, to exhibit his workmanship to his congregation! But he has no conception that he has himself found some rich new thought in the gospel, and that,

in delivering his discourse, he is communicating fresh knowledge to those who hear him. How can there be freshness in such a service?

Suppose another and different case. A preacher is carefully reading the word of God, and his mind is arrested by something important in a text of that word which never struck him before. He examines the passage with care, so as to make sure that the thought with which it seems to have arrested him is really a true, and likely to be a useful, thought. By and by the text gleams before him with new and genuine light. He considers how he may best communicate this fresh thought, which has affected his own heart, to the minds of his people. Where and how should he begin to tell them of it? How should he go on telling them? What great object may be gained if he succeed in getting them to see as he himself has been led to see? His mind is getting full of his discovery. Old truth seems new in the glory of fresh ideas. Illustrations of the character and value of his subject are occurring to him. These too come from new regions, or are at least themselves new. If he writes, it is to get his thoughts compressed and arranged, not to "get up" a discourse. If he commits, it is to train his mind and bridle his tongue, in giving forth the abundance of his heart. Does any one imagine that such a sermon will lack freshness? It cannot possibly lack it. But let us suppose another case. When the preacher has fixed upon his text,—it may be an exceedingly common one, though some new thought may have struck him in connection with it,—he will probably find that the old and much worn way of treating it is after all strongly impressed upon his mind. He should avoid that. Indeed he must avoid it, if he would do justice to his theme. He may begin with the usual division and topics associated with the text, but only to set them aside, and to disabuse his hearers of the thought that he is about to lead them along an old worn-out path. He will thus clear the ground for the acceptable statement of a really fresh discovery of the rich thought that is involved in the expression with which he is dealing. As an instance of what we here mean, the preacher may have fixed upon the text, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice," (as in Matt. xii. 7.) He has at least two totally different aspects of the great truth, presented by such a text, between which he may choose. The one calls for the discussion of the duty of man to show mercy, rather than to offer formal worship. This leads very readily to a commonplace treatment of the whole subject. The other aspect directs the mind to the character of the Saviour, as one who prefers the merciful heart in his creatures to the worship which without such a heart they may render; and who, though himself by far the most deeply wounded by sin, pleads with guilty man to have mercy on his guilty brother. Opening out

the character of Immanuel, in dwelling on this view of the text, the preacher's treatment of his theme will scarcely fail to be full of delightful freshness, while the discussion of the duty of mere man towards his fellow will be likely to be comparatively stale.

But we must go to another field to show how the preacher may secure freshness in his preaching. He must have as much close spiritual conversation with his people, or at least with some people, as he readily can command. He will discover in such intercourse what subjects and aspects of the saving truth are familiar, and what of that truth is strange to their minds. He will not find it difficult to ascertain that there is great room for the introduction of fresh thought to the ordinary mind. Thus he will be guided to that preaching, which even if it have not the quality of freshness to himself, will be sure to possess that quality to the minds of those who hear him. He will avoid presenting that with which they are already familiar, and he will find abundant means of leading them ever onward to fuller and richer views of the precious Saviour. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of real success in so preaching the gospel.

Something might very well be said as to freshness in relation to tone and manner, as well as in reference to matter, in the preaching of Christ. If a preacher allows himself to get into a sing-song habit of delivery, the freshness of the freshest thought will be in danger of being lost to his hearers. No doubt he will be likely to escape this if he has due regard for variety and freshness in the more important department of his momentous work. When he comes to the pulpit with the enthusiasm of a man who has something new and important to tell, we can scarcely conceive of his falling into a hum-drum mode of telling it. Still it is not unnecessary that he should be on his guard against the stealthy advance of such an evil.

The youngest and least experienced of preachers need have no misgivings as regards his ability to give, even in a high degree, variety and freshness to his preaching of the gospel. In some respects he is in a more favourable situation for success, in this respect, than the man of riper years. Many things, that have ceased to excite the enthusiasm of the advanced in life, possess all the charm of novelty to the young, and these are all in favour of the variety and freshness with which an earnest and studious youth may instruct and persuade his fellow-men. He has only to be a true student,—and as a student, a real personal discoverer of the glories of the gospel,—a constant discoverer of fresh glories in that gospel,—in order to be so inspired himself, as to feel con-



strained to tell of the riches which he finds stored in the unsearchable mine of Christ. His preaching, in such a case, will inevitably be characterised by variety and freshness. Even if it should not be so profound, or so lofty, as it will by and by become, it will certainly be as varied and fresh as could be reasonably desired. Should the limits of his knowledge be far within those that have long since been reached by some of the more advanced of his hearers, there will be a charm in the freshness of his ingenuous utterances of even well known truths, that will never fail to give pleasure, or to call forth the hearty "God speed him," from maturer minds. Who does not know what it is to feel the heart gladdened by even a child's enthusiastic announcement of discoveries that are immensely important, as such, to him, though they have long since ceased to be new to older men? The one essential quality in all such announcements is, that the discoveries proclaimed are truly the preacher's own. The spirit of man is never affected by anything, of this nature, which is at best only second-hand, and given forth by the preacher as something which another has told him, and which he merely repeats as a "hearsay" which he believes. While we must receive most of our thoughts from others, and so must give, in preaching, what we have received, we must so receive these thoughts, that they become the actual discoveries of our own minds, and fill and influence our minds to such a degree that they come pouring forth in language which is strictly our own. It seems to be a principle inherent in the very nature of our progressive intellectual and moral life, that the ideas that are to affect us powerfully, should be personal discoveries by those who teach us, and also and equally personal discoveries to those who are delighted and benefited by their teaching. For the fullest operation of this principle, there is ample scope in the immensities of gospel truth. When shall we ever exhaust the treasures of that divinely varied, and eternal region, of blissful thought, which embraces all the fulness of God in Christ Jesus? Let the youngest and oldest alike be assured, that if we only study, investigate, explore, and increasingly store up fresh supplies of "the unsearchable riches," we shall have more than enough to give perennial freshness, and ever growing power, to our preaching of the glorious gospel.

J. K.—E.

## CONVERSION:—AN IMMEDIATE AND CONSCIOUS CHANGE.

WE wish to write a few simple earnest words about conversion ; about its nature and immediateness, and the consciousness which man himself has of it, as the great change which restores the soul to God. More is said about conversion now, at least in many quarters, than used to be ; for as minds are being illumined by the word and Spirit of God, as the force and progress of truth are sweeping away vain refuges, and as the deep troubled waters of conviction are overflowing one insecure hiding place after another, men are led to distinguish between outside moralities and a change of heart, and are driven to feel that something more is required for the soul's rest than such a shell of externalism as social respectability, or business-integrity, or a name set down on the church's roll.

I. *Of the nature of conversion.*

We must be careful to distinguish conversion from such antecedent and preparatory states as conviction and penitence. Conversion is something further on, and more blessed than these. It is a consummation to which they lead. Conviction is the arousing of the soul to a sight and sense of its sin and danger. Penitence is that humble, sorrowful, submissive state which comes to the soul when we see the darkness of the past, feel the bitterness of the present, and cast ourselves, with smiting of the breast, before God, saying, "be merciful to me a sinner." But conversion is not yet. So far we have the prodigal, come, indeed, to himself, sensible of his degradation and shame and poverty, loathing these and seeking to flee from them as utter abominations ; but in conversion, we have the same prodigal risen up, and on his way home,—in sight of his Father and his Father's house ; yea clasped in the warm embrace of paternal rapture and love, and with the glad accents saluting his ear, "bring forth the best robe and put it on him, put a ring on his hand and shoes on his feet, for this my son was dead and is alive again, was lost and is found."

Conversion signifies a turning, and in its religious acceptation, is the turning of the soul, and its returning to God. We need to *turn*, for, as sinners, we were going down instead of up ; and we need to *return*, for we had taken our departure into a far country, "we had all like sheep gone astray, and had turned every one to his own way." While we were unconverted, our faces were turned from God and our backs to God ; but in conversion the soul is turned right round,—the face upward, the

feet heavenward, the whole spirit Godward. The broad way of death is forsaken, and the narrow way of life is entered. In conversion we step from the one to the other. And as it is a turning from darkness to light, from sin to God; so it is a passing from death into life: in short, a new birth, for the soul then starts into new life, even eternal life, the life of God himself. Even in human families the return of a prodigal child is often regarded as a second birth. So long as he was away from home, living in sin and covered with shame, his parents regarded themselves as bereft and childless; but his restoration has given him once more the name and place of a child, and his parents feel all the pride and joy they experienced at his birth. And so it is at the sinner's conversion. God says "this my son was dead and is alive again, was lost, and is found." What a blessed change,—from the death and darkness and bondage of sin, to spring into newness of life! into the gladness and freedom of the child of God! And how fundamental! No mere process of gilding or whitewashing; no bare lopping off this branch or that; but a resurrection of the soul, a starting afresh into spiritual existence, to be new creatures, no more to live to ourselves, but to Him who is our Father, and to Him who died for us and rose again.

## II. *Of the immediateness of conversion.*

When we speak of the *immediateness* or *instantaneousness* of conversion, we do not mean that the preparation for it may not be gradual,—that there may not be gradations in the soul's awakening, from the first slight feeling of insecurity, the first faint glimmering of the malignity of sin, on through deeper distress and profounder convictions, till the light of God's presence and God's own thoughts about sin, flashes in upon the soul as if to scathe and consume it, before salvation has been reached. Some, in their awakening, are led gently forward as the peaceful dawn of the summer morning; while others are overwhelmed in their distress, and are made to feel the arrows of God entering the soul, piercing the heart and the conscience, till they are made to cry to God for help, as from the depths of the pit of miry clay. Some are convicted and converted in the same hour, and out of one great birth-pang start into life at once; while others plunge into one depth of the Slough of Despond after another, and travel wearily forward for days and weeks and months in the bitterness of their souls. Like the impotent man at Bethesda's pool, they lie long by the very edge of the fountain, opened for sin and uncleanness, fearing to cast themselves in, or hindered from doing so. But while there may be all this preparatory struggle, or this mistaken and unnecessary delay, yet, when the

soul is brought into the presence of Jesus, and no longer seeking salvation by trying to put itself into the pool of ordinances, or by waiting for the official help of others, listens to the Saviour, and looks up to Him in simple faith, then the cure is instant. The transition from death to life is effected at once. The fetters fall from the hands; and the scales from the eyes. And the glad utterance of the soul is, "Whereas I was blind now I see."

Not that the restoration of the soul is *perfected* in the same instant. Conversion is not sanctification, not at least in its totality. In conversion we step from darkness into light. In sanctification we walk in that light, and go from strength to strength, from dawn to perfect day. But just because conversion is the beginning of salvation, the start of the new life, the outset of the christian race, it cannot extend over a lengthened period of months or years. Either we run the christian race, or we do not. If we do not, we are strangers to conversion; but if we do, we must have begun to run, and the moment we began was the moment of our conversion. There can be no interval between faith and conversion, and because faith is an act for which one instant may suffice, conversion which follows it must be immediate as well.

Or we may represent the matter thus. Is conversion the turning of the soul to God? Then that turning must be instantaneous. The face of man cannot be toward God and away from God, toward heaven and toward hell at the same instant of time. This moment the steppings of the immortal spirit are on the broad way,—downward, away from God; but the next moment, they are on the narrow way, upward, away to God; not between the two, not partly on the one and partly on the other, but wholly and solely on the narrow way which leads up to light, to God, and to glory. Or again, is conversion the second birth? Then, no more than the first, can it extend over a period of days or months. Is it passing from death to life? There must be a moment when the passage is made. The soul cannot be alive and dead at the same time; under condemnation as the child of wrath, and yet the heir of glory, as an heir of God, and joint heir with Christ Jesus. It must cease to be the one when it becomes the other. The moment it escapes from the captivity of darkness, it is translated into the kingdom of God's Son.

To make the matter yet plainer, let us take one or two Bible illustrations of this great change. We have one in the healing of the impotent man at the pool of Bethesda. It is true he had lain long at the pool's edge, just as any sinner may sit long enough unconverted in the house of God. But see, no sooner has the blind, or the halt, or the withered, stepped into the waters, than

he is made whole of whatsoever disease he had; and no sooner does Jesus say "arise," than he starts to his feet, and bears the bed on which he lay. Now there is a great Bethesda pool for the world's sin,—the fountain of the Saviour's blood, one that never loses its efficacy, that needs no angel to come down to trouble it, but which is ever open, ever potent to cleanse the foulest; and no sooner has the chief of sinners, by faith, plunged into it, than in God's sight he is white and clean.

Or look to the Hebrew stung by the serpent, and dying in the desert. He may have been stung for hours, and step by step he is approaching the grave's brink. This moment the tide of life is ebbing, but the next he has got a glimpse of the brazen serpent on the pole, and with that glance his body is plenshed afresh with energy and bloom from above. Striking picture of the sinner fatally wounded by trespasses and sins. The poison of sin spreads stealthily through the soul, and does speedily its deadly work. But yonder, on Calvary's summit, the Son of man has been lifted up; and one glance of faith to the Lamb of God arrests the process of death, and brings new life to the soul.

Once more. Yonder a trembling woman works her way through the crowd till she stands within arm's length of the Saviour's person. She has long striven, to no purpose, to stem that outflow of life's tide. The ebb proceeds. But one secret touch, not of his hand, but only of the hem of his garment, and what physicians cannot do for all that she has, and with years to do it, is done,—her issue of blood is stayed and she is sound once more. Now look to the sinner. He may go to many a physician and spend all that he has,—his little stock of prayers and penances, of charities and other good works; but he is nothing better. But the Saviour has come;—and let the sinner only get to his side and lay the hand of faith on that stainless robe, and what man or angel cannot do, though eternity were given, is done,—“immediately he is made whole.”

Take one or two actual cases of conversion. Here is Zaccheus. Led by curiosity, he has climbed the sycamore tree by the wayside. He is not a converted man now. But the Saviour must needs pass by; and, bidding this chief of the publicans come down, he went home with him, and the result is, “*This day hath salvation come to this house.*”

Another publican has gone up to the temple;—not a real case this, perhaps, yet designed to set reality before us. Now he is convicted and penitent. Not claiming the goodness of the Pharisee, not daring to look to heaven as that proud worshipper does, but standing afar off, and smiting on his breast in deep anguish, he can only throw himself on the dust, and cry, “God be merciful to me a sinner.” But what was the result? He does not need to come back and repeat the same prayer on the

morrow, and for many morrows together. "He went down to his house justified."

Yonder is one dying, by man condemned and hung up on the malefactor's cross. He was not saved when the nails were driven through his hands and feet. No, nor when he was nearer eternity than that. But even his cross has brought him, as a cross has brought many others, to the side of the Son of God, and one sigh of penitence, one outbreathing of faith, has brought him this response, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise."

Space would fail us to speak of all those, whose story of conversion we read in the word of God. The Ethiopian was returning from Jerusalem, from the temple and the feast, a stranger still to God. But not long now. Philip joins him by the way, preaches to him Jesus who was led as a lamb to the slaughter; and the Eunuch, believing with all his heart, goes on his way rejoicing. And the jailor, at midnight, in the prison, found peace. Blessed change, and soon brought about! He was a troubled man when, roused by the tottering of his prison, and frantic with despair, he drew his sword and would have run himself through. Frantic still, he called for a light, and sprang into the presence of Paul and Silas. But a better light than his prison lamp soon burst in upon his soul. "Straightway he rejoiced, *believing in God* with all his house."

### III. *Of the consciousness which man has of his own conversion.*

What we wish to shew here is, that the change implied in conversion is such, in itself, its antecedents, and consequents, that we cannot well have passed through it and yet be ignorant of it. This will be evident, if we consider:—

1. *The nature of conversion and the greatness of the change it works in the soul.* In its nature it is a spiritual and not a bodily change,—internal and not external. Were it only a better condition of the muscular or nervous system of the body, or only such an external change as the change of creed or of church, or did it consist only in the practice of certain additional outside moralities, little note might be taken of it, and we might be in much doubt about it. For the creed might not be the right one, or the church the true one, or the moralities those that are indispensable. But no. Conversion is none of these things. Neither is it any change in the Divine mind,—in the love of the Father, or in the atoning sacrifice of the Son, or in the converting influence of the Holy Spirit, with regard to our salvation. Its seat is not in the body where there are many hidden vital processes carried forward of which we see nothing: not in the sphere of the outer life where many changes transpire of which we take little note; not in the mind of God where there are ten thousand things to us altogether

inscrutable; but in the soul itself, where everything is naked and open to the eye of our own self-consciousness. Conversion is neither a thought nor a feeling, but it is such a change of the soul's condition and relations, more especially of its attitude towards God, as affects both of those elements of our being. It springs out of new thoughts about God. It gives birth to new feelings. And it issues in a new life. So that the converted person can say "all things have become new." And just because conversion takes place in this inner region which is so closely and constantly scanned by the vigilant eye of consciousness, it cannot possibly have transpired if no note has been taken of it.

The *greatness* of the change shows the very same thing. Its magnitude is implied in what we have just said. If it be so vital and fundamental, so penetrative and comprehensive as to go from top to bottom, from centre to circumference of the soul's being and powers, it must be great indeed, and cannot well be concealed. Look, besides, at the sweeping contrasts in which the Bible presents it. It is a turning from darkness to light, a passing from death unto life, a stepping from the broad way into the narrow way, a translation from one kingdom to another. It is a new birth, a new creation; it is liberty to the captive, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound. Can such a change be effected, and no trace of it be found in consciousness? If, indeed, it had been possible for Lazarus to have been brought unconsciously from the corruption and chill of his grave; for the Hebrew, stung and dying, to have been healed unconsciously by the sight of the serpent on the pole; for the poor leper to have been cleansed, and to have his flesh come again like unto the flesh of the little child, and yet unconsciously; for the man born blind to have vision restored, without being conscious of it; for Peter to have had his chains taken off, and himself led from Herod's prison by the angel's hands, and yet to be unconscious of the great deliverance; then, but only then, it might be possible for the soul to be converted, and yet know nothing of its healing and emancipation, of its release and resurrection.

2. We reach the same result by considering the *antecedents* of conversion. When we speak of these, we refer chiefly to repentance and faith. We are not wrong in regarding both as coming before conversion, and as being, to some extent, its indispensable conditions. Peter, speaking to the Jews says, "repent and be converted"; and Paul quoting from Isaiah, says, "their eyes have they closed, lest they should see with their eyes, and understand with their hearts, and be converted." These passages shew us that repentance and faith are indispensable to conversion. If the one be needed, so must the other; for Paul has shewn us how indissoluble, not simply in the preacher's message, but also in the sinner's experience, are "repentance toward God, and faith to-

ward our Lord Jesus Christ." But if repentance and faith thus invariably go together as antecedents or conditions of conversion, let us ask, can either have attained so furtively to a place in the soul, that its existence has not been detected? If not, then both will be as finger-posts, pointing beyond themselves to conversion; as sidelights, shedding, each, its beam down upon the condition and pathway of the soul; making it, one would think, impossible to mistake whether conversion has taken place or not.

Now that neither repentance nor faith can be hid, if they exist at all in the soul, is manifest from the nature of both. What is repentance? It is not simply sorrow for sin, or regret that we have done wickedly. Even, indeed, though it were nothing more, it would reveal itself as any other sorrow or regret does. But repentance is deeper down in the soul than either. Judas, we doubt not, had regret and pungent sorrow, for the treachery wherewith he had burdened his soul and blackened his memory, but repentance toward God he had not. There will be both sorrow and regret sufficient in the spirits of the lost to make hell the most repentant place in the universe, if sorrow or regret were the whole of repentance. But no; for while repentance produces both sorrow and regret, it is more than either. It is such a change of mind with regard to sin as sheds a flash of light on its criminality, as committed against God; and such as imparts profound feelings of sorrow that we have ever been guilty of it, as an outrage on the infinite majesty and the fatherly love of our God, and strong determination to shun it, and henceforward to cease to do evil. Such repentance cannot be present in the soul and yet be unknown.

Again, what is faith? No matter, at present, whether we say that it is trust or simple assent to the truth as it is in Jesus; whether we say that it has its home in the understanding, in the heart, or among the volitions, for all these come under the keen scrutiny of consciousness; and be faith where it may, if it be in the soul at all, its existence must be revealed. Let us take it to be the apprehension and reception of the truth about God's love and about the work of Jesus;—then no one can believe, in this sense, and yet be ignorant that he does so, any more than he can be ignorant that he remembers the event of yesterday. No verily, if we have set to our seal that God is true; if we have received the witness of God, that is, if we have believed to the saving of the soul; we must know it, and have all the blessedness that accompanies such knowledge.

Our position cannot be controverted. If repentance be such, and if faith be such, and if conversion itself be such as we have shown it to be, there can be no room for reasonable doubt whether conversion has taken place or not.

3. We are led to the same issue when we contemplate the *consequents* of conversion.



Those which we are about to name do not spring, perhaps, so directly, from conversion itself, as from what conversion implies as its own subjective origin, namely, faith in Jesus. But this does not detract from their fitness or force as evidences of conversion, because, as we have shown, faith and conversion are so combined and inseparable, that what testifies to the one, testifies with as much point and power to the other.

First then, there is *peace with God*. And so directly does this point to conversion, that it is no bold venture to say, conversion cannot be without peace with God, and peace with God cannot be without conversion. The inference is easy. If the sinner has peace with God, he knows what it is to be born again; but if he is a stranger to peace, then, whatever he is, he is not a child of God.

Again, *love to God*, intelligent and hearty, is another unmistakable evidence of conversion. The connection of the two is very manifest. When we come to God, turn to him, as in conversion we do, we see him as he is, at least, as he is in Christ Jesus, and so we cannot but love him. The unconverted do not see God thus. Their faces are away from God, and what they see is not God but the caricature which their own sins set before them. For this reason they cannot love God truly, and this shews the more forcibly that love to God, as well as peace with God, unmistakably implies conversion.

We might refer as well to *brotherly love*. John regards this as an evidence of conversion; for he says, "We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren." We might point, moreover, to the *joy* that is unspeakable and full of glory; to the *hope of glory*; to the *good works* that are seen of men, and to many things more. The sum of them is found in that Godlikeness, that blessedness, and true usefulness, that so certainly mark the true child of God. Just as we know, when all the frosts and snows have passed away, when our fields and gardens flush into beauty, and our woods break out into song, that summer has come: as we are sure when the habiliments of the sick room have been laid aside, when the pallor and feebleness of disease have gone, when the bloom of health suffuses the countenance, when there is spring and elasticity in every step, vigour and freedom in every movement, that health has returned; so when we see the soul casting aside its filthy rags, and putting on its strength and beautiful garments; when we behold the life bursting out into moral loveliness, clothed in the beauties of holiness, and vocal with the harmonies of love and well-doing, we cannot doubt that the spirit has been made whole, and that its winter has been changed into glorious summer.

D. H.—L.

## TRIALS, AS SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF FAITH.

"Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us an exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory, while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporary, but the things which are not seen, are eternal." 2 Cor. (2). 17, 18.

TROUBLE of one description or another seems to come as naturally to man, as it is natural for sparks to fly upward.

There are, indeed, very great diversities among men in reference to the species of troubles which befall them. But no individuals, whatever their station in society, whatever their constitution of body, whatever their endowments in mind, whatever their character in their relation to man, and in their relation to God,—none on earth are exempt from trouble. And if we could see, as with the eye of God, into the actual details, outer and inner, of all men's condition, we should probably discover that many, if not all of those, who are frequently envied as being in a position, which seems to be almost unassailable by woe, are subjected to more poignant anguish of spirit, and to more poisoned stings within their heart, than multitudes who are universally recognized as the sons and daughters of misfortune. Affliction sometimes arises chiefly from the state of the body. Sometimes it arises from the bodily state of a friend. Sometimes it arises chiefly from pinching poverty. Sometimes from sudden alarms and accidents, which give such a shock to the whole system, that it never entirely rallies. Sometimes it arises chiefly from some perversity, or still worse, from some flagrant iniquity, on the part of a husband or of a wife, of a son or of a daughter, of a father or of a mother. Sometimes it arises from one's own folly, and is the natural consequence of weakly yielding to temptation. Sometimes it arises from the selfishness of others who have been trusted, but whose promises turned out to be broken reeds, which not only snap when they are leaned upon, but also pierce. And in the case of those who are "Christians indeed," it often arises chiefly from the cruel persecution which they have to endure for conscience' sake,—the cross which is laid either upon their body, or upon their business, or upon their reputation, or upon their social standing, or upon the tenderest spot that is to be found within the sensibilities of their heart, because they have resolved to follow Jesus whithersoever he will lead. The apostle Paul refers to the crushing effect of this cross upon the vigour and buoyancy of his terrestrial life, when he says in the fourth chapter of his second epistle to the Corinthians, and with a special reference to his own experience, though he speaks in the plural,—"we are troubled on every side"—"we are perplexed"—

“persecuted”—“cast down”—“always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus”—“we are always delivered unto death for Jesus’s sake”—“death worketh in us”—“our outward man perisheth.” Such was the apostle’s affliction. And such, or something else that presses hard upon the sensibilities of the spirit, is the affliction which every true believer in Jesus, and which, indeed, every individual, whether a believer in Jesus or not, either has had already, or has still, or will yet have, to endure.

But, in that same chapter, and in the words quoted at the head of this article, we have something very noticeable regarding *the estimate which the apostle made of the severity of his affliction,—“our light affliction.”* How was it that he could so speak, when he felt nevertheless that it was so severe upon him, that his “outward man” was “perishing,” and that it was well for him to bear in mind, as he says in the next verse,—the first of the fifth chapter,—that “if the earthly house of his tabernacle were dissolved, he had a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens”? How came it to pass that he could speak of his accumulated, and often very grievous trials, as a “light affliction”? Was it because he was destitute of tenderness of feeling, so that his trials made but little impression upon him, and inflicted but little pain upon his sensibility? Was he a sort of iron man, with an iron heart within him? Was his sensibility petrified into a more than stoical indifference? Was his heart unlike the heart of his Lord, who knew what it was to weep, and who tells us himself that it was “broken by reproach”? Or was it because, after all, his affliction was trifling when compared with the afflictions of other Christians around him, or with the afflictions of his fellow-men in general? Was he conscious that there was something so peculiar in his lot, hedging him round and round, and so protecting him as with a rampart, that his heart was inaccessible and invulnerable, let men act toward him as despitefully and cruelly as they chose? Nay. It was on no such account that Paul could speak of his “light affliction.” He was a man, who was, like his master, sorely tried. The archers shot at him, and wounded him; and, like his master, he was of exquisite sensibility, so that he felt, in the intensest degree, the anguish of every poisoned shaft that entered into his soul. Yet his affliction was to him a “light affliction.” And there was good reason for him thus regarding it. It was “light” *comparatively*. When he compared it with what he deserved, he could not but esteem it light. And again, when he compared it with what will be endured throughout eternity by unbelievers, he could not but esteem it light. And thirdly and chiefly, when he laid it in the balance along with the heavenly glory which

was awaiting him, when he should have finished his terrestrial career, he could not but see and feel that it was exceedingly light. It is a man's view of things that imparts to them their chief reality and peculiarity in his experience. It is the view which we take of one another's character, which causes us to feel either attracted on the one hand or repelled on the other. It is the view which we take of riches, which causes us either to be contented or to be discontented. It is the view which we take of the Bible, which causes us either to esteem it as better than thousands of silver and of gold, or to regard it as less important, less interesting, and less worthy of perusal, than a collection of old almanacks or of old wives' stories. It is the view which we take of Jesus, that causes us either to care no more about him than about Judas himself, or about Julius Cæsar or Alexander the Great; or else to glory in him as our "All in all," and to live in daily communion with him. It is the view which we take of God, which causes us either to shrink from having anything to do with him in thought, or to walk day by day, in spirit, beside him, ever looking up to him and speaking to him in that way called prayer and praise, ever doing our duty in the world with an eye to his will and with a desire for his approbation. And, in like manner, it is the view which we take of affliction—our affliction—our own affliction,—which causes us either to regard it as extremely heavy on the one hand, or, however intense and heart-ploughing it may really be, as marvellously "light" on the other. And our view of affliction, like our view of everything else of which we think, will be determined by the comparisons which we make. If we view our affliction chiefly in comparison with the affliction of others around us, we may not be able to speak of it as light. If we view it chiefly in comparison with what we should have liked to have experienced on earth, we may not be able to call it light. But if we are believers in Jesus, and have got, by thought, into the presence of God as our Father, then by means of a light which streams out from God, and which, with especial intensity radiates forth from His presence as that presence is revealed in Christ Jesus on Calvary, we shall see and feel our affliction, however heavy it may be, to be light indeed, when compared with what we have deserved; light indeed when compared with the affliction of everlasting woe; and especially light indeed, inexpressibly light, when compared with "the exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory" which is "reserved in heaven for us," and which shall one day be ours in possession, and thus obliterate for ever all our sorrows, and wipe away for ever all our tears.

But it is noteworthy that the apostle speaks of his affliction,

not only as "light," but also as "*but for a moment.*" And in using this language, he speaks again comparatively. And the comparison which was lying in his mind, and ruling his views of things, was truly glorious. The presence of it in his thoughts is a fine indication of the sublime kind of life which he was leading on the earth. His heart was in heaven. His soul was there. So far as his chief thoughts and feelings were concerned, he was a citizen of "the New Jerusalem." So far as his chief thoughts and feelings were concerned, he was living in the presence of eternal realities. It was not things which he could see with his eye, which he could hear with his ear, which he could touch with his hand, and which he could taste with his mouth,—it was not these things which were absorbing his interests. It was not these things which were to him the great reality—the one thing needful. No. His thoughts and his feelings were shooting continually up, far beyond such objects. He "looked not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal," and temporary, and transitory, but "the things which are not seen,"—and which are round about the invisible Jesus and God, as they sit enthroned in the centre of the universe,—"*are eternal.*" Hence it was, that he spoke of his long-continued persecutions and cruel mockings, and other trials, as a "*light affliction, which was but for a moment.*"

But the apostle has something more to say of his affliction:—"our light affliction, which is but for a moment, *worketh for us an exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory.*" Here was the true secret of the estimate which he made at once of the severity and of the duration of his affliction. It was, in his estimation, light and but for a moment, because it had at the farther end of it an "*exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory.*" It was the pathway and the consecrated road that led to the "*exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory.*" It was working for him,—working for him all the time that it lasted,—working an "*exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory.*" There was thus some grand link of connection between his affliction here and his glory hereafter;—between his cross and his crown. And the link was such that there was something proportional between the affliction that was experienced in time,—the cross, and the glory which was to be experienced in eternity,—the crown. And yet the proportion issued in a ratio of astounding contrast, so that, in place of a "*light affliction, which was but for a moment,*" there was to be obtained "*an exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory.*" The idea is not that "*the exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory*" is merited by "*the light affliction which is but for a moment.*" The crown is not purchased by the cross.

Every thing the reverse. So far as merit is concerned, we can only speak of demerit: and our demerit is such that we all deserve an exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of woe. Merit on the part of sinners, merit of glory, of eternal glory, of a weight of eternal glory, and especially of "an exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory," is altogether out of the question. If we wish to find out the meritorious cause of the "exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory," which is available to us, and which is at the end of the pathway on which all those who believe in Christ Jesus are treading,—if we wish to find out the merit of all this,—the meritorious cause of this "exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory,"—we must look to Him who knew no sin, who ever was good and did good, who though tempted never yielded to temptation, and who wrought out and brought in an everlasting righteousness,—a heaven-meriting righteousness. He, and He only, is the meritorious cause of "the exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory." And yet there is, as the apostle's expression suggests, an interesting link of connection between the cross of "light affliction, but for a moment," which the believer endures here, and the "exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory" which will crown him hereafter. What then is this connection? It is a connection of *meetness*. The "light affliction, but for a moment," which is endured by the believer, helps to make him *meet* for the "exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory," and thus it "works" for him.

The explication is obvious. Affliction of every kind, and more especially affliction endured for the gospel's sake, leads the believer to realise more and more the vanity of earthly things. It leads him consequently to realize the supremacy of heavenly things. But those heavenly things are attainable by sinners, only by means of a Saviour. And hence, when the vanity of those earthly things, which are the objects of supreme desire to the multitude around, is fully realised, Jesus the Saviour is more and more prized. His company, as appreciable in the thought of the intelligence and in the feeling of the heart, is sought and cherished. The life becomes more and more emphatically a life of faith in the Son of God who loved us and who gave himself for us. And thus the soul becomes more and more *meet*, in its moral state, for rising up higher, and higher, and higher still, and being for ever with the Lord. "Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us an exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory, *while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are transitory, but the things which are not seen are eternal.*" The apostle specifies the mental attitude that is requisite in order that affliction may be felt to be "light," may be seen to be "but for a moment,"

and may be experienced to make meet for an "exceedingly exceeding eternal weight of glory." We must look "not at the things which are seen; but at the things which are not seen." We must sist ourselves into the presence of the realities of that spirit-world into which we are hastening. We must stand, as with unveiled faces, before those things of Jesus, and of God-in-Jesus, which have been, in all ages, the "things hoped for" by the noblest, the purest, and the best of the children of men. We must "look up;" and, "looking up," must look *into* the world of spirit, the world of glorified spirits, the world of glory. It is not a world of shadows, but of substances. It is not a world of prefigurative types, but of antitypes. It is not a world of transitory pleasures on the one hand, or of transitory pains on the other, but of enduring, ever-enduring glory and gladness and bliss. All tears are wiped away from all eyes;—and everlasting joy encircles, as with an amaranthine coronet, every head. It is the world of everlasting life,—that everlasting life which is the gift of God and the purchase of Christ Jesus. It is, in short, the world where Jesus is. It is the world where God is revealed most gloriously, and reigns in undisputed sovereignty over every thought, over every emotion, and in every will, throughout the vast domain. If we live looking at the things of this high and holy and happy world, all the afflictions, trials, and crosses, which are peculiar to this world of probation and discipline and preparation, will appear in their true light, as extremely "light" and "but for a moment." "This is the victory that overcometh" this present "world," in all the elements of its antagonism to goodness and godliness and glory,—this, "even our faith."

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#### CHRIST'S TEMPTATION.

IT is disputed whether the incidents of our Lord's temptation, as recorded by the Evangelists, are to be understood as having really taken place, just as they are narrated; or whether the whole scene was merely a vision, that passed before his mind, indicating what he would have to endure in prosecuting his mediatorial work. Much might be said on both sides of this question. But we intend not, at present, to enter upon a discussion of it. We think we are warranted—whichsoever view may be the correct one—to regard the extraordinary event itself as being a sort of proleptic outline of our Lord's entire conflict and triumph. It was a summary, so to speak, or a condensed

epitome of his contest and victory. It represented his future career in a kind of sublime panorama.

It cannot be deemed unimportant, that our Saviour should thus have had, at the outset of the public part of his ministry, such a pictorial exhibition of his work placed before his mind. His humanity would thus become fully acquainted with what he had to encounter. His human mind would have a clear view of the nature of the conflict that awaited him. He would see what was needful on his part to ensure success. And he could not but be cheered by the prospect of the triumphant end of the whole. Though Jesus, as divine, knew all beforehand, we can readily conceive that great service would be rendered to him, in so far as he was human, by giving him a miniature view of the whole of his career in the manner described.

I. *Let us consider the scene of our Lord's temptation.* It was in the wilderness. Why must he be led thither in order to be tempted? Would not any other place have answered the same purpose? Are we to view it as a merely incidental matter, that the temptation took place in a particular locality? We think not. There was no doubt design, wise and gracious, in selecting the wilderness rather than any other place. And among many reasons which God may have had for fixing on such a place, there may have been a design to effect a contrast to Eden, where man, in his state of innocence, was placed; and thus to shew the difference between the state of man, while he remained faithful to his God, and his state after he became unfaithful and rebellious. When Jesus came to fight our battle, to bear the curse for us, and to rescue us from our degradation and ruin, he had to follow us into the depths of woe into which we had fallen. He had to grasp the evil that bound us to death and hell, and break it into pieces. He had to contend with the enemy on the enemy's own ground, and deliver us from the waste howling wilderness into which he had enticed us. A glance on this side, and on that,—at the wilderness on the one hand and at Eden on the other,—will shew us the contrast, and let us see how low we had fallen, and what Jesus had to encounter in order to rescue us.

(1.) *Eden was a place of bliss and beauty.* No doubt everything that could regale the senses, and minister to the delight of man, would be there. There would be nothing to awaken feelings of pain or sorrow. There would be everything that was required to give the highest gratification. Everything around would be pouring forth its treasures upon man, to fill him with joy of the most exquisite description.

*How different the wilderness!* Nothing there but barren rocks,



frightful precipices, yawning ravines. Nothing but what was calculated to fill the mind with gloom and alarm. It is not certain which wilderness it was into which Jesus was led. But it seems to be certain that it was some drear and doleful place. Sights the most terrific! sounds weird and most alarming! All around would be as the shadow of death.

(2.) Eden was not only a place of beauty, *it was a place of plenty*. Not only was there everything to minister to the emotional delight of man: there was abundance to satisfy all his corporeal wants and to sustain his compound being. "Of all the trees of the garden thou mayest freely eat," were the words addressed to man by his God. What variety would be there! What abundance! Nothing would be wanting that the necessities of incarnate nature required. Plenty would be flowing in from every side.

*It was vastly different in the wilderness.* There, all was sterility and death. There was nothing in the wilderness that could afford sustenance to man's body. Jesus fasted forty days and forty nights. There might be other reasons why he fasted; but one seems to have been, that there was nothing to eat. Satan seems to have had nothing better than stones to offer Jesus, that he might, as best he could, make bread out of them. How awfully true is this the case as regards man's spiritual condition! Spiritual destitution and death are all he meets with in his lost and undone state.

(3.) *Eden was a place of peace and harmony and joy.* There was nothing to hurt; nothing to destroy. It was the garden of the Lord; and there was nothing in it to pollute or disturb or distress. Man had dominion over all the inferior creatures, and they all submitted to him with a willing and gentle obedience. All looked up to him as their lord. They played and gambled around him in the fondest and most endearing manner. All was amity and peace.

*It was very different from this in the wilderness.* We read that Jesus was with the wild beasts. These were the monsters of the desert: and how striking the words,—*"Jesus was with them."* It may be that they howled and roared around him in the most terrific manner, ever threatening to seize him, as their prey, and tear him to pieces. Such companionship suggests much as regards man's fallen condition. He is ever exposed to danger. Every moment he is liable to be devoured by what is infinitely more terrible than the wild beasts of the wilderness.

(4. *Eden was the place of God's manifested love and favour.* Amongst all the blessings of Eden, none could be so precious, as the manifested presence of God, and the joy which Adam would

feel in communion with him. It was God himself that constituted the centre of Adam's blessedness. The soul of man drew near to its God, and found enough to satisfy it to the full. All his affections gathered round about God; and untold peace and satisfaction were poured into his glad heart.

*Alas, how different was the wilderness!* Jesus was shut in there, and his only conversable companion was the foul fiend of hell. This fiend was his companion to harass and torment and tempt him. It is awful to think of our Lord—the second Adam—being confined to such a place, and shut in with Satan to be exposed to all his malice and rage and wicked wiles:—to be led hither and thither by the devil, and compelled to do battle with him in his own den! Yet such is some part of man's wretched condition, while away from God. God has been forsaken, and Satan has been chosen as a master. Satan's service has been preferred to that of God; and now he drags his willing victims through the mire of sin, down to the depths of woe.

II. *We would now notice the temptation itself.* The end why Jesus was led up into the wilderness was, "that he might be tempted of the devil." It was not that he might be there in mere solitariness. It was not that he might merely endure privation and suffering. The object was, that he might come into contact with Satan, and encounter him, and overcome him. Satan had opposed God. He had deceived man, and led him astray. He had succeeded to a lamentable extent. Man had been ruined by him. But shall he continue to triumph? Is there no power able to grapple with him, and overthrow him, and rescue the lawful captive out of the hand of the mighty? Yes: there is Jesus, the captain of our salvation, the appointed Messiah. He is able and he is willing to contend with the dread foe. As our mediator, he must:—and for this purpose he is "led up into the wilderness." In that wilderness Satan is allowed to put forth his utmost skill, to exert himself in all the mightiness of his power. He avails himself of his liberty. He buckles on his armour for the contest. It must be "now or never" with him. Jesus must be tempted and tried to the utmost. If Satan can only succeed here, then all he aims at is gained. Nothing, therefore, must be left untried.

The temptation of Jesus was of a threefold character, and this three-fold element may be viewed as connected with a three-fold condition of our Lord when in the greater wilderness of his greater and life-long conflict. It may also be considered as having a connection with a three-fold action of man, while he was in Eden: and, in addition, a connection with a three-fold glory, promised to the Redeemer of men.

(1.) The first temptation presented to the mind of Jesus was,—*that he command the stones to be made bread.* The power of the temptation lay in the condition in which Jesus found himself at the time. He was hungry. He had passed through a long period of fasting; and now the cravings of hunger were intense. In the wilderness, there was nothing to satisfy these cravings. Satan pointed Jesus to the stones, and told him, that he need not hunger any longer. If he were the Son of God, he could easily convert the stones into bread, and satisfy himself.

In looking at Jesus thus situated, we are led to look back to man's primitive condition, when he was surrounded with plenty of everything that could afford him sustenance and pleasure. May we not suppose that this hunger of Jesus had a bearing on man's fulness in Eden? Though man was there, surrounded by everything that a kind God could bestow upon him, in order to satisfy his nature and render him happy, yet he broke through the bounds within which his safety and happiness lay, and did eat of that which was forbidden. And now, when going forth over the wilderness of this world, Satan presents to him the hard flinty stones of the things of time. These he bids him try to turn into bread, such as may satisfy the cravings of his immortal nature.

Then it must also be kept in mind, that Jesus was promised full and ample satisfaction for the work of love, which he had undertaken on man's behalf. "The pleasure of the Lord" was to "prosper in his hand." He was to "see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied." He had "a joy set before him." Satan brings this to bear upon his present condition of hunger and destitution; and tempts him to exert his power in freeing himself from that condition, and in procuring for himself the satisfaction which was promised him.

(2.) The second temptation to which Jesus was subjected was, *that from the pinnacle of the temple he should throw himself down, in the presence of the people, and shew his divine glory, by preserving himself from all harm; or by making it manifest that he was borne up by angelic hands and kept from receiving injury.* The power of this temptation lay in the fact that Jesus was at the time entirely destitute of all apparent glory. He was a poor, lowly, and lonely man, away in the wilderness. Satan suggests to him the folly of remaining thus lowly and unknown, thus destitute of all glory. Why not go to the pinnacle of the temple at once, and manifest his glory there, in the presence of all the people, by showing his miraculous power?

From this we are again led to look back to man in Eden. There we see him surrounded with all the glory that God could

bestow upon a creature. He was surrounded with a true and soul-enriching glory. He was made truly honourable, with the glory of God resting upon him. This, however, did not satisfy him. He aimed at being more than a creature. He wanted to have a glory all his own. And in the eating of what was forbidden him, he made an effort to become a god. And now, he wanders forth, a poor outcast; and Satan has no glory to give him but the vain empty show which the pageants of this world are able to afford.

We must also remember, that Jesus was promised glory. There was a glory set before him as well as a joy. Christ "ought" to enter into his glory. There was a glory at the Father's right hand, kept in reserve for him. This was to be a glory worthy of the only begotten Son of God, who had done all his Father's will. Satan tempts him to take possession of the glory at once, and not remain any longer the poor solitary and humble man in the wilderness.

(3.) The third temptation was, *that Jesus should worship Satan, and he would give him the kingdoms of the world and all their glory.* If Jesus would only acknowledge the dominion and authority of Satan over earth, and submit for a little to his sway, he would, it seems, give him all. The force of the temptation lay in this, that Jesus was destitute, to all appearance, of dominion and rule and power. He was a solitary man in the lone wilderness; without followers, without friends, without dominion. Could this be in accordance with his true dignity as the Son of God? If not, why remain any longer without the dignity and the dominion, which properly belonged to him, when he might have it on such easy terms?

In this we are led to look back to man in Eden. There, we see him made lord of this world. All things were given into his hand. Dominion was given over the earth, and over the beasts of the field, and over the fowls of the air, and over the fishes of the sea. He was to be ruler over all. All the creatures of earth were to yield to him, submit to his sway, and obey his will. Only one little thing was denied him:—the fruit of one tree. From this he must abstain: he was not to have dominion over that. God reserved that; and man became dissatisfied with the dominion he possessed, because this was withheld. He must have this too. And thus, by his act of eating what was forbidden him, and aiming at becoming a god, he sought to extend his dominion. But now he wanders over earth, the meanest and poorest slave, with Satan ever whispering in his ear, tauntingly and wickedly, "only worship me, and I will give thee the kingdoms of the world and all their glory."

Then, too, we must remember, that Jesus, as the Messiah, was promised dominion,—and dominion over the whole earth. The kingdoms of the world were to be his. The uttermost parts of the earth were promised him, as his possession. Universal dominion was set before him. All were to submit to his sceptre; for “the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth.” Why not, then, according to Satan, take the glory which is properly his due?

It is thus, that the life of Jesus on earth was one of privation, suffering, meanness, and subjection, as contrasted, first, with man's former condition, and secondly, with the promises made to himself as to what he was to become. One part of his struggle was to go through all this privation, suffering, meanness, and subjection; and to wait patiently for the coming glory, that he might lift man to glory with himself, in the future kingdom.

III. *We would now notice the means by which Jesus was thus brought into the wilderness to be tempted.* He was “led by the Spirit,” or “carried away by the Spirit.” The Spirit is employed in conducting Jesus into the place of his temptation.

We are in this reminded, that in carrying out the work of man's redemption—in making a propitiation for the sins of men—*Jesus became a servant.* He “took upon him the form of a servant.” He gave himself up to be led or carried away, that he might do or suffer whatever the will of the Father and the salvation of men required of him. In this he submitted cheerfully and unreservedly, to be the servant of the Godhead. He “came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.” Well may we stand amazed and admire the loving condescension of our Lord.

Farther, we see *the interest that the Godhead took, and still takes, in the redemption of men.* By the appointment of the Father, the Spirit led Jesus into the sphere where he was to perform his work. Jesus was not merely sent by the Father and then left to find his way as best he could, and work his work in any way that seemed best to himself. All was under the guidance of the Spirit. The Spirit conducted him into his sphere; shewed him what he would have to endure in working out a way of salvation for man; and pointed out the glory that was to result from the work. The Spirit did all this too, by the appointment of the Father. This reveals to us, in no dim or uncertain manner, the intense interest that the Godhead—Father, Son, and Spirit—takes in our salvation.

*The time when Jesus was thus led,* also claims our notice. It

was just after his baptism, when the heavens opened, and the voice of the Father was heard proclaiming "Thou art my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased," and the Spirit descended upon him in the form of a dove. Jesus was thus solemnly and gloriously set apart to his work; and then was he led by the Spirit into the wilderness. How great the contrast between the two scenes! Yet, how needful that the one should precede the other. No doubt, what took place at the baptism, was intended to prepare the way for the terrible conflict in the wilderness. And no doubt it did so. We may conceive something of what Jesus would feel in being led *immediately* from the one into the other. How vast, how awful, the change! Yet how well-timed is the whole! Seeing that this conflict must be gone through, what strength would be imparted to the holy soul of Jesus, enabling him to endure the fiery trial, when, fresh from the scene of his baptism, and greatly refreshed, he was led immediately into the wilderness.

Then, *he was alone*. He had not yet chosen his disciples. Entirely by himself was he thus led. When agonizing in Gethsemane, he was alone; yet there seems some little comfort in the fact, that a few of his disciples were not far off, even though they were asleep. But now he is all alone. He must tread the wine-press by himself: of the people there could be none with him.

IV. We would now observe, *that in this conflict with the enemy, Jesus obtained a complete victory*. As Jesus was alone, and had to struggle alone, and battle with the foe alone, so, *alone he obtained the victory*. The triumph and the glory are altogether his. It is to Jesus and to Jesus entirely, under the direction of the Godhead, that we owe our salvation. Had there been any of his disciples with him, it might have seemed as if they did a part. Had there been angels with him, it might have been supposed that they did a part.

But the angels ministered to him only after the victory was gained. Even the Spirit took no share in the work; he only led Jesus into the work. Thus, alone, Jesus triumphed.

Jesus was *ever undismayed before the tempter*. There was no doubting as to whose side he was on. There was no quailing with fear in the presence of the foe. There was no hesitation in his grapple. There was not the smallest uncertainty as to who should gain the victory. Jesus betrayed no agitation. There was no trembling anxiety, lest all might be lost. Jesus manifested that calm and noble dignity which became him; and, sure of victory from the first, he dealt blow after blow, that made

the enemy reel and stagger and fall. Calm, collected, undismayed, he proceeded step by step, till he could say "It is finished."

The victory was obtained *by relying upon, and wielding rightly, the word of God.* "It is written," was the weapon employed so effectively by Jesus. This is "the sword of the Spirit," which always has been, and which always will be, terrible to the powers of darkness. Man distrusted the word of God, and fell; Jesus trusted the word of God, and conquered. It is remarkable that the three texts quoted by Jesus, were spoken to Israel while in the wilderness. Jesus is the true Israel of God. He is the true Seed of Abraham. Into the wilderness he went to fight with the foe; and with the greatest propriety he could apply these texts to himself. By the word of God he came off more than conqueror.

The victory was *complete*,—"the devil leaveth him"; though resolved to return at a future time and once more try his power. Meanwhile, completely baffled, he gives over the contest and flees. Jesus is victor. He has completely triumphed. What was true as regards the conflict in the wilderness, is true of the work of Christ in general. Jesus, by finishing his propitiatory work, has foiled and overthrown the tempter. At the last, when the ransomed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion, then shall he triumph gloriously. The great dragon shall be laid hold of, and cast into the bottomless pit; to be tormented for ever and ever.

The victory of Jesus is not some half triumph,—part defeat, and part victory. It is victory all through. He has obtained complete mastery over the foe.

By the triumph of Jesus *the wilderness, as it were, became converted into a paradise.* No sooner had Jesus caused the tempter to flee, than angels came and ministered unto him. Heaven came down into the desert and made it a place of glory. Where, before, there were only the devil and the wild beasts; now there are the angels of God celebrating Immanuel's triumph. This shall yet be the case, in a still more glorious sense, over all our earth. Through Jesus, "the wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad, and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose." Our earth shall become bright and glorious. The old waste places shall be renewed and restored, and the heavenly hosts shall shout forth, with the voice of triumph,—*"glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, good-will toward men."* The cause of Jesus shall yet be in the ascendant. Truth must prevail. Our world shall yet be made a part of heaven, and Jesus shall be the living Centre of all.

We have, in Christ's temptation and triumph over the tempter, much to cheer and bless our souls. Adam was a representative Head, and so is Christ. We were connected with Adam, and so are we with Christ. We are subjected to evils because the one fell; we are surrounded with blessings, and we may rise to glory, because the other triumphed. "The first Adam is of the earth, earthy; the second Adam is the Lord from heaven." "As we have borne the image of the earthy, so may we bear the image of the heavenly."

Adam, in Eden, stood not only for himself, he represented the human family. And thus we suffer and die because he fell. Christ, in the wilderness, fought not for himself, but for man; and through him we may be delivered from the power of Satan, and from all the consequences of our own transgressions. Our consent to suffer the consequences of Adam's fall was not asked. But, as we have become sinners, by our own actual transgressions, we must yield to the strivings of the Spirit and consent to the plan of mercy, in order to share the blessings and glory of Christ's triumph.

D. D.—B.

"NONE BUT CHRIST" IN THE PULPIT—WHY?

"I determined not to know anything among you, save  
Jesus Christ, and him crucified." 1 Cor. ii. 2.

It is generally admitted by the best critics that a slight alteration should be made in the translation of these words. They should be rendered thus:—"I did not determine to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified." There is not much difference between the two translations. In substance they coalesce. But that which is given in our authorised version exhibits a little more exclusiveness in the determination of the apostle, than seems to be warranted by his own words. The inspired man does not so much indicate that he had tied himself up,—hand and foot, as it were, to a resolution,—and by a resolution, never to occupy his mind while in Corinth with any other object than Jesus Christ and him crucified;—he does not so much indicate this as assert that, in going to Corinth, he had gone under the constraining influence of one mighty motive, which ruled the aspirations and actions of his soul,—the motive, to wit, which is constituted by an intense desire to know and make known Jesus Christ and him crucified. Whatever else might



more or less interest him ; with whatever else he might be willing to allow himself to have more or less to do ; of one thing only had he a fixed resolution, when he went to Corinth ; and that was to know and make known Christ and him crucified.

It is noticeable, however, that the apostle does not say,—“ I did not determine *to make known* any thing among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.” He might have said this. And if he had said it, he would have uttered undoubted truth, and a very important resolution. But it would nevertheless have been only a fraction of that sum-total of truth, which was realised in the actual resolution which he formed. It would, indeed, have been that fraction of the truth which, to many lesser souls, placed in the same circumstances, would have constituted the whole. It would have been that which forms the fulness of the resolution of many a minister of the gospel. And hence, we doubt not, much of the spiritual barrenness of the ministrations of many preachers of the gospel. They resolve, indeed, *to make known* to the people of their pastoral charge “only Jesus Christ and him crucified.” They think it right that their ministrations should be, to a decided and paramount degree, evangelical. They would deem it undutiful or imprudent to preach literature from their pulpit, or to preach art, or to lecture on politics or on metaphysics or on physiology or on any department of cosmical science. But nevertheless their own intensest interests are to a very large extent dispersed over these wide-spreading fields of culture and research. They feel as regards their own deepest longings, their most cherished tastes, and their most welcome studies, more at home in these regions, than in the region, which surrounds, as within the circumference of a hallowed circle, or halo, “Jesus Christ and him crucified.” And hence they never bring the fulness of their heart into their pulpit ministrations. The home of their spirit is elsewhere than under the shadow of the cross.

But it was far otherwise with the great apostle of the Gentiles. He not only had a fixed determination to spend and be spent, so far as his ministrations among the Corinthians were concerned, in *making known* Jesus Christ and him crucified. He was convinced that what was good for the people of his charge was good for himself. And hence he determined, as regarded himself, to give himself up, and “wholly,” to those meditations and studies and researches, which would issue in his own ever-enlarging knowledge of Jesus Christ and him crucified. He inwardly gloried only in the cross of Christ Jesus. He wished no other centre for his thoughts and emotions and outward activities. And thus, in going to Corinth, he did not determine either *to make*

*known*, or *to know*, anything else among the people, to whom he was to minister, than “Jesus Christ and him crucified.”

Now we may assume, we presume, and we will and do assume, that the principle of procedure, according to which the illustrious apostle acted, was right: and that it was right, not for him only, but for all, who, like him, dedicated themselves to the ministry of the gospel. We assume, too, and must assume, that the same principle is still right for all who wish to make it the business of their lives to be heralds of the glad tidings of salvation. It is a principle, which is, like Jesus Christ himself, “the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.” And it should be, so far as the regulation of the inner and outer activities of ministers of the gospel is concerned, their guiding star. It should be like their Alpha and Omega. For it is the beginning, the middle, and the ending of the sum-total of the ministerial duty which devolves upon preachers of the gospel.

This is our assumption. And, upon the basis of it, we would now raise the question for consideration,—Why is it that such peerless prominence should be given by ministers of the gospel to Jesus Christ and him crucified? Why should they not give lectures to the people on history, ancient and modern? Why should they not give lectures on poetry, and the poets? Why should they not expound the Greek and Roman classics, and make their hearers familiar with the brilliant outpourings of genius that are to be found on the pages of Homer or of Horace? Or why not plunge into investigations regarding the genesis and progressive development of literature, both Asiatic and European, at once in ancient, and in medieval, and in modern times? What is the reason, moreover, why ministers should not preach about painting and statuary? Why not expound the principles of these aesthetic arts, and give lectures on the comparative merits of the different schools in which they have been carried to the greatest perfection? Why not make their hearers acquainted with the biography of Raphael, or of Michael Angelo, or of Leonardo da Vinci, or of some of the great masters of ancient Greece? What is the reason of all this? Or, if general literature and art were to be passed over, why is it that ministers should not lecture on mathematics, or natural philosophy, or natural history? Why not dive into the profound questions of physiology? Or why not give demonstrations in anatomy? Or why not soar into the regions of astronomy, and describe the mechanism of the skies, or at least the distances and magnitudes and interrelations of sun, moon, and stars?—What is the reason why the apostle Paul did not include such vast and magnificent objects of thought as these, within the scope of his determination as to what he would know

and make known? Or why did not he, and why should not ministers of the gospel in general, determine to make known to those who hang on their lips, from sabbath to sabbath, the niceties of the problems of metaphysics, or the intricacies of the forms of the Aristotelian logic, or the still more practical and practically important science of politics? What is the reason why all these subjects were pushed into the back-ground by the apostle Paul, and why should they all be kept in abeyance by every preacher of the gospel? What is the reason, in short, why in going to a congregation, and in staying in the midst of it, a preacher should "not determine to know anything save Jesus Christ, and him crucified"? Why is such peerless pre-eminence to be accorded to Jesus Christ and him crucified?

Is it because Christ-the-crucified is the enemy of literature and art and science? Is it that literature is in itself a profane thing and wrong? Or that art is in itself a profane thing and wrong? Or that science, cosmical or anthropological, is in itself profane and wrong? Is history in itself an ungodly thing? Is poetry? Is beautiful or majestic prose? Is painting unholy? Is sculpture? Are the principles of decoration, to whatever object they may be applied, unrighteous? Surely no. For infinite beauty is in God, and all real beauty is an emanation, direct or indirect, from his infinite intelligence. Is it wrong and sinful to study anatomy, or physiology? or chemistry, or electricity, or magnetism, or any form of molecular physics? or natural history, or astronomy, or geology? Surely it cannot be. It must be commendable and becoming to search out the works and wonders of the great wonder-worker, the infinite Jehovah: must it not? Why then was it that Paul overlooked all these objects in accomplishing his ministry of reconciliation, and pushed them aside from his special contemplation, and only determined to know Jesus Christ and him crucified? Why did he not say—"I did not determine to know anything among you but *poetry*?"—"I did not determine to know anything among you but *politics*?"—"I did not determine to know anything among you but *cosmical science*?" And why should ministers, now-a-days, follow the example of Paul, and everlastingly think and speak about the crucified Christ, still reverberating in the peoples' ears, even to the thousandth echo, "none but Christ, none but Christ"? What is the reason of all this? Should not ministers wish their people to get the benefit of all the sciences? Should they not wish them to be—aye, all of them,—healthy, and to be, all of them, more or less wealthy; and to be, all of them, graceful in manner, and wise in science and in literature, and, indeed, in all the circle of wisdom, viewed in its greatest amplitude of reference? And if they should, why be for ever "preaching *the gospel*," and ex-

pounding the Bible, and either starting from Christ, or pointing to Christ, or coming round circuitously till they find themselves once more at Christ, and taking hold of his cross with the tenacious grasp of faith ?

The reason of this circumscription of the work and aim of “ministers of the gospel,” is simply to be found in the fact that they *are* “ministers of the gospel,” and not professors of literature, or physicians, or lawyers, or painters, or sculptors, or anatomists, or teachers of geology or of astronomy or of physiology or of philosophy. And all their hearers, whether they be healthy or incurably unhealthy ; whether they be wealthy, or in such circumstances that wealth is utterly beyond their reach ; and whether they be intellectually cultured and wise, or of such capacities, and surrounded by such specialties, that much of the ornamental relations, and almost all of the deeper principles, of things in general, are entirely beyond the range of their grasp ;—*all the hearers of those who are “ministers of the gospel” need the gospel ; and all of them may be blessed to the full by means of the gospel.*

(1.) All men, of all classes, and in all conditions, *need the gospel.* And hence, were ministers of the gospel to lecture to their hearers on some other theme than Christ-the-crucified, their wants as sinful beings, would not be met. If, for instance, a “minister of the gospel” were to lecture to his hearers on *the way to be healthy* :—that might indeed be very beneficial to some of them. But it might also be altogether unsuitable to some others. It would be unsuitable to those who are treading on the very brink of eternity. It would likewise be unsuitable to those who are already quite healthy in body, but most unhealthy in soul. It would, too, be unsuitable for those who are anxiously inquiring about the way to be saved, as also for those who are not anxiously inquiring how to be saved, but who greatly need to become anxious inquirers on such a momentous subject. It would therefore be quite out of place for “ministers of the gospel” to devote themselves, in their ministrations, and especially within the “amiable tabernacle,” to lecture on physiology or on anatomy, or on such other departments of science as have immediately to do with health. There should, indeed, we admit and contend, be means taken to give to the masses of the people more systematic instruction on the momentous subject of health. And it may be requisite, in certain peculiar conjunctures, for some, who are in the ministry of the gospel, to withdraw from the discharge of what has hitherto been their professional work, and to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of practical or theoretical physiology or therapeutics. This we do not call in question. But assuredly it does not lie with the minister of the gospel, as such, to dedicate

himself to this department of scientific and philanthropic labour. It is not his duty to lay aside the gospel, when the people of his charge are gathered together for the purpose of worshipping God under his ministrations. It is "none but Christ, none but Christ" that should be the grand staple of his ministry,—the alpha and the omega of his preaching.

It is for similar reasons that the "minister of the gospel" must not occupy his time, and the time of the sacred day, in lecturing to his people on the way to become wealthy. The gospel indeed is no enemy to wealth. The silver and the gold belong to God. And it is doubtless his benevolent desire that the blessings which are attainable by wealth should be much more extensively diffused than they are. But still were the "minister of the gospel" to give himself up to treat of the principles on which the wealth of nations, and the wealth of individuals, could be realised and increased, the most deplorable consequences would ensue. What, for example, would become of those of his hearers who are just about to step out of time into eternity? It is with something else than wealth that such have need to be engaged. What, too, would become of those who, do what they like, never will and never can become rich? What, too, would become of those who would be spoiled were they to become rich, and who need to be poor that they may not be swallowed up in the vortex of vanity, or in the vortex of pride, or in the vortex of sensual self-indulgence? And what would become of those who are wealthy enough already,—who have, in other words, as much wealth as they know how to make a good use of—as much in their cup as they can carry to their lip without spilling? And what, moreover, would become of those who have no correct idea of what true wealth is,—the wealth of the soul,—wealth of thought, wealth of heart, wealth of love, wealth of hope, wealth of peace and of joy,—that wealth which does not take to itself wings and fly away,—that wealth which a man can carry with him out of time into eternity,—that wealth which a man can communicate to others without impoverishing himself,—that wealth which was characteristic of Jesus,—that wealth which is characteristic of God, who is rich, infinitely rich, but especially in goodness, in grace, in happiness, in holiness, in inward glory? No, no. It is not the business of "ministers of the gospel," as such, to lecture to their people on that subject.

Neither is it their business to lecture on worldly wisdom, or speculative wisdom, or the wisdom of the philosophies, or the wisdom of the sciences. Not at all. It is their business to make known and to know, more and more of Jesus Christ and him crucified. For they themselves need Jesus Christ, whatever may be their state as to health, wealth, or wisdom. Their people,

too, all need Jesus Christ, whatever may be their state as regards health, wealth, or wisdom. They and their people have this in common,—that they are moral creatures,—creatures made in the image of the Heavenly Father, and thus capable of goodness, and bound to be good. They have this too in common,—that they are immortal,—passing on to a state of everlasting award, corresponding to what they choose to be in this state of probation. They have this too in common,—that they are sinners. Alas! they are. It is wonderful that they should be. But it is true. They have sinned against light and love. They have sinned against God and man. They have done what they ought to have left undone; and left undone what they ought to have done. But men, *with sin*, and *without a Saviour*, never can be saved. They never can be truly blessed. They cannot be everlastingly blessed.

They may, indeed, for a season be healthy in body. They may, for a season, be wealthy in silver and gold. They may be wise in history, poetry, art, politics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, physiology, and the sciences in general. And all this would be enough perhaps, if they had no conscience: or if there were no death: or if there were no judgement, and no eternity. But there is conscience, there is death, judgement, and eternity. And what then?

Perhaps, too, their wealth may take wings and fly away. And what then? Or their health may take wings and fly off. And what then? Or their wisdom may suffer an eclipse. And what then?

Or, on the other hand, they may be without wealth, health, and wisdom. And what then? Or, though having all these, their house may be turned into a place of mourning by reason of a child that “is not,” or of a wife, or of a husband, or of the entire family cluster. And what then?

Or, though surrounded with a loving and attached family circle, they may themselves, notwithstanding their surroundings, come down to the arena in which they must struggle alone, and be in the end laid low. And what then? What then?

Ah, it is abundantly evident that all men *need the gospel*. They need Christ-the-crucified; whether they be healthy or unhealthy; whether they be wealthy or poor; whether they be cultured and wise, or ignorant and unrefined; whether they be living and life-like, or drawing nigh unto death. And it is the business of the “minister of the gospel” to minister what is needed by all, and thus to proclaim, incessantly, “none but Christ, none but Christ.”

(2.) And not only do all need the gospel:—*the gospel suffices*

*for all, and is fitted to impart to all a bliss that will fill their cup to overflowing.* The gospel may not indeed make every one healthy;—although all its physiological tendencies are in the direction of health, and its influence will, ultimately, issue in the perfect physical healthfulness of mankind. It may not however, meantime, suffice to make every one healthy. That is admitted. It is indisputable. But it can achieve a greater wonder still. It can give happiness where health is enjoyed; and it can give it, too, where health is irrecoverably lost. It can illumine the gloom of the sick-chamber, and dissipate the darkness that broods in the shadow of death. It can pour the balm of consolation into the heart of the loneliest sufferer that lives; and it can give victory and triumph at the end of the career, when death itself has to be encountered. Christ-the-crucified, exhibited in the gospel of God's grace, can accomplish all this. And while he is accomplishing it, the whole circle of the cosmical sciences, along with literature and art, must stand aside, as utterly powerless, as absolutely incompetent for so divine a ministry.

Then, too, in the case of the poor—even the hopelessly poor—the gospel is equally beneficial and efficacious. It was preached of old to the poor; and the common people heard it gladly, and embraced it. No wonder. It is their palladium. It may not indeed lift them up into material wealth; although we must, at the same time, maintain that it is fitted and destined to annihilate every vestige of the poverty that pinches and crushes so many millions on our earth. Meanwhile, however, it cannot enrich all with silver and gold. But it can make contented and happy amid the lack of both gold and silver. And in a higher plane of things than the material, in things moral, spiritual, and eternal, it can impart true riches,—riches so great as to be beyond computation. It can make rich in goodness, rich in usefulness, rich in works of faith and labours of love, rich in soul, rich toward God, rich for eternity. And this is far more than material wealth can accomplish, far more than can be achieved by geology, or astronomy, or physiology, or philosophy.

Even the illiterate can be blessed by the gospel. It can make them truly wise—wise unto salvation, and wise to win souls. And amid much ignorance regarding the earth's stones or the heaven's stars,—regarding the ultimate essence and the intimate relations of bones, muscles, and nerves,—regarding the varied claims of the various forms of government, and the laws that should regulate international procedure,—regarding painting and painters, sculpture and sculptors,—regarding logic or the profundities of metaphysics or the flights of poetry:—amid ignorance on these things, there may be knowledge of the one thing needful—there may be wisdom in the things of the heart, and the heart's relations to its

God. And thus there may be bliss. The gospel can achieve such a glorious result, for it exhibits Christ-the-crucified, who is "the wisdom of God," and who is made of God unto us "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption." It is no marvel, then, that Paul did not determine to know anything but Christ and him crucified. It is no marvel that "none but Christ, none but Christ," should be the motto and the everlasting aim and theme and echo of every true preacher of the gospel. If there ever was a profession that demanded unreserved devotement to its own distinctive sphere of work,—the "giving of one's self wholly" to its things,—it is the profession of *the minister of the gospel of Christ Jesus, the crucified.*

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*The Canon of the Holy Scriptures. By L. Gaussen, D.D., Geneva. pp. xviii. 668. London:—Nisbet. 1862.*

THIS massive volume is on a subject, which, meantime, is of great importance, and occupies the attention of all those who are in any way called upon to expound and defend the oracles of God. Questions relating to the authorship of certain books of the Scriptures, and the integrity of others, are being stirred with more than ordinary zeal; and answers must be given to them sooner or later, else the religion of Jesus will suffer in the estimation of the more thinking classes of society. How was our Bible formed, and by what authority? By what means were the books, included in the inspired volume, separated from those cast aside, and which form the Old and New Testament apocrypha? Have we now the books, which from the beginning were received as of divine authority? And why should we receive our Bibles as the word of God? Such are the problems which infidelity urges constantly upon the attention of the christian church, and to aid its members to give them a reasonable solution, is the aim which the late professor Gaussen had in view in the publication of the present volume.

The author takes rank among that small, but influential, band of Swiss divines, who have done, and are still doing, not a little in defence of protestantism against the abettors of popery, and of Christianity against the propagandists of rationalistic infidelity. Merle D'Aubigne, Vinet, and Gaussen are names familiar to the theological world; and the men to whom they belong are men of thought, learning, piety, and principle. Merle D'Aubigne is known as the historian of the reformation, and is beloved by all who



know him. Vinet has been called the Chalmers of Switzerland ; not so much, we should say, for his eloquence, though, in this too, he excels ; as for his Chalmers-like philosophic views of the solemn verities of the common faith. Gaussen is known in this country as the author of an interesting book of lectures addressed to the young on "The Birthday of the world," and principally by his work on the "Inspiration of the Scriptures." This latter work is, by no means, a satisfactory treatise on the important topic on which it treats. Though extensively read, it has never been acknowledged as a standard work ; and this it never can be, except as a vindication of a theory, which is now all but abandoned. From the author's profound reverence for the very language of holy writ, from his excessive love for the vocables, out of which he drank so largely the water of life, from his peculiar horror at the loose and low views entertained concerning the Bible by many around him, and from misunderstanding certain texts of Scripture, he was led to contend not only for the plenary inspiration of the books which compose the canon,—an irrefragable position,—but also for a kind of mechanical inspiration of the terminology of the Scriptures,—a position which certainly cannot be sustained. The error which vitiates the entire book is by way of excess. It is a right-hand extreme. And yet he argues for it so manfully, and with such reverence for the authority of God's word, and with such a strong faith in what he says, that few evil consequences can flow to the Christian's mind, from a perusal of its pages. The present volume is a kind of sequel to "Theopneustia," and while it bears unmistakable evidence of the same unwavering faith, it is free from many of its predecessor's weaknesses. The contents, as to matter, were originally delivered as lectures to the students of the theological institution of Geneva, an institution "founded for the purpose of elevating the long depressed banner of the Saviour's divinity, and the great doctrines connected with it." The book, however, bears no traces of its original lecture form. It is systematic in arrangement, clear in style, lucid in its expositions and grouping of facts, and is one of the richest storehouses of facts, and arguments, bearing on the canon of the Holy Scriptures, which is available to the English-reading public. While it is specially adapted to the young minister and the student of divinity ; it is also fitted to benefit the thinking, reading, unprofessional follower of Jesus. Indeed, the subject, though a difficult one, is rendered so transparent, that it may be understood, at least in its great outlines, by the simplest minds. The theme itself, Gaussen holds to be "obscure only at a distance," while it presents a very luminous aspect when closely studied. Hence he says, "I have endeavoured to write a book that will be sufficiently intelligible to every

serious reader; and it has been my desire that all unlettered Christians who may have been disturbed by these attacks of modern infidelity, may feel themselves, on reading it, confirmed in their faith."

The book is divided into two parts, in which the canon is viewed according to the method of science, and according to the method of faith; or, in other words, simply as a collection of ancient books, transmitted to us; and as books which claim to speak to man in the name of God. In the first part, arguments purely historical are advanced to demonstrate to all unbelievers the authenticity of all the Scriptures of the New Testament: and, in the second part, Gaussen seeks to establish, to believers only, the canonicity of all the Scriptures of both Testaments. The whole field is thus covered, and though it is impossible, in one volume, or even in very many volumes, to exhaust the topics which must be touched upon, enough is said to answer the end which the pious writer had in view.

To our minds, the more interesting of the two divisions is the one in which the canon is viewed according to the method of faith. Here the author puts forth all his strength, and so sets his facts and arguments in array, that they cannot fail to produce a powerful impression on those who have faith that a free and living God rules the world. Few, we presume, will go from fact to fact, and feel the cumulative force of the whole, without coming to the conclusion that the Scriptures have not only proceeded from God, through holy men, but that they have also been preserved by a special providence, and that, in the last analysis of things, God himself is at once the Guardian and the Guarantee of the canon.

Without entering upon an examination of the professor's production in its details, or subjecting to special criticism such positions as he seeks to defend, but which appear to us untenable, we shall endeavour to present to our readers, in our own words principally, a brief outline of what, in the first part, is elaborately worked out in the author's volume. The second part must be read in order to be at all appreciated and understood. To epitomise it, would destroy its force and break its spiritual power. Suffice it to say, that the doctrine which the author, in this second part, seeks to establish and expound, is, *That God has made himself the Guarantee of the canon*: that his almighty providence is engaged for the preservation of this sacred deposit: that he has guarded, now guards, and will guard it till heaven and earth have passed away. In more precise terms, it is,—That God, by a secret and perpetual agency, watches over his written word, because he watches over his church; it is, That he has invisibly, but

sovereignly, made use, first of the Jewish people during 3350 years, to make them the sure depositaries of the sacred oracles of the Old Testament, and still later, of christian people—that is to say, of all christian churches, good or bad—to make them, in like manner, through fourteen centuries, and to the end, depositaries, not less sure, of the oracles of the New Testament. This doctrine is fortified by six classes of proofs, which if not in every detail thoroughly relevant, are nevertheless of such a nature as to convince the Christian that God does watch over his own word and has preserved it in the most wonderful manner from the corruptions of the world and the inroads of the traditions of man. But to return to the first part, in which the canon is viewed historically.

The word *canon* signifies primarily a reed, rule, or measure, and has been applied, from the earliest christian times, to the Scriptures as the measure or standard of faith and practice. The idea of such a canon was familiar to the minds of the early disciples of Jesus, from the fact, that as Jews they possessed sacred books, which, as the oracles of God, were committed to their custody. As a new church was needed to carry out the ends contemplated by the advent of the Redeemer, so, a New Testament, or new canon, was required as a repository of the truth made known, when God spake to the world by his own Son. Being required, it was soon given; not all at once, but gradually. About fifteen years after the ascension of the Saviour, the first inspired books, which go to constitute the new canon, were written by the apostle Paul. The rest followed; called forth generally by the circumstances in which the infant churches were placed; and they were all written, and the canon closed, at furthest, before the end of the first century. Ere this, however, there was by means of oral preaching, and specially by apostolic labours, a people prepared, into whose hands the inspired writings could be placed, that they might be preserved, multiplied, and transmitted, in all their integrity to those who should follow. Such are the facts that relate to the formation of our New Testament: and thus, says professor Gaussen, “was the written word faithfully transmitted, from age to age, to all the churches of God.”

In looking into the New Testament, and viewing its several books in the light of their history, they may be divided into three classes, which, for convenience sake, are called the first canon, the second-first canon, and the second canon. These, though distinguished for a season from one another, were all carefully distinguished from all other books professedly written on behalf of the christian faith. The first canon consists of those books which have been universally received by the church as divinely authoritative and genuine, viz.: the four gospels, the Acts of the

Apostles, the thirteen epistles of Paul, the First Epistle of Peter, and the First Epistle of John. When judged by the number of verses, these make up eight-ninths of the whole. The second-first canon is composed of the two books of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Revelation; which, though received at first, as genuine and authoritative, by the churches East and West, were yet afterwards opposed, the one in the East and the other in the West, for a season, but at length were restored to their original position. The second canon is made up of the five short epistles of James, Second Peter, Jude, Second and Third John. These were not received by the christian community all over the world, when they appeared. Some were received in this place, others were received in that, while elsewhere all the five were acknowledged as belonging to the rank of canonical writings. Their position is well indicated by Eusebius when he says, "These Scriptures though received by most people, and recognised by most ecclesiastical writers, and publicly read along with other catholic epistles in most churches, have experienced some opposition, and are less quoted by ancient writers." These three divisions are not arbitrary and without historical basis. Besides numerous testimonies from the fathers, which imply such divisions, they are warranted by the three most ancient catalogues,—those of the Peshito, Origen, and Eusebius. From these it is demonstrated that twenty books were universally, uniformly, and unanimously received from the commencement. Then two books also were received uniformly and universally from their appearance till the middle of the third century, at which time various objections in reference to them began to be raised in some churches, and continued to be entertained for a century and a half: although, at the same time, these objections were not historical, but merely critical. Lastly, five small epistles were received by the great bulk of christendom, though controverted in some churches till the council of Nice.

Into the reasons of the different treatment received by the books composing the three canons professor Gaussen enters fully. With a steady hand he traces out the causes which operated to the production of those relations in which the church stood to the various divisions, and in doing so, he places the whole books of the New Testament on a historical foundation which the strongest efforts of the critical school will not be able to destroy. The causes which led to the unanimity regarding the first canon of twenty books, or eight-ninths of the whole, were principally three: (1) The long career of the apostles, which enabled them to attest the authority of all inspired books produced in their day. (2.) The existence of numerous churches among whom the sacred writings were multiplied; and (3.) The anagnosis or public reading of the

scriptures. These coincidents served to produce and maintain a universal faith in the books referred to,—books which at all times and in all places have been received as of divine authority. That they have been so received is a matter of fact, the proof of which is both extensive and varied. It consists in the testimony of Christians, heretics, and pagans, who all agree in bearing witness, that, from the beginning, the four gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the thirteen epistles of Paul, the first epistle of Peter, and the first epistle of John, were acknowledged as belonging to the rule of the early church's faith and practice.

The history of the second-first canon is surveyed at length. And it is clearly seen that though, as we have said, the epistle to the Hebrews and the book of Revelation were looked upon as genuine, and received as such at first universally, they were, nevertheless, during the third century, set aside on doctrinal grounds; but when the causes which led to their partial rejection were removed, they were both restored to their present canonical position. In the East the book of Revelation,—whose genuineness is supported by as powerful an array of testimonies as can be advanced on behalf of any book,—was opposed on the ground of the millenarian doctrine which it was supposed to reveal, while in the West it was received and used as part of the sacred volume. At the same time the West rejected, at least generally, the epistle to the Hebrews, because it was thought to give countenance to some of the doctrines of Montanus,—the East, meantime, received it as divine. By and by however, when the agitation in the East concerning the millennium, and in the West concerning Montanism, subsided,—when the voice of the Spirit was heard and obeyed, rather than the feelings of controversy, all doubts as to these parts of the record were removed, and they were universally looked upon as portions of the scriptures which make “wise unto salvation.”

The history of the second canon is then taken up and disposed of. The epistles which form it are the five short letters which, taken together, constitute only the twenty-sixth part of the whole New Testament. Indeed, were the second canon, and even the second-first entirely cast aside, such an act would not deprive us of any one of those doctrines which are essential to christianity. The principal grounds of our faith lie in the twenty books which have been unanimously received for eighteen hundred years. But while this is true, we are far from supposing that rationalistic critics have a right to demand that we should give up the canonicity of the five short epistles. They have been, as Eusebius tells us, “accepted by a great number,” from the time they were produced, and if they were not received by all, sufficient reasons for such treatment can be given without invalidating their claims to form part of the Book of God. One reason is, that they were

addressed to the whole body of the faithful, and not to any specific church, and would not, therefore, have the same advantages for particular recognition as the epistles of Paul, for example, had. Another reason is, that they were written not long before the death of their authors, and were published without their personal superintendence and influence. They consequently took a longer time to work their way into the confidence of the holy catholic church, and to universal reception by the people of God. Yet this they did ultimately and permanently achieve. Gaussen says, "While a majority of the churches received these five epistles from the first, as making a part of the Sacred Scriptures, there were always many, during two centuries-and-a-half, who remained in suspense as to the divine authority of one or other among them; and it was only at the beginning of the fourth century, about the year 325, that these hesitations ceased in all parts of the east and west. But this very delay, by attesting at once the liberty and the sacred jealousy of the primitive churches on the subject of the canon, should serve, as we shall soon see, only to render our confidence more entire in the peaceable and final result of this sacred investigation." From the time here mentioned, till this present hour, the New Testament canon became settled, so far as the great mass of the church universal is concerned. And all christian sects profess, at least, to receive the canon as a whole. No sect is a sect, because it rejects certain books and retains others. Individuals reject and retain at pleasure; but as a matter of fact, churches never thus act. As the Jews, good and bad, cleave to their Old Testament canon, and carry it about with them wherever they roam, so all christian churches, good and bad, hold by the records of the new dispensation, as we have them now. "Never has any general council, any synod, any particular church, Arian or Trinitarian, Romanist or Reformed, Free or National, been seen to profess in its decrees or its catechisms that it rejected any of the books of the New Testament, or even to express publicly its doubts respecting any of them. And this in the age of Alaric, as well as in the times of the Reformation, or in modern days: in Europe, and in the east, and in the United States; at Rome, as well as in that Germany, where from day to day so many audacious systems are fabricated, and where the infidelity of the schools has so sadly prevailed." The Book of God then, which we have in our houses and hands, is the same book which for upwards of fifteen hundred years has been a light to the feet and a lamp to the path of all those millions of the church who have from generation to generation testified by their lips and by their lives to the mightily constraining grace of the Lord Jesus Christ.

This is the conclusion in which we are landed by the whole of

our author's argumentation. And we close the volume with the firm persuasion that it is a book for the times, and should be read and understood by those who have not hitherto turned their attention to the subject on which it treats. The author has gone to his rest, but has left behind him in his works, a monument that will survive for some time to come, and by which, though dead, he will continue to speak.

W. A.—P.

## DOCTRINAL AND EXEGETICAL QUERIES.

### QUERY 1. BAPTISM.

“Are we authorised, from Matt. iii. 14, 15, to conclude that the ordinance of baptism was specially instituted of God, though we have no record of the fact, and that our Saviour (Matt. xxviii. 19,) merely reissued a previous command?”

W. L. W.

ANSWER. The application of water as a symbol denoting the necessity and the means of spiritual purification, was practised long anterior to the time of John the Baptist. It was a natural symbolical act within the sphere of the things which belong to the spirit. And it is not at all inconsistent with the plan of the divine administration, to suppose that existing practices were taken up, on the introduction of the New Testament economy, and developed and sublimed into standing New Testament ordinances. The rough draft of baptism existed, we believe, in the old economy. Its fulness belongs to the new.

### QUERY 2. BAPTISM AND THE HOLY SPIRIT.

“Is there any authority in Scripture for asserting, that the Holy Spirit is conferred in baptism?”

W. L. W.

ANSWER. We think that there is not, so far as baptism with water is concerned,—the only baptism which man can administer. It is no more the case that the Holy Spirit is conferred in the administration of the ecclesiastical ordinance of baptism, than it is the case that Christ is conferred in the administration of the ecclesiastical ordinance of the supper.

### QUERY 3. BAPTISM FOR THE REMISSION OF SINS.

“How are we to understand the clause in the Nicene Creed,—‘I acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins?’”

W. L. W.

ANSWER. We think that the expression is unhappy, unless it may be interpreted as having reference to the inner end of baptism,—its spiritual end,—that element of the two-sided institute which consists of the out-pouring of the Holy Spirit.

## QUERY 4. INFANTS DEAD IN TRESPASSES AND SINS ?

"If all are *dead in trespasses and sins*, how could it be said of children, 'of such is the kingdom of God;' it being had in remembrance that the children in question are not said to be believers?" W. L. W.

ANSWER. We do not, for our part, find that it is anywhere said that "all" are "dead in trespasses and sins." We think that it is only those, of whom a plurality of iniquities can be predicated,—only those, in other words, who are actual sinners,—who can be legitimately represented as "*dead in trespasses and sins*," *i. e.*, dead in law in consequence of trespasses and sins.

## QUERY 5. THE LAW.

"John i. 17, appears to teach that the 'law' and 'grace and truth' are opposed. How can that be; understanding the law after the definition of our Lord, Matt. xxii. 37-39?" W. L. W.

ANSWER. The word "law" is used in various phases of reference, in the New Testament. The "law," although a unity, is a many-sided unity. And, when it is spoken of, there is frequently a reference to only one of its aspects or relations. In Matt. xxii. 37-39, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great commandment: and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"—the reference is to the essence of the authoritative revelation of God's will, so far as the exhibition of the duty of man as man, is concerned. In John i. 17, again,—"*The law* was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ,"—there seems to be special reference to those more circumferential elements of the authoritative revelation that exhibited the special duties of Jews, as Jews, and that pictorially represented to them, in shadows, the blessings of propitiation.

## QUERY 6. THE SPIRIT IN RELATION TO FATHER AND SON.

"Where in Scripture is the authority for the statement found in the Nicene Creed,—'which proceedeth from the *Father and the Son*'? Such appears to me to be at variance with our Lord's teaching, John xv. 26, —'But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, *which proceedeth from the Father*, he shall testify of me.'" W. L. W.

ANSWER. Nowhere is it taught, expressly or implicitly, that the "Spirit proceedeth from the Father and the Son," if the reference be to what is regarded as the eternal procession or spiration of the Spirit, or to his essential relationship, in the unity of the Godhead, to the Father and the Son. It is said, indeed, in John xv. 26, that "the Spirit of truth proceedeth from the Father." And it is said in Gal. iv. 6, that the Spirit is "the Spirit of God's Son." But in these passages the reference is to *economical* relations—the subordinate relationship, to wit, of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son in the economy of salvation.



## QUERY 7. THE HOLY SPIRIT.

“In what respect did the work of the Spirit, under the Old Testament dispensation, differ from his work under the present dispensation? When Jesus left the world he promised to send the Comforter, ‘even the Spirit of truth to convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment.’ Before the death of Christ, did the Spirit do nothing to convince the world of sin? In David’s prayer, in the 51st Psalm, ‘uphold me with thy free Spirit’—is the Spirit spoken of, ‘the Holy Spirit’?”

A. Y.

ANSWER. We see no reason to doubt that “the free Spirit” is the Holy Spirit, and that he has been acting in all dispensations for God and for man. But it is possible, it would appear, to bring a mightier influence to bear upon the minds of men through the things of Christ, wherewith the atonement was made, than apart from these things. And hence the vastly increased potency of the Spirit’s moral agency under the New Testament dispensation.

## QUERY 8. THE SIN OF THE GOLDEN CALF.

“Wherein lay the great sin of the children of Israel in making the golden calf, seeing that the law against the making of graven images was not yet made known?”

A. Y.

ANSWER. The law against graven images is not an arbitrary enactment. It is founded in the nature of things; and therefore it was implicitly revealed in the ante-Sinaitic editions of the moral law. Even though the primary revelations had not interdicted all sensuous representations of the Infinite One, as being necessarily caricatures, on the one hand, and decoys to the worshipping spirit, on the other; it is nevertheless obvious that to liken God to a four-footed beast—and especially such a beast as a calf, or an “ox that eateth grass,” is to insult his Majesty and moral glory. It would be, an insult to a king or to any man, says Elnathan Parr justly, “to liken him to an ass.” How much greater must be the indignity to liken God to a calf?

## QUERY 9. FAITH AND ELECTION.

“What is the force of the reason for Jewish unbelief assigned by our Lord in John x. 26,—‘But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you’? In the parable of the judgement, Mat. xxv.—‘the sheep’ are the friends of Jesus,—the elect of God. Has the phrase the same meaning in John x. 26? If not, what does it mean? If it has the same meaning, does not our Saviour account for the unbelief of the Jews, by affirming their non-election? And in that case, what becomes of the teaching that it is by believing that a man ceases to be of the number of the non-elect? In other words, does not our Saviour, in the above reason for Jewish unbelief, place election before faith?”

A. D.

ANSWER. We think that he does not. When the Saviour says,—“But ye believe not,” his meaning seems to be—“But ye believe not that I am the Messiah.” This seems to be rendered evident by the two preceding verses,—“Then came the Jews round about him, and

“said unto him, How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly. Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not: the works that I do in my Father’s name, they bear witness of me.” He then adds “But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you,” that is, “*But ye believe not the New Testament gospel, that I am the Christ, because ye belong not to those who believe the Old Testament gospel regarding the Christ that was to come.*” The Saviour was addressing Jews, who professed to be the true people of God, and he, as it were, says to them, “*if ye really had been what ye professed to be, you would have recognised me to be the Messiah.*” But ye do not recognise me, because ye have not ‘learned of the Father,’—ye have not availed yourselves of the ‘teaching of the Father.’ “If ye had been, by your own voluntary consent, ‘taught of God,’ ye ‘would have been ‘my sheep,’ and *if ye had been my sheep, ye would have known the voice of the Shepherd.*” But ye know it not, because ye “are not my sheep,” *i.e.* “you do not believe that I am the Messiah, because, notwithstanding your great profession, you do not believe the gospel of God’s grace.” The passage is explained at length in *Apology for the Freeness of God’s grace to all*, pp. 58, 59.

QUERY 10. DOES GOD NEED TO BE RECONCILED TO SINNERS?

“Is it correct to represent God as reconciled to sinners? If it be, is it also correct to represent him as reconciled only to such as have believed on the Lord Jesus Christ?” J. W.—G.

ANSWER. The discussion regarding the use of the word “reconciliation” is apt, in some phases of it, to degenerate into a logomachy, a mere war of words rather than a war of ideas. If the word “reconciliation” be understood as implying the previous existence of a feeling of *unkindness*, then assuredly it is utterly inapplicable to God. He has never been unkind to men. If, however, it be understood as merely implying the previous existence of such antagonism as does not involve unkindness, then we must admit that there has been, on the part of God, some kind of governmental antagonism which gave scope for propitiation,—propitiation however, be it ever remembered, springing ultimately out of his own unprompted love. See Hebrews ii. 17. But now that the propitiation is accomplished, God is already, most assuredly, propitiated and propitious, and it is not Scriptural terminology to represent him as unreconciled. It is the sinner that needs to be reconciled to God, not God that needs to be reconciled to the sinner. It would be sad, indeed, to use phraseology that might be legitimately calculated to convey the idea to the inquirer that God is his enemy, and that the relinquishment of the divine enmity depended on some act of the sinner himself. This would be, in reality, to withdraw from the object of faith its principal element, and to turn the sinner into his own Saviour, by making him the propitiator of his God.

QUERY 11. SIN, WHAT?

“Distinguishing *sin* from its antecedents and consequents, in what does the essence of sin consist, and when is it committed?” W. H.

ANSWER. Strictly speaking, it must consist in the *choice* of what is inconsistent with the Infinite Reason.

## QUERY 12. THE INNER SPHERE OF DUTY.

“If love be not a state of the will, why is it designated *benevolence*—good willing? And why is a feeling, which is under the law of necessity, rather than a voluntary act, commanded,—and commanded as the fulfilling of the law?”

W. H.

ANSWER. Benevolence, we apprehend, properly means *good-wishing*. But *willing* is so generally coincident with *wishing*, that in popular phraseology, and often indeed in phraseology that claims to be strictly philosophic, the two states of mind are confounded. The feeling of benevolence or love is enjoined, on the same principle on which the outer acts of *stealing, killing, etc.*, are prohibited. The well-spring of our emotions and our outward acts is hidden from the direct gaze or recognition of our fellows. But God, in his legislative enactments, has regard to what is generally cognizable. And he relies on universal consciousness and conscience, for detecting and acknowledging the deep psychological groundwork of the duties prescribed. The duties, it will be observed, are not abstract choices, but *choices of this or of that particular form of emotion or outward action*. Our emotions and outward actions are thus indirectly under our control. And our power of choice is valuable because it possesses this control.

## QUERY 13. MORAL ACTS, ALWAYS UNMIXED?

“Is every moral act in its most inmost principle, pure, in the sense of unmixed;—or, may a moral act be partly good and partly bad?”

W. H.

ANSWER. If we distinguish a moral act from its inmost principle, it may certainly be partly good and partly bad. For, when thus distinguished, it may denote what is the result of complex thoughts and impulses. And these thoughts and impulses may not be wholly on the side of what is true and good. Even “the inmost principle” of a moral act,—the choice or volition which eventuates in some form of emotion or in some outward movement, though always *metaphysically* “pure in the sense of unmixed,” for it is a simple choice, may not be always *morally* “pure in the sense of unmixed.” For it may be the result of a conflict of motives, amid which there may have been only a preponderance on the side of the good on the one hand, or on the side of the bad on the other. Choices, to have any moral character at all, must have their genesis in a motive or motives.

## QUERY 14. PERFECTION AND IMPERFECTION.

“Is all imperfection sinful,—or, are there imperfections which are sinless, and which will cleave to us as creatures so long as we are on the earth?”

W. H.

ANSWER. The word perfection may be used absolutely or relatively. In its absolute sense, it can be predicated only of the Infinite One. All other beings, are, by the very fact that they are limited, imperfect. They are never absolutely “finished.” They are under the law of pro-

gression, in some phase of it or other, and will be so to all eternity. There may, however, be moral perfection in many creatures, so far as the relativity, that consists of sinlessness, is concerned.

QUERY 15. PERFECTION AND IMPERFECTION.

“Will saints in heaven ever be increasing in love,—and if so, may it not be said, in that sense, that they will never be fully perfected?”

W. H.

ANSWER. Undoubtedly.

QUERY 16. FOREORDINATION,—ITS SPHERE.

“What valid objection is there to the idea, that God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass,—*volitions alone excepted*?”

W. H.

ANSWER. None whatsoever; when we speak of things, not popularly, but philosophically.

QUERY 17. SINNERS, AND GOD'S GOVERNMENT.

“What is the extent or limit of the divine moral government over wicked men?”

W. H.

ANSWER. It extends to every thing in them, and in relation to them, with the exception of their own volitions on the one hand, and the volitions of other creatures on the other. But, of course, the Divine Being has fixed rules of wisdom, according to which he acts in view of these volitions.

QUERY 18. OUR LIFE.

“Will you please favour me with your view of John i. 4, *specially* the word ‘life’?”

G. H. E.

ANSWER. We are disposed to think that the reference is to that *eternal life*, which is in Christ for those who are “dead in trespasses and sins.” And Christ is himself called “the Life,” because life for sinners is in Him. Eternal life is eternal bliss; for whatever, in consciousness, is of the nature of woe, lies on the line that issues in death; and whatever is of the nature of joy, lies on the line that loses itself in life.

QUERY 19. BELIEVERS GIVEN TO CHRIST.

“What are we to understand by the expression in the Saviour's prayer, John xvii. 6, ‘*Thine they were, and thou gavest them me.*’ When? How? Please explain the verse.”

J. L.—N.

ANSWER. The reference, we apprehend, is to the disciples, viewed as having been believers of the gospel according to the Old Testament. Being believers in this respect, they belonged to the spiritual people of God, before they knew Jesus. Belonging to the spiritual people of God, they recognised Jesus when he came to them. His likeness had been previously photographed, by the divine Spirit, through the medium of the Old Testament Scriptures, in their souls. Thence they knew him. They were his sheep; and as such they knew the voice of the Shepherd.

The Father gave them to Jesus as his disciples, whenever they were prepared to say—"Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel." He then *actually* gave them. But He gave them *in purpose* before the foundation of the world.

QUERY 20. FAITH IN HEAVEN ?

"Is the idea contained in the following verse of the hymn, entitled *My Heavenly Home*, correct?—

'There faith exists no more,  
Its work for ever done;—  
They left it on Death's darkling shore,  
Its final victory won.'

W. C. K.

ANSWER. The idea, in one aspect of it, is correct; and, in another aspect, it is incorrect. So far as faith in the person of the Saviour is concerned, it will cease when, with unveiled face, *we see* our glorious Lord, as he is. Faith will then be merged in sight, and lose itself. But as far as faith in the work of Christ, as accomplished upon Calvary, is concerned, that will never cease. For that work we can never see. And, being of the nature of historical fact, it can never be known otherwise than by faith.

QUERY 21. ABILITY TO KEEP THE MORAL LAW.

"Are all men able to keep the Moral Law?" J. G.—S.

ANSWER. We believe that they are. For if they were not, the following consequences would ensue:—*First*, They would not be responsible for disobedience: *Secondly*, Their own consciences would not condemn them for disobedience: *Thirdly*, The law would be tyrannical. And *fourthly*, It would be unaccountable that, in the very terminology of the law, we are called upon to love, not beyond our strength, but "with our strength."

QUERY 22. THE COMMANDMENTS OF LOVE.

"Do you make any distinction between the commandments of God and the commandments of love?" J. G.—S.

ANSWER. No. The *moral commandments of God* resolve themselves into *commandments of love*, in which we are commanded to love. "Love" is "the fulfilling" of the moral law of God.

QUERY 23. "ABLE PERFECTLY" AND "PERFECTLY ABLR."

"Is there any distinction, or rather, do you make anything of the distinction, between 'able perfectly,' and 'perfectly able,' to keep the commandments of love?" J. G.—S.

ANSWER. We would make nothing of the distinction. The two expressions seem to us to present two aspects of a unity.

QUERY 24. THE HOLY SPIRIT.

"We read in John xiv. 17, that the world *cannot* receive the Spirit;

while in John xvi. 7-11, we are told the Spirit shall convince the world of sin, &c. How are we to reconcile these statements?"

W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** In the former passage the Holy Spirit is referred to as the Guest of the soul,—abiding in it as its Instructor, Adviser, Advocate, and Comforter. It is only believers, who can have the Spirit in this capacity. All others keep him outside. And though he knocks, yet they will not open to let him in, as the Inmate of the heart of their heart.

#### QUERY 25. THE HOLY SPIRIT.

"We read, Acts ii. 38, that to those who repented and were baptised, the Holy Ghost was assured; nevertheless, although they of Samaria were baptised, they did not receive the Spirit until the apostles' hands were laid on them. Acts viii. 16, 17. How are these seeming contradictions to be reconciled?"

W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** The influence of the Divine Spirit waves out from his infinite fulness in concentric circles. All mankind are included in the outermost circles: he operates benignly on all. All believers are *farther in*. They are nearer the glorious centre. And they experience another wave of his influence, suitable to their condition as believers. They are thus inside one of the interior circles. But there are various of these interior concentric circles. Within the limits of one, miraculous gifts are enjoyed,—gifts such as were common among the members of the primitive churches. Within a circle nearer the centre still, apostolic inspiration was enjoyed.

It would appear that all believers enjoy some spiritual gifts—such as peace, joy, hope, love, &c. But it would likewise appear that the more extraordinary gifts, which the Samaritan believers received in the presence of Peter and John, belonged to a circle of influence which was inside the other and larger circle.

#### QUERY 26. THE HOLY SPIRIT.

"From what period did the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit cease in the Church?"

W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** The answer to this question will depend in part on the meaning attached to the word "miracle." We may rest assured that no influence that is really needed for the increased weal of the church and for the conviction and conversion of the outlying world, ever has been, or ever will be, arbitrarily withheld.

#### QUERY 27. PRAYER FOR THE HOLY SPIRIT.

"To what extent is a believer warranted, in the present dispensation, to pray for, and expect the Holy Spirit's aid? Should he restrict his desires and expectations to the fruits of the Spirit as set forth Gal. v. 22?"

W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** He is doubtless warranted, and bound, to pray for every element of the influence of the Spirit, which is needed for his confirmation, sustentation, consolation, and usefulness. And when he thus prays,

he is warranted, and bound, to look up for an answer. He must ever pray, however, in absolute submission to the divine will, realizing that God only knows within which of the concentric rings of influence it is befitting that he should be placed. Prayer of this kind always is, and always will be, answered. The Holy Spirit is given, in larger and still larger measure, in proportion as by true prayer the reciprocity of the soul is opened up. It is obvious, of course, that the strictly *moral* element in the influence of the Divine Spirit is the most important. All the rest is but ancillary.

#### QUERY 28. ONE FLOCK, ONE FOLD.

“Does our Lord mean, that there shall be one fold in this world, John x. 16, or in the next? If the former, how can believers reconcile it to their consciences, that they do not gather themselves from out the many folds, or professed folds, into one and the same?” W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** We think that the fold of Christ's flock is not the visible fence of any visible ecclesiastical organization. It is the spiritual surrounding that encompasses, as in a spiritual unity, and in spiritual security, all who believe in Jesus and live by faith. The line of this spiritual palisade runs through all the existing ecclesiastical communities, including some individuals, and alas, excluding others;—for what community is absolutely pure?

It should be noticed, however, that in John x. 16, there is a slight mis-translation in our authorized English version. In the original, the expression runs thus,—“there shall be one *flock* (*ποιμνη*) and one Shepherd.” So Luther correctly renders it (und wird eine *Heerde* und ein *Hirt* werden). So did Tyndale. So did Beza. But Wiclif and the Geneva followed the Vulgate. And the compilers of the authorized version followed in their wake. Jewish and Gentile believers form one spiritual flock under one spiritual Shepherd—the Good Shepherd, who leads into green pastures and beside still waters.

#### QUERY 29. JUDAS AND HIS THIRTY PIECES.

“How can Acts i. 18,—‘Now this man purchased a field with the reward of iniquity,’ be reconciled with Matt. xxvii. 5,—‘And he cast down the price in the temple’?” W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** The statement in Acts must, we presume, be interpreted with a little rhetorical license, as being equivalent to this:—“Now through this man was a field acquired with the reward of iniquity.” What is procured *through* a man is often rhetorically said, when a retrospect is taken, to be procured *by* the man. He who is the *occasion* of a transaction is often freely represented as its *cause*.

#### QUERY 30. EVERY UNFRUITFUL TREE IS HEWN DOWN.

“Are we to understand by the expression, Matt. iii. 10,—‘is hewn down,’ the time when the unfruitful individuals come to die in the course of nature?” W. L. W.

**ANSWER.** The whole representation is metaphorical: and the mean-

ing seems simply to be, that, under the reign of the Messiah, certain retribution awaits at once unfruitful individuals and unfruitful institutions.

QUERY 31. ORDAINED TO ETERNAL LIFE.

“What is the real force of the expression in Acts xiii. 48, ‘as many as were ordained to eternal life’? And what agency or agencies brought about this condition?”  
R. M.

ANSWER. The expression has evidently no reference to *fore*-ordination. It is not said, “as many as were *fore*-ordained to eternal life believed.” The word “ordained” is a verbal development of the word “order.” Whatsoever is “ordained” is *ordered* or *set in order*. And it is in some such sense, apparently, that “as many as were *ordained to eternal life* believed.” As many as were *set in order in relation to eternal life* believed. As many as had their minds *put in order and adjusted in relation to eternal life*, believed. The original term has a similar reference to adjustment and order in its fundamental import (ῥεταγμένους). As many as were *arrayed and arranged* in relation to eternal life, believed. The word has thus a reference to a certain inward assortment of the contents of the soul,—an assortment or adjustment, that is in all cases essential in order to faith. Before a man can believe the gospel, his mind must be in some sort of preparedness. He must, for instance, have some notion of moral distinctions. He must have some notion of God. He must have some notion of guilt, and his own guilt. He must have some notion of his responsibility and danger. He must have some notion of the objective reality and validity of what is presented to him as the object of his faith. The sinner’s mind must thus be, in some definite manner, *assorted, arranged, set in order, or disposed*. There must be *disposition* in the primary sense of the word,—*arrangement*. And thus it is “as many as are *disposed in relation to eternal life*, that believe.” This *disposition* involves as one element of itself, though only as one, *inclination*. It must also involve *determination*; and at this point, another phase of the word’s conventional import is touched. The word is translated *determined* in Acts xv. 2; and it might receive the same translation in xiii. 48:—“as many as were *determined* for eternal life believed.” But this translation would bring into view only one element of the adjustment or ordering of the soul that is an essential to faith.

As to the agency or agencies, by which the soul is set in order for eternal life, there is doubtless a complexity. Man’s own agency in relation to himself must not be overlooked. He has a part to act. His fellow-men, also, who take an interest in his soul, and work and pray for it, may have some other part to act. Their agency need not be ignored or denied. But doubtless the great Agent is the Divine Spirit;—who acts nevertheless in harmony with our free moral nature, not necessitating, but only sollicitating, those inner elements of mental adjustment,—volitions,—which are assuredly indispensable in order to the soul’s reception of eternal life, and indeed in order to its condition of reciprocity.



QUERY 32. IS THE LENGTH OF LIFE ABSOLUTELY FIXED ?

"Are we to conclude from Job vii. 1 and xiv. 14 that the number of each man's days, on earth, has been fore-fixed by God? If so how are we to reconcile Prov. x. 27 and other similar passages? If the length of each man's time, on earth, is fore-fixed, must we not believe that other events, in his life, are fixed also?" D—r.

ANSWER. The passage in Job. vii. 1 runs thus:—"is there not an appointed time to man upon earth? are not his days, also, like the days of an hireling?" Job xiv. 14, is as follows:—"If a man die, shall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come." In the first of the two passages, the word rendered "appointed time" is translated "warfare" in the margin. It is a very common word, and is generally rendered "host" or "army." It is rendered "war" in Job x. 17,— "changes and *war* are against me." It is rendered "warfare" in Isai. xl. 2, "her *warfare* is accomplished." And this is undoubtedly the meaning of the term in the passages, to which our querist refers. It is so translated in the vulgate. It is so interpreted in the Chaldee Paraphrase. Grotius agrees. So does Codorus. Even Caryl admits that "warfare" is "the most proper signification," and thence describes the life of man as a "troublesome warfaring life." The late Professor Lee, in his "Book of the Patriarch Job," gives "warfare" as the translation. So does Gesenius. And Drusius explains the expression by reminding us that though every one is not an actual soldier, yet every one, like an actual soldier, has to do battle. He has to combat "with the flesh, the world, and the devil." Hahn understands the reference to be to the hard service exacted in war, (*der schwere Dienst, Frohdienst*). There can be no doubt that there is reference to the hardships, which man must endure in this world; and no reference at all to any supposed limit of time, unconditionally fixed, during which man is appointed to live on earth. The Septuagint renders the word freely, "trial."

QUERY 33. PERSEVERANCE.

"My pastor has often spoken to me on the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, and expressed the ardent wish he has, that I should embrace it, as it would, he says, make me so much happier. Of course, I have as strongly taken the opposite view; but last Sabbath week he somewhat staggered me, when preaching from Rom. viii. 32. Among the 'all things' he included the doctrine referred to, strongly condemning those who grant that the things enumerated in verses 35, 38, 39, shall not separate us from the love of God, and yet say *sin* may. 'Awful perversion! Is not sin included?' He went on to say 'I should be wretched, miserable, if I thought that my eternal security rested upon the thin hair of my own *will*, which might be broken under strong satanic temptation, even in the very last moment of life.—No: nothing can separate us from the love of Christ.' I feel there is a hollowness in this specious reasoning, and yet its falsity is not so clear to me as I could wish. Will you kindly let the light of truth shine into my mind?" D—r.

**ANSWER.** There must, we fear, have been more of declamation than of reasoning in the discourse referred to; and we should imagine that in the theology of the discourses, *privilege* must occupy a higher place than *duty*. But this would be to turn realities upside down, and to minister, though no doubt unconsciously, or only theoretically, to selfishness. There must, in the nature of things, be some limit to the "all things" which are "freely given to us with Christ." Sin cannot be included: nor the everlasting punishment of sin: nor anything that is inconsistent with man's moral agency—his innermost similitude of nature to the nature of God. To hold the doctrine of infallible perseverance, in the shape referred to by our querist, is to hold the doctrine of necessitated volitions, which is the doctrine of fate and irresponsibility.

As to the power of Satan referred to, we must bear in mind that Satan never does and never can get all things his own way. The Holy Spirit is as near us, as is Satan; and he is stronger, too, than Satan. And it is part of our probation to give ourselves up to be led by Him, and through Him, and through that Jesus whom he exhibits, to combat and to conquer "spiritual wickedness in high places."

#### QUERY 34. BAPTISM WITH FIRE.

"In Mat. iii. and 11, does John discriminate betwixt those who were baptized, *confessing their sins*, and the Pharisees and Sadducees whom he designates a generation of vipers? And does the baptism he attributes to the coming Messiah develop into blessing to the one party, and punishment to the other? Or what does the expression, *and with fire*, mean?"

A. J.—K.

**ANSWER.** There is much diversity of opinion among expositors regarding the interpretation of the words,—"*he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire.*" But, as for ourselves, we are persuaded that the fire referred to is not the fire of punishment, but the fire of purification. This is indicated, we imagine, by the very word "baptize." It has a purificatory reference. And it was the aim, we think, of the Baptist not so much to point out the two final conditions of men under the mediatorial agency of the Messiah, as to contrast the merely symbolical baptism which he himself administered, with the real and penetrative and efficaciously purifying baptism which it is the Saviour's prerogative to confer. The passage, we think, bears analogies to John iii. 5,—"*except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.*" The "water" referred to we regard as a figurative description of the purifying influence of the Holy Spirit. So, we apprehend, is the "fire" referred to in Mat. iii. 11.

#### QUERY 35. ELECT "THROUGH."

"What is there to prevent us from regarding the words—'*through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth,*' in 2 Thes. ii. 13, as being connected with the noun 'salvation,' rather than with the verb 'chosen'?"

J. F.

**ANSWER.** The clause "through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth" is not articulated to the word "salvation" in any

way that would suggest, on merely grammatical grounds, that it was an exegetical appendix to that word. It is certainly natural,—on mere grounds of grammar,—to regard it as denoting the element *in which* the divine election to salvation takes place. We say “in which,” for the expression is literally “*in* sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth.” The corresponding expression in 1 Pet. i. 2 should also be noted,—“elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, *through sanctification of the Spirit, &c.*”

QUERY 36. BY NATURE THE CHILDREN OF WRATH.

“What is the meaning of the word ‘nature’ in Eph. ii. 3? Does it signify the nature of man, either physical or mental? Or does it mean the moral state of the Ephesians in their unregeneracy? If the latter, what is the evidence that such is its meaning?” A. H.

ANSWER. We rather suppose that the word “nature” in the passage specified has a wider scope of reference, and denotes that general system of things, in virtue of which “the children of disobedience” become “the children of wrath.” Compare the 2nd verse. It is *natural* that “the children of disobedience” should be “the children of wrath.” It would be *unnatural* if there were no black shadow of wrath following the act of disobedience. And if there had been no superinduction of a mediatorial scheme upon the original “nature” of things, if there had been no remedial grace, all “the children of disobedience” would have been for ever “the children of wrath.”

QUERY 37. THE DECEITFULNESS AND WICKEDNESS OF THE HEART.

“In Jer xvii. 9, it is said ‘The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked.’ How is this passage to be explained in harmony with the truth, that the soul, as it comes from God, is innocent?” A.—H.

ANSWER. The expression in Jeremiah seems to describe the heart, not as it comes from the Creative Hand, but as it exists in the bosoms of men, in the state in which men actually are in the midst of the engagements of society, and the temptations of the flesh, the world, and the evil one.

QUERY 38. DO INFANTS NEED REGENERATION?

“If the soul of man, as it comes from God, is innocent, neither sinful nor holy, does it, in cases where death takes place in infancy, need regeneration? Or does the statement of Jesus with respect to the universal need of the new birth relate to men as moral agents?” A.—H.

ANSWER. We should certainly think that our Saviour had in view such as are not only germinally, but actually *moral agents*. Infants, however, will doubtless need, when ushered into the spirit-world, a hallowed and hallowing divine influence, that they may be developed into the fulness of moral beauty. And it will be through Jesus that they will be admitted into glory.

## OBITUARY.

## THE REV. PETER MATHER.

ON Jan. 11, 1864, at half-past 10 A.M., the spirit of the Rev. Peter Mather ascended. He was born at Whitekirk, Haddingtonshire, on April 27, 1792, so that he was in his 72nd year, at the time of his decease. He spent the most of his boyhood in the country,—removing to Dunbar, along with the rest of the family, when he was about thirteen years of age. Though ardently aspiring, from an early period of life, after the christian ministry, he did not, for a considerable time, see his way broken up. Hence he became apprenticed to a joiner, and completed his apprenticeship; and thereafter worked at his trade in various places. But Providence whispered to his spirit to step up, as well as to step on. A school became vacant in Roslin. He felt prompted to apply for the situation: and obtained it. Some years rolled past; and voices without or within seemed to be urging him with this call—“higher still.” He got a school in Rose Street, Edinburgh. And thus he was brought to the vicinity of a university. He stepped up. He attended the university classes for the consecutive sessions of a full literary curriculum. In 1819 he entered the divinity hall in Selkirk, where he enjoyed the prelections and other instructions, and came under the patriarchal example and blessed moral influence, of Dr. Lawson. Thence he went to Glasgow, and attended the divinity hall under Dr. Dick. On and up:—He received Presbyterial license, in 1824, to preach the gospel, in the capacity of a probationer, and in connection with the Burgher party of the Secession church. He went hither and thither, preaching the gospel, as best he could, and no doubt with solemn earnestness and zeal. He received two calls, one to Orkney, and another to West Kilbride, Ayrshire. He chose the latter sphere: and was ordained to the pastorate in 1829 or 1830. Time rolled on:—and incidental circumstances led him to dip deep into the points in dispute between Presbyterians and Independents. He was staggered in his first assumptions. He prosecuted his researches; and at length came fully and firmly round to the conclusion

that congregations of believers should be self-governing communities. He resigned his charge in West Kilbride in 1836, preaching on the occasion a loving sermon from 2 Cor. xiii. 11,—“Finally, brethren, farewell. Be perfect, be of good comfort, be of one mind, live in peace; and the God of love and peace shall be with you.” The whole congregation were deeply moved,—many to tears. The concluding Psalm, which he gave out to be sung, was Ps. cxxii. 6–9:—

Pray that Jerusalem may have

Peace and felicity :

Let them that love thee and thy peace

Have still prosperity.

Therefore I wish that peace may still

Within thy walls remain,

And ever may thy palaces

Prosperity retain.

Now, for my friends and brethren's sakes,

Peace be in thee I'll say.

And for the house of God our Lord,

I'll seek thy good alway.

Mr. Mather joined the Independents, receiving from Dr. Wardlaw, and Mr. Greville Ewing the cordial right hand of welcome. He accepted the charge of the small Independent church in Glasgow,—Brown Street, Anderston,—where he laboured for two or three years. Thence he removed to Ardrossan in 1838 or 1839, where he also laboured for several years with quiet ardour and indomitable zeal. While there, he seems to have undergone some enlargement of view in reference to the means of salvation. And the writer of this notice remembers well that in 1840 or 1841 he received, while labouring in Kilmarnock, a visit from Mr. Mather,—who was till that time unknown to him, even by name,—and very cordial was the sympathy, personal and theological, which was mutually expressed. The controversy on the means of salvation developed itself in connection with the Independent churches in the West of Scotland, and very particularly centered in the church in Hamilton, under the pastoral care of the Rev. John Kirk, now of Edinburgh. Mr. Mather went hand in hand with Mr. Kirk; and in consequence, he and his church were dropped off from the fellowship of those opposing churches, who supposed that the tenet of an *infallibly efficacious, or irresistible, influence of the Holy Spirit, reserved for, and unconditionally conferred upon,*

*the unconditionally elected of mankind*, is one of the cardinal doctrines of the christian religion. Mr. Mather bore with equanimity the unbrotherly excommunication, and pursued the even tenor of his way. In 1846 he was removed to Glasgow to undertake the editorial superintendence of the *Christian News* newspaper;—in which responsible and laborious situation he continued till 1858, when failing energies induced him to sigh for the gentler and more congenial labours, which were his first love. He received a call from Blennerhasset, Cumberland, and once more returned to the work of the ministry. But after only four months effort, a knell was rung within the dome of his stately body. It startled both himself and his flock, and his friends at large. He was laid low by a paralytic stroke. He somewhat rallied; but not to such a degree as to permit him to continue his pastoral "labour of love." He hence returned to Scotland,—the land of his nativity; and settled for a season at Barrhead to enjoy the society and pastoral superintendence of the Rev. Alex. Davidson. Thence he removed, after Mr. Davidson's removal, to Glasgow, where he lingered on, an increasingly helpless paralytic, till his fetters were mercifully snapped, and his spirit was released from its corporeal bondage on the morn we have specified,—Jan. 11, 1864. All through his illness, he was carefully nursed by his attentive and devoted wife,—the faithful partner of his toils and cares and joys,—till her own energies succumbed, and she sank a few months before him, a sacrifice to her untiring devotion to her husband. By secret links she seemed to continue to draw him to herself, and he seemed to be drawn. And now they are, again, one for ever, one within the nearer and dearer unity that makes them one with Jesus and with God.

Mr. Mather was "a good man, and full of the Holy Ghost and of faith" (Acts xi. 24). The words might have been prophetically penned by the Divine Spirit to serve for his spiritual photograph: they so accurately pourtray him, as he really was. He was good and godly. He was eminently sincere. He was also a genuine christian gentleman. He was utterly incapable of anything approximating incivility. He was pre-eminently conscientious; and was prepared, we believe, to sacrifice everything on earth,—worldly means, reputation, position, health, and life itself,—for conscience sake.

He was of the very stuff of which martyrs of old were made; and, had he been called to a literally "fiery" trial, he would, we doubt not, have burned at the stake not only without invoking curses on his murderers, but even without so much as uttering a single cry of excruciated nature,—a single agonizing ejaculation.

He was greater morally, than intellectually: though in intellect he was far from being behind the bulk of his compeers. He was firm in his convictions, massive in the exposition of his conceptions, and fertile in the adduction of reasons for his opinions and beliefs. He was ever stately withal. And the fine moral element—his unflinching sincerity and courtesy—gave a condiment to all that he spoke and wrote.

During the years of his paralytic feebleness, we had frequent opportunities of seeing him. And we found him stately, in a sort, to the last. He always recognized us in an instant:—and his strong friendly feelings invariably overflowed in the language that comes readier from the eyes, than do words from the stricken tongue, but is none the less eloquent,—copious tears. Though the fountain of his speech was comparatively sealed, the fountain of his heart was ever welling up and running over. Often, often, did we ask him *if he knew Jesus*. "Yes," he invariably answered, "I know Jesus." Often, often, did we ask him—"do you love Jesus?" "Yes," was the unvarying reply, "I love Jesus." And when we rejoined that *Jesus loved him*, he always wept for joy.

He has rather *broken up*, than *broken down*. His body, indeed, has descended; but his spirit has ascended. Existence has been with him *up, upward*, to the last. But instead of the dim whisper in his soul, "come up higher," it was, at the end, a sweet cherubic summons that thrilled from above into his heart, and said "come up *hither*." He was ready to reply "I come." Who next? and next? and next? Reader, be *thou also* ready.

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## BOOKS.

*The Prince of Light and the Prince of Darkness in conflict; Or, the Temptation of Christ newly translated, explained, illustrated, and applied.* By the REV. ALEXANDER BALLOCH GROSART, Kinross; author of "Jesus mighty to save, or Christ for all the world, and all the world for Christ," "Small sins," &c., editor of the Works, with memoir, of Richard Sibbes, D.D. London: Nisbet. 1864.

WE have had much enjoyment in perusing this volume. It is fresh and practical. And it is animated withal, with a literary enthusiasm, which it is pleasant to witness. The author, moreover, is abundantly self-reliant; though also, we doubt not, spiritually modest. He thus walks firmly, as he treads upon the ground which he has occasion to traverse. He seems to realize that he "knows a thing or two;" and this gives him confidence. And he is, besides, benevolently desirous that others should be sharers of the enjoyment which he has had in the acquisition, development, and literary envelopment of his ideas.

The work, indeed, is but the first instalment of a much larger work, which he purposes, if life and opportunity be afforded, to publish on the same theme. It is therefore, as we take it, only a rough draft, but containing the practical kernel, of something more thorough, comprehensive, and exhaustive, which he hopes to achieve in "a good number of years." It is the earnest of a better work to come. And hence, we presume, there are several questions, at once peculiarly interesting and most important, connected with our Lord's temptation, which are not mooted in the present treatise, and several others which, though mooted, are not discussed. We have nothing to object to the postponement of these investigations; although we do not doubt that Mr. Grosart would have consulted his own literary, theological, exegetical, and philosophical reputation, if he had been content to wait a little, until he was prepared to give, in its full-orbed completeness, the entire result of his labours in this department of research. If he had even begun with the natural prologomena of the subject, and given a volume, which grappled with the first principles involved in his theory of the Temptation, it would, we cannot help thinking, have been more satisfactory, even to his circle of sympathetic readers, and certainly better adapted to conciliate the expectant interest of a more critical circle outside the inner range of his present admirers.

We hope that he will excuse us, if we add, that we believe, that with maturer investigation and consideration, he would have modified some of the present features of his work. We do not mean that he would have found reason to change his ideas regarding the grand principles that underlie his interpretation of the temptation. These principles we consider to be sound,—so far as they assume the historical verity and objective reality of the scenes recorded by the evangelists. But there are numerous retrospective and prospective, personal and economical, physical and spiritual relations of the fiery trial, through which our Lord passed, and passed victoriously and gloriously, which would have adjusted themselves into a grander



and more developed and comprehensive sum-total, if Mr. Grosart had *steeped* his thinking for a few years to come.

There are other odds and ends of things, besides, which would undoubtedly have been modified. And Mr. Grosart will not, we trust, take it amiss, if we refer to some of these. We do it in love, and with a genuine desire that his rising sun may be, to as great an extent as possible, unclouded and unspotted.

There is, for instance, a tendency to egoism in the present volume. Mr. Grosart obtrudes Mr. Grosart too much upon his readers. He will excuse us for saying that he does not hide himself sufficiently behind his subject. And some of the things, too, that he says about himself seem to lie rather far on the line of the complimentary, more especially when either by implication, or by express reference, he compares himself with his ministerial brethren. He has occasion, for instance, to quote a passage from Shakspeare; and, in a note, he says,—

“I cannot help adding here how much I owe to William Shakspeare. I daresay I read his works oftener, and return to them more frequently, than any merely human writings; and I don't know that I ever read a page without personal enjoyment and personal profit. His many-sidedness, his *insight* so wide and yet so minute, so subtle and yet so modest, so strong and yet so tender, so awful and yet so humanly pitiful, so reverent, so believing, is something not less wonderful than blessed. Let me beg of my cleric brethren that they will cast aside their Simeons and Jays, and *fusionless* ‘Plans’ and ‘Skeletons’ of sermons, and turn to the creations—the breathing thoughts in burning words—of wise, gigantic, yet child-like-gentle, William Shakspeare. To *anathematize* him betrays sheer ignorance.”—p. 145.

This is too much in every way. And far more than many, at least, of Mr. Grosart's “cleric brethren” deserve at his hands. We believe that there are numbers of these, who have never had a “Simeon” or a “Jay” or any book of “Plans” or “Skeletons,” at all, in their hands. And we believe that there are still more, who need no stimulus whatever from any younger brother to take a spell now and again, in the volume of “sweet Willie.”

Intimately connected with this egoism, is a tinge of pretentiousness, which we could like to see no more of. He says of himself, for instance,—“I believe I have made myself familiar with the extant literature of the Temptation.”—p. xiii. This certainly is a very large assumption. And although we have a large opinion of the large extent of Mr. Grosart's reading, it is difficult to interpret the assumption in a way which is as creditable to his acquirements as one would wish. We do not doubt, indeed, that Mr. Grosart believes that he has really made himself familiar with “the extant literature of the Temptation.” He speaks what he thinks, when he speaks what he says. But, if we may judge from the present volume, there are indications which afford evidence, not only probable, but we fear demonstrative, that by far the greater part of the literature to which he refers has never yet come at all under his eye, or within the range or outer circle of his cognisance, and of course has not been mastered by him. It is but a very minute part of that literature that is comprised in the English language; and the way in which Mr. Grosart refers to foreign literature, does not in-

dicating a familiar or extensive acquaintance with the vastitude of its stores, in general, or with the lesser vastitude of its stores on this subject of Christ's Temptation, in particular.

In connection with this tendency to pretentiousness, we may instance the way in which Mr. Grosart makes reference to the old Syriac version of the New Testament, the Peshito. He says:—

"I may note in this place, that in the Peshito or Syriac translation of the New Testament,—one of the most venerable of existing versions,—Luke iv. 5, renders  $\epsilon\rho\tilde{\nu}\varsigma$   $\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\varsigma$  by  $ar'o$ —the Land," [he means,— $\epsilon\rho\tilde{\nu}\varsigma$   $\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\varsigma$  in Luke iv. 5 is rendered by  $ar'o$ —the Land]; "but if by 'the Land,' the Holy Land was intended, the phrase, 'all the kingdoms' becomes preposterous; and such a petty possession no share at all. It is difficult to understand where 'the Land' was got by the translators [translator]. I have failed to trace a reading justifying it. Even  $\epsilon\rho\tilde{\nu}\varsigma$   $\gamma\eta\varsigma$  would hardly have done so; but even it I can't discover."—p. 206.

Mr. Grosart speaks, in this passage, as if he needed to turn over lots of dusty manuscripts of the text, or to wade among the folios of the Greek fathers, in order to "discover" a reading which would justify the Peshito version. The uninitiated would imagine that an immense amount of research had been actually expended by our author, since after it all, he "had failed to trace a reading justifying" the version. And yet he had only to glance, for two moments, at the margin of any critical edition of the New Testament, or at the textual annotation of any good expositor, to find the whole evidence, diplomatic and patristic, likely to be available on the subject, spread out in a bird's eye view, or condensed into a nutshell. But this is not all. It is in some respects, the least part of the mirage. The larger part remains behind,—namely that there is nothing at all that is in the slightest degree peculiar or remarkable in the Peshito version of the phrase in question. There is not a shadow of evidence that the Syriac translator interpreted the original Greek as meaning "the Land." If Dr. Cureton or Dr. Murdoch, or any other translator of the Peshito, renders the term employed, by the word "land," he has no other reason, than his own exegetical opinion of the passage, for the rendering. And all the greater scholars, who have published translations of the Peshito, render the word not "land," but "earth." The word used does indeed mean "land"; but it also means "earth"—"the earth," being simply the Syriac transformation,—akin to the Chaldee  $ar'a$ ,—of the common Hebrew word for "earth." The same word occurs in very numerous passages of the New Testament, in which none would for a moment think of rendering it *land*;—as, for instance, Mat. vi. 10,—"*thy kingdom come, thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth*"; Mat. ix. 6,—"*that ye may know that the son of man hath power on earth to remit sins*"; 2 Pet. iii. 5,—"*by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water*;" 2 Pet. iii. 7,—"*the heavens and the earth, which are now*"; 2 Pet. iii. 10,—"*the earth also, and the works that are therein shall be burned up*;" Rev. i. 5,—"*the first begotten of the dead, and the prince of the kings of the earth*." Rev. i. 7,—"*all kindreds of the earth shall wail because of him*;" &c., &c., &c. We have quoted only a few out of many parallel passages,—parallel so far as the use of the Syriac term is concerned. And in every one of these passages, Dr. Murdoch,

for instance, with all other translators we presume, renders the term, not *land*, but *earth*. Indeed if Mr. Grosart had just turned up the very first verse of the Syriac Bible, "In the beginning God created the heavens and *the earth*," he would have found the word that so puzzles him. The real truth of the matter,—the long and the short of it,—is simply this—*Mr. Grosart does not know Syriac at all*, and should not have attempted to bespangle his work with a Syriac criticism.

There is another place in which he makes an awkward reference to a Syriac matter. In an annotation on Mat. iv. 1, "Then was Jesus led up *of the Spirit* into the wilderness," he says,—

"*The Spirit*.—The article is expressed, and it is singular that Wickliffe should render 'a spirit.' Yet I have been astounded with the numbers who overlook the fact, that it was God the Holy Spirit, not the Devil, who 'led' the Saviour 'to be tempted.' Cureton's Syriac is 'the Spirit of holiness.'"—p. 280.

We dwell not at present on the surprise of Mr. Grosart that Wicklif should give "*a spirit*" instead of "*the Spirit*," and that many expositors and theologians should have supposed that an evil spirit was referred to. The surprise is mitigated when it is remembered that there is no article in the Latin language, and that Wicklif translated from the Latin Vulgate,—from which also multitudes of ancient, mediæval, and more modern writers, practical and speculative, drew the whole of their scriptural information regarding the temptation. It is, however, Mr. Grosart's remark regarding "Cureton's Syriac," with which, at present, we have to do. One would suppose from it that the Syriac recension discovered, edited, and translated by Dr. Cureton, differed in the particular specified, from the common text of the Peshito. *But it is not so*. Why, then, say "*Cureton's Syriac*"?

We do not think that Mr. Grosart has been happy in his new translation of the passages in the evangelists, which record the Saviour's temptation. And both in his translation, and in his notes in justification of it, he hardly displays that scholarship which would warrant him to speak so depreciatingly of Alford and some other critics, as he does. He translates, for instance, the 1st verse of Mat. iv. thus:—"Then Jesus was led up *within* the wilderness *under* The Spirit, *in order* to be tempted *under* the Devil." Now, passing by the superfluous number of capital letters, we think that Mr Grosart has been unfortunate in the choice of the words we have italicised. The preposition, which he renders "*within*" (*εἰς*), naturally denotes motion *into* or *unto* the object which it governs, not rest *within* it. The preposition again, which he renders "*under*," does indeed bear, as its primary import, that signification. But it does not, in such applications as those before us, conventionally denote what in English we conventionally mean by the word "*under*." And it is no more idiomatic to render it *under* in the first verse of Matthew Fourth, than it would be in such passages as the following:—"all that heard it wondered at those things which were told them *under* the shepherds,"—"the beggar died, and was carried *under* the angels into Abraham's bosom;"—"when he was demanded *under* the Pharisees when the kingdom of God should come;"—"and ye shall be hated *under* all men for my name's sake;"—"which was well reported of *under* the brethren which were at Syria and Iconium."

As to the other expression which we have italicised, "*in order* to be tempted," it belongs not to translation, but to exposition,—two distinct functions of interpretation which are confounded by Mr. Grosart.

The second verse in Matthew's narrative Mr. Grosart renders thus:—"and having fasted *days forty*, and *nights forty*, afterwards he was hungry." We are surprised at the unidiomatic transposition which we have italicised, but which Mr. Grosart regards as "imparting vividness." It may be so in his idea of things; but it is in vain to battle with the established idiom of our tongue. And he might, with the same propriety, contend that in the following verse, we should read, not "these stones," or "these, the stones," but "the stones, these,"—"command that *the stones, these*, be made bread."

Mr. Grosart's rendering of the 3rd verse of Matthew is as follows:—"And being come to Him, the Tempter said, if Son Thou be of *The God*, speak, in order that these, the stones, may become loaves." But, assuredly, Mr. Grosart would not attempt to carry out into the New Testament at large this mode of rendering the articulated name of God. Surely he would not say "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with *the God*." This would murder our idiom. It is true, indeed, that, in English, we can use the article, at times, before the word "God" because of the radical relativity of the meaning of the name, in distinction from the irrelativity of such a name, for instance, as Jehovah. But in conventional English, the relativity of the name "God" is, in actual usage, very generally merged in an absolute idea. The measure, however, of our English conventionality in this matter, is not the precise measure of the conventionality of the Greeks; and hence the English and Greek tongues are not exactly parallelistic in the usage of the article. In this, as well as in many other expressions, and classes of expression, it would be to wage war on our idiom, if we were to attempt to produce in translation an exact mechanical echo of the articulations of the Greek original. Such an unidiomatic parallelism would sometimes amount to an actual inversion of the substantive idea that lies under the conventionalism. *And it is so in the case before us*,—as Mr. Grosart may see in a moment, if he consider the common Hebrew idiom in reference to the article, when two nouns are in regimen, and if he then take into account the Hebraizing nature of Matthew's Greek.

Mr. Grosart translates the fourth verse thus:—"But He answering spake, It is written, Not upon bread alone shall live *the man*, but upon every word proceeding through the mouth of God." Here again he mistakes, we apprehend, the import of the article, and supposes that the expression, which we have italicised, means "*the man*, *i.e.* the God-fearing, God-trusting man"; whereas, as is evident from multitudes of collateral instances, as well as from Deut. viii, 3 itself, the meaning is, "*the being* who is man," which is just equivalent to the abstract word "man."

The 5th verse is thus rendered by Mr. Grosart:—"Then the devil *took* Him with him unto the Holy City, and set Him upon the *wing* of the temple." We quote it, to note (1) an oversight, and (2) an unwarrantable limitation. The oversight is in the first word italicised. The verb is in the present tense in the original, and is, so far as tense is concerned, correctly rendered "taketh" in our authorized version. It must, we

presume, be by simple oversight that Mr. Grosart returns to the free præterite translation of the vulgate, Luther, and Tyndale. (2.) The unwarrantable limitation is connected with the word "wing";—which, says Mr. Grosart, "Brameld renders 'gable,' following Luther." But it is not the case that Luther's word necessarily means 'gable.' It is *zinne*, which may denote, generally, *summit* or *ridge*, or the *parapeted roof* of a building, or the *machicolated embattlement* of the top of a tower.

The 6th verse runs thus in Mr. Grosart's version:—"And says to Him, If Son Thou be of *The God*, cast Thyself *beneath*, for it is written that to the angels of Him will He command concerning Thee, and *upon* [their] hands they shall bear Thee up, lest ever thou mayest strike against a stone Thy foot." Here we have again the unidiomatic expression "The God." And, instead of the "down" of our authorized version and its English predecessors, we have "beneath";—as if Satan had asked the Saviour to inject himself beneath the structure, and thus beneath the foundation of the temple's wing. And yet Mr. Grosart not only gives this translation. He actually contends for it. He says, "I apprehend the preposition refers to *place*, and therefore is to be rendered 'beneath.'" Just as if *down* were not as much a word of locality or place, as *beneath*. He gives, too, the unidiomatic translation,—"*to* the angels will he *command*"; forgetting that the original Greek verb is by no means a precise synonyme of the English verb "command"; as is obvious when the force of the primitive element of the word (*τέλλω*) is considered. The composition of the term causes the mind to think of some effect produceable or produced *in* the parties commanded, not of the mere direction of an injunction *to* the beings addressed. Again, Mr. Grosart contends for "*upon* their hands" instead of "*in* their hands"; and he approves of Mr. Thrupp's remark, when he says, "The difference between '*in* their hands' and '*on* their hands' is nearly the same with the difference between '*under* her wings" and "*on* her wings." But here again substance is sacrificed to shadows, essence to form and formality. For the clasping of an object *in* the hands, when once it comes *on* them,—the clasping that ensures safety and preservation,—is not suggested, so far as our conventional idiom is concerned, when we say—"they shall bear thee up *upon* their hands."

The 7th verse is rendered by Mr. Grosart in the following manner:—"Jesus said to him again, It is written, Not tempt shalt thou *Jehovah*, the *God of thee*." We italicise *Jehovah*; for most assuredly there is no such term in the Greek New Testament. And if our Lord, or the Divine Spirit, approved of the version given to the peculiar Hebrew name by the Septuagint translators, and introduced it into the New Testament, it does not devolve upon us to resile from the divine precedent and sanction, so far as translation is concerned. In exegesis, indeed, we shall do well to note the instances in which the word employed denotes the absolute,—as distinguished from the instances in which denotes the relative, name. But exegesis is one thing and translation is another: and the offices or functions of the two departments of interpretation will not be lightly confounded by competent scholars. We have also italicised the expression, "*God of thee*." It is certainly a clumsy substitute for "thy God." And so,—for we must bring these

criticisms to a conclusion,—is the expression which our author employs in ver. 10,—“Then Jesus says to him, Go [*at the back of me*],” instead of “Get thee behind me,” (that is, “get thee *to the back of me*.”) As to the new translation of the 13th verse of Luke’s narrative, it is a positive oddity:—“and the Devil, having ended *all a temptation*, withdrew until a fitting opportunity.” “It is not,” says Mr. Grosart, “*The Temptation* as in our English version, but *A Temptation* ;”—as if there were in the Greek an actual indefinite article. But we refrain. And we shall not proceed to point out other infelicitous details in Mr. Grosart’s new translation. Our author, we have not the smallest doubt, would have produced a very different sort of thing, if he had allowed the light of days to shine upon his first conceptions, until they had got somewhat ripened and mellowed.

Indeed, we should not have gone, as we have done, into the specification of the infelicities and inaccuracies which disfigure Mr. Grosart’s volume, if he had not assumed a rather high tone in reference to translations and commentaries; and if he had not, in an especial and somewhat extraordinary manner, spoken contemptuously of one who should certainly be no object of contempt,—Dean Alford. Indeed he speaks of the Dean in such a tone as is fitted to suggest that he must be actuated by some personal grudge, pique, spite, or other animus. He says:—

“We have in this as in multitudes of places in his Greek Testament for ‘Theological Students and Ministers,’ a betrayal of that want of *deliberation* and thoroughness of scholarship in those niceties that mark the genuine from the second-hand scholar and exegete, which crowd his pages with the most hap-hazard and not less illiterate and shallow than self-contradictory interpretations. As a young man I should hesitate to so characterize a work that has met with wide acceptance; but having in the prosecution of my own studies habitually used Alford, and found him perpetually most disappointing and inexact, I will not shrink from saying, that I know no modern Expositor of Holy Scripture who more needs his own dogmatic ‘Beware,’ whether as concerns *insight* into ‘the mind of the Spirit’ or *scholarship*.”—p. 86.

Now, though we are far from being indiscriminate admirers of the Dean, we must say that this is strong depreciation, and, so far as we can see, as gratuitous as it is strong. It seems to be utterly uncalled for in the circumstances; and therefore, it appears, at least at first-sight, to indicate a personal prepossession, like what might be expected as the effect of some unforgotten wound in the region of the *amour propre*. But Mr. Grosart does not content himself with general denunciation. He tries to grapple with the Dean in details. He quotes, for instance, a remark of the Dean in support of his own translation of a part of the 1st verse of Matthew’s narrative,—“Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit into the wilderness, *in order to be tempted*.” He says:—

“I may here adduce Alford: ‘*to be tempted*: the express purpose of *was led up*. No other rendering is even grammatical. Hence it is evident that our Lord at this time was not “led up” of his own will and design, but as a part of the conflict with the Power of darkness, He was *brought* to the Temptation. As He had been subject to his earthly parents at Nazareth, so now he is subject in the outset of His official course, to his heavenly Parent, and is by his will thus carried up to be tempted.’” [So far Alford. Mr. Grosart continues—] “In passing, I have these remarks to make upon this note:—(1.) There is surely incaution in affirming that the going to the Temptation was not of the Lord’s own will and design. It was not of His own *will-ing* or *design-ing*, that is, it was contrived for Him; but that is some-

thing very different from its not having been his will and design. His Father's will became His will; and certainly, in harmony therewith, it was his 'design,' in going forth, 'to be tempted.' (2.) Why 'in the outset' only? Throughout and to the close He was 'obedient,' was *the servant*. (3.) The Dean mistakes when he says, 'no other rendering is grammatical,' for according to the usage of the verb, it signifies not to 'tempt' merely, but 'to put to the test,' 'to put to the proof,' 'to prove,' all of which are warrantable and 'grammatical.' Perhaps he means that only as the infinitive to *was led up* can to be tempted be rendered grammatically; but he does not say so. Moreover, who ever thought of construing, grammatically or ungrammatically, otherwise?"—p. 281.

Now, this attempt at criticism is extremely unripe, extremely unhappy, and in extremely bad taste. It is utterly unworthy of Mr. Grosart, and must, surely, have been distilled from his quill, when some bitterness of feeling was brewing in his heart, and casting a shade, by its fumes, before his eyes. To begin with the end;—the last remark of Mr. Grosart,—“Moreover, who ever thought of construing, grammatically or ungrammatically, otherwise?” It astounds us. Is it really the case, that Mr. Grosart knows so little of the history of the interpretation of the passage which he “newly translates, explains, illustrates, and applies,”—and with “the extant literature of which he believes he has made himself familiar”? Is this really the case? Does he not know that a respectable number of critics have actually contended that the verb *to be tempted* does not denote the “purpose” that was involved in the leading up of Jesus into the wilderness? Does he not know that they contend that the verb *to be tempted* denotes “result” and not “purpose”:—“Jesus was led up into the wilderness, so that he was tempted”? If he does not know this, he knows very little indeed of the exegetical history of the passage which he undertakes to expound. And if he does know it, how was it possible for him to put his question, —“who ever thought of construing, grammatically or ungrammatically, otherwise?” It is, of course, perfectly obvious to every one who is at all aware of the real state of the case, that the Dean was simply excluding, by his observation, the *ecbatic* interpretation to which we have referred. He rightly excludes it as ungrammatical.

But Mr. Grosart remarks, as follows:—“Perhaps he means that only as the infinitive to *was led up* can to be tempted be rendered grammatically; but he does not say so.” To which we would reply,—True, the Dean does not say so, and, of course, he did not think so. The Dean knew better what he was about. He meant and says,—not, that the one verb is to be rendered as the infinitive to the other,—but, that the infinitive of the one verb, in its relation to the other, denotes *purpose*,—the purpose embodied in the action which is passively expressed in the verb that goes before.

Let us now take a step farther back:—“The Dean,” says Mr. Grosart, “mistakes when he says, ‘no other rendering is grammatical,’ for according to the usage of the verb, it signifies not to ‘tempt’ merely, but ‘to put to the test,’ etc., etc.,—all of which are warrantable and ‘grammatical.’” Is it indeed so? And does Mr. Grosart not know the difference between “grammatical” and “lexicographical.” The Dean does not say a word about the lexical meaning, or meanings, however interrelated, and dovetailing or diverging, of the word *to be tempted*. He had nothing to do with that matter. He assumes that his readers

are familiar with it. But he is speaking of a point of grammar, and indicates, without any "mistake," the import of the "grammatical" connection of the two verbs employed in the evangelist's narrative. The "mistake" is wholly on the part of Mr. Grosart.

We go back to Mr. Grosart's *secondly* :—"why in the 'outset' only"? But the Dean does not say "only." He speaks, indeed, of the "outset." And he had a good right to do so; because, as a matter of fact, the inspired biographers are themselves speaking,—in the event referred to,—of the start of the Redeemer's official career.

And now we get to Mr. Grosart's *firstly* :—which is simply a piece of hypercriticism, resolving itself into a logomachy. The Dean obviously means the very thing which Mr. Grosart himself means. And he says what he means quite as distinctly, and less clumsily than Mr. Grosart.

Our author, we imagine, will require other weapons, and of a different temper, before he will find himself sufficiently panoplied for a critical encounter with the Dean. He does not know this, however. And hence he returns to the attack at a future stage of his Exposition. In explaining the 8th verse of Matthew's narrative,—in which it is said that the devil "sheweth" our Lord all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them :—he says of the verb "sheweth,"—"With reference to this verb, Webster and Wilkinson, *in loco* Luke iv 5, very properly render it 'pointed out.' Dean Alford on Mat. iv. 8 mistakes when he makes this equivalent to 'points out the *direction of*,' and then thrashes his own man of straw."—p. 203. But the "mistake" is, again, entirely and humiliatingly Mr. Grosart's; and the man of straw is of his own manufacturing. The Dean had no intention whatever of reprobating the translation approved of by Webster and Wilkinson, and by a host of other critics. He only very properly reprobates and pushes aside an interpretation which has been given to the word by certain rationalistic interpreters,—apparently unknown to Mr. Grosart,—who, to get quit of the supposed miracle of shewing from the mountain-top all the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time, contended that the evangelists mean that Satan merely *pointed out* to our Lord *the direction* in which these kingdoms lay;—relatively, namely, to the mountain on which they stood. In short, Mr. Grosart seems not to have attained that moderate measure of acquaintance with his subject, historically viewed, that would have enabled him to understand, at a glance, the Dean's references.

We are pained to make these observations. But Mr. Grosart's wanton attribution of "illiteracy" to a man of such culture as the Dean,—an impeachment entirely ultroneous, utterly uncalled for, and actually arising, as we have seen, at least in the instances specified, the instances in which Mr. Grosart "condescends upon" particulars, from a real inacquaintance with literature,—has prompted us to discharge the unpleasant duty. We would not have had it to discharge, if Mr. Grosart had "waited a bit," ere he rushed into print on so large a subject,—a subject demanding for its treatment so peculiar a training. In matters of New Testament criticism, it is not the man, who cites as his editorial authorities for a textual reading, "Webster and Wilkinson, and Wordsworth, as before them Tittman and Robinson," (p. 279), while he omits *all the real authorities*, who is qualified to speak in a tone of scholarly elevation, or to administer a rebuke to the Dean of Canterbury.



In the department of old English divinity, however, we believe that Mr. Grosart is an authority, and is entitled to speak as *ex cathedra*. And had he confined himself, in his fights or flights, to what he had found in that region, it is not likely that he would have done damage to his rising reputation. Many of his references, indeed, to that early English literature, do not jump with our ideas of things. Sometimes, too, quotations are thrust forward with what appears to be something like a dash of ostentation. There is often an unnecessary profusion or obtrusion. At other times books are referred to in a style that either betrays a recent acquaintanceship, and the wonderment that is connected with novelty, or that indicates a judgement of which we cannot fully approve; as when, for instance, he speaks of Richard Ward's "extraordinary folio (1640) expository of the gospel of Matthew." At other times comparisons are infelicitous; as when, for example, he says,—“the most scholarly of early Scottish Divines, Professor Dickson,” (p. 188) forgetting Andrew Melville—who soared, in scholarship, as in acumen and general genius, far above Dickson, eminent as Dickson is. Nevertheless we greatly love Mr. Grosart's enriching references to the early English expositors of our Lord's temptation. And we only regret that, amid the galaxy of Puritan worthies, whom he has collected, he has omitted one, who was a star of the first magnitude, and whose light shone brilliantly on the subject of the temptation,—William Perkins, in his “*Combate between Christ and the Devil displayed*.” We could also have wished, for our own benefit's sake, to have seen some quotations from Thomas Bentham, Henry Mason, Mr. Murcote, and John Allington,—especially Thomas Bentham. And we could have liked, too, some references to Jeremy Taylor, and Bishop William Cowper. But we must be satisfied with the favours conferred. And we are grateful.

*The Day-Star: a Monthly Magazine, devoted to the Revival of Religion.*

Second Series, Vol. II. London: Jackson, Walford, & Hodder. 1863.

It is a “*Day-Star*,” shedding, we doubt not, into many a heart, gentle light from above, and heralding the advent into consciousness of the glorious Orb of spiritual day. It is faithful to its relation, as a fore-runner of the Sun. It ministers to Christ.

As a periodical, it is admirably and ably conducted, reflecting the highest credit on the editor.

*The Dew-Drop: a monthly Magazine for the young.* Second series,

vol. 1. Glasgow: Christian News Office. 1863.

THIS *Dew-drop* refreshes sweetly, we believe, many a tender plant, and fits it for a healthy growth. Beautifully, too, does it reflect the rays of the Sun of righteousness. It sparkles with light. Long may its devoted editor be spared to prosecute her labour of love.

*Ragged Life in Egypt.* By M. L. Whately. London: Seeley, &c. 1863.

THE authoress of this handsome little volume is a “member of the society for promoting female education in the East,” and is, evidently,

a fine specimen of a christian lady. Her whole heart has been set upon doing good, in the way of leading poor little Moslims, Copts, and other juvenile wanderers, to Christ. Her love—the reflection, we believe, of the love of her Saviour—seems to have made an impression upon a little circle of the poor in Cairo, whom she sought to bless. And, doubtless, a vast multiplication of such labourers would eventually result in some appreciable modification of eastern society. “Awake, O north wind,” come and blow upon the southern and eastern gardens, that the spices thereof may flow out! The good lady’s book is a simple but graphic memorial of what she did and witnessed in Cairo.

*The Church: its Past, Present, and Future.* By P. W. Perfitt. London. 1863.

DR. PERFITT, a medical gentleman, is the chief speaker in connection with a congregation holding *theistic* principles,—theistic, in antithesis to Trinitarian, or Biblical, or Christian. He seems to be an honest and earnest philanthropic labourer,—seeking to do good as best he can, according to his present views. He is, besides, exceedingly perspicacious in the direction of all that is inconsistent in the existing state of religious institutions. He would fain have all things right. But, he imagines, that *whatever is, is wrong*. The very bible itself, it seems, is, in the main, wrong. And nothing is right but astronomy, geology, botany, music, and dancing, &c.

We think that Dr. Perfitt has misunderstood man in his innermost essence, and consequently in his most inner wants. He is an advocate for morality; but he has not, we think, found its true basis. He believes in God; but he does not realise his chief relations to human nature.

He excels, moreover, far more in *destruction* than in *construction*. He is, though unwittingly, rather a *deformer* than a *reformer*. He forgets that it is not by calling out to every thing that is—“I tell you, you are bad,” neither is it by saying “No,”—that society can be reconstructed. It is by introducing something that is “yea and amen,”—some great and far-reaching positive verity which will work among men as a little lump of leaven, till the whole mass be interpenetrated and transformed.

“*This Do in Remembrance of Me.*” London: Nisbet. 1862.

A SWEET little explanation of the ordinance of the Lord’s Supper, and an enforcement of the duty of observing it. It is admirably fitted for being put into the hands of young believers of the gospel. As we ourselves love exceedingly the simple ordinance, and find it to be a feast indeed, we rejoice over every judicious effort to unfold its import, and to commend its celebration. Such an effort is the one before us.

*Life in Light: or, The highest welfare of Man found in the knowledge of Jehovah.* A series of discourses by the Rev. JOHN KIRK of Edinburgh. Glasgow: Christian News Office. 1864.

A MOST precious volume;—full not only of truth, but of that which is emphatically “the truth.” Its way, too, of exhibiting the truth is

eminently fitted to stimulate to thoughtfulness in the right direction, and thus to guide the spirit, when thoughtfulness has been aroused, to "the one thing needful" for peace, purity, and everlasting salvation. We heartily commend and recommend the volume.

*The Queen's English: Stray Notes on Speaking and Spelling.* By Henry Alford, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. London: Strahan. 1864.

WHILE we can by no means coincide with Dean Alford in all his notions regarding *the Queen's English*,—just as we cannot see precisely as he sees in all his ideas regarding *the Exegesis of the New Testament*,—we have read with zest the little book before us. It is pleasingly infectious: for it is written with zest. And, although quite off-hand, and free and easy, it hits many a nail on the head. It is certainly a pleasingly communicative,—we had almost said a delightfully talkative—companion, for rail or boat, or for the recreative hour amid severer studies.

*My Ministerial Experiences.* By the Rev. Dr. Büchsel, Berlin. London: Strahan. 1863.

WHILE we differ from Dr. Büchsel on several important doctrinal points, we find him experienced in things spiritual, and characterized by a large amount of instinctive prudence and genuine wisdom. Young ministers cannot but get important hints from the perusal of his narrative. And it is specially interesting, too, as affording us glimpses of the peculiarities of private ecclesiastical life, and of public ecclesiastical movements, in Germany.

*Sketch of the Life and Labours of Robert Gray Mason, Temperance Advocate.* By William Logan, Glasgow, author of *Sketches of the Temperance Labours of John Dunlop, William Collins, Joseph Livesey, &c.* London. Tweedie. 1864.

A FASCINATING little work,—the effort of love to weave an amaranthine coronal for a veteran and efficient labourer in the great enterprise of Temperance.

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AGAINST  
THEE,  
THEE ONLY,  
HAVE I SINNED.  
(Ps. li. 4.)

EVERY one of our readers will undoubtedly be able to look upward to God, and to say—"Against *thee* have I sinned." Every one will be conscious of having come short, in some things at least, of the duty which he has owed to God. Some things he will have done, which he ought to have left undone. Some things he will have left undone, which he ought to have done. God is our Father: have we loved him, and loved him all along, with that filial affection that is due? He is the best of Fathers: have we loved him supremely? He is the kindest: have we loved him warmly and devotedly? He is the wisest: have we always preferred his will to the will of every other being, and made our own impulsive wishes entirely subservient? He is the loftiest Potentate, the highest Magistrate in the universe: have we always revered him? and stood in awe? and feared to offend? God is God, as well as King of kings, and Father of fathers: have we always adored him? and sought in him the end, even as we have found in him, the beginning, of our being?

When we start such questions as these;—when we not only start, but pursue and apply them;—when we bring them, like touchstones and tests, into contact with our every-day demeanour;—when we weigh ourselves by means of them as in the scales of a balance;—when we measure ourselves as by the moral foot-rule which they put into our hands:—the conclusion, we should

suppose, to which every one must come, will be this,—“Against thee, O God, have I sinned.”

Some may have sinned more grievously than others. The sins of some may have been more gross than the sins of others. Some may have sinned against greater light than has been enjoyed by others. The temptations amid which some have been placed, and by which they have been besieged, may have been far less formidable than the temptations that have encompassed others. And thus there will undoubtedly be degrees in the sinfulness of the sinful. Nevertheless, the conscience of each, we apprehend, will be ready to say,—“Thou art the man.” Each will have reason to exclaim with Isaiah of old, “Woe is me, for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips;” or perhaps some might modify Isaiah’s confession and say, “Woe is me, for I am a man of unclean heart, and I dwell in the midst of a people whose hearts are unclean.” At all events, all will be ready with all solemnity to take home the language of the royal psalmist, each looking up and exclaiming for himself,—“Against thee have I sinned.”

But while all will thus feel, perhaps there are not a few who have a feeling of difficulty in saying—“against thee, thee only, have I sinned.” Would to heaven that I could use such language!—is perhaps the inward exclamation of several, or it may be of many. Such persons may be conscious, that, at this very moment, their thoughts are flitting back, with far more than the rapidity of lightning, over the events of their past life. And in reviewing, amid the vivid flashes of far-reaching recollections, the long list of their actions toward their fellow-men,—their actions secret and overt,—they cannot but note with pain and self-humiliation, that they have done, not only to God, but also to man, many things which they ought to have left undone, and left undone many things which they ought to have done. Perhaps some one remembers that by folly or ingratitude he brought down to the grave, in sorrow, the grey hairs of an excellent and indulgent father. Perhaps another remembers that, in a moment of wild passion, he spoke daggers into the heart of the mother who bore him, and nursed him, and taught his infant lips to lisp the words of prayer. Perhaps another remembers that he was for years a domineering tyrant over a younger brother. Perhaps another remembers that he was guilty of wanton cruelty either to some who were poorer, or to some who were weaker, or to some who, by reason of being maimed, or lame, or otherwise partially disabled, ought to have been treated with special tenderness and sympathy. Perhaps some one remembers that he acted on several occasions in

reference to his most intimate companions, with undoubted selfishness. If it should be doubtful to others whether he acted thus, his own conscience, at all events, cannot doubt it. Perhaps there may even have been acts of positive dishonesty. In some way or other, all have been faithless or unkind to their fellow-men. And how then could any look up to God and say—"Against thee, *thee only*, have I sinned"?

Not only so. But it is noteworthy that, in the very title of this penitential psalm, it is said that it was composed by king David in consequence of the faithful dealing with him of Nathan the prophet, in reference to the crimes which he had perpetrated in the matter of Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah. He had dishonoured Bathsheba. He had taken base advantage over Uriah, and dishonoured him too; although he was not only a man, and a subject, but a devoted and trusty servant,—an officer, of noble character, in his army. The king had heaped injury above injury on Uriah, and tried meanly to deceive him. And when he could not succeed, he cruelly and treacherously contrived and procured his death. The whole affair was an interwoven net-work of crimes. And the monarch's heart, by and by, as well it might, was bowed down, and broken, under a sense of his aggravated criminality. And how, then, are we to account for it, that in these very circumstances,—when he was far indeed from being in the mood for extenuating his wickedness,—how are we to account for it that he expresses the depth of his penitence by saying—"Against thee, *thee only*, have I sinned?" Had he not sinned against Bathsheba as well? Had he not sinned, very emphatically, against Uriah? Had he not sinned against the entire community at whose head he stood, and who could not but reap some very bitter consequences from his evil-doings? How are we to account for the psalmist's language?

It is to be accounted for, we would reply, on the principle that here and there throughout the Bible, we have gleams of the profoundest philosophy. The Bible as a whole, indeed, is not a system of philosophy. It could not be a book for the millions, if it were. It could not be a book for millions of millions. It could not be a book for the young as well as for the old; for the savage as well as for the sage; for universal man. Philosophers have always been but a small fraction of mankind. They must always continue to be, at least under the present progressive dispensation of things, a very small minority of the race. It would hence have been unwise and unkind—and therefore undivine—to have made the Bible a system of philosophy.

Nevertheless there is underlying the contents of the Bible the grandest, the profoundest, and the sublimest of all philosophies:

and here and there we find incidental clefts or openings, up through which jets of this philosophy spring or gush into view. The expression before us is one of these. It is an expression which finds its vindication, and receives its explanation, in the great and dominant idea that *all sin is relative to God*. Sin is *sin*, because it is antagonism to the will of God. If speculation were successful in taking away the idea of God, it would also be successful in taking away the idea of sin. The atheist has no place in his system of things for the idea of sin. The pantheist, as well as the atheist, is constrained to let go the idea of sin; and, in his last analysis, he fears not to proclaim that "whatever is, is right." Sin can have no existence, if there be not a personal God, whose will is a perfect rule for the demeanour of his moral creatures. And thus, there can be no place in any creature's mind for the idea of sin, if there be no place for the idea of God.

There may be cruelty where there is no place for the idea of God. Wolves, and bears, and tigers, may be cruel. But their cruelty is not sin. There may be overriding selfishness, where there is no place for the idea of God,—selfishness that seeks to make all surrounding things subordinate to its own gratification. This selfishness we find in multitudes of the inferior creatures. But, though often exceedingly inconvenient to other creatures, and to man, it is not sin. The jackdaw does not sin. The horseleech does not sin. The hyena does not sin. And if there were no place in the mind of man for the idea of God, man too would be incapable of sinning. He might continue, indeed, to be supremely devoted to self. He would be far more self-indulgent than he is. He might be sordid. He might be sensual. He might be cruel. He might be brutal. But his self-indulgence, his lust of lucre, his lust of sensual pleasure, his lust for blood, his cruelty, his ferocity, his brutality, would not be sin.

If the idea of a God be fictitious: if it be a mere fancy: if it have beneath it no base of reality: if there be no personal God: there can be no code of morals absolutely binding upon man. If there be no divine lawgiver, there can be no absolute moral law. And if there be no absolute moral law, murder would be no murder, theft would be no theft, lying would neither be a virtue nor a vice, licentiousness, however flagrant or prodigious, would be no criminality. And if all this were the case, how could man have confidence in man? How could property be held, but by might? How could the family-relationship be maintained? How could commercial credit be established? How could complicated business be transacted? How could civilization be maintained, not to say advanced? How, in short, could society hang together? What one possession of any one individual would be secure for one hour? It is abundantly manifest that in atheism

and pantheism there are the elements of the speedy dissolution and annihilation of all that is valuable and desirable in human society.

And as the idea of sin is relative to the idea of God; so it is just in proportion as our idea of God is intensified, and magnified, and purified, that our idea of sin, and of our own sin, will be quickened into something corresponding to God's own idea of it, when he declares it to be the one "abominable thing which he hates." When we *sin*, we *sunder* ourselves in thought, and in feeling, and in will, from God. We depart in spirit from God. And when we return, in thought, to God,—when we return to him as the Infinite and infinitely perfect Being,—the Being who is infinitely perfect in all his ideas of things, in all his feelings in reference to things, and in his will about things,—then it is that we see light in his light, and perceive clearly that opposition to his wish and will is not only, *in one direction*, folly and moral madness; and, *in another direction*, the grossest unkindness, and the most heartless ungratefulness; and, *in another* still, cruelty toward our fellow creatures; but is also,—what is comprehensive of all, and more than all,—“sin.” It is “sin,” and “exceeding sinful,” just because it is opposition to God.

Popularly speaking, we may say indeed, that we sin against men as well as against God. The Bible thus speaks in several passages. And certainly, whether we speak popularly or philosophically, we may say with perfect truthfulness, that King David acted very ungenerously, very unkindly, very selfishly, very cruelly, toward man. And all who act on the same line of things act ungenerously, unkindly, selfishly and cruelly. But when we take a high philosophic standpoint in thought, and look at things in the clearest light that can be shed upon them,—then we see that as all sin is relative *to God*, and as nothing could be sin but what is opposition *to God*, so it is, in the highest sense of the terms, awfully true that all our sins—so far as *they are sins*—are launched *against God only*. Against men we may act malignly and cruelly. It is against God, *God only*, that we sin.

And hence it is, as well as for some other interlinking reasons, that atonement is needed *by God only* in order to the forgiveness of sins. Man may very often forgive man without atonement. For man, strictly speaking, however unkindly and cruelly used and abused, is not the being who has been *sinned* against. The unkindness of the sin, its cruelty, its malice, may have been against man. But its sinfulness has been wholly against God.

O how glad we ought to be that God is willing and wishing to forgive our sins. How glad we ought to be that he himself has provided an atonement, whereby they may be consistently forgiven!—an atonement, whereby every single soul that lives may



have all its sins forgiven, and itself saved with everlasting salvation! "Thanks be unto God for his unspeakable gift"—Christ Jesus, "who loved *us* (who loved *all*), and gave himself for us (and for *all*)."

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THOUGHTS ON  
DEPENDENCE, RESPONSIBILITY, AND FUTURE JUDGEMENT.

MUCH has been, and is still, said concerning the respective provinces of reason and faith, science and revelation. No anxiety, however, need be felt regarding the final settlement of such problems; because ultimately, reason and faith, science and revelation, must terminate on the multiform and harmonious excellencies of Him who is the Truth. It cannot be doubted that reason and faith must generically speak one language, and bear concurrent testimony concerning Him "in whom we live, and move, and have our being," and who "has appointed a day in the which he will judge the world by that man whom he hath ordained." That men are dependent on God, that they are responsible to him for their conduct, and that he will at some future time judge them in equity, are the generic truths of the Scriptures. All the divine utterances of the holy men who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, presuppose, and derive their convictive force from, these three fundamental principles. These same principles, however, are affirmed by reason, as fully as they are taught by revelation. The Word of God ever appeals to certain indestructible convictions of the human mind, and, hence, carries within it, to a large extent, its own credentials as an utterance of divine thought. Let the affirmations of human reason concerning the dependence and responsibility of man, and the coming day of judgement, be properly ascertained, and it will be found impossible to dispute the truthful accuracy with which the Bible develops, expounds, and applies these principles to human life and destiny. Yea, let every line of the Bible be blotted out, still there are beliefs and convictions within us, which assert our dependence and responsibility, and which demand as their logical and rational complement, a day in which God shall judge the world in righteousness, and render to every man according to his works. Men may throw away God's blessed Bible, but when they have done so, there is another Bible written on the immortal pages of their souls, which testifies that man is dependent and responsible, and that God will judge every man according to his deeds.

We desire to point out the complete coincidence of what God's word teaches, and man's reason affirms, concerning the three subjects at the head of this article.

### I. MAN'S DEPENDENCE ON GOD.

That which is taught in the Bible on this subject is expressed in the words of Paul to the philosophers of Athens,—“In God we live, and move, and have our being.” God “giveth us life, and breath, and all things.” This commends itself to every man as the truth. For, first of all, it is a simple fact that *we do exist, or have being*. We are something, instead of nothing. Doubt is impossible on this point. There is nothing of which I can have greater certainty than that I have being, real existence. It is also most certain that “we move;” our existence is not an inert existence,—as is the case with mere matter, which moves only as it is moved, and has no inherent activity or motion. We are conscious of a personal activity, a power of moving, of originating changes within and around us. Our being is in its nature active, causative, originative. This we know as a simple fact of consciousness. We move by a self-energy. In many of our movements of mind and of body we are consciously *free movers, free actors*. We affirm that this is a fact of consciousness which no arguments to the contrary can overthrow. This conscious freedom as movers, active agents, is acknowledged by all men, even though right in the teeth of the necessitarian theories of multitudes. And our being, thus endowed with the principle of activity, has an intelligent life. “We live.” In a certain sense, plants live; in another and higher sense, animals live. Among animals, there are some which have a higher form of life than others. They have more, and higher, capabilities in their life. The life which man has, embraces capabilities of the noblest kind. Our life as realized in consciousness, in addition to ordinary animal life, contains the attributes of rational thought and moral sensibility. Our life, as known to us, consists of all the wonderful powers and susceptibilities of thought, feeling, and free action, presented in consciousness.

Here we are, then, *living, moving, and having being*. And here comes the inexorable demand of reason, whence are we, whence came we? Our little brothers and sisters put that question when we first made our appearance among them. They could not be satisfied until an answer of some sort was given. Though they had never heard of the metaphysical axiom, “Whatever begins to be must have a cause,” yet, as a principle of rational thought, they were subject to its power, and asked for a cause of that which formerly was not. The question of the child is the question of

the man. Here I am, living, moving, having being:—whence am I? I have not always been. A few years ago I was not; a few years ago my children were not; whence then are we? The necessities of rational thought demand an explicit answer. Reason says there must be some cause:—what is it? For a time, the young mind may be satisfied with falsehoods about the doctor, and nurse, etc. But these are in due time set aside as insufficient to account for the existence of a human being. The young mind may pause for a season at the parental relationship, as the final answer to its queries. But very speedily even this proximate cause of our life, motion, and being, breaks down under the imperious demands of rational thought. For the question runs back to our parents:—whence were they? From their parents, is the reply. But the old inquiry is as necessary as ever,—whence were our grandparents, and our great, great, great-grandparents? And the inquiry never can cease till we reach the first human pair. A first human pair must ultimately be reached. For no series of human pairs—each pair occupying only a finite duration—can ever constitute an infinite duration, or fill up a past eternity. When we reach the first human pair, the original demand of reason is as inexorable as ever,—whence came they? Since they are not eternal, they began to be, and must have a cause.

If, in reply to this question, it be said, that nature in her wonderful processes and developments produced the first human pair, or a multitude of pairs of human beings, this, in so far as it acknowledges and assigns a cause for the existence of the first human pair, may be satisfying to reason; and reason may rest in it as one stage of its inquiry. Soon, however, the farther question emerges, what is meant by “nature”? Does it mean mere stars, and suns, and rocks, and earths, and seas, and material atoms, with their peculiar properties and laws of operation? If so, these are mere material masses:—they have no life, no thought, no emotion, no self-moving activity. Each one of the atoms of the material universe moves only as it is moved; receives and transmits, but never originates, motion or change. It cannot, therefore, be the cause of thought, emotion, free activity, in man, since it does not possess such properties in itself; and it cannot give to another positive powers and qualities, of which it is destitute. That which is in the effect, cannot exceed, in the least degree, that which pre-existed in the cause. We cannot, therefore, be the product of mere matter. It has nothing in it to account for mind. Neither can any race of living beings be the cause of the human race, for each individual, in each race of living beings, as much requires to be accounted for as each individual of mankind. There is no resting place for reason, in its search after the cause of our existence, in anything which is

finite. For whatever is finite requires to be accounted for by some cause preceding it. The material universe in the whole, as in the parts, is finite, and therefore cannot be the primary cause of any thing in itself,—atom, animal, or man.

We must, therefore, seek for the cause of finite nature, and this cause cannot be anything finite, it must be an Infinite Being, who possesses thought, emotion, and free activity, and who is, therefore, capable of communicating life, activity, and being, to others. This Infinite Being is God, who has life, self-existent life, and thought, and emotion, and activity; and who gives being, and properties to being, in different measures. It is in him man lives, and moves, and has his being. He gives to man life, and breath, and all things. In this, reason rests with perfect satisfaction, and is therefore prepared to receive from the Infinite One, as the cause of his existence, revelations of his thoughts, feelings, and purposes.

There is also a sense of dependence in the human soul,—as conscious of limitation. We necessarily know ourselves as finite. In our consciousness of self, we recognise that which is not self. Inseparable from this consciousness of limitation, there is the sense of dependence on what is not ourselves. Now, just as the finite, as known, necessarily implies or involves the notion of the infinite, so the idea of dependence implies or involves the notion of independence. Hence, our recognition of self as finite and dependent, has for its antithetic pole of thought the idea of the infinite and independent God. It is to this infinite and all-sufficient One that our reason ever leads us. To him who created us we are ever led for every thing requisite to supply our creature wants. The intuition of our limitation of being, and its cognate sense of dependence, have ever led the human mind to seek for something all-sufficient as its complement. This cannot be found in any being short of the infinite and independent God, from whom our existence and all its wants originally spring. To this all-perfect God reason ever points, and to the same all-sufficient One, Scripture, by its myriad voices, ever exhorts us to come that we may be filled with all the fulness of that God whose name is love.

## II. MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY.

Admitting that we live, and move, and have our being in God as our all-sufficient and loving Creator, are we under any obligation to love, honour, and obey him? Is it reasonable to suppose that God will take no notice of how we employ those powers which he has bestowed, and those benefits which he has conferred upon us? The whole of the Bible is an exposition of human

responsibility. Take this element out of the Scriptures, and they are destitute of meaning. But it is precisely the same with the human mind itself, if we abstract the element of answerableness for our conduct. We are conscious of freedom in our acts of choice, and recognise our responsibility in every action we perform. The testimony of the human mind is as clear and authoritative on this point as the Bible itself. In fact, the Bible is the divine translation of the facts of consciousness. To these facts we shall briefly refer.

(1.) *Every man necessarily makes a distinction between his actions as right, or as wrong.* Some acts he regards as right, others he esteems to be wrong. This distinction appears to young and old, to the learned and illiterate. Just as the mind distinguishes between the true and the false in thought, the good and the bad in emotion, so it discerns the difference between right and wrong in action. This distinction is applied by every man to his daily conduct. When entering upon his work, and in considering what he will do throughout the day, the deeds to be done resolve themselves into the right and the wrong. So likewise, in taking a retrospect of his deeds during the day, he retires to rest with his conduct split up into the right and the wrong. He cannot escape the conviction that his acts are either right or wrong. He makes the same distinction concerning the conduct of his fellow-men; it splits up in his thoughts into the right and the wrong. He is, therefore, absolutely certain that when his conduct is submitted to his fellow-men, they will, as truly as himself, declare it to be right or wrong. Let him submit his conduct to an angel, and he is sure that the same moral distinction must be discerned. Let him take a step higher, and submit his actions to God, can he conceive that God will pass over his conduct as neither right nor wrong? It is impossible to conceive of the Infinite Intelligence regarding the man's voluntary acts otherwise than as morally right, or morally wrong. The notion of right and wrong, as moral contradictories, is to the mind necessary and indestructible.

It is no objection to what has been stated, to say, that no reliance can be placed upon such moral judgements, because what one man thinks is right another thinks is wrong; and even the same man affirms that to be right which he, at another time, declares to be wrong. It is true that the judgements of men are not to be relied on as the supreme standard of what is right and wrong; and we do not adduce them as such. But we present them as a proof that such is man's mental nature that he of necessity makes a distinction between things right and wrong. All the differences, and all the changes of opinion concerning the moral character of actions, expressly acknowledge that there is,

and must be, a right and wrong in the matter. The errors and mistakes which occur in our moral judgements simply prove that we require a supreme, infallible standard by which to ascertain what is right and wrong. This supreme and infallible standard is, to us, in "the word of God"; and when we know it, and apply it to our every-day acts, we immediately recognise their moral character. It is certain, therefore, that we necessarily make a distinction between actions which are right, and actions which are wrong, and cannot but think that all intelligent beings, and especially God himself, do the same.

(2.) *Every man feels under obligation to do only that which is right, and never to do that which is wrong.* No sooner does it appear to us right to do a thing, and wrong not to do it, than we necessarily feel bound to do it, without regard to consequences. We need no proof, no argument, to persuade us that we ought to do that only which is right. The "ought" of the right is inevitably felt. If we set before a man that it is right for him to do such a thing, and wrong for him not to do it, and he admits it, but asks, why ought I to do the right, and not to do the wrong? what could we say to such a man, except, "you ought to do that only which is right; you feel that you ought; it is a simple fact of your moral nature." We no more need to prove that a man ought to do what is right, than that snow is white, ice cold, and fire warm. Simple facts, observed either by the senses or by consciousness, do not admit of proof, and need none. Look at them, and you see them, and cannot deny their existence, without convicting your soul of mendacity.

Finding this imperative "ought," or obligation, to arise out of our moral judgements concerning right and wrong, we apply it as a law of duty to others, and regard them as under obligation to do what is right. We are also certain that they will do the same in respect to us. Hence, in the family, in society in general, in all our commercial transactions, we proceed on the principle of our mutual obligations to do that only which is right. Apart from this principle, human life would become a chaos of moral disorders. If, then, we find ourselves under an immediate obligation to do right, and if we, and our fellow-men, hold each other bound to act according to what is right, so also are we certain that an angel must be under the same obligation. Is it then to be supposed that God, the supreme Mind, will set us free from the imperative "ought" of moral obligation. Assuredly not. He has given us our moral nature, with its imperative sense of duty in the presence of what is right, to tell us what is his mind respecting our conduct. Men may refuse to act as they know they ought to do, yet, in so doing, they know, and God knows, that in going contrary to what is right, and in opposition to what they

ought to do, they commit sin, not only against God, but also against their own consciences. Every man lives and acts in the presence of a moral tribunal : and by himself, his fellow-men, and his God, has a moral judgement pronounced upon his conduct every day he lives.

(3.) *Every man necessarily feels, or regards, himself, as worthy of praise or of blame, according as he does what is right or wrong.* This is one of the deepest, most authoritative, and indestructible convictions of the human mind. Give praise to a man when he knows that he is doing what is wrong, and he feels that it is empty flattery, or cruel mockery ; it is a lie to his consciousness. Censure him, condemn him when he is doing right, and your censure and condemnation are to him mere reproach and calumny. Conscious of wrong-doing, the man is incapable of receiving any reward, he is self-condemned, and reward never can enter into his soul. Others may heap outward honours on him, and his name may be enrolled amongst the most honourable, yet his honest soul refuses the honour and reward of virtue, and adjudges him to the punishment due to his evil deeds. But, conscious of rectitude and personal integrity, he cannot be punished. He may be abused. Sufferings may be inflicted. Still, punishment is impossible when he knows that he has done that only which is right, and ought to be done. These are facts in our moral nature, and cannot be denied. Hence the peculiar blessedness of the man who is conscious of uprightness. He has peace, self-approbation, a sense of deserving well, even should all men revile and abuse and wrong him. Hence, too, the inner woes of the man who does wrong. Even should no human eye see it, no human ear hear it ; still, knowing it himself, he feels self-condemned, self-cursed, and full of remorse.

We are also perfectly certain that our fellow-men will judge us to be worthy of praise or of blame according as we do right or wrong. When our conduct is submitted to them, if they ascertain its rectitude, they at once declare us to be worthy of praise and reward, and honour, according to the measure of our rectitude. But if our conduct is wrong, they at once pronounce us to be worthy of blame and punishment, in proportion to our sin. Now, if it be thus with ourselves, and with our fellow-men, in judging ourselves and one another to be worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment, according as we do right or wrong, must it not be the same with God himself ? Can the holy and the righteous One look upon human conduct, and see man doing what is right, and yet regard him as unworthy of praise and reward ; or see him doing what is wrong, and yet regard him as not worthy of blame and punishment ? Assuredly not. Can man have finer, and keener, and more exact moral discriminations and

moral judgements, than God? If not, then, by so much as God is exalted in intelligence and purity above man, he must discern with infallible precision the right and the wrong in human life, and adjudge every man to be worthy of praise and of blame, reward and punishment, according to his deeds. Our consciences, in their declarations of moral desert, are revelations from the God of the conscience, and are prophetic voices concerning what the God of the conscience will yet manifest in his final treatment of men.

### III. FUTURE JUDGEMENT.

That God shall at some future time judge the world of men in righteousness, is in perfect harmony with the moral nature and judgements of mankind. This statement is abundantly evidenced by what has been already said. A future judgement of man by God is the final appeal of every human conscience, as that which is to give effect to, and carry out in retributive awards, its moral judgements. Left to reason, we are unable to say at what time, or under what circumstances, God will give a public and formal sentence upon our conduct. But conscience in us does imperatively demand, as its logical terminus, that God, as moral lawgiver and governor, shall at some suitable time, and in some proper manner, judge the world in righteousness. The people of Britain demand, in conscience, and as a right, that the sovereign shall, in one way or another, judge the people, and apply the law of the realm to the praise, peace, and good of them who do well, and to the punishment of them that do evil. In like manner, and on the same principle of moral equity, all moral communities in the universe, look, in conscience, and as a right, to God as the sovereign lord of the souls of men, and of angels and devils, to judge the peoples of the world, and apply his laws for the punishment of them that do evil, and for the praise of them that do well. Such a moral judgement is necessary to implement the claims of reason and conscience. The time and manner of this final judgement are plainly revealed in the Scriptures, and commend themselves to every man's conscience. But on this we do not enter.

When this final judgement takes place, it must be in equity. Nothing else can satisfy universal conscience. It will be one of the most solemn parts of that Great Assize, that each man shall say "amen" to God's award, whether it shall be life or death. Not only the respective states of men, but also the respective degrees of glory, honour, and incorruptibility to the good, and of tribulation and anguish to the bad, shall be so transparently matters of equity, that every conscience must declare, It is right! It is right! the great God could not have done anything else in



righteousness. Justice shall then be seen to be the imperial, the regnant principle of the moral universe, determining the nature of all moral character and destiny, from the highest heavens to the lowest hell. Moreover, as these final awards are based upon the eternal distinction between right and wrong; the eternal obligation to do that which is right, and never to do that which is wrong; and the eternal praiseworthiness of virtue, and blameworthiness of sin; it follows, that the awarded destinies of men must be as eternal as the moral distinctions on which they are based. In this, reason and conscience are coincident with the solemn utterance of Jesus, "These (the wicked) shall go away into *everlasting* punishment, but the righteous into life *eternal*."

W. T.—K.

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THE LORD  
NOT FAR FROM EVERY ONE OF US.

**THERE** is a sense, in which it is true, that the Lord is far from every one of us. He is, in a certain sense, a God "afar off." He is as far off as the sun and the moon and the stars. He is with the sun. And it is because he is with it and holding it fast and firm in the centre of our planetary system, that we have morning and evening with regularity, and the circle of the seasons, ministering successively to the wants of our world. He is with the moon, and it is because he is with it, and wheeling it with his finger round our earth, that we have our ocean-tides with regularity, and that we are periodically illumined with a sweet mild radiance by night, when the more searching and glorious lustre by day is withdrawn from our hemisphere. The Lord is with the stars. And it is He who not only planned their stations, and mapped out their courses, but who also guides them in all the intricacies of their inter-relations, and who radiates out from them the light, with which immensity seems flooded, and which renders them wondrously visible to the human eye, even though they are hundreds of millions of millions of miles distant from our earth.

The Lord is farther away still. He is far out, and high up, on the outskirts as it were of immensity, and it is from afar that he "humbleth himself to behold the things that are in heaven and on earth." And if there be some glorious centre of the universe,—a centre, bearing some such relation to the aggregate of all worlds, and systems, and firmaments, as our sun bears to its clustre of surrounding planets,—then, undoubtedly, though this centre must be so far away from us that all human arithmetic would be utterly

baffled to give an idea of its distance, the Lord will be emphatically there, enthroned amid peculiar profusion of beauty and magnificence of glory, and incalculably far away from every taint of sin, and from whatsoever defileth or degradeth. In that heaven of heavens, in that holy of holies, the Lord will undoubtedly be "all in all." And none who worketh the least approach to abomination will be there. It must then be the case that the Lord is afar off there. And thus there is a sense in which the Lord is far away from every one of us. He needs to be afar off, as well as nigh at hand. Sun, moon, and stars, would rush into chaos, and collapse into nothingness, were the Lord not with them. There would be no heaven of heavens at all, were the Lord not there.

But yet "the Lord is not far from every one of us." (Act xvii. 27.) It is sublimely true. The words are "words of truth and soberness." There is no exaggeration in them. They are not words of hyperbole. They are not words of turgid extravagance. There is no bombast in them. No. Neither is there anything that has been brought out of the fairy-land of fancy. It is no day-dream of imagination which is depicted in them. They are not poetry. There is no romance about them: not the shadow of a shade. They are a simple, sound, and sober statement of a glorious matter of fact. "The Lord is not far from every one of us."

True, the heaven of heavens cannot want the Lord. It would fall into nonentity, were it not for the sustaining energy of his presence. In Him, the heavens of heavens has its being. But the earth too, as little as the heaven of heavens, can want the Lord. He, with his almighty fingers, must uphold it, and poise it, and whirl and spin it, or it would relapse into its original non-existence. It is in the Lord that the earth has its being. And as it is with the great earth as a whole, so is it with every part of it in particular, with every particle of sand, and with every pile of grass. And so is it with every man and woman, with every boy and girl. We all need God. Without Him, we could not have been. We came from him. He is our Creator. He is the Father of our spirits, and the Former of our bodies. Without him we could not continue to be. "For in him," says the apostle, in the very words which follow the expression we are considering, "in him we live and move and have our being." It would be no more absurd to suppose that fish could swim though there were no water, and that birds could fly though there were no atmosphere, and that beasts could roam though there were no land, than it would be to suppose that men could "live and move and have

their being" though there were no God. If there were no infinite God around us all, and interpenetrating us all, there would even be no space in which we could have our being, and no time within which we could endure. It is God's infinity that constitutes at once the space in which we move, and the time in which we live. Behind us, before us; at our right hand, and at our left; above us, beneath us; all around us, and most intimately nigh to us, is the Lord. He is to us a very present God. Our houses are full of God. Every apartment in them is full of God. The streets of our towns and cities are full of God. The country is full of God. The world is full of God. The universe is full of God. Immensity is full of God. It is God who constitutes immensity. And thus "the Lord is not far,"—he cannot be far off—"from every one of us."

It is admitted. Indeed it could not be denied unless we were to turn rank atheists, and to plunge into the bottomless abyss of physical and moral perplexities which would be the result of such infatuation.

But it is one thing to admit the great reality and quite another thing to realize it. Do we realize it, then? Do we carry about with us in our mind the conviction that we are surrounded with the presence, and the power, and the glory, and the purity, and the goodness, and the love of God?

How blessed would be the consequences if we did! Would we not experience that the Lord is "our Shield"? Would we not feel armed, as from head to foot, against temptations to vice, and to those lesser, but still criminal, failings, which poison the happiness of many a home, and leave stings of agony within many a heart? Would we be proud, would we be vain, would we be sordid, would we be giddy, would we be obstinate, would we be irritable, would we be passionate, would we be careless, would we be prayerless, would we be neglectful of our Bibles, would we be selfish, if we were ever to bear about with us the consciousness of the presence of our God?

And what a mighty difference would this consciousness make in the time of trial! Suppose, for instance, that we are unjustly forsaken by some fellow-creature, and apt to feel desolate and dreary. What a blessed relief and refreshment would we experience, when we open the eyes of our spirits and behold the presence of Him who is the Friend of friends, and whose name is Love. We can commune with him, we can walk with him, we can talk with him, we can enjoy his sympathy, we can bask in the sunshine of his smile. Would not this be a blissful compensation to us for the desertion we have to endure at the hand of our fellow-creature?

If again, our family circle is invaded by dire disease, and some loved one is snatched from our embrace. We no longer see the loved countenance. We no longer hear the loved voice. We no longer feel the loved touch. We no longer interchange the look of mutual love. We see a vacant space. We see relics and memorials. And our heart is prone to turn in and settle on its own sorrows. And it will be in great danger of thus going within, and mourning far too bitterly, and almost repiningly, refusing to be comforted, and thinking itself almost justified in being discontented : or it will be apt to oscillate to the other extreme and get reckless and hardened ; unless we adopt the blessed alternative of opening our eyes to the glorious reality of the presence of our God. He, the infinite, the only indispensable One, the nearest, and who ought to be the dearest,—he, the loving and the lovely, whose name and whose nature are Love,—he, the supreme good, the satisfying portion of the soul,—he is present with us. Death cannot remove HIM. It cannot come nigh him. He is beside us, in all the fulness of his grace and glory. He is present with his eye. It looks on us and into us. He is present with his ear. It bends towards us and hears whenever we cry or sigh. He is present with his hand, mighty to uphold. He is present with his heart, which is like an everlasting and everlastingly flowing fountain of love. O will not the fulness of such a divine presence, if we realise it, make the mightiest possible difference to our souls. If we live like Moses, “as seeing Him who is invisible,” we shall be able to say, with Habbakuk, “Although the fig tree should not blossom, neither should fruit be in the vines : although the labour of the olive should fail, and the fields should yield no meat ; although the flock should be cut off from the fold, and there should be no herd in the stalls ; yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.”

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DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY — WHAT IS ITS NATURE ?

THE term *sovereignty*, though found in catechisms, confessions, and theological works, occurs nowhere in Scripture. We do not, however, on that account, take exception to its use. If it were objectionable on that ground, there are many other words to which in consistency we should have to object. The word *sovereignty* appears to us to express an important truth concerning God ; and this is a sufficient reason why we should retain it, so long as we attach a proper meaning to it. It is usually defined *supreme authority* ; and this definition is in beauti-

ful harmony with its etymology, as all scholars know. The sovereign of a country is its chief or supreme ruler. In affirming sovereignty of God, therefore, we assert that he is supreme Ruler. To what extent he is such, is a point to be hereafter determined. The supreme authority of a king does not, for example, extend beyond the kingdom of which he is the acknowledged sovereign. A man may have supreme power in one place, and not in another. Queen Victoria is the highest personage in these realms, but not in France, Austria, or Italy. Sovereignty belongs to her, but hers is a limited sovereignty. And the same remark may be made regarding all who exercise supreme authority on the face of the globe. The mightiest of earth's kings falls far short of *absolute* sovereignty. Human beings are sovereigns only within certain limits.

Now, there can be no doubt that God is a sovereign, and an *absolute* sovereign. There may be a difference of opinion as to *what kind of a sovereign* God is, but there can be none as to the fact itself. He would not be God, if he were not chief magistrate of the universe. If we believe the Bible, we must believe in the absolute sovereignty of God. He is spoken of as "the King of kings, and Lord of lords," which is just saying that, in the fullest sense of the expression, he is supreme Ruler. He is "God over all." The sovereignty of creatures is limited, but God's sovereignty is unlimited. God has no superior. The first of Beings, he is also the highest. He is not both a subject and a sovereign. To whom is he subject? His creatures are his subjects, whenever created, and wheresoever they dwell. He has the right to reign over them. On him it devolves to reward them when they obey his laws, and on him it devolves to punish them when they set at nought his authority. Responsible to no being above him, for there is no such being, all intelligent creatures are responsible to him. He made all other beings; he preserves them; and he presides as king over the entire universe, be its magnitude what it may. There is no creature that is not a subject of his government; and there is no spot in relation to which he is not supreme Ruler.

God is no *usurper*. He has a right to rule the world. And instead of demurring to his sovereignty over us, we should be thankful that he is at the head of affairs. A better sovereign than God is not conceivable.

He is a *self-elected* Sovereign. A father does not ask his children whether they will allow him to rule them. He assumes the government of his family. And by his own election God is the Sovereign of the universe. He possesses, in reality, supreme power; and why should he not exercise it? It is due alike to him and to his creatures that he should act a sovereign's part.

Cheerfully do we admit that the divine sovereignty is universal and absolute. All things are under the control of God, and there is no person to control him. If he should do us wrong, of which we have no fear, there is no appeal in the case. There is no higher being to whom we can go to redress our grievances. It cannot be disputed that in God is vested supreme authority, and that he has a right to do what he pleases. There is no one to dictate to him, or interfere with him. He is the supreme Governor. But it does not follow from this admission that God may *act in any way*, or, *that it is all one how he acts*.

There are those who seem to take an exaggerated view of the divine sovereignty. Their notion is, that no matter what God might do, it would be right:—that there is neither right nor wrong relative to him, and antecedent to his choice. But this is a view of the sovereignty of God with which we cannot sympathize. It is infinitely certain that God will always do what is right. As a sovereign, he has always done the right; and “righteous in all his ways” hitherto, he will be “holy in all his works” while eternity endures. He hates the wrong with too profound an abhorrence to become a wrong-doer. Creatures may depart from the path of rectitude; God never will. We may have unbounded confidence that his sovereign administration will be conducted on right principles. He is as incapable of deviating a hairsbreadth from the line of duty, as he is of deviating an inch or a mile. His doing a thing does not *make* it right. He rather does a thing because it is right; and his doing a thing is evidence of its rightness. If it were not right, he would not do it. We require to know nothing more than that God has done a particular thing, to feel assured of its rightness. Without any hesitation we aver that what God does in heaven, on earth, or in any other part of the universe, is absolutely right: and, as he has acted, so will he act eternally. There is not the least danger of the infinitely pure One staining his character. It is utterly inconceivable that he should. If his creatures cannot see that a certain arrangement or act is right, he can himself see that it is, and that is enough.

But it is perfectly plain to us that there are things which it would be wrong for God to do. It would be wrong in God to command us to hate himself, for instance. It would be wrong in him to command us to disobey himself. It would be wrong to command us to do an impossibility, and then to punish us for not doing it. It would be wrong to create a rational being for the express purpose of making it miserable. It would be wrong to cast a holy angel out of heaven, and shut him up in hell. There are a thousand things which it would be wrong in any being to do:—so that they commit a mistake who imagine

that God is such a sovereign that he might rightly do any conceivable thing.

We cordially assent to it that, as Sovereign of the universe, God will do what he pleases, and has a right to do what he pleases. But the question arises, *what does God please to do?* Than this there is no question of greater importance relating to the sovereignty of God. And the answer to it will put us in a position to say what is the *nature* of the divine sovereignty. By what then are God's acts as a sovereign morally complexioned? We reply,—his acts as a sovereign are morally complexioned by his *character*; and we are sure that the reply which we have given will commend itself to all who reflect on it. By what are the acts of a father, who is the sovereign of the family, morally complexioned? By his character, of course. By what else could we expect them to be complexioned? We do not look for good acts from a bad father, or for bad acts from a good father. By what are the acts of earthly sovereigns morally complexioned? By their character of course. The king who issues iniquitous laws, who deprives his subjects of their rights, who oppresses them, and does everything in his power to render them miserable, must be a king of a bad character. His sovereign acts are so many proofs of the badness of his character. Were our sovereign lady the queen not a good christian woman, the government of these countries would be very different from what it is. It would neither be so wise, nor so liberal, nor so just, nor so kind,—in one word, it would not be so right. When the successor to a throne is understood to be a man of intelligence, and a man of blameless character, the people concerned calculate that he will study their interests, and do nothing which can be shown to be prejudicial to them. They count on escaping the evils inseparable from tyranny and unwise legislation, so long as God is pleased to spare him among them. Nothing can be clearer than that amongst men the acts of sovereigns are complexioned by their character. Truer words are not in the Bible than these,—“A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.” The character of every sovereign is reflected in his rule; and God is not an exception. His acts as a sovereign are complexioned by his character; and it would be unaccountable if they were not.

What, then, is the character of God? Until we have ascertained this, we are not able to characterize the sovereignty of God.

The works of creation give God a splendid certificate of character. The more we examine them, and the better we understand them, the more do they impress us with the power, wisdom, and goodness of Him who called them into being. We cannot intelligently survey them—we cannot decipher the laws, to the

music of which they are set,—we cannot observe their relations, one to another, and note the properties they individually possess, and not feel the glory of their Maker's character. The intention in producing them was evidently to make men happy: and in presence of them we are naturally led to exclaim, "O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches." The written word sheds a still greater amount of light on the character of God. According to its statements, his is the best of characters. There is no character to compare with it in point of excellence. Infinite perfection is predicable of it. It is marred by no excrescence, and marked by no defect. It is full-orbed, and as morally lovely as it is complete. He is the possessor of every kind of excellence, and every kind of excellence in an absolutely perfect degree. We cannot suggest or conceive of any improvement in it. Our loftiest conceptions of its completeness, purity, and beauty, come not near the sublime reality. All the fine characters in the universe, united into one, would not equal God's, and when the angels contemplate it, they are "lost in wonder, love, and praise."

It has been said that,

"God only knows the love of God."

And who knows the other moral attributes of God except himself? "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" are queries which may be asked about the divine character. No creature has a full knowledge of its glory, or ever will attain to a full knowledge of it. There is a difference between knowledge and wisdom. In the latter there is a *moral* element. Wisdom is the architect; knowledge is the materials with which it builds. Now God is represented in Scripture as "the only wise God." He uniformly selects the best ends, and employs the fittest means to realise them. How admirable the arrangements made in nature to light the world! How economically and admirably is the earth watered! What an insight Paul must have got into the wisdom of God when he burst forth with the exclamation,—"O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" *Justice* is a noble trait of character. We have been so constituted that a sternly just man excites our admiration; and does not God reckon justice among his moral qualities? He is the "just one." His whole nature is against doing an unjust act. Bildad might well inquire, "Doth the Almighty pervert justice?" Addressing God, the psalmist says, "Justice and judgement are the habitation of thy throne." This is part of the song of the celestial harpers, which John heard,—"Just and true are thy ways, thou king of saints." How just God must be, when we read that "there is *no respect of persons* with him." Is *holiness* an excellent feature of character?



God is described as of "purer eyes than to behold iniquity." What do the seraphim in heaven cry, one to another, as with wing-veiled faces they bow "before Jehovah's awful throne"? "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts." The thrice holy One is God. He is infinitely opposed to every species of impurity. God requires holiness at our hands. Hence, he must be himself holy; the holiest of all beings. Is *benevolence* a form of moral goodness? We have the apostle James's authority for it that "the Lord is very pitiful, and of tender mercy." What beautiful thoughts David must have had of God! We have a sample of them in the 145th Psalm,—“The Lord is gracious, and full of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy!” Twice over in the same chapter we are told by the apostle John, "God is love." His nature is essentially benevolent. As there is no ignorance, no injustice, no impurity, so there is no unkindness in God. To say that God *has* love is but to speak half the truth. He *is* Love. Thus might we go on enumerating one moral attribute after another, but it is unnecessary. We have already sufficiently indicated the character of God. All moral excellence is centred in him. He is infinitely wise, just, holy, and benevolent, and if so, what must be the *nature* of the divine sovereignty? There cannot surely be two opinions about its nature. It must resemble God's character. It must be a wise, just, holy, and benevolent sovereignty; and when we think of God as the sovereign of the universe, we should not forget that, possessing the right to do what he pleases, he is pleased to do only what is wise, just, holy, and kind.

To be informed that God has absolute authority over us,—has a right to do with us as may seem to him good,—is apt, unaccompanied by any explanation, to sound harshly in our ears. There are few who take kindly to this sovereignty of God, considered abstractly in itself. And we fear that theologians have been too much in the habit of setting it forth in all its baldness. It strikes us that this should be guarded against as much as possible. To clothe it attractively should be our aim, and we do this when we exhibit the sovereignty of God under the presidency, if we may so express ourselves, of such attributes as divine wisdom, justice, holiness, and love. There is everything to reconcile us to God as our supreme Ruler in the thought that his acts of sovereignty are one and all complexioned by his character, for, if there is a glorious thing in existence, it is the *character of God*. Given that God is infinitely wise, just, holy, and loving, it should not pain, but delight us, to know that supreme power is lodged in his hands. It should concern us not, that there is no Being over God to control him, and to whom he is accountable, since it is utterly inconceivable that he should act

unwisely, unjustly, unholily, and unkindly. The nature of the divine sovereignty is such that the more clearly we apprehend it, the less disposed will we be to object to it.

Now, if the sovereignty of God be all that we have described it, it follows that no doctrine can be true or scriptural which implies unwise, or unjust, or unholy, or unkind acting on the part of God. We may be reminded, when we antagonize the doctrine that God has unconditionally predestinated millions of the human race to the endurance of eternal death, that *God is a sovereign*. That, however, is no argument in its favour, unless it can be proved, that the predestinating act is wise, just, holy, and kind. Till this is done,—and done it never can be,—we are justified in refusing to connect God's will with it. Other false doctrines, in support of which the sovereignty of God is urged, might be referred to, but in the one specified, our readers have a fair example of them all.

G. C.—B.

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THE WISDOM  
WHOSE WAYS ARE WAYS OF PLEASANTNESS.

(Prov. iii. 17.)

THE wisdom, whose ways are ways of pleasantness, is not that which is often designated *worldly wisdom*. It is not that which exhausts itself on the things that are contained within, and that are bounded by, this world. It is not that which contents itself in securing, and accumulating, the great prizes for which the masses of the world's inhabitants are contending. It is not that which qualifies a man for success in getting the choicest things to eat, the choicest things to drink, and the choicest things wherewithal to be clothed. It is not money-making wisdom.

Neither is it what is sometimes called *speculative wisdom*. It is not, that is to say, the wisdom which is realised in the successful prosecution of science; and which enables a man to dive into the depths, or to soar into the heights, of the constitution of things. It is not the wisdom which qualifies a man to philosophize both on things terrestrial and on things celestial, and which thus lends him wings to rise in his conceptions from things that are finite and evanishing to things that are infinite and everlasting. It is not a wisdom that begins and ends within the faculties of the understanding. It is a higher and a nobler wisdom than even this; and yet it is attainable by the humblest and the most illiterate individual.

This loftiest kind of wisdom—this wisdom of which it can be said, “her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace,”—is, indeed, no enemy to well-regulated worldly wisdom. Neither is it an enemy to that speculative wisdom which is broad of pinion and keen of eye. Well-regulated worldly wisdom is good. It is a wisdom. Speculative wisdom is also wisdom, and is therefore good. It is certainly better to be wise in reference to the things that are contained within this world, and that are really, as the creatures of God, good, than to be foolish in reference to these things. It is better to be wise, than to be foolish, in reference to what we should eat, and what we should drink, and wherewithal we should be clothed. And it is likewise far better to be wise, than to be utterly ignorant, in reference to science and philosophy. Science and philosophy have to do with the workmanship of God; and the more successfully they can be prosecuted, the farther, and still the farther, do men succeed in working their way, into the margin at least, of the immensity of the omniscience of God. They rise as regards this thing and as regards that, into the thoughts of God.

Speculative wisdom, then, is good; so far as it goes. And well-regulated worldly wisdom, or worldly wisdom when it realizes to itself that it is only a subordinate kind of wisdom, and has to do with only a subordinate range of things,—this too is good. But there is something better. There is a wisdom that is wiser still. And it is of this wisdom only that it can be said, in the fulness of the import of the terms, “Her ways are ways of pleasantness,” and “all her paths are peace.”

Wisdom, in the highest sense, has a high moral element, and a high moral excellence, in it. Indeed, all true wisdom has a moral element in it, a good moral element. The man who is speculatively wise has this good moral element in him, that he has chosen as the aim of his thoughts, a noble class of objects. The man, too, who is distinguished for worldly wisdom, has this good moral element in him, that he too has chosen as the aim of his efforts, things that are in themselves good and honourable objects of ambition. But a man may be pre-eminently characterized by worldly wisdom, and yet be far from being pre-eminently noble in the moral element of his nature. And a man may be pre-eminently exalted in speculative wisdom, and yet be far indeed from being pre-eminently exalted in a moral point of view. Whereas, the most exalting and exalted wisdom is nothing else than the most exalted condition of the whole moral being.

The wisdom, whose “ways are ways of pleasantness,” and “all whose paths” guide into the delightful territory of “peace,” con-

sists in a twofold choice,—the choice of the best of ends, on the one hand, as the great aim of life, and the choice of the best of means, on the other, for reaching that best of ends. It consists, in other words, of the choice of the glory of God as the end of ends and the highest aim of life, and of the determination to be guided in all things by the will of God, as the means whereby the end of ends may be attained. This is the highest wisdom,—the wisdom which is emphatically commended in the Book of books. It is this wisdom which is “more precious than rubies,” “and all the things thou canst desire are not to be compared unto her.” “The merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine gold.” “Happy is the man that findeth (this) wisdom.” “She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her: and happy is every one that retaineth her.” It is piety that constitutes this wisdom. It is godliness. It is goodness. It is holiness. It is religion. For piety, godliness, holiness, goodness, or religion, is just the choice of God’s glory as the end of ends, and a determination to be regulated in all things, with a view to this end, by the revelation of his infinitely perfect will. Hence it is that we read again and again, in *the Volume of the Book*, that “the beginning of wisdom” is “the fear of the Lord.” He who stands in awe of the Lord, and fears to offend him, has begun to be wise. And he who rises higher, and “loves the Lord his God with all his heart, with all his soul, with all his strength, and with all his mind,” is wise indeed. He is wiser than the wisest of those whose only wisdom is either worldly wisdom or speculative wisdom, though each of these should be, in its own peculiar sphere, of the highest degree.

If these views be correct, then there is ground for very great and grateful rejoicing over that glorious constitution of things, which puts the highest blessings within the reach of all. It is not possible for all to become rich in silver and gold. It is not possible for all to become healthful. It is not possible for all to become beautiful in person. It is not possible for all to acquire æsthetic culture. It is not possible for all to become versed in Greek, and Roman, and Oriental lore. It is not possible for all to become distinguished for worldly or for speculative wisdom. There are thus many good things which are beyond the reach of the great masses. And it would be in vain to repine at such an arrangement. It is inseparable from the essential conditions of the race. And yet, it seems, the best of all good things, the highest of all blessings, are attainable by the masses and the millions. They may be attained by all. That which is better than silver and gold, and health, and beauty, and æsthetic culture, and Greek and Roman and Oriental lore, and worldly wisdom, and

speculative wisdom;—that which is far better, and more enriching, and more beautifying, and more elevating, and more ennobling than all these, is within the reach of all. All may be truly wise, wise with the highest wisdom,—that wisdom whose “ways are ways of pleasantness, and all whose paths are peace.” Only few can be millionaires: but all may be wise, and thus rich unto God. Only few can be kings or queens: but all may be wise, and thus kings or queens unto God. Only few can be dukes or duchesses: but all can be wise, and thus nobles of God’s own making, nobles nobler than the noblest. Only few can be great scholars: but all can be wise, and thus skilled in that which is a sublimer learning than Greek and Roman and Oriental lore. How benignant that wonderful constitution of things, which puts the best of blessings within the reach of us all! The air to be breathed is for all. The sun shines on all. The grandeur of the nocturnal sky is spread out over all. God is the father of all. Christ is a Saviour for all. And all—all—may be “wise unto salvation,” and thus walk in “ways of pleasantness and paths of peace.”

It is indeed only “thus” that men can get into ways of true pleasantness, the paths of true peace. And yet how many there are who will not believe it! They think that to be thus wise, or pious, or godly, or holy, or good, or religious, is almost one and the same thing with being gloomy, and melancholy, and dull. They consider that christianity—which is but another name for true piety, or godliness, or holiness, or pure and undefiled religion—may be very necessary indeed to go into eternity with. It may be needed on one’s deathbed, that there may be escape from everlasting misery. But to have anything to do with it, except at a respectful distance, in youth, and amid health and buoyancy, would be to cover oneself as with sackcloth and ashes, and to exchange mirth and gladness for the spirit of heaviness, and weeping, and wailing, and woe. They imagine that when piety is accepted, there must be farewell for ever to every real and satisfying pleasure.

There never was a greater mistake. Such a notion of things is a caricature of realities from beginning to ending. It is indeed a total inversion of what is experienced by every one who chooses wisdom’s ways.

There is, we admit, a pleasure attainable in sinning. But it is not only evanescent, and such as will not bear the criticism of conscience, or the calm reflection of the reason: it is also low and grovelling. And, besides, everything that is real in it, could be enjoyed, and enjoyed better, and much more fully, apart from sin, and in connection with wisdom.

There is also, we admit, an end, in true religion, or holiness, or godliness, or wisdom, to noisy merriment, and empty laughter, and giddy gladness, and boisterous jovialty. But there is no end, but only the beginning, to true satisfying happiness,—happiness that bears the retrospect,—happiness that bears the scrutiny of conscience,—happiness that bears the reflection of reason,—happiness that endures alike through health and through sickness, through riches and through poverty, through prosperity and through adversity, alike through life and into death and beyond it:—there is no end to this happiness, but only the beginning, when the folly of impiety and godlessness and unholiness and irreligion, is renounced, and the wisdom of piety and godliness and holiness and religion is chosen. If the young would but ask the aged Christians around them, concerning their experience: if they would ask them whether they lost their happiness, when they lost their folly, and found true wisdom: if they would ask them, in other words, if they ceased to be joyful, when they began to live to Christ and to God: if they would ask whether they would wish now to go back to forbidden indulgences in order to get pleasure:—if they would ask such questions as these, they would be assured, with not a single dissentient voice, that true happiness never was really known by them until they took God's way of things, and chose for their portion *what he calls wisdom*. Or if the young would ask the young who have given themselves to Christ, and to goodness and godliness, and who have renounced all the things in which they cannot walk with Christ, and abandoned all the places in which they cannot hold fellowship with Christ, and left all the companions in whose company they cannot associate with Christ,—if the young, who are undecided for Christ, would but ask the young, who are thus decided for Christ, whether they have now lost their happiness, and got dulness, and sadness, and sorrow, and woe; they would be told, as by one voice, and with the utmost emphasis, that it is only since they gave themselves to Christ, and sought the wisdom which is found *through* him and *in* him, that they have tasted true and satisfying gladness, and walked in ways of unalloyed pleasantness and peace. How encouraging to such as are seeking they know not what, that they may be blessed! It is Christ, fellow immortal, after whom you are feeling. It is he who is the magnet that is attracting the deepest desires of your heart, and who will not let you be fully satisfied in any other object. It was for him that your heart was made. There is in it a throne for him. And never till you place him on that throne, and crown him Lord of all within your soul and your body and the sphere of your outer possessions,—never till then will you be at peace: for never till then will you be truly "wise."

Go, then, to Christ. Go now. Go—in thought. Behold Him,—“your Lord and your God.” Open the door of your heart for his entrance. Let him in. Keep him in. Let your whole inner and outer life be a service to him. That is wisdom. This is bliss.

### PRACTICAL EXPOSITION

#### OF THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

Verse 2. *For if the word spoken by angels was stedfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward ;*

Verse 3. *How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation ; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him ;*

Verse 4. *God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will ?*

“For” is the first word of these three verses. It is an argumentative word. It shews that the writer is reasoning. It is a reason-rendering word. And by using it, the writer leads us to expect that he is about to give us a reason for what he had said in the immediately preceding verse. He thus deals with his readers as reason-endowed beings,—as beings, consequently, who would not like merely to be commanded, or merely to listen to authoritative dictation :—and hence it will be well for us to try to enter into the spirit of the inspired logician’s argumentation.

What then is it, that is the subject-matter of the reasoning ? What is it, for which a reason is rendered ? It is, as we have intimated, something which is spoken of in the immediately preceding verse. Let us look, then, at that verse. It runs thus :—“Therefore, we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest at any time we should let them slip,” or rather, “lest by any means we should be floated away,”—away out of the course which we ought to pursue,—away from the destination which we desire. The inspired writer enjoins upon us a duty, which must be fulfilled, if we would not, as voyagers on the sea of probationary life, miss our way. The duty is—“to give earnest heed to the things which we have heard ;”—to give earnest heed, not indeed to all the things which, from whatsoever

quarter, have fallen upon our ears, or come under our observation. No: This cannot be any one's duty. It cannot be *our* duty. For we hear many frivolous things. We hear many contradictory things. The things which we hear from the lips of one man, we often hear contradicted by the lips of another. We often hear positively evil things,—things of such a nature that the less heed we pay to them the better. When, then, the inspired writer says that we ought to give “earnest heed to the things which we have heard,” he cannot be referring to all the things, without exception or distinction, which we may have happened to have heard. His expression looks back to the scope of the first chapter of the Epistle,—in which he draws our attention very particularly, to the things which God himself has spoken to us through his Son Christ Jesus. It is these things to which he here refers:—the things which have been divinely revealed to us in and through Christ Jesus. It is the things of christianity,—the things consequently that have to do with the great propitiation,—the things that have reference to the forgiveness of our sins, the purification of our souls, the peace of our hearts, and the everlasting salvation, glorification, and bliss, of our whole being. It is to these things, that it is our duty,—our imperative duty,—to give earnest heed. And we ought to give to them the more earnest heed because of the peculiarly exalted nature, dignity, and position of that very Christ Jesus, in and through whom God hath so graciously spoken to us and revealed his benign desires and intentions.

Now, in the 2d, 3d, and 4th verses of the chapter, the inspired writer stoops to reason with us regarding the duty which he has enjoined,—the duty of giving very earnest heed to the things divinely revealed to us in and through Christ Jesus. He adduces a consideration why we ought to give earnest heed to these things:—“*for*,” says he, “if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence of reward; how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?”

We should notice the peculiarity of the consideration, which the inspired writer argumentatively adduces. It has reference to the peril of neglecting to give earnest heed to the things which God has revealed to us in and through Christ Jesus. It is thus an appeal to that principle of fear, which is, in less or greater development, in every man's nature. And, being an appeal to that principle, it is ultimately resolvable into an appeal to every man's interest in his own everlasting weal. The inspired writer assumes that every man is interested in himself. He assumes that every man is desirous to have his most momentous concerns favourably adjusted. There is no man living who has not some love to himself. All



men living do desire that it should be well with them. It would be wrong, indeed, to say that all men living have it, as their supreme or superlative desire, to secure their own happiness. The world has not yet come to such a pitch of utter and unmitigated selfishness. There are noble self-sacrificing men scattered up and down throughout society, who are the salt of the earth. There are men who postpone themselves to the glory of God above them, and to the weal of their fellow men around them. There are men who have in them some particles and living sparks of the generosity of soul, which dwelt in the bosom of Christ Jesus, and which led him to come into our world, not to be ministered unto, but to minister,—not to sacrifice others for his benefit or gratification, but to sacrifice himself for the sake of others. These do not love themselves monopolizingly. They do not love themselves supremely and preponderatingly. But yet they do love themselves. They feel that they are bound to love themselves, for God loves them. They cannot help loving themselves, for God has implanted an instinct of self-love within the heart of their being. And all other men love themselves, and desire to be blessed. All men on earth wish that it may be well with themselves.

The inspired writer knew this. And hence, in the practical argumentation before us, he appeals to the interest that every man feels in his own true and permanent welfare:—"for, if the word spoken by angels was stedfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence of reward, how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?"

It is obvious, at a glance, that the inspired writer might have adduced other considerations to induce us to give earnest heed to the things revealed to us in and through Christ Jesus. He might have contented himself with saying "This is right; and therefore you ought to do it." Or he might have enlarged the horizon of our view and said,—“You will give joy to the angels in heaven, joy to Jesus, joy to the heart of the divine Father, if you discharge the duty which is devolving on you.” Or he might have appealed to another element of generosity, and said,—“you will be Blessings in the universe, if you do what you ought to do.” Under some one of these points of view, or under some other still, might the inspired penman have presented to us an argument for compliance with the duty of giving earnest heed to the things revealed to us in and through Jesus. But he wisely gives prominence in the passage before us to an argument that is more likely to come home to the bosom and conscience of universal man, in whatsoever physical, intellectual, moral, and social state he may be found. He reasons and says, that it is tremendously dangerous to neglect to give heed to the things which we have heard through

Christ Jesus ;—“for, if the word spoken by angels was stedfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward ; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation ?”

The inspired writer's argument is based on a comparison. He refers to the revelation which God had made of himself under the Old Testament dispensation. That revelation centred in the Jewish law. This Jewish law was “the word spoken by angels.” It was “ordained,” as the apostle Paul expresses it in Gal. iii. 19, “by angels in the hands of a mediator,”—Moses to wit. It was given, as the proto-martyr Stephen expresses it in Acts vii. 53, “by the disposition of angels.” These holy ministering spirits would seem to have been employed even on Mount Sinai, as the intermediate agents through whom God revealed his mind ; for we read in Psalm lxxviii. 17, that “the chariots of God are twenty thousand, even thousands of angels ; the Lord is among them as in Sinai, in the holy place.” The Jewish law, then, or the Old Testament revelation, was a “word spoken through angels.” It was God's word. It was an utterance of the divine mind. It was lying—though far removed—on one line of things with that which is God's New Testament word. It was lying—though still farther removed—on one line of things with Him who is the Word—the living Word—of God. It was “the word spoken through angels.” And, says the inspired writer, it “was stedfast.” It was “firm.” It could not be set aside at the pleasure, or by the effort, of men. It was imperative. It was in force. It was of absolute authority. “And every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward,”—*every violation of its precepts, or neglect of its injunctions, subjected to righteous retribution.* All this was the case ;—although the revelation referred to was only a “word spoken through angels.” And, therefore, argues the inspired logician, “how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation ?”

He does not say—“how shall we escape, if we neglect *the word spoken through Christ Jesus ?*” And yet this is really his meaning. His argument really is as follows,—“for if *the word spoken through angels* was immoveably imperative, and every transgression and neglect received righteous retribution, how shall we escape if we neglect *the word spoken through Christ Jesus ?*” But instead of exhibiting prominently to view the manner of the New Testament revelation, he specifies its subject-matter :—“how shall we escape if we neglect *so great salvation ?*” It is salvation which is the subject-matter of the New Testament revelation. It is salvation which is revealed to us in the New Testament word of God. It is salvation which is in him who is the living Word of God. It is salvation, salvation *for us*, which

is in Christ Jesus. It is everlasting salvation;—salvation, full, free, glorious, and gloriously resulting in heavenly glory, glory, glory. And thus it is the case that when God hath revealed himself to us in these last times through his Son, he has revealed to us salvation; and he who rejects or neglects this revelation of God, rejects or neglects salvation.

And it is “*great salvation.*” Compare it with all other salvations, and you will pronounce it “*great.*” If a man save his house, when it is threatened with fire: that is a salvation. If a man save his purse, when a robber struggles with him to wrest it from him: that is a salvation. If a drowning man catch the rope that is flung out to him, when he is almost about to sink into a watery grave, and if he is thus safely drawn to land or raised up into a life-boat: that too is salvation. If one strike down the tyrant who was enslaving the nation of which he forms an integrant part, and if he thus delivers his country from a yoke of bondage, too heavy to be borne: that too is a salvation, a glorious salvation. But what are all these, or other salvations such as these, compared with the salvation of immortal souls? They are like “*the small dust in the balance.*” They are like drops in contrast to oceans. It is the salvation of the immortal soul, that is the “*great salvation.*”

But we must notice that the expression of the inspired writer is, “*so great salvation:*”—“*how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?*” The expression is mensurative; and yet it leaves the mensuration absolutely indefinite. It leaves the reader’s mind to do its best to measure an illimitable height, depth, length, and breadth, and to lose itself at last in a boundlessness that passeth knowledge. For who can really tell how great the great salvation is? Until we can tell how deep is that awful woe, from which it delivers; and how lofty is that everlasting glory, to which it exalts; and how broad is that ever-increasing sensibility of soul, in which its blessedness will be realised; and how long is that long, long eternity, through whose cycles it will run on and increase;—until we can tell all this, we shall not be able to tell, even to ourselves, how great the great salvation is. And all this we shall never be able to tell, until we can tell the number of the stars of heaven, added to the number of the leaves of the forest, the number of the drops of the ocean, and the number of the atoms of sand that go to the formation of the crust of our globe. It is indeed a “*great salvation.*” How shall we escape, “*if we neglect it?*”

It is well to note that it is not asked—How shall we escape *if we oppose* so great salvation?—or, How shall we escape, *if we despise it?*—or, How shall we escape *if we scorn it and laugh at it?*—or, How shall we escape *if we reject it?* Though

we should do no more than neglect it, escape will be impossible. The power of neglect is incalculable. It is not, for instance, needful in order to get a business ruined, that a man madly set fire to his premises, and burn his materials and books. If he only neglect it, that will suffice. It is not needful, in order to destroy the body, that a man lift a hatchet and hack his flesh, muscles, and bones; or that he buy poison, and swallow it; or that he climb some pinnacle and cast himself down. If he only neglect his body, and persevere in his neglect, he will infallibly gain his suicidal end. It is not needful in order to waste our gardens, that we put ourselves to the trouble of carting into them loads of weeds, or of sowing in them the seeds of nettles and thistles and other useless plants. If we only neglect them, they will soon run to waste. And so it is with the salvation of our immortal souls. It is not needful that we take any strong and violent measures, in the way of plunging into abysses of excess, or of running to riot in animal indulgences, or of interlarding our conversation with volumes of the profanest oaths. It is not necessary to become murderers, or robbers, or liars, or drunkards, or grossly licentious. If we only neglect our souls and the great salvation; all, all, will be lost:—"How shall we escape *if we neglect so great salvation?*"

The inspired writer adds, concerning this "great salvation;"—"which, at the first, began to be spoken *by* the Lord," or rather "*through* the Lord." It was at the first revealed through the Lord Jesus, in what he was, and thus in what he did and suffered, as well as in what he said. It is added, "and was confirmed unto us (or rather, *for us*) by them who heard:"—by those who were the original recipients of the revelation,—namely, the personal disciples of our Lord. "God bearing," the inspired writer continues, "concurrent witness by signs and wonders and divers powers and distributions of the Holy Spirit according to his will." It is miracles that are referred to,—miracles viewed either objectively in their accomplishment, or subjectively in the agency that preceded their accomplishment. Viewed objectively and as accomplished, they were "signs," pointing to something beyond themselves, and greater and more important than themselves: they were "wonders," marvels that could not be accounted for except on the principle of extraordinary divine interposition. Viewed subjectively, and in their genesis, they were "powers,"—"divers powers,"—powers that were supernaturally conferred:—powers that resolved themselves into "impartations," according to the divine will, "of the Holy Spirit." Thus the evidence in support of the "great salvation," unfolded in the great New Testament revelation, was complete. No room remained for

reasonable unbelief or doubt. Jesus was the Christ. He was the Word of God. He came to be a Saviour. In his work, as revealing the thoughts, and feelings, and will of God, there is for every man "great salvation." And none shall fail to obtain and enjoy this "salvation," but such as wilfully reject it, or wilfully "neglect" it. All such, however, will find to their cost, that it is impossible to escape "the just retribution" of God. But all who humbly accept and prize it, shall be blessed for ever, and indeed are blessed already. The glad earnest of a glorious eternity are in their souls.

The inspired writer proceeds to say:—

Verse 5. *For unto the angels hath he not put in subjection the world to come, whereof we speak.*

6. *But one in a certain place testified, saying, What is man, that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou visitest him?*

7. *Thou madest him a little lower than the angels; thou crownedst him with glory and honour, and didst set him over the works of thy hands:*

8. *Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet. For in that he put all in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him. But now we see not yet all things put under him:*

9. *But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour: that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man.*

The word "for," which introduces these five verses, leads us to look at their connection with what goes before. It leads us to look, we apprehend, to the momentous question which we have just been considering, the question which is contained in the three verses immediately preceding:—"if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward, *how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?—which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him: God also bearing witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers powers and distributions of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will.*" The inspired reasoner as it were says,—It is well for me to propose that question, and to urge it upon your solemn consideration, *for he, by whom the great salvation first began to be spoken,—he who is the Word of God concerning it, and in whom alone it is to be found, is really and supremely royal, and emphatically so in relation to this world of ours.* It cannot be safe, therefore, to do anything that would amount to a disallowance or a disregard of his authority.

“Not unto angels did he put in subjection the world to come, whereof we speak.” By the expression “the world to come,” we are not to understand specifically the spiritual world, into which we are hastening, as distinguished from the material world, in which we are at present living and moving and having our being. That spiritual world is indeed put in subjection to Jesus; and he carries at his girdle the keys that open into its glorious upper galleries on the one hand, or into its dismal lower wards on the other. But it is not to it that the inspired writer refers. He speaks of the world in which we are now living,—this earth of ours, on which our feet are treading. He speaks of it, however, from his own Jewish stand-point. He speaks of it *as it was to be* under the reign of the Messiah. He speaks of it as it is under this christian era, and *as it is yet to be*, when the influence of Christianity shall have been developed to the full, and gloriously consummated. “The earth is the Lord’s,” and He hath given it to his Son. He hath given to him “the uttermost parts of the earth for a possession.” “All power on earth” has been given to our Saviour. The kingdoms of this world are his. And all within these kingdoms, and around them, and beneath them, and above them belong to him. “All power in heaven and on earth is given unto him.” He is “Lord of all.” He is at present “Lord of all” by right: and by and by his absolute Lordship will be universally realised and recognised.

The inspired writer says that it is of the earth *as it is yet to be*, and as it has already begun to be, that he is speaking:—“For not unto angels did God put in subjection the world to come, *whereof we speak.*” In all that goes before he makes reference to the new order of things which has been introduced under Jesus. And this new order of things is realised on this earth of ours,—this earth as the arena of his contests, the scene of his victories, and the domain in which he is to reign,—to reign gloriously for himself, gloriously for his Father, and gloriously for all who bow beneath the sceptre of his benignant rule.

“Not unto angels” did God put in subjection this world of ours, with all its contents, and with all its far-reaching relationships to things around and above. No. It was to a being of another stamp. It was to one with whom we, who are partakers of flesh and blood, have more intimately to do. And hence the inspired writer, in verses 6, 7, 8, says,—“But one in a certain place testified, saying, What is *man*, that thou art mindful of him? or the *son of man*, that thou visitest him? Thou madest him a little lower than the angels; thou crownedst him with glory and honour; [and didst set him over the works of thy hands;] thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet.” It is noticeable that this beau-

tiful Old Testament quotation is introduced by the expression, "one in a certain place testified." We are not to suppose, from the language, that the passage quoted was floating loosely in the memory of the writer, so that he could not precisely recollect who it was who originally uttered the words, or in what part of the volume of the book they were to be found. We are, on the contrary, to regard the indefinite method of introducing the quotation as evidence that the writer considered that he had only to rehearse the words in order to secure that they should at once be attributed, by the original recipients of his epistle, to their real penman. He takes for granted that they were familiar with the contents of their bibles, and that they would have no difficulty in making an instantaneous mental reference to the place whence the words were drawn. It is King David who is the "one" that is spoken of. It is the eighth psalm that is "the certain place," where King David's words are found.

It is a sweet little psalm; and as sublime as it is sweet. It begins and it ends thus:—"O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth,"—*how excellent*, that is to say, *is the manifestation of thyself*—for the name of old was the significance of the nature—*in all the earth!* Between this rapturous commencement and conclusion, the psalmist records his devout wonder at the regard which has been shewn to the earth's principal inhabitant,—man. But his wonder,—while it adores,—rises up into that which constitutes its complete solution. It rises up toward Him, who, by becoming the second Adam, became the true archetypal Man, the man who exhibits in himself the ideal of manhood, and in whom the race,—little, and weak, and degenerate though its individual units be,—may find an all-sufficient and perfect title to the fulness of the divine blessing—to the full enjoyment of all the divine blessings that are found on, in, around, or above our earth.

After the first outburst of admiration and adoration, "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth!" the psalmist adds, "who hast set thy glory above the heavens,"—thus recognising the vastitude of the divine dominions, and the possibility of the Lord obtaining, apart from the earth, the full measure of the glory that is due to his name. He then, in the second verse, proceeds to say,—“Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings hast thou ordained strength because of thine enemies; that thou mightest still the enemy and the avenger.” Not unlikely did he regard himself, in humility, as being but a little one in the world. And perhaps, indeed, the psalm may have been penned in his youth, while he was but a stripling, and long before he had taken his place among the high and mighty of mankind. At that time

he was but, as it were, a child. He thought as a child. He spake as a child. He composed as a child. But still the Lord his Lord could make use of his childish expressions to carry conviction into the consciences and the hearts of those who were hardened in their feelings and hostile to pure and undefiled religion. There is often an amazing power in the remarks of those who are children, and of those who are childlike,—when their remarks are dictated by a sense of the grandeur, or goodness, or graciousness of God. In the confidence that his remarks might be invested with this power, the psalmist continues and says:—“When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers; the moon, and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him?”—*what is there about man to induce thee to be so mindful of him?* “and the son of man that thou visitest him?”—*that thou shouldest come to him in kindness, and be so graciously attentive to him?* “For,” continues the psalmist, or rather, “and”—“and (that) thou hast made him a little lower (*only a little lower*) than the angels; and hast crowned him with glory and honour,” namely *in the Messiah*, the second Adam, who was to come, and who now has come. “Thou madest him,” continues the psalmist, that is, “thou madest man” to wit, as reconstituted in the Messiah—the second Adam, “to have dominion over the works of thy hands” at large; “thou hast put all things under his feet,”—*all things in the world,—the world with all its far-reaching surroundings.* And, beginning with those things that are nearest at hand, and immediately needful for comfort, and that may be regarded as the representatives, and earnest, and startingpoints of all the other blessings that are bound up in the universe,—beginning with these, the psalmist, in his childlike strain of things, says, “all sheep, and oxen, yea and the beasts of the field, the fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passes through the paths of the sea.” All things on earth, and all things in all the surroundings of the earth, that can be turned into bliss,—all these things are given, in Christ, to man. They were forfeited by sin. But they are restored in Christ; and by and by they will be enjoyed to the full by all who take as the motto of their being,—“to me to live is Christ.”

The inspired penman of the Epistle to the Hebrews, having come, in his quotation, to the words “thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet,” adds,—“for in that he put all in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him. But now we see not yet all things put under him.” Man is not yet enjoying to the full the blessings of God’s creation. Man is not yet wielding at his pleasure, and for his highest weal, all the elements of things that are surrounding him. On the contrary, while he



is enjoying much, he is also suffering much. While he has subjugated many of the creatures that are around him, he is at the same time himself subjugated to a great extent by forces around him which he has not learned to control. Hence, even in the lower planes of his being, he suffers much. He is sometimes too cold, and sometimes too hot. Sometimes he suffers from too much drought. Sometimes he suffers from too much moisture. On all hands, indeed, man is hemmed in and pressed, and as it were besieged and attacked. He is subject to a thousand forms of disease, and at last he has to yield and die. "We do not yet see all things put under him"; neither shall we see this consummation, so long as death is roaming about. "The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death." (1 Cor. xv. 26.) There must be a re-adjustment of things before all things will be ministrant to unalloyed bliss. "The elements must melt with fervent heat: the earth also, and all the works that are therein, must be burned up:—nevertheless, we, according to his promise, look for a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness."

This glad and glorious consummation shall come, and shall not tarry; for, as the inspired penman continues,—“we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, crowned with glory and honour for (or, because of) the suffering of death.” He has been thus crowned at the right hand of the majesty on high, to which he has been exalted. And this his coronation is the first instalment of his mediatorial reward. By and by the reward will be gloriously augmented. The kingdoms of this world shall be gathered into his one universal kingdom. And this kingdom shall be “the kingdom of heaven.” It shall be heavenly. It shall continue too as long as the sun and moon endure. And during the period of its continuance “the meek shall inherit the earth.” And earth shall be paradise restored, the paradise of God. This world, as it is thus to be, “whereof we speak,” is put in subjection to Jesus, “because of his suffering of death”: for he was made a little lower than the angels “that he by the grace of God might taste death for every man.” The position of the clauses has perplexed expositors. It seems to us that the inspired writer, after mentioning the coronation of our Lord, reverts in thought to what preceded the coronation; or rather, having held in abeyance the statement of the end that was contemplated in his humiliation, when he was “made a little lower than the angels,”—having held this statement in abeyance, till he had introduced the fact of the coronation as the first instalment of his future universal empire, and of the universal subjugation of all things under his feet,—then proceeds to produce it in such a way as to leave its natural impress, in all its solemn weight upon the mind:—“that he by the grace of God

should taste death for every man." Yes. He became a little lower than the angels that he should have experience of death. He died that we might live. He died propitiatorily. He died sacrificially. He died as an atonement for sin: and God is propitiated. But his experience of the state of death was brief. He only as it were "tasted" it. And now he is alive for evermore. In three days he rose triumphant; giving in this, his peculiar experience, a pledge of the triumph that is awaiting all who believe in him. It was, too, "by the grace of God" that he tasted death. It was not to induce God to love us, that he died; but it was because God loved us beforehand. "God *so loved* the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." "Herein is love; not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." We must specially note that by the grace of God he tasted death "for every man" in particular; not for "the world" merely, in the mass; not for humanity in the abstract; but for the personal units of the world; for thee, reader, thee, whosoever thou art; and for thy neighbour, thy wife, thy husband, thy child, thy parent, thy friend, thy foe; for all individually. How glad-some! how glorious!

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DEVOTIONAL THOUGHTS  
ON THE LOVE OF GOD.

THE principle of love is native to the divine mind. "God is Love." He is not a Being who loves by fits and starts: but a Being who loves always. He is not a Being who loves merely when a very lovely object is presented. He is One who is Love itself without alloy or mixture. Though God cannot look upon sin, he turns not away from the sinner. He turned away from Jesus on the cross, because Jesus represented sin. Jesus, indeed, had no sin of his own; but "he was made sin for us." We do not require to become anything but what we are already,—guilty sinners,—in order to become the objects of the love of God.

Love was the cause of creation. Universal nature proclaims its existence; while providence reiterates, and grace re-echoes the proclamation. Angels and men were not created for the purpose of increasing the happiness of God; but for the purpose of diffusing it. They were created because God is Love. The work of Jesus does not create the divine love: it only proclaims it. Everything that God does is regulated by this principle of love. The rolling thunder, the flashing lightning, the raging

tempest, in common with the winter's frost and the summer's sun, indicate the existence of love. Eternity will be taken up in unfolding it; and even the separation of the righteous from the wicked will signally display it:—for it would tend to mar the joy of heaven were an impenitent sinner admitted within its sacred precincts: and it would tend also to increase—were such a thing possible—the sinner's own misery.

The divine love is not something, which, while it operates to-day, may cease to-morrow,—as is too often the case in the human mind. Love is essential to the Deity: and the period will never arrive when it will cease to exist. Were God to cease to love, he would cease to be. "Heaven and earth may pass away;" but the divine love, never. "The earth may be removed, and the mountains may be carried into the midst of the sea," but the principle of love in the mind of God is "from everlasting to everlasting."

God loves men. Not angels merely; but men. He loved men, even while they were enemies; while they were traitors, in the hey-day of their treason; while they were rebels, with their arms up against their rightful sovereign. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for all our sins." "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost." "God who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ." What blessed quotations these are! How full of encouragement! Paul says to the Romans, "For when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly." "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us."

Were a man drowned in debt, and another to give a thousand pounds for his release, it would be an evidence of love. Were one bound in chains, and another to offer all he possessed for his ransom, would it not be an evidence of love? But were he not only to give his all, but to surrender himself that he might take the place of the captive, in order that the captive might go free, this new feature of disinterestedness would still more strikingly manifest love. A young man in ancient Greece became liable, as a punishment for an act of criminality of which he had been guilty, to have both his eyes put out. His father was the sovereign and the judge; and, pitying his son's sad case, consented to bear half the penalty by parting with one of his own eyes, that the way-

ward lad might be saved from total blindness. Surely every time the lad looked, thereafter, on his one-eyed father, he would see an undeniable evidence of love. In like manner, every time christian men look toward Calvary, they behold love the most tender, and the most perfect, that ever was exhibited. It was love passing knowledge. It was love that brought Jesus from heaven to earth. It led him to exchange the adoration of angels for the curses of men and devils. It was the spring that moved him to lay aside, for a time, the crown of glory, that he might wear a crown of thorns. The offended died to set the offenders free.

The love of God is everlasting love. He says by Isaiah, "With an everlasting kindness will I have mercy on thee, saith the Lord thy Redeemer." Again, "But Israel shall be saved in the Lord with an everlasting salvation." The shining of the sun had a beginning. There was a time when there were no sea, no day, and no man. But there never was a time when God did not love. Angels were created: the heavens and the earth were called into being: but divine love had no commencement: and it will never terminate.

This love is not only everlasting; it is immutable. God says by the prophet Malachi, "I am the Lord, I change not." Suppose a man to have left, while quite a youth, the village in which he was born. After the lapse of many years, he returns an old man. But the change is on himself. His native place has been stationary. The tones of the village bell are still familiar to his ears. The village green, on which he often sported, remains unchanged; and the rivulet, in which he was wont to paddle, is still the same. But the man has altered. He was young when he left; but now he is old, wearing wintry locks, and a face furrowed with the tear and wear of years. The change is on what is within or on the man, not on what is without him. And so in the relation of men to God. They may change. They do change. But God changeth not. The seasons change—and so do people. One generation succeeding another with undeviating regularity. Rich men often become poor, and powerful men impotent: but with God there is neither "variableness" nor "shadow of turning." He is the same "yesterday, to-day, and for ever;"—the same in love.

And this love is also unspeakably great. David says, "How great is thy loving kindness O God, therefore the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wings." It covers mountains of sins, and it has subdued millions of hearts. Christ's riches

are "unsearchable," and his salvation most efficacious. "His blood can make the foulest clean," for "it cleanseth us from all sin."

The divine love, it may be further noticed, is "long-suffering and kind." It harbours no suspicious thoughts. It is patient with the worst of men. It brought the Hebrew captives out of Babylon; and it aims at bringing sinners out of their bondage-state even now. Paul says to the Romans, "Despiseest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?" This agrees substantially with the statement of Solomon, that, "because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is set in them to do evil." What depravity this depicts, and what wickedness it exposes! The very thing that ought to melt and win over, seems only to harden and repel. What should bring the penitential tear to the eye, appears to be turned into an excuse for coldness and indifference. But O, eternal praise to our God, neither the sinner's guilt, nor His own spotless purity and unbending justice, could dry up the outflow of His tender compassion. To this hour it remains in all its fulness, towering above the loftiest pyramid of accumulated guilt; and it comes down in rays of melting tenderness on the penitent soul. We have vivid reflections of this affection in the prodigal's father; and in David, as he wept over the mangled remains of Absalom. But its own divine reality is most signally displayed in the life and death of Jesus. He came to call sinners to repentance, and when he could do no more, he wept over those who would not come to him for life; and then he gave himself up to the death for them, a propitiation for their sins. Should any reader of this paper wish pardon, and be willing to come to the Saviour for it, such an individual may be encouraged by the words, "Him that cometh unto me, I will in no wise cast out."

Indeed, it is this death of Jesus, which is the crowning evidence and demonstration of the love of God. It is the most wonderful phenomenon with which history has to deal. We see in it the offended taking the place of the offending men. We see innocence taking the place of the guilty. We see purity bearing the punishment due to the impure. In one word, we see God becoming man, that he might die for men. And yet, the great majority of men treat the fact either with scorn or with indifference. Love, nevertheless, surrounds them. And in place of treating them as they deserve, it extends its native long-suffering to them: and the Holy Spirit is sent forth to convince them of their sin, folly, and danger. By providence, too, Jehovah works with the same end

in view. And by his hand on their conscience he likewise powerfully operates to turn them to himself. Rebels are not allowed to sink into perdition till all the moral means which infinite benevolence can bring to bear on the guilty, are exhausted. The language of the divine love is, "How can I give thee up Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee Israel? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together." The love of God is "long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."

The natural tendency of this love is to melt. The sight of distress deeply affects most hearts. There is an inner law that constrains us to "weep with those who weep." Jesus did so; and we cannot but sympathize with the feeling. He wept with the afflicted, and he wept over the impenitent. But no scene is more thoroughly fitted to impress sympathetically the hearts of men, than the garden of Gethsemane and the cross of Calvary. There our Saviour's soul was "sorrowful even unto death," and on *our* account. It is a most affecting sight. Transcendently so. And, indeed, it is because of its power to affect, that the gospel is, at least in one of its aspects, "the power of God unto salvation, to every one that believeth." It is His power to melt hearts, just as the sun is His power to melt snow, or the fire to melt lead. God shines on mind through the "Sun of righteousness;" just as he shines on snow through the sun of nature. In the one case, snow is dissolved and made to run onward to the ocean; in the other case, hearts are melted, and their affections flow outward and upward to God himself. When lead is melted, you can form it into any shape you please; and it is on the melted heart that the Holy Spirit leaves the impress of the Saviour's likeness.

The divine love is drawing. "With loving-kindness have I drawn thee." "And I," says Jesus, "if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." Not by force, nor by miracle, nor by any internal charm exercised on the mind, but by love. This is God's mode of drawing. God says by the prophet Hosea, "I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love." This is the way he wins souls. The exhibition of his own love is attractive and drawing. The terrors of the law may awaken the careless, but it is the exhibition of love that wins over the anxious. Consequently, we find Jesus saying, "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man, therefore, that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh to me." This is quite plain. God draws by teaching,

and those who learn when he teaches, become the true followers of the Messiah.

The love of God is purifying. It brings the mind, into which its influence is admitted, into unison with itself. Hence, the true Christian, Enoch-like, seeks to walk with his Maker. Joseph's mind was brought into this state in Egypt; and the mind of David seems to have been brought into deep sympathy with purity when he penned the fifty-first psalm. When the soul gets captivated by the love of God, it becomes his temple, and then he both lives and works in it. Paul says, "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." The same apostle says to the Philippians, "It is God that worketh in you;" and his work is always a good work. How anxious the cottars about Balmoral are to keep their houses tidy, when the queen is expected to step in, as she often does. How much more concerned believers should be to "keep their hearts with all diligence," that nothing be allowed to enter, or, if entering, to remain, that would defile the temple of God. A believer's title to everlasting glory in the skies is founded on Christ's work for him, but his fitness for the place depends on the Saviour's work in him. The first glimpse of the crown is got at the cross: but as the believer moves from the one to the other, he becomes more and more a partaker of the nature of Him who was, when on earth, "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners," but who is now "made higher than the heavens."

F. F.—A.

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#### WATER — THE GIFT OF GOD.

Speaking of the various street-cries in Cairo, M. L. Whately says:—"Perhaps no cry is more striking, after all, than the short and simple cry of the *water-carrier*. 'The gift of God,' he says, as he goes along with his water-skin on his shoulder. It is impossible to hear this cry without thinking of the Lord's words to the woman of Samaria:—'if thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith unto thee, Give me to drink, thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water.' (Jo. iv. 10.) It is very likely that water, so invaluable, and so often scarce in hot countries, was in those days spoken of as now, as *the gift of God*, to denote its preciousness. If so, the expression would be exceedingly forcible to the woman, and full of meaning."—*Ragged Life in Egypt*. p. 37.

## OBITUARY.

## THE REV. ALEXANDER DEWAR.

THE Rev. Alex. Dewar was born at the Mill of Muick, in the parish of Crathie, Aberdeenshire, on the 10th March, 1822. He was eminently a self-taught lad, having been at school only one winter. He joined the Church at Bathgate, under the pastoral care of the late Rev. Robert Morison, and soon evinced a desire to enter the holy ministry. In the autumn of 1845 he entered the E. U. Theological Academy, at Kilmarnock. In 1846-7 he was employed by David Reid, Esq., as a missionary in Dunfermline; and his earnest labours, both in preaching the gospel and in advocating the cause of temperance, were blessed to many. In 1848 he studied at the University of Edinburgh, and in 1849 at Glasgow, attending the E. U. Academy during the autumn. He was appointed in 1849 to supply the pulpit of a small congregational church at Port-Glasgow. Having received an invitation to visit Manchester in the spring of 1851, he bade his flock adieu, and parted from them with great and mutual reluctance. His hopes respecting Manchester were disappointed, and he was induced to enter business. He married in 1853. In 1855 he composed and published a volume of poems, which was favourably received. In the autumn of 1857, his attention was drawn to Ormskirck, at that time destitute of a minister. The church had hitherto been partially dependent on the Lancashire Congregational Union, but they now resolved to try to be independent; and they laid their case before Mr. Dewar, guaranteeing him £80 of salary to begin with, if he would come. He disposed of his business, accepted their invitation, and went, determining to know nothing among them but "Christ and him crucified." He soon felt the need of a place for Sunday-school and temperance meetings. Funds were collected, and rooms were opened free of debt in August, 1858. A spirit of earnest inquiry began amongst the young of the congregation. In one family seven, in another four, besides many others, were converted and joined the church. In December, 1859, "The Higher Christian Life" was sent to him; he saw in it a calm power described, which he lacked, and he resolved to give himself more unreservedly to the Lord. The change was speedily felt: his morning



sermons addressed to Christians became full of life and power. One of his friends, unhappily, took offence at an expression of his opinion respecting the influence of rifle corps on Revivals. Having no desire to control free thought in others, he tried to set the matter at rest; but his effort was vain, and his removal was desired. He left Ormskirk in June, 1861. When on a visit to Sale, near Manchester, he preached at the British School, Altrincham. Having said, in viewing the field, that if the Lord should open a door to him, he could trust Him for temporal support; Mr. J. H. Micklem took the old Independent chapel, fitted it up for worship, and became responsible for the incidental expenses. The door having been thus opened, Mr. Dewar began to preach on November 3, 1861. God gave him favour in the eyes of the people; many were deeply impressed, and not a few gave themselves to the Lord. His house, however, being damp and ill-drained, he was seized with cold, fever, and swelling of the limbs. The fever abated, and as the work was urgent, he preached on, and formed a church of twenty-three members, in May, 1862. But in July he was obliged to desist. Mrs. Dewar, however, visited the members of the congregation; and good and able men were sent by God to supply his pulpit: and thus souls were from time to time born again, and added to the Church. It was a trying time for all: he suffering, and his little flock waiting and praying earnestly for his recovery. But the Lord was with them. Everything which love could suggest was done for his comfort. Supplies were arranged for three months: and the Church met, and agreed to wait for Mr. Dewar another year. He resolved, with the concurrence of his beloved people, to visit Scotland, and await the intimation of the Divine pleasure. He administered the Lord's Supper in July, 1863, and bade them farewell, leaving for Aberdeen on the 10th of that month. He bore the journey well, but in a few days unfavourable symptoms supervened, and he sank rapidly. He died on the 7th August, 1863, at Midmar, without a struggle. Almost his last words were, "If the Lord has work for me, He can raise me up yet; His will be done." He was buried in the churchyard of Kinernie, Aberdeenshire.

W. B. M.—m.

## THE DOCTRINE OF EVERLASTING PUNISHMENT.

*To the Editor of the Evangelical Repository.*

REV. AND DEAR SIR,—You are aware, and doubtless your readers, generally, are aware also, that recent events of an ecclesiastico-legal nature have brought some great theological doctrines very prominently before the English public, and sympathetically, to some extent before the Scottish public too. The events to which I refer are, of course, those connected with the notorious “*Essays and Reviews*”; and, more immediately with the results of the late ecclesiastical trial of two of the seven authors of that book. The Rev. Dr. Williams and the Rev. Mr. Wilson appealed from the decision of the Court of Arches to the Privy Council; and this dignified body, by the mouth of the Lord Chancellor, reversed the prior judgement, and absolved the Rev. appellants from the legal pains and penalties hitherto believed to be incurred by the advocacy of their peculiar views. In the case of the latter of the two gentlemen named, it was decided,—and the decision had a kind of elaboration about it that was itself significant,—that the belief in the ultimate restoration of the race to purity and bliss, is not incompatible with ecclesiastical status in the Establishment, and that, of course, it is not inconsistent with professional subscription to all her creeds and articles.

This decision has produced considerable disquietude and agitation within the circle of the English hierarchy; and the ripples of disturbance have extended themselves to other and outer circles. That it was wholly unanticipated can hardly be said. Doubtless, some of those who dwell within the inner circles were cognizant beforehand of the likely issues of the prosecution. Nevertheless, the decision was heard by many—both within and without the Episcopal pale—with surprise, and alarm too. The fact was made indubitable, at any rate, that among the English clergy there is a considerable, though perhaps uncertain, amount of resiliency from some of the fundamental verities of theological belief, and specifically, from that which invests time and life with their solemnity and finality as regards probation.

If the judgement was declarative of what is, and what is not, the articulated contents of the objective national creed, it was besides indicative, to some extent, of the actual condition of the subjective professional belief; that is to say, it virtually announced that among the clergy, there are those—be they many or few—who have already resiled from the doctrine of eternal retributive punishment, and adopted some phase or other of Universalism in its place, and that probably there are others who are drifting in the same direction.

But if this be the case, what does it portend? As to the Establishment itself, one has less concern, than for other and vastly greater interests. What think you are the likely consequences of this professional latitudinarianism on the well-being of English society? Is it not ominous of something worse behind? May we not legitimately fear that, if it descend from the clergy to the laity, and disseminate itself, as by an occult law of epidemics, the obligations and restraints of men

toward men may be unwholesomely relaxed and attenuated. Apparently, indeed, it is a beginning of which a seer may not see all the ends.

But the great judicial decision is only one of a growing plurality of events that have transpired within that great Institution. The Primate has himself appeared on the arena of the conflict; and in the form of a Pastoral letter, has endeavoured at once to set himself right with the public in his relation to the Privy Council, and to soothe the minds of those who had been alarmed by the legal judgement. Perhaps, however, this was mainly due to the rumours which floated about to the effect that his Grace had himself concurred in it. Be this as it may, he explicitly contradicts the report, and explains that but for the prohibitive precedents and formalities of the court, he would have protested. In point of fact, then, he dissented, and ecclesiastical superior though he be, he declares, in opposition to the Lord Chancellor, that the doctrine of eternal punishment is an essential element in the great Church's creed. Thus there is collision of authorities. The queen in council pronounces this: her primate declares that. Other and subordinate authorities again oppose either the one or the other. The regal conflicts with the ecclesiastical, and, in some respects, the legal again conflicts with both. In short, the Establishment is, in the meantime, in the throes of distress; and everything apparently is symptomatic of a crisis of some sort. What will the end be on the great moralities of the national life?

Other events have emerged on the surface of ecclesiastical society,—to wit, the publication of the Oxford declaration, designed apparently to neutralize the effects of the legal decision; and also, the appointment of a committee of Convocation, to adjudicate on the "Essays and Reviews." But to these, it is beside my purpose any further to advert. Suffice it to say, that they are, as events in the history of a great Association, instinct with admonitions. And they that have the eyes to see will see, as they that have the ears to hear will hear.

And yet, these are not all the current theological signs of the times. There are others which are exhibiting themselves outside the boundaries of the Great Ecclesiasticism. The agitation of thought has rolled itself, wave-like, into general society. Some of the secular journals have assumed the championship of the neo-latitudinarianism. Secular journals, in sooth! What next? For my part, I have no wish in the world to restrict the sphere of secular journalism within the lines and limits which its acknowledged functions clearly indicate; but manifestly, its own leaders being witness, the determination of matters purely professional, and particularly of matters that are sacred as well as professional, and that therefore involve the mightiest of all human interests, fall not within that sphere. Nevertheless, the doctrine of eternal retribution, all-tremendous as it is, has been, and continues to be, a theme of popular animadversion, elaboration, and condemnation, by certain members of the metropolitan press. The thing is deplorable, to my apprehension, and evinces an audacity, a recklessness, and an itch for the new, that too plainly demonstrates their unfitness for the work they have ultroneously and so incontinently assumed. And the style in which they talk! The free-and-easy, the self-satisfied, and off-hard

air with which they pronounce their assumptions! It is something astounding. It were, in fact, ridiculous, if it were not something decidedly worse in another domain of things. Problems concerning realities of transcendent importance, and which have taxed, and taxed, and puzzled, some of the greatest of thinkers, are solved by these journalists, and their correspondents, with perfect *abandon*.

And as to the individual doctrine, that is specifically in question, it is,—to utter it in brief,—tabooed. It is obsolescent, they say, in relation to the modern mind. It is out of harmony with the liberalities and humanities of the age. It is, we are coolly told, a *ferocious invention* of the past; and however suited to keep the uncultured and turbulent in subjection, it is, in this era, wholly unnecessary. The time for its supersession has at last come, it is affirmed, and forthwith, with superabundant assurance, these self-constituted dictators of things theological, substitute Universalism in its place. The whole thing is graceless, and smacks more, it seems to me, of impertinent irreverence, than of competence and modesty. Such are some of the supplementary signs of the times to which I referred. And are they signs that do not signify? I trow not.

I shall just add, in this connexion,—and while expressing my own alarm at my discursiveness,—that the initiation of this popular phase of the theological discussion was taken in January last, by the Rev. F. D. Maurice, who thought fit to broach, in the columns of the Spectator, in the epistolary form, the great subject of the veritability of eternal punishment. The initiation has had its continuation, but not its termination. And if it was this gentleman's aim to provoke the popular settlement of the question he has had his reward. For, week after week, clerical and non-clerical correspondents followed suit in that journal, and under the protection of anonymity, gave in their adhesion to the new theology. The original epistle has had effects, like "beating to quarters"; or, as when the tocsin is sounded, and there's the consequent rush to arms.

Now, as to Mr. Maurice himself, I am far enough, for my part, from exalting him into an oracle, in relation to things either philosophical or theological; and yet, at the time of the publication of his letter, I regarded his *theologisation* in this matter, as ominous of something of greater gravity than itself. And perhaps I may not be wholly mistaken as regards the sequel of things. But he is not, I imagine, the man to effect any great permanent change in our theological ideas,—whatever estimate he may himself entertain as to own potentialities in that respect. Unless I greatly mis-apprehend his features, and mal-pourtray his mental characteristics to my own mind, he is rather a theologaster than a theologian, and, it may be, more a be-mystifying mystagogue, in things sacred, than either the one or the other. And if he be, one need neither hope nor fear that he will turn the theological world upside down, and consummate a great reformation of thought. Still, as he is to some extent, the exponent of some popular tendencies in things divine, his theologisings, as in the instance specified, may have a value extraneous to themselves, and it is simply as such that I here advert to them. I might have quoted from his letter, for the information of your readers, but—your space. Allow me to say, however, that he pushes the doctrine of eternal punishment aside, on the double ground of its demoral-

izing influence on the masses, and its inconsistency with all our ideas of the paternal character of the Infinite One.

Well, if it be the case that we have, under the law of progression, reached a kind of theological crisis, and that among other evolutions and revolutions of doctrinal notions, this one of the eternity of the punishment inflicted on the finally impenitent, is destined to be metamorphosed into some other notion wholly different from itself, what shall we say? Shall we say, what certain humanitarians are already saying, that the absolutely penal view of the subject is in antagonism with the moral interests of society? That it goads men into the recklessness of despair? That it impels them, will they, nill they, into irreclaimable atheism? And farther, shall we say, with others, that, after all, this doctrine is, at last, in these critical days, found destitute alike of biblical and of philosophical foundations? And that the time is now at hand for the initiation of some substitute for it that shall be at once final and of universal adoption? Or rather, shall we say, that notwithstanding all the difficulties which admittedly beset the subject, exegetically, philosophically, and practically, it is yet susceptible of vindication against all the allegations of latitudinarianism? Surely we may.

Now it may not be denied that not a few of the adherents of the non-penal view have reached their conclusion from considerations that reflect lustre on their philanthropy. They would have compassion even on the finally impenitent; and as they do not find anything within themselves to consign them to endless misery, they infer, by an ascending process of logic, that neither will the great Father of spirits condemn them. Indeed, the staple argument for ultimate universal salvation, is drawn from the all-embracing and unchangeable mercy of God. That men's sympathies should be caught up by such a subject, one cannot wonder. The wonder is, that it is ever otherwise. Now, this humane philanthropy,—this humanism or humanizing feeling,—repudiates, it is affirmed, and repudiates as a moral incompatibility, the doctrine that any portion of the race will be retributively doomed to everlasting punishment. One cannot deny either the amiability or the plausibility of the allegation.

Very well; it is apprehended then that Universalism is absolute in its applications of the one great principle of benignity. According to it, mercy, nothing but mercy, is the beginning, the middle, and the ending, of the Divine moral administration, and this, too, in its references not to pluralities and communities of individuals, but to individuals as isolated units of personality. And hence, the consummation of this system of things will be the ultimate purification and beatification of every single member of the vast family of man. Such, in the rough, is this ultra-benevolent theory of the grand end of ends. Who would not wish it were true? There are difficulties in the way, however. Is it not chargeable with fallacious one-sidedness? And if it be pushed into its legitimate results, will it not collapse on itself? Can it be held, without denying some of the fundamental principles of moral government?

I cannot but remark here, Sir, that it is, in truth, a solemn reflection

that in contending for the verification of the doctrine of the endlessness of future punishments, one is dealing with a topic of the most tremendous import. And it is impossible to think of it, even superficially, without a shrinking of the sensibilities. One recoils from it stunned, appalled. The mind reels and staggers, in fact, and is fain at last to escape from the contemplation. It is then far too momentous a theme for one to approach in any mood save that of mingled awe and dread. For myself, I would tread softly within its precincts, and seek, beforehand, some kind of preparation for contact with it. Still, while its intrinsic nature demands a certain correlative moral condition in the inquirer, it cannot be, I imagine, a reason in bar of its thorough investigation. On the contrary, the conditions attained, the work of inquiry is to be desired. It must be both our duty and our interest to know the truth of it even to the uttermost. And yet, for a time, as you are aware, a sickly sentimentalism dictated that "hell should never be mentioned to ears polite." The dictation was an offence—an impertinence. Apparently, however, the spirit of the thing is changed; and it is becoming the *mode* in certain high quarters not to mention "hell" to ears philosophical. Be it so. A truer philosophy than that which it affects, the philosophy of a real divinity, while keeping its countenance serene and its heart tender, may yet teach inquiring men a more excellent way.

Universalism is not one and the same thing, in all respects, as held by its professors. On the contrary, in almost every case, it is represented in some modified form by each individual elaborator. In some, there is the ultraism of the theory, which excludes altogether and absolutely the penal element. In others, again, there is, it would seem, some sort of compromise between the absolutely penal and the absolutely non-penal representations of the subject. Still, in every form of it, the ultimatum of things is tenaciously held. There is, indeed, much dubiety, and more contrariety, as to the specific means by which this is to be brought about. Generally speaking, it is true, there is some kind of consistent harmony, and the conception is, that impenitent men, after death, will be introduced into an intermediate disciplinary state, in which, by some unknown processes, they will be reformed and made fit to be finally glorified. Such, indeed, is the view propounded by one of the Rev. appellants in the ecclesiastical trial just alluded to. It is his doctrinal hope, that the perverted in this sphere of things "may be restored," and that, "all, both small and great, may ultimately find a refuge in the bosom of the Universal Parent." This, then, is the new candidate for our theological creed. All men, without distinction or exception, will eventually attain to everlasting blessedness. Heaven, the perfect realization of happiness and holiness, is the destined goal of aggregate humanity. This is the idea. Can it be substantiated?

Specifically, let me inquire, *first*, whether this theory, no matter how it is accommodated in individual hands to supposed exigencies, does not *contradict the accepted theory of the present life*? By this, I mean, that, to my apprehension it implies, as, indeed, in the mouth of some of its professors, it avows, that men are not now probationers for their future destiny—in the sense generally understood—and that time, consequently, is not their only sowing season, to be followed by the reaping season to

come. At any rate, this much is clear, that it necessitates such an abatement from the strict notion of a final probation, as to justify one in challenging it. As I have just stated, some of its adherents accept this result. John Foster, for instance, may be taken as a representative of that section of them. According to his notion, the idea of a probation is "absurd." Others, it may be supposed, scarcely venture this length. Logically, however, there is no middle place. If the retributory element be eliminated from the view of the future, the probationary must be extruded from that of the present. For, are they not something like mutually involving conceptions? Do they not reciprocally infer each other? And hence, if the one be affirmed, the other is implied: just as the exclusion of one is the negation of both. Well, then, Universalism, theoretically, either dilutes or expunges the immensely important idea of a probation. If it be true, we are not now on trial. We are not candidates for everlasting life. We are not preparing for contingent unalterable destinies. Earth is not the exclusive arena for the formation of character. Time is not invested with any sort of finality peculiar to itself. And between moral character, as here evolved, and irrevocable destiny, there is no link of connection. Are these, in any measure or kind, the involved notions in this theory? Are these some of its fruits? If they are, may we not tremble at the practical effects of the adoption of it? What a prostration of the moral energies would ensue! and what a deterioration and attenuation of all those moral obligations and restraints which unquestionably keep society together! Not now under trial! That were "good news," indeed, "to the lawless and disobedient, to the godless and profane;"—and ultimate salvation and bliss, besides!

Am I right then in the inference, that the theory before us does logically abolish, or at any rate mitigate, the idea that life-in-time is a trial? And am I further right in the allegation that if it does, it is held at the expense of what is indispensable to our wellbeing?

But how may I certify myself that this life is probationary? Doubtless, it is of moment that the idea should always lie at the springs of our activities. Is the notion then the result of a combination of notions? And are these some of them?—that men are moral, and therefore responsible, agents—that, as such, they are the proper subjects of moral government, and that they are placed for a limited period in this region of things, where inducements and counter-inducements actively assail their power of moral choices?—and this, also, that what we call character is an accretion of littles,—the total effect of innumerable individual actions,—as by the law of continuity and habit?—and of this, besides, that character gradually petrifies and becomes, more or less, an unchangeable thing?—and lastly, of this, to boot, that in a vast administration, embracing cosmical arrangements of unknown and unknowable magnitude, and presided over by the Infinite Moral Governor, the Patron of goodness, there must be awards? But this is much more than enough. I resume.

*Secondly*, not only does Universalism nullify the idea of probation, it also mutilates, and, in fact, annihilates, the just idea of law. I am not conscious of exaggeration in saying that, according to it, we live in a

universe without law. Am I wrong in this? I do not think it; for by its own interpretations, both the life that now is, and that which is to come, are purely disciplinary, having the reformation and restoration of all as the ends sought; and the ends thus sought are to be infallibly attained. Now, what does all this imply, but (1) that law has no penalty to inflict retributively when it is violated, and thus law is no more law: And (2) that the perpetration of sin is not necessarily visited with its consequences: And (3) that sin has no criminality, demerit, or ill-desert, and is, indeed, though the most prodigious of evils, no more sin. It will never do to plead that in the "life beyond life" the unholy are subjected to punitive inflictions,—it will never do to plead this, so long as it is affirmed that these are solely reformatory measures. The penal element in the divine law is, I apprehend, a wholly different reality.

But what is the pure conception of law? It is of some consequence to know. Is it not this,—that it is, in its ideal unity, the synthesis of the elements of precept and penalty? That is to say, that all law, strictly so called, is at once preceptive and comminative. And hence precept, apart from penalty, is not law, but something indefinitely less. The two elements are the essentials that constitute the reality. Very well, if this be unchallengeable, is it not indubitable that in the theory we are combating, there is no such conception of law; and that I was justified in saying that it denuded the great universe of moral law? Just imagine it,—a universe without law! It is something dreadful. But any system of thought that eliminates the penal element from law, and, therefore, eliminates law itself from the moral dominions of the great Governor, is a system, I cannot but think, radically untrue. And such a system, I fear, is Universalism.

One word more. If moral law be extruded from the moral system under which we live, where is there scope or necessity for the atonement? But of this again.

*Thirdly.* But, besides the false jurisprudence, I am amazed at *the false psychology* which enters into this matter. If anything be scientifically ascertainable about the human mind, it is, one would think, that its volitive faculty is free. And such freedom, we understand, is essential to moral agency. It constitutes, indeed, one of the plurality of elements in the formation of a real moral agent. But what does this imply? Assuredly, that moral evil is a contingency of such a freedom. Now, if men, as the possessors of a genuinely free moral agency, have abused their freedom, in this sphere of things, to the commission of sin, what grounds are there for the supposition, which unquestionably is made by this theory, that the same agents—and all-polluted too—will, in the future beyond, cease to do evil and learn to do well? Do not men depart into the unseen as *men*?—constitutionally intact? If they do, what possible guarantees are there for their reclamation there, which are not available here? If they be volitionally, and therefore morally, free, they must be free to do evil then, as now: and this, I imagine, must be affirmed whatever be the circumstances in the midst of which they may be placed. The dictates, then, of a sound psychology are, in my mind, antagonistic to this theory. Of course, the difficulty is got



over by assuming that a necessitating influence will effectuate the desired results, and that impenitent spirits will be then irresistibly constrained to that goodness which they voluntarily eschewed here. I suppose this is really one of the bases of the system. But it is a futility. The assumption can never be verified. On the contrary, besides running counter to all our consciousnesses on the subject, it, in the end, annihilates itself. Is not a necessitated morality a contradiction in terms, and, in reality, an impossibility? Besides, if it were a possibility, why should the consummation be postponed until the future? Why not necessitate goodness now?

*Fourthly.* But there are more formidable difficulties still. On such a theory, what *provisions are made for the security of the moral well-being of the rest of the universe?* The universe! It does not appear to have entered into the calculations of this theory. And yet, it is just as certain as it need be for our purpose, that our world is only a very tiny part of the mighty totality of things and beings. And if there be, in other worlds, moral beings in myriads upon myriads, what safeguards, for their stability in moral goodness, are implied or given in the theory of a universal restoration of human sinners? None: so far as we can see. And if so, is not the objection conclusive?

*Fifthly.* And then, again, what an *amendment*—if amendment indeed it be—*does such a theory require us to make in our settled conception of the great propitiation!* Universalists, to be sure, do not scruple to make any such alterations as they may deem necessary for the maintenance of their pet theory, and, of course, suppose them amendments. Hence, every theory of universal salvation has at its heart some peculiar concoction of its own on the great atonement. It could not subsist without it. But what then? Are we first to do battle for our cherished views of that ineffably glorious reality, and then to attack the something else in the rear? Is it not enough to doom the theory in question to the limbo of unbelievabilities, that it requires, as an efficient part of itself, a truncated notion of that wonderful intervention? In fact, a strict notion of propitiation is incompatible with a similar notion of universalism; and, conversely, a thoroughgoing universalism is incompatible with propitiation;—and hence, as between these mutually repugnant ideas, our belief must be decided by the results of investigations into the original grounds of each. And in reference to this, is it too much to say, that the evisceration of propitiation from the moral system under which we live, in the sense, of course, of a real but exclusive satisfaction to the Divine rectoral justice, is to tear out the vitals of christianity and to make the biblical documents a collection of enigmas?

*Sixthly.* If all this, and more, can be alleged against Universalism, what about *the critical difficulties which beset it?* In a word, quite apart from general philosophical considerations, are there not most substantial reasons in biblical exegesis to warrant the retention of the antithetic view? I am aware that the textual difficulties are real in some instances, and I also know that they have been incontinently exaggerated. But after all legitimate deductions, is it, or is it not, the case, that

sacred criticism is constrained, by the innate harmonies of the disputed passages, to give its decided verdict in favour of the orthodox doctrine?

There is this to add, that on the assumption of the validity of this theory, one would not know how to understand the threatenings and denunciations and promises and remonstrances which compose so large a fraction of the whole bible. Would not the wonderful "volume of the book" become, with universal salvation in mind, altogether unintelligible? Its existence, together with the peculiar nature of its contents, constitutes, in my view, a protest against its adoption.

Let me now briefly inquire,—How can we account for the recoil which many minds experience in relation to the accepted doctrine? Doubtless, the cause, at bottom, is not identical in all classes. In the lower order of minds, the cause, it may be feared, is not far to seek. Obviously, it is connected with their own guiltiness. Alas! the wish, in their case, may be father to the thought. But in the nobler class of minds, the causes must be sought for in something else. Not a few, it is certain, are repelled by the idea of the *endlessness* which is affirmed of future punishment; and this they cannot reconcile with their view of the essential goodness of Him who is the Infinite Good. Such an one was John Foster. Others, again, are unable to believe in some of the special representations of future punishment, as being "fire," and involving "a worm that dieth not," etc., etc. As to this latter difficulty, is it not your opinion that, in the rhetoric of the pulpit, a wanton employment of sacred terms, in their lowest signification, has sometimes given occasion to not a little of this scepticism? In many instances, the inspired passages on this subject are couched in intensely figurative forms. They are hyperbolical and metaphorical. If so, has there not been such an abusive interpretation of them, as, in some cases at least, may have produced that repugnance in sensitive minds of which I speak. As to the element of endlessness from which some shrink, what can be said? Must it not be the case, that if penal retribution constitute a part of the great system of things under which men live, its infliction in the future *must always be future*? Truly, it is a tremendous conclusion. But is there an alternative? Can we legitimately suppose that moral beings, living under the infliction of the divine punition, will cease to sin? If we cannot, then must we not suppose that the wrath will always continue because the sin will always continue?

And as to the alleged aggravated character of the punishment, do not objectors forget that it is God with whom we have to deal, and that there is no *ferocity* in Him. Granted that the inspired language is terrible, say even horrible—and this is a term of Foster's on the subject—it is ever to be recollected that the Great Judge is not vindictive, and that nothing that is malicious has any place in the Infinite heart. In the relation of avenger of evil, as the Magistrate of the moral universe, he will always be infinitely holy; and in infinite holiness there is no malevolence. And then it must ever be borne in mind, that in every case the retribution awarded will be righteously proportioned to the demerit of character.

But after all, I am constrained to think that a just conception of sin is the key to the solution of this mighty matter. But this conception

men are seldom competent to realize. They are, alas! too familiar with it for that. And yet, when it is approximately realized, is it not seen and felt to be the greatest of all evil things? It is, in a word, the absolute evil. And as such, its proper penalty must, one would think, be the endless wrath of God. If men recoil from this, is it not likely that the rebound is traceable only to some inadequacy in their thinkings as to the essential malignity of the one absolute evil—sin? But whether the orthodox doctrine be susceptible of complete vindication or not, is there not ground to fear, that if it be swept out of the minds of the people, or even only superseded by some such substitute, as one or other of the forms of Universalism, a great moral restraint will be swept away too? And what then will be likely to ensue?

Other considerations suggest themselves, but I have already overstepped the limits of your available space.

I remain,

Rev. and Dear Sir,

Yours very truly,

INQUIRER.

YE SHALL BE AS THE WINGS OF A DOVE.

M. L. Whately says:—"The roofs (of the houses in Cairo) are usually in a great state of litter; and were it not that *Haana*, the seller of *geelah* (fuel), gets a palm-branch and makes a clearance once in a while, her roof would assuredly give way under the accumulation of rubbish. One thing never seemed cleared away, however, and that was the mass of old broken pitchers, sherds, and pots, that in these and similar houses are piled up in some corner. And there is a curious observation in connection with this. A little before sunset, numbers of *pigeons* suddenly emerge from behind the pitchers and other rubbish, where they had been sleeping in the heat of the day, or pecking about to find food. They dart upwards and career through the air in large circles, their outspread wings catching the bright glow of the sun's slanting rays, so that they really resemble shining 'yellow gold;' then, as they wheel round, and are seen *against* the light, they appear as if turned into molten silver, most of them being pure white, or else very light coloured. This may seem fanciful, but the effect of *light* in these regions is difficult to describe to those who have not seen it; and evening after evening we watched the circling flight of the doves, and always observed the same appearance. 'Though *ye have lien among the pots*, yet shall ye be as the wings of a dove covered with silver, and his feathers with yellow gold.' (Ps. lxxviii. 13.)

"It was beautiful to see these birds rising clean and unsoiled, as doves always do, from the dust and dirt, in which they had been hidden, and soaring aloft in the sky till nearly out of sight among the bright sunset clouds. Thus a believer who leaves behind him the corruptions of the world, and is rendered bright by the Sun of Righteousness shining upon

his soul, rises higher and higher, and nearer and nearer to the light, till, lost to the view of those who stay behind, he has passed into the unknown brightness above."—*Ragged Life in Egypt*. pp. 33, 34.

#### CHARIOTS, RUNNERS, & TORCHES.

M. L. Whately, speaking of the Bazaars of Cairo, says:—"It is in the Goreeah and Hamzané that the most lively traffic is carried on, and also in the Mosky, where the Greek, Maltese, and Italian shops are chiefly situated. Here carriages are constantly to be seen, as the space is wide enough to admit of driving, though not always with safety. The Arab drivers, however, are rash and headstrong, and dash furiously along, a *says*, or running footman, armed with a long wand, going before to clear the way. 'And some shall run before his chariots.' (1 Sam. viii. 11.) By night the carriages are lighted by torches, borne by the *says*, which cast a beautiful red glare as they hurry past, and strongly bring to mind the passage of Scripture, where it is said,—'The chariots shall be with flaming torches,—the chariots shall rage in the streets, they shall jostle one against another in the broad ways: they shall seem like torches, they shall run like the lightnings.' (Nah. ii. 3, 4.)"—*Ragged Life in Egypt*. p. 20.

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#### BOOKS.

*An Appeal to the Churches on the Atonement, in its Calvinistic and Arminian Aspects.* By the Rev. G. B. Porteous, minister of "the New Church," west end of Hanover and Cathedral streets. Glasgow: W. Love. 1864.

DIFFERENT individuals have sent us copies of this pamphlet, accompanied with a request that it should receive some notice in our pages. Others have written us concerning it, to the effect that they hoped that it would be passed by without observation.

It was under the influence of these divergent opinions that we took up and read Mr. Porteous's Appeal. And, although, for the sake of Mr. Porteous himself, we should have preferred to have allowed his publication to lie on our table unnoticed, we think that it may be a right thing, on the whole, to take some cognizance of its character and contents. It is a Glasgow publication. It is the product of a Glasgow clergyman. It is "an Appeal to the churches" in general. It professes to discuss the vital subject of the atonement "in its Calvinistic and Arminian aspects." And it seems to be, in a great measure, aimed at and against ourselves and those brethren who move in the same theological sphere with ourselves.

We may say, in the outset, that we did not, in all respects, dislike the title of the pamphlet. We felt that it invited, to some degree, our interest. We may also remark that we had no prejudice whatever against

the brochure, in consequence of the author's name. That name had only become known to us a few months before. And we had heard Mr. Porteous spoken of as a gentleman of fascinating bearing as regards a certain class, and of popular powers as a speaker. We presumed, therefore, that there might be something deserving our attention in an earnest "Appeal to the Churches," issuing from such a quarter.

We thought, indeed, that there was a trifle of pretentiousness in a young clergyman, whose position had yet to be established, assuming the attitude of an Appellant "to the churches." It indicated, as it appeared to us, the port of one who seemed to have no misgivings as to his ability to instruct the universal christian brotherhood. It seemed to intimate, and as it were announce, that he was, in his own estimation, the coming man, come at last, to whom all should give ear, and from whom all might receive guidance. There did appear to be a dash of pretentiousness in the affair; and all the more so as the "Appeal" is, after all, only a pamphlet, and consequently of such limited bulk that it could scarcely be regarded as a very exhaustive or even adequate discussion of a theme so vast, and so varied in its relations. This dash of pretentiousness we did not altogether relish. It rather staggered us. It did not seem to indicate a very large amount of that modesty, which is generally the characteristic of really great minds. And besides, when we turned from the first page of the pamphlet's cover to the last, we noticed an announcement, "by the same author," of "*An Oration on the Essays and Reviews.*" It is, we assure our readers, legibly and unequivocally printed—"An Oration." This too staggered us. It seemed to indicate a rather intensified predilection for what amounts to pretentiousness. For the word "oration," as viewed in the light of modern conventional usage among Britons, is a term which a modest man will not readily arrogate in speaking of his own speeches. It is not customary, we presume, for public speakers, even though they be of acknowledged eminence, to characterize themselves as *orators*, or their productions as *orations*. And, besides, "*An Oration on the Essays and Reviews*" is not exactly, we imagine, what the thinking part of the reading public desires. It is not oratory, but argument, that is desiderated on such a subject.

We must confess, then, to a little misgiving, when we looked at both sides of the cover of Mr. Porteous's pamphlet. We opened it nevertheless, and read.

As we proceeded, we noticed that the author quoted Hebrew and Greek, in support of his views of the atonement. That is very right, and indeed just as it ought to be. For no one, who knows anything of such subjects, could have objections to see the discussion carried into the region of the inspired phraseology. But when an author is apparently somewhat pretentious, one, naturally enough, looks observantly to see if there be a good intellectual groundwork which may serve as a support to his assumption. We looked, therefore, with both our eyes, at the Hebrew and Greek. And the learned reader may judge of our surprise when we found, in Mr. Porteous's *Appeal to the Churches*, the following remark:—"The Hebrew verb (*kapher*) to atone, and its Greek correlates, *ιλάσκομαι*, *ἱξιλάομαι*, and *καταλλάσσω*, mean properly to *produce*

*agreement.* The lexicographers include *to appease* within the import of the first two, but the element of vicarious substitution is totally wanting."—p. 21. Now, not to dwell on our astonishment at finding one, who writes "orations," using such a word as "awanting" instead of "wanting," and employing such a tawdry tautological expression as "vicarious substitution," which just means *substitutionary substitution*,—not to dwell, we say, on our astonishment at finding such blurs and blemishes of genuine oratory as these, we would at present confine our attention to the scholarship of Mr. Porteous. He quotes a Hebrew word; though it is the only one, which, so far as we remember, he refers to. It was certainly well to quote it, for the term is a most important one in connection with the Biblical idea of atonement. *But then Mr. Porteous mis-quotes it.* In plain, though homely and un-oratorical phraseology, *he mis-spells it!* The mis-spelling is rather ominous, in as much as one would naturally have expected that the Appellant would pay special attention to accuracy in a word of such moment, and a word which he ventures to print only once. Of course every scholar knows that there is no such word in the Hebrew language as *kapher*. There is a verb *kaphár* (or *chaphár*)—to which no doubt Mr. Porteous intended to refer. It occurs once in the Bible, and means *to cover (with pitch)*. See Gen. vi. 14: "and *thou shalt pitch* it within and without with pitch." And this same verb, in a different conjugation, as grammarians call it, and in which it is pronounced *kippér*,—the word which Mr. Porteous should have given,—is very frequently used in the Old Testament, and is generally translated in our version "to make atonement." See Levit. iv. 20, 26, 31, 35; v. 6, 10, 13, 18; xiv. 18, 19, 20, 31, 53; etc., etc. This specimen of Hebrew literature, in the *Appeal to the Churches*, more especially when taken in connection with the pretentiousness already spoken of, staggered us. It threatened to shake our confidence in the author's competency to instruct "the churches" on an important biblical doctrine.

But farther, Mr. Porteous,—animated apparently by the conviction that he was ripe in his biblical scholarship, so far as regards the terms that express the biblical doctrine of the atonement,—speaks not only of "the Hebrew verb *kapher*," but also of "its Greek correlates, *ἰλάσκομαι, ἰξιλάομαι, and καταλλάσσω.*" We were staggered again. He speaks of the "Greek correlates" of the Hebrew word. The Greek "correlates"! So it stands. And does Mr. Porteous, it could not but occur to us, who professes to make "orations,"—does Mr. Porteous really not know the meaning of the word "correlates"? It would appear, strange though it be, that he actually does not. He uses the term as if it might be properly employed to denote *corresponding words*, or phraseological *analogues*, or *homologues*; whereas *correlate* means something, as Dr. Johnson remarks, "that stands in an *opposite* relation." Correlatives, says Blount, are those objects "whose whole being is to be to another." "Man and woman," says Hume, "master and servant, father and son, prince and subject, stranger and citizen, are *correlative* terms." (*Essays*, 11.) *Down*, too, is the correlate of *up*: *left* is the correlate of *right*: *creature* is the correlate of *creator*: *effect* is the correlate of *cause*. But it is not to any such relation as this, we presume, that Mr. Porteous refers. He means something altogether different, and consequently something

altogether different from what he says. But such an antithesis between what one means and what one says, is rather a bad blunder for an orator ; though we should not, in all likelihood, have deemed it needful to take notice of it in the composition of one who made no pretensions to oratory.

But passing this misuse of the word "correlates,"—a misuse, it may be noticed, occurring in the immediate vicinity of "vicarious substitution" and "awaiting,"—we were, still farther, somewhat surprised that Mr. Porteous, in quoting his Greek, should give *ἰλασμομαι* and *ἰξιλάομαι*, instead of *ἰλάσσομαι* and *ἰξιλάσσομαι*. But, passing this too, we were far more surprised to find him thrusting in *καταλλάσσω* as a "correlate" of the Hebrew verb, when he ought to have known that it is never employed by the Septuagint translators in their rendering of *kippér*; and those theologians who hold that, while the propitiation terminated on God, reconciliation is predicated only of man, would strenuously contend that the words belong to different categories of import.

But even this is not all. Mr. Porteous determines the "proper meaning" of the Hebrew and Greek terms. He says that they "mean properly to produce agreement." But he might really,—will he pardon us for the form of the remark?—have said, as well and as truly, that they "mean properly to make orations." Our remark is strictly to the point, as every scholar will perceive. Mr. Porteous is not speaking, doctrinally, of what may be the results,—in the consciousness of God or of man or of both,—of the action or actions indicated by the verbs in question. He is speaking, philologically, of the "proper meaning" of the verbs, as verbs. And, in thus speaking, he speaks philological incongruity, and philological incongruity in the superlative degree. In short, he speaks philological nonsense. Take *kaphár* for instance. It only means to cover (with pitch). But this surely is something different from producing agreement. Take *kippér*: it is used in two distinct relations. It is used sometimes to describe a certain action of God in relation to men. And when it is so used, it means to cover (iniquities, &c.), or to cover (men, as regards their iniquities), that is, to pardon. And hence the word is translated to pardon and to forgive, in 2 Chron. xxx. 18, and Ps. lxxviii. 38. But undoubtedly even Mr. Porteous will acknowledge that to cover iniquities, in the sense of pardoning them, is something very different indeed from producing them into agreement. When he calmly reconsiders the matter, he will see that this is the case. But if he should not, let him only make trial of his translation on Ps. lxxviii. 38:—"But he, being full of compassion, forgave their iniquity." His translation would make the passage run thus:—"But he, being full of compassion, produced agreement their iniquity"; (or would he say, produced their iniquity into agreement?) The version, we fear, is very far from being delightfully self-luminous, or delightfully oratorical, or delightful in any respect whatsoever. Let us try again 2 Chron. xxx. 18,—“But Hezekiah prayed for them saying, the good Lord pardon every one.” Mr. Porteous's version would be the following:—"The good Lord produce agreement every one." It appears to us, to be, in no respect, a clearer, or chaster, or juster, or grander translation.

But *kipér* is far more frequently employed in the Bible in its other relation, viz., to denote a certain action of men (in reference to God). And it is generally translated, when used in this relation, *to make an atonement*, that is *to cover* (*sins by means of some sacrifice or offering that may be acceptable to God*). The word, in short, “means properly” *to cover*. And when Mr. Porteous said, that it “means properly *to produce agreement*,” he only spoke at random, and from his own fancy, and without one atom of philological usage for his warrant. He was *inventing* his scholarship:—rather a sorry kind of erudition. And yet his treatise is an *Appeal to the Churches*, and, we suppose, *to the intelligent* in them, and *the scholarly* too!

His explanation of the Greek words *ιλάσκομαι* and *ἱξιλάσκομαι* is, of course, equally fanciful with his explication of the proper meaning of *kaphár*, and equally arbitrary too, and therefore equally unscholarly, and equally impracticable. Any child that can spell Greek will see that it is so, by consulting any respectable Greek lexicographer, or by trying the proposed translation on Luke xviii. 13, for instance,—“*God be merciful* (that is, be propitiated, be propitious) to me a sinner.” How would it sound, if we were to adopt Mr. Porteous’s meaning of the word, and to translate it thus:—“*God be thou produced agreement*, or, *God be thou produced into agreement*, to me a sinner?”

It is enough, we imagine:—enough as regards Mr. Porteous’s scholarship, at least, and his consequent competency to deal with matters that require scholarship. Yes, it is enough; aye, enough, more than enough.

But perhaps, though greatly deficient in the qualification of scholarship, Mr. Porteous may be eminently characterized by some compensating qualities, such, for example, as controversial candour. Let us see.

He argues that it is not God, on whom the propitiation of Christ terminates. He maintains that God did not need to be propitiated,—whatsoever be the aspect of things, under which we may consider Him,—in order that He might see it fit to forgive. He holds, in short, the same view, substantially, of the relationship of God and of Christ which we discussed at length in the 2d and 3d Nos. of the *Second Series* of the *Repository*.

Well. We have not, of course, the shadow of an objection to Mr. Porteous holding whatsoever views of the propitiation may commend themselves to his judgement. He is entitled to look from his own standpoint, at every subject that is presented to him. And it is to his God alone, that, like the rest of us, he must stand or fall for the use or abuse he makes of his powers in prosecuting his “search after truth.” This we fully acknowledge. But if, in his effort to establish before the public his own particular view of any subject, say of the atonement, he misrepresent the views of others, there will be some excuse, we should suppose, for some of his fellow-men adventuring to call him to account. We are constrained to plead this excuse.

Mr. Porteous says, for instance, in reference to the common evangelical view of the atonement:—“Such a doctrine as that held by the orthodox is what we can neither admit nor entertain. It supposes the existence of *three divine persons* in the Godhead, each being ‘equal in substance, power, and glory’; therefore, in possession of opposite and



equal attributes. It also affirms and involves the idea, that a change took place in the divine character, an alteration, or mutation, took place in the divine nature."—p. 10.

Such is one of Mr. Porteous's statements. And, in looking at it, we do not at present pause to consider his objection to the doctrine of the tri-personality of the Godhead. We may, at a subsequent stage of these remarks, have something to say on that subject. But meanwhile we only refer to his second reason for rejecting the doctrine of "the orthodox" on the atonement. "It affirms," says he, "and involves the idea that a change took place in the divine character, an alteration, or mutation, took place in the divine nature."

We pass by the grammatical and unoratorical error of omitting the demonstrative "that" before the expression "an alteration." We wish to fix attention exclusively upon the allegation that the common evangelical theory of the atonement "affirms and involves the idea that a change took place in the divine character, [that] an alteration or mutation took place in the divine nature." Now, does it? we ask. We are constrained to say, that it does not. Most certainly it does not "affirm" the idea; and we would therefore call upon Mr. Porteous to substantiate his allegation to that effect by some quotations or quotation from some evangelical theologians or theologian. We shall be satisfied with even *one* quotation from any *one* theologian, however humble that theologian may be in his relative position in "the churches."

Mr. Porteous has spoken unadvisedly. He has spoken misrepresentingly. We make bold to "affirm" that no theologian, whether Calvinistic or Arminian, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, ever "affirmed" that the atonement changed either "the divine character" or "the divine nature." There must, we fear, be, in our author, either a want of controversial candour, which we should be loath to suppose, or a want of controversial competency. There must be controversial recklessness: and that will amount either to a deficiency in controversial candour, or to a deficiency in controversial competency.

But not only is it not the case that the common evangelical doctrine "affirms" such an idea. It is as little the case that it "involves" it;—unless, indeed, Mr. Porteous is prepared to maintain that there can be no change predicable of the divine Being, which is not resolvable either into a change of character, or into a change of nature. And if Mr. Porteous is prepared to maintain this position, then he must be prepared to maintain that God never acted, and never can act. For to act is to change. It is to do something that was not done before. If Mr. Porteous is prepared to maintain that God never thus changes, then he must maintain that there has been no creation, and never can be any; and, of course, that there has been no incarnation, and never can be any. But if, on the contrary, he feels constrained to admit that there may be changes, which are not changes of "character" or of "nature," then for ought that he has shown, the change that is ascribed by evangelical theologians to the direction of the divine volitions, in consideration of the meritorious atonement of Christ, may be a change that neither involves mutation in the divine character, nor infers alteration in the divine nature. Where then, we feel constrained to ask,—where was

candour in Mr. Porteous's representation? If candour was present, where was controversial competency?

Mr. Porteous says, again, in another part of his *Appeal to the Churches*:—

“ We have adverted to the fallacy entertained by nearly all the orthodox, that God needed to be reconciled to man. This notion supposes that the Father, or first person of the Godhead, was dissatisfied with man's transgressions, and demanded satisfaction for his offended justice, but in making such a demand, nothing is said of the justice of the Son and Holy Ghost, who each being ‘God and Lord by Himself,’ and equal in substance, power, and glory, of one feeling, thought, and mind, ought equally to have been dissatisfied, and each to have demanded justice. Again, though much is said of the great forbearance of God the Son, nothing is said of the forbearance of God the Father. In harmony with this false notion, Jesus Christ comes into the world, suffers the penalty and punishment due to sin, in order to make satisfaction to the injured justice of God the Father, and to appease His wrath. Now, if it was necessary for God the Son to do this for the sake of God the Father, it was equally incumbent upon God the Father to suffer in like manner, to appease the wrath, and satisfy the injured justice, of God the Son; and God the Holy Ghost would require equal satisfaction, as God the Father and Son; for all three are alike in *attributes, predicates, and powers*. Yet, there is no complaint on the part of God the Son, nor yet of the Holy Ghost, and therefore we are led to conclude, that there is a deadly error in the common view. As the Father and Son are equally holy, pure, and just, there can be no claims of justice, or of any other attribute predicable of the one which does not equally hold in regard to the other. There cannot be any such conflict in the demands of the Divine perfections, as is implied in the prevalent theology of the Church. The truth is, the current theory is built upon a view of the Divine perfections, which implies such a variance between them, as is utterly irreconcilable with the essential unity of the Godhead. If the Father and the Son be essentially *One*, there is as much wrath in the Son as there is in the Father, and as much of clemency in the Father as in the Son. To this view of the scheme of Redemption there are many serious objections; chief amongst which is this—that it effectually makes the work of Atonement to satisfy the *will* of one Divine person, whilst it does not satisfy the demands of internal consciousness. No reasonable or good man can really believe that God is divided, or has *two equals*, and that He can be angry, or the subject of wrath. There can be no real wrath on the part of Deity, to be propitiated, for wrath is not predicable of a Being whose very and essential nature is Love and Mercy; and if there were, how could the sufferings of a Divine personage, endured by Himself alone, be an atonement or expiation on behalf of sinners? ”—pp. 21–23.

Such, it seems, is a specimen of the way, in which Mr. Porteous *appeals to the churches*. It pains us. For if there be, as we trust there is, controversial candour, there must be the alternative indicated,—a very great lack of controversial competency. This *must* be the case;—there is such a huddling into a heap, as with a pitchfork, of gratuitous distortions, and caricatures, and misrepresentations. And then, side by side with this heap, there is, the assumption of successful and, indeed, positively triumphant argumentation.

To begin with what is found toward the close of the quotation;—there is something which is, we are in one respect glad to say, not so much a distortion or misrepresentation, as a mere, but by no means harmless, asseveration. Mr. Porteous asseverates that “there can be no real wrath on the part of the Deity, to be propitiated, for wrath is not predicable of a being whose very and essential nature is love and mercy.” Such is Mr. Porteous's asseveration:—Wrath is not predicable of God. And yet, strange to say, it is actually predicated of him in the Bible, scores upon scores of times. And not only so;—God himself expressly predicates it of himself, in multitudes of instances, saying,

"my wrath." God, then, it seems, says one thing, and Mr. Porteous another. God predicates wrath of himself; and Mr. Porteous says that it is not predicable of him. God takes one side of the subject; Mr. Porteous takes the other and the opposite. Which are we to believe?

But Mr. Porteous has an argument in support of his side of the case; and perhaps it will outweigh God's simple word. Let us consider it. "Wrath," says he, "is not predicable of a Being *whose very and essential nature is love and mercy.*" Such is the argument. But, *in the first place*, it is nowhere said in Scripture that God's very and essential nature is "mercy." And, *in the second place*, it is by nobody proved that wrath must be malicious, and therefore inconsistent with love. *In the third place*, we have no right, when the Scriptures ascribe both "love" and "wrath" to God, to take the one ascription and reject the other. It is our duty, indeed, to eliminate from the import which we attach to either of the words, every idea that would exclude the essential meaning of the other. But it can never be our duty to sacrifice the one idea on the altar of the other. And, *in the fourth and last place*, the man who sees not that love must involve polarity of emotion, and consequent antithesis of feeling, and such antithesis as may be designated holy indignation, has never considered, or, at all events, has never apprehended, the essential nature of sensibility.

Travelling up the quotation,—we find Mr. Porteous saying that "no reasonable or good man can really believe that God is divided, or has two equals, and that he can be angry, or the subject of wrath." We have disposed of the last idea, and would fain hope that we shall not be accounted exceedingly unreasonable for "really believing" what God himself really asserts, even although we have the misfortune of thereby differing from Mr. Porteous, who asseverates the contrary. As to the other idea, again, that "God is divided or has two equals," we are at one with Mr. Porteous. We really do not believe that God is "divided." Neither do we believe that God "has two equals." Why, then, is it asked, do we refer to Mr. Porteous's remark? We refer to it because we deeply regret that he should insinuate, as he does, that evangelical theologians hold that God is divided on the one hand, and equalled by two other gods on the other. We never read the works of any such theologians. We never heard of them. And we fear—yea, we know—that Mr. Porteous has sought for them and found them in the fairy-land, or rather, we should say, in the satyr-land, of his own inventive imagination. It was too bad in him to import them, misrepresentingly, into his *Appeal*. And if we might tender him an advice, it would be this,—to transport them, in all subsequent editions of his *Appeal*, to the limbo of grotesques whence he got them. And it would not be amiss for him to bear in mind that it is no great triumph for him to conquer mythical or imaginary antagonists, especially if he have the intertwisting of all the straws that constitute them, in his own hands.

Still proceeding upward with our quotation,—we find our author saying:—"The truth is, the current theory is built upon a view of the divine perfections, which implies such a variance between them (the divine perfections), as is utterly irreconcilable with the essential unity of the Godhead. If the Father and the Son be essentially *one*, there is

as much wrath in the Son as in the Father, and as much clemency in the Father as in the Son." Undoubtedly, we reply. No evangelical Calvinist, no evangelical Arminian, ever doubted it for a moment. And since this is the case, we would respectfully ask, who was it that gave to Mr. Porteous a licence to insinuate that some Calvinistic or Arminian theologians have held that there is less wrath in the Son than in the Father, and less clemency in the Father than in the Son? Is the word misrepresentation of the same meaning, in Mr. Porteous's vocabulary, with the word argumentation? If not, why, when professing to use argumentation, give nothing but misrepresentation?

"There is no complaint," says Mr. Porteous, "on the part of God the Son, nor yet of the Holy Ghost, and therefore we are led to conclude, that there is a deadly error in the common view." Indeed! "There is no complaint,"—no such complaint, namely, as is, according to Mr. Porteous, ascribed by the current theology to the Divine Father. It is theological news to us. And we rather suspect, indeed we know, that our author is again doing nothing but manufacturing for his antagonists his own wild and mythical imaginations, and then fathering upon his theological opponents, not their own representations, but his own misrepresentations. All evangelical theologians maintain that all the three Persons in the Godhead alike complain of the sins of men. They all maintain that it is the whole Godhead that requires satisfaction or propitiation: though it is very commonly supposed that, in the economy of mercy, one of the Divine Persons, the Father namely, acts, by mutual agreement, as the Representative of the entire Three.

Hence in what lies nearer the commencement of our quotation from Mr. Porteous's *Appeal*, there is really nothing but persisted in imagination and myth. "This notion," says he, "supposes that the Father, or first person of the Godhead, was dissatisfied with man's transgressions, and demanded satisfaction for his offended justice, but in making such a demand, nothing is said of the justice of the Son and Holy Ghost, who each being 'God and Lord by Himself,' and equal in substance, power, and glory, of one feeling, thought, and mind, ought equally to have been dissatisfied, and each to have demanded justice. Again, though much is said of the great forbearance of God the Son, nothing is said of the forbearance of God the Father." This is all mere myth, baseless imagination, and,—we must out with it,—reckless misrepresentation. And that too without one redeeming element of authenticity, accuracy, or necessity. There are no such representations made by any evangelical theologians. And hence, we should fear that Mr. Porteous's *Appeal* will have but little effect upon those who know the difference between fact and fiction.

When Mr. Porteous is so successful in misrepresenting the opinions entertained by all evangelical theologians without exception, it need not be matter of extraordinary surprise to us that he should have succeeded in carrying the principle of misrepresentation triumphantly through, when treading upon the views entertained by the *Evangelical Union*. At all events, and whether we should be surprized or not, he does, as a matter of fact and "no fiction," ride victoriously forth over the doctrines of the *Evangelical Union*, completely subju-

gating, and with a very high hand, all correctness of representation. He says:—

“There is one other view of the doctrine of the Atonement, as currently believed, which we approach with becoming caution—viz., the relation of Christ’s sufferings to the forgiveness of sins. It is affirmed that Christ paid our debt, suffered our penalty, and disposed God to forgive man; farther, that the debt having been discharged, men are now in a state of pardon. This is prominently the doctrine of the ‘Morisonians.’ They believe that Christ settled our debt, and suffered our penalty, and now, God *must* forgive and pardon us. It only needs that we intellectually *assert* to and *admit* the fact, to constitute us Christians. In order to illustrate our meaning, let us suppose the case of a man who owes to a creditor the sum of ten pounds. This sum may be the amount of debt contracted, or as (*sic*) the price (*sic*) of a personal ransom (*sic*) for a personal injustice or injury (*sic*). But the debtor is told, that unless in a given time he pays the debt, the creditor will have him punished for the amount owing. There stands to our left a kind friend, who, rather than see the poor debtor going into prison, discharges the debt, and so frees the man from punishment. On a subsequent day the creditor meets the debtor, and accosts him with the remark, ‘Sir, the debt you owed me I freely forgive you!’ It would be a very natural thing for the late debtor to answer, ‘What debt is it you are forgiving me? Is it the ten pounds that my friend paid you on my account? If so, let me assure you I owe you nothing; your forgiveness ought to have been exercised *before* the sum was paid.’ How supremely ludicrous would it appear, if the person who discharged the debt for the debtor, should *still* beseech the creditor to forgive the poor man, for whom he had paid the ten pounds. And it would be yet more insane and unmeaning for the debtor, to plead with and pray to the creditor to forgive him the debt which had been paid.”—pp. 26, 27.

Now,—not to spend time on that most curious specimen of oratory, “or as the price of a personal ransom for a personal injustice or injury,”—it is really too bad to asseverate that this is “prominently the doctrine of the Morisonians”; for the truth is, that, “prominently” it is the very reverse of their doctrine. There is a treatise, which was published long ago by one member of the body referred to, entitled *The Nature of the propitiation, or, the Question what is the Atonement? answered*. The second edition was published in 1843; and, although both the thinking and the writing are in many respects immature, we imagine that it may serve a good purpose to take from it the following somewhat lengthened extract. We do it all the more readily, as numerous requests have, of late years, been made for the republication of the treatise. The passage is as follows:—

“There are some weighty considerations which induce me so strongly to assert that the propitiation is not the payment of a debt.

“1.—*Debts when paid, cease to be debts; but sin, though atoned for, is a debt still.* If you had been formerly in debt to any man, and had long ago got all paid, either by your own exertions or by a representative, you could not be said to be in debt still. No man, with justice or propriety, could call you a debtor. Your debt is obliterated,—it has no existence. If, then, Christ by his death, actually paid the debt of the elect, the elect are no longer debtors, and their sins can no longer with justice or propriety be denominated ‘debts.’ It is a fact, however, that their sins are ‘debts’ still; for the Saviour himself has taught them, in his own epitome of prayer, to use, and daily too, this petition, ‘Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.’ Mat. vi. 12. The propitiation, then, must be something else than the payment of these debts.

“2.—*Debts which are paid cannot be forgiven; but though sin is atoned for, it must also be forgiven.* If some person, who had been owing you a hundred pounds, which you were determined to exact, should obtain the sum from a generous friend, and pay you to the ‘utmost farthing’; would it not be an insult at once to justice and to common sense, were you to go away and talk of your kindness in forgiving him his debt? Why, the debt was paid; and being paid, it could not possibly be forgiven, unless you

returned him the money you received. Now, if the propitiation of Christ be like the payment of a debt, it would be a flagrant inconsistency to say that the debt has been forgiven; and it would be a strange anomaly were the discharged debtor to go and beg the pardon of his liquidated debts. The sinner is, however, commanded to pray humbly and earnestly every day, that his 'debts may be forgiven;' and we therefore conclude, that whatever the propitiation may be, it was not the payment and discharge of these 'debts.'

"3.—*Debts may be forgiven without any payment; but sin could not be forgiven without a propitiation.* If any person owes you a sum of money, you are not obliged to exact it. You may generously and mercifully remit it. If, then, our sins were merely 'debts,' (and not CRIMES,) God, as our great creditor, would be under no necessity to exact payment. It would be quite consistent with his sovereign character, like 'the Lord of the servant' in the parable, to be 'moved with compassion, and loose us and forgive us our debt.' Mat. xviii. 27. One would naturally expect, indeed, seeing his name is 'Love,' that 'when we had nothing to pay, he would frankly forgive us.' Luke vii. 42. But sin is something else than a debt, and God is something else than our creditor. Sin is a crime, and God is the universe's Governor; and without an atonement, sin could not be pardoned. 'Without shedding of blood there is no remission;' it was therefore 'necessary,' Heb. ix. 22, 23, and 'of necessity,' Heb. viii. 3, that Jesus, as our atoning priest, 'should have somewhat to offer.' It became God to exact such a sacrifice, and Jesus 'ought to have suffered those things.' Heb. ii. 10; Luke xxiv. 26. The propitiation, then, must have been something widely different from the mere payment of a debt.

"4.—*Debts are transferable, sins are not.* If any friend of yours contracts a debt, you may become responsible for it, and then he is no longer himself responsible to the creditor. If you, moreover, having once transferred upon yourself the responsibility for the debt, should pay the whole, he could no longer, in any manner, be liable to the consequences of his debt. He is no longer a debtor; neither could he lawfully be subjected to any pains and penalties, although he neither has, nor could have paid one fraction of his debt. The debt was in whole transferred to you; you were voluntarily liable for all the consequences of the debt, and, upon failure of payment, it is you who would have been subjected to all the penal consequences. It is quite otherwise with sin. It is not transferable. If I commit a theft, my sin could not be transferred to you or to Christ so that you or He should be the thief. The effects of sin are transferable, but not sin itself. Jesus could never have become the debtor,—the sinner. He could never have deserved to suffer the consequences of sin; neither could he ever so suffer the consequences as to liberate us from deserving punishment. The believer does not obtain deliverance as a right, he implores it as a favour. Luke xviii. 13. The imprisoned debtor, as soon as he has obtained an able friend to pay his debt, may demand his immediate release; he can no longer deserve to suffer punishment. The reason is, he is no longer a debtor, because his debt is paid. The sinner is, however, still a sinner, though his sins are atoned for. His sins cannot be so transferred to Christ, that they cease to be his own. He has still to implore forgiveness; ay, and it is mercy manifold if God do not 'hold him guilty.'

"5.—*The satisfactory payment of a debt does not depend on the dignity of the person who pays it: but the whole value of the propitiation depends upon the high and glorious rank and character of the sufferer.* The first part of the proposition requires no illustration. If some poor man were owing you £100, and if he were getting a great nobleman to become responsible for his debt, you would not take £10 from the nobleman as a full payment, because of his nobility and dignity. You require to get a certain amount of money, and no amount short of that, though given by ever so great a personage, is an adequate discharge of the debt. It is far otherwise, however, with the propitiation. Its value does not depend upon the amount of suffering endured, but entirely on the majesty of the God-man who suffered."

"The sufferings of Jesus were but finite in respect of time; and that they could not be infinite in respect of degree, is clear from the fact that it was only the finite nature that suffered, and the finite never could contain or sustain the infinite. Christ did not, then, in the glorious atonement, pay the exact amount of suffering which the sinner had incurred. The glory and lustre of his character,—being the uncreated and creating God, who, as God, made the law, and, as God, could not be subject to the law,—more than swelled out the deficit in the amount of penalty endured, to an infinitude of value. His obedience to the precept, and his endurance of the penalty of

the insulted law, did more to demonstrate God's regard to its excellence, his determination to punish its transgression, and his abhorrence of any violation of its precepts, than could have been manifested in the final and eternal perdition of the whole human race. No being can say or think *now*, though God pardons ever so many sins, forgives without payment ever so many debts, that he is not a sin-hating God."

"It appears to me that multitudes, indeed that whole swarms of the objections that are commonly made to the unlimited extent of the propitiation, owe their birth to this mercantile idea of the work of Christ. It is thought, and justly too, that it would be unjust in God to exact double payment of the same debts,—once from the Surety, and again, and for ever, from the finally impenitent. It is thought, and justly too, that it would have been absurd, and even ridiculous in Christ, to have paid a second time the debt of those who were, before his death, already in torments, paying for themselves the penalty of the law which they had broken. If the propitiation were the payment of a debt, all this would be unanswerable. If Christ would have paid less, had fewer been saved; and more, had none been lost;—subtracting or adding so many stripes in consideration of so many sins;—all such objections would be logic indeed. But if the propitiation was not at all a transaction bearing even the remotest resemblance to the payment of a debt, or the giving of so much for so many; if it was a glorious device, which only rendered it right in God to forgive any or every debt, without any payment, and which would have been equally required had there been only one sinner to be saved, and only one sin to be pardoned; and by looking forward to which from the dispensation that is past, or looking back to which from the dispensation that is present, any and every sinner may go and crave, and get remission of his debts—if the propitiation be this, every objection to its universality is palsied, every difficulty is paralyzed, and it stands forth to every sinner seeking salvation, 'majestic in its own simplicity,' as 'the shadow of a great rock in a weary land.'"—pp. 29-34.

So far as we know, it is views, somewhat like these, that are entertained by the ministers and members of the Evangelical Union, in general. The same author, in a controversial tract, which he published in 1860, entitled *The Rev. John Stewart's Shield-bearer again*, has the following sentence;—"The idea that the atonement is the payment of a debt is utterly at variance with the Scripture injunction that we should pray, *forgive us our debts*. A debt once paid, by whomsoever the payment may be made, can never be forgiven. Of course all competent thinkers know well that it is not as a debt, but as a crime, that sin has been atoned for."—p. 6. And in a still later publication, entitled *The Evangelical Unionists not wrong but wronged*, in reply to Mr. Gall of Edinburgh, the same author says:—

"Mr. Gall would never ask such a question if his mind were not twisted by a narrow and commercial conception of the nature of the atonement. He might easily see, one would think, that what Christ suffered in our room was not, from its alpha to its omega, the very identical punishment which the sinners, for whom he suffered, would themselves have endured. His death assuredly was not the actual payment of the sinner's debts; for debts once paid can never be forgiven. His atonement was never meant to oblige God to grant forgiveness to sinners, or rather to grant salvation without the grace of forgiveness. It was only meant to be a propitiation to the Great Moral Governor; and such a propitiation, that forgiveness should thereupon be a consistent thing, and a boon therefore which the great Father could righteously will and wish and long to confer."—p. 18.

Such are the views generally, and so far as we know, universally entertained by the members of the Evangelical Union. And yet Mr. Porteous, in an *Appeal to the Churches*, could actually asseverate that opinions *the very opposite* are "prominently the doctrine of the Morisonians." What can be made of such a controvertist? He asseverates that white is black, and maintains with all his might that black is white. There must surely be in him a large amount of reck-

lessness. And there must hence, as we have already indicated, be either a sad deficiency of controversial candour or a lamentable deficiency of controversial competency. Who now can give credence to his representations of the opinions either of his theological foes, or of his theological friends?

There is another part of the *Appeal*, to which we deem it right to refer. And, after that, there will be yet another matter on which we shall have a word or two to say: and then we shall, in all probability, wind up these observations.

The penultimate point, to which we wish to refer, is one that specially concerns *ourselves*, apart from our brethren. In a small popular treatise, entitled *The Extent of the Propitiation*, published long ago, and now out of print for a considerable number of years, occur the following sentences:—

*"Thus even the goodness which the Holy Spirit inworks is of no avail at all to make it safe for one to die. Nothing but the 'blood' is soul-saving. O sinner, then, have no respect to anything whatsoever, when you wish to know if it would be safe for you to die, but to the blood of atonement. Come to this blood, away from all else within or without you. Come to it with all your sins, though millions in number, and cast yourself into its ocean-greatness, and the sins will sink and the sinner swim. There is blood to drown all your sins, and to bear you up."*—p. 216, ed. 1847.

In reference to these words Mr. Porteous says:—

"Before concluding, we desire to say a word about what some of our Arminian brethren have written upon this subject. It is to be regretted that several theologians of this school have entirely mistaken the drift and fact of the atonement, and by a too fond adherence to '*first impressions*' have perverted the Scriptural doctrine of propitiation and its involved obligations. For example, the following passage will indicate that the writer had no just conception of the spiritual scope or nature of the atonement, but was immersed in the fantasies of his own self-derived system."—p. 45.

"How utterly inattentive must the writer of these lines have been to the teachings of Christ, which inform us that if we would enter into life, 'or be fit to die,' we must keep the commandments—and that we must take up our cross and follow Christ—and that we must give up our own life. Nothing but the craziest scaffolding of premature opinion and devotion to his own wisdom, could have hid from his view the truths which we have quoted. Not only is the language in which the writer states *his* idea of Atonement exceedingly irrational and unscriptural, but there is in it a total misconception of what Christ's blood means. What could be more puerile than the phrases?—'Come to this blood, away from all else within or without you'—'Come to it with all your sins, and the sins will sink and the sinner swim.' What does the author mean by this 'blood' that is so magical? Spiritual Christianity drops out the carnal idea of Jesus' blood—'Henceforth let us know no man after the flesh, *not even* Jesus Christ.'"—pp. 45, 46.

Now we admit that the words on which Mr. Porteous animadverts, —having a reference to a representation of things akin to that which is suggested by the "fountain filled with blood,"—are warm and practical; one-sided too, if you will; and "oratorically" immature also, if you will. And we know not that, on grounds of good "oratory," we should now select them to convey our ideas, in any attempt that we might adventure to make at an *oration* or a *peroration*. Nevertheless, we do most certainly abide by their substantial import. The intention of them is to glorify the blood of Christ,—as that in which the only propitiation for sin culminated. And in this intention we have certainly the inspired writers for our warranters and exemplars, as will be evi-



dent from such quotations as the following, in all of which the "blood" is glorified:—"Without shedding of *blood* there is no remission,"—"This," says Jesus himself, "is *my blood* of the New Testament, which is shed for many,"—"By *his own blood* he entered in once into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption for us,"—"We have redemption *through his blood*, even the forgiveness of sins,"—"being now justified *by his blood*,"—"whom he hath set forth a propitiation, *through faith in his blood*,"—"feed the church of God, which he hath purchased *with his own blood*,"—"and washed us from our sins *in his blood*,"—"The *blood of Jesus Christ*, his son, cleanseth us from all sin,"—"The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of *the blood of Christ*?"—"elect unto the sprinkling of the *blood of Christ*,"—"through the *blood* of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect,"—"Thou hast redeemed us to God by *thy blood*,"—and so in many corresponding passages. We certainly do regard that work of Christ which culminated in the sacrificial shedding of *the blood*, as the only meritorious ground of pardon, justification, and everlasting life to guilty men. And while sanctification, or *the goodness which the Holy Spirit inworks*, constitutes our indispensable and *only moral meetness* for celestial glory, it is, undoubtedly, "the blood," or the propitiation of Jesus, or his ransom, or his substitutionary *righteousness*,—for these different expressions are but different phases of the one great reality,—it is the blood of Jesus which is *the one, the only, title* to everlasting life. It is not, indeed, the blood, chemically or physiologically considered. We never entertained such a gross idea. It is the blood, morally viewed,—viewed as the outward manifestation and symbol of an unreserved inward subjection, in a mediatorial way, to the will of God, both in relation to doing and to suffering,—such doing and such suffering as were required to magnify the violated law and make it honourable. To know the blood thus, is by no means equivalent to "knowing Christ *after the flesh*." The apostle in that expression goes far deeper than Mr. Porteous seems to imagine. He indicates that whenever a man believes in Christ, and thus gives himself up to Christ, he is completely changed in the principles of his moral demeanour, inward and outward. He passes from under the sway of such motives as terminate on the things of the flesh, and of self as encompassed with flesh. He no longer "lives after the flesh." He is "led by the Spirit of God." He lives self-sacrificingly. And even Christ is regarded in a far higher relationship, than as the Mere Means of his salvation. The "new creature's" wish is not so much to *use Christ for himself* as it is to *be used by Christ for Christ Himself*. It is thus that he no longer "knows Christ after the flesh." (See 2 Cor. v. 15-17; and Rom. viii. 1-14.)

The other and ultimate point in Mr. Porteous's *Appeal to the Churches*, on which we deem it needful to make a single remark or two, is one, for which we were certainly not prepared, until we had opened the pamphlet, and read a few of its words with our own eyes. We had assumed, that one who publishes "orations," would—whatever might be his imperfections in scholarship, so far as regards the biblical languages,—we had assumed, we say, that he would be qualified to compose in his mother tongue, with tolerable accuracy, grammatical and lexical. And yet, to

our utter astonishment, we had only to open the pamphlet to find our assumption to be unfounded. In the very first sentence of the *preface* there is an extraordinary grammatical blunder:—"The substance of the following *Appeal* was lately delivered as a Sunday evening's discourse, in the Trades' Hall, Glassford Street, and, at the suggestion of several of those who heard it, *is now published in its present form.*" Let any one attempt to combine, grammatically, the parts of the sentence which we have italicised. "The substance of the following *Appeal* is now published in its present form"! It is not "the following *Appeal*," it would appear, that does really *follow*, and is "now published in its present form." It is only "the substance" of it, as delivered in the Trades' Hall. This first sentence was a revelation of things that we were not prepared for. And the concluding sentence of the *Preface* runs thus,—“He has, however, faith in the honesty of men and the power of truth, and cannot believe that the substance of this discourse will be mistaken for a shadow, merely because it lacks a more perfect investiture.” “Investiture”! So it stands. And the author doubtless deemed it a fitting word for an “oration.” He uses it again, if we recollect aright, in the course of his *Appeal*, and in a similar way. But he has yet to learn its meaning! He evidently fancied that it would do to express some such idea as *vesture*, or *vestment*, or *dress*. But, of course, all those, who, without any pretensions to oratorical superiority, are acquainted, in a plain and ordinary way, with their language, know that the word,—while it has some relation to *vesture*, *vestment*, or *dress*,—has no such import as Mr. Porteous attributes to it. It is a legal term, borrowed from the French, and is explained by Richelet as meaning, either *induction into possession*, or *possession* itself. Johnson explains it as meaning, “1. The right of giving possession of any manor, office, or benefice. 2. The act of giving possession.” Bailey explains it as “a giving or putting into the possession of.” Ogilvie explains it thus:—“1. The action of giving possession, or livery of seizin. 2. The right of giving possession of any manor, office, or benefice.” Smart explains it thus:—“The act or right of clothing with, or giving, *legal possession.*”

These blunders, grammatical and lexical, occur in the compass of *half a page of preface*. There is another blunder,—though not so gross,—between the two. And the whole pamphlet, as might be expected, is bestrewed from beginning to ending with scores upon scores of similar and still more flagrant violations of rule, usage, and propriety. And yet it is an *Appeal to the Churches*, in general! and by a writer who composes and publishes “orations”!

We had almost forgotten to make a remark or two on the subject of the trinity. And, indeed, though we now remember that we said that we might have something to say on that topic,—we do not deem it necessary to take into consideration Mr. Porteous's polemic on the subject. He is evidently not a man whose opinion will carry much weight with “the churches.” He simply echoes the view of Swedenborg, which we regard as an utter inversion of the Scripture-representations. But in echoing the view of the famous Swedish seer, Mr. Porteous makes blunder upon blunder, all his own, we presume. He says, for instance, “It is rationally impossible (*sic*) for the mind to realise

the form, or to conceive the existence of *three divine persons* each of whom is 'very God of very God,' and to see that these three can be *the one Jehovah and Lord.*"—(p. 12.) He has misplaced, as the reader will note in passing, the word "rationally,"—a misplacement which ought assuredly to be avoided in "oratory" as well as in logic,—for impossibilities are not divisible into rational and irrational. He should have said,—“It is impossible for the mind to realise *rationally* the form etc.” But passing this peculiarity of “investiture,” we draw attention to what he says about the impossibility of “conceiving the existence of three divine persons, each of whom is ‘very God of very God.’” He thus intimates that some Trinitarians have held that *each* of the divine persons is ‘very God of very God,’ whereas, we make bold to say that *no Trinitarian that ever wrote or lived ever held such a notion.* Some indeed, who find their faith in the Athanasian creed, believe that the second person of the Godhead is “very God of very God.” But none, in any age or denomination, have ever for one moment believed that the Father is “very God of very God.” And many Trinitarians altogether object, as we ourselves do, to the doctrines of eternal generation and spiration. What can one make of a controvertist who imputes, right and left, to all and sundry, notions which they have never entertained? What can be made of a controvertist who imputes to Trinitarians a notion which no sane mind that knows the meaning of the preposition “of” could possibly entertain? What can be made, we ask again, of so reckless a controvertist?

Mr. Porteous labours with might and main to establish that there is *but one God*; as if any evangelical Trinitarian denied or doubted such a doctrine. His labour is labour in vain. But when he contends that there can be no plurality of personality in the unity of the Godhead, because the Godhead is one, he forgets that any degree of plausibility which may characterize his conceptions or his reasonings arises from a too narrow and immature notion of what it is that is absolutely essential to personality. It is needless, however, to enter on the discussion of such a topic in this place.\* We have said, we conceive, enough on

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\* A correspondent has asked us to explain two of the passages insisted on by Mr. Porteous,—“He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.” (Jo. xiv. 9),—“in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.” (Col. ii. 9). As to the former of the passages, it is to be understood, we should imagine, on the principle that he who sees *the express image* may be said to see *the object imaged*. He who sees *the reflection*, may be said to see *the object reflected*. Hence we speak of *seeing ourselves* in a mirror. It is, however, not *literally* ourselves that we behold:—it is only *the image or reflection of ourselves*. In Jesus, as in a mirror, was the Father seen. We cannot imagine, then, the shadow of a difficulty in reference to John xiv. 9. As to the other passage there is just as little. For by “the fulness of the Godhead,” we are not to understand *the fulness of the essence* that is in the Godhead, but *the fulness of the blessings for sinful men* that are in the Godhead. “For it pleased the Father that in him (in Christ) should all fulness dwell.” (Col. i. 19.) And hence Christ is “full of grace and truth.” (Jo. i. 14). He is “full,” that is to say, of all that truth and reality of grace for sinners of mankind, that was foreshadowed in preceding typical dispensations. “And of his *fulness*, have we all received grace for grace.—For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” (Jo. i. 16, 17.) The “fulness of the Godhead,” thus, dwelleth in Christ, not typically or foreshadowingly as in the institutions of Moses, but “bodily.” In the institutions of Moses,

Mr. Porteous's *Appeal to the Churches*; though all that we have said of a rather depreciatory character is less than a tithe of what might have been legitimately adduced.

*A Pastoral Letter addressed to the Clergy and Laity of his Province.*  
By Charles Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Rivingtons. 1864.

THIS is a letter in reference to the theological topics, which are implicated in the late decision of the Privy Council, in favour of Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson, two of the Oxford "Essayists." In virtue of that decision, it would appear to be determined that it is not inconsistent with the formularies of the Church of England, to deny that the Bible is "the word of God," and to maintain that there is no good reason to believe that the punishment of the wicked is everlasting.

The Privy Council, it has transpired, were not unanimous in this decision. And while Dr. Tait, Bishop of London, was heart and soul with the majority, the Archbishop of Canterbury was heart and soul with the minority. In this letter he seeks to establish his conviction that the formularies of his church do teach that the Bible is "the word of God," and that there is no hope whatsoever held out in reference to the future of those who die impenitent.

There can be no doubt that the Archbishop is on the right side of the subjects disputed. And his publication is seasonable, although it does not aim at establishing *what saith the Scripture?* but only at ascertaining *what saith the Church of England in her authorised formularies?*

On the subject of the future prospects of those who die impenitent, we would refer our readers to a *Letter to the Editor*, in the present No. of the *Repository*. On the other subject, there is scope for logomachy, although we cannot but express our astonishment that the Bishop of London should argue, that, if we regard the Bible as "the word of God," we shall be obliged to receive all its minute contents, such as the antagonistic speeches in the book of Job, (and perhaps too the sayings of Satan,) as authoritative expressions of the divine mind. This is quibbling. For surely it was competent for Cicero, for example, to include quotations in his orations, while yet his orations remain entirely his own. And if so, there is nothing remarkable in the occurrence of quotations in the Bible. And there is nothing in the fact of that occurrence that militates against the idea that the Bible is "the word of God."

*Infidelity in High Places, with a Letter to the Right Rev. the lord Bishop of London, on the Doctrines of the Very Rev. A. P. Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster.* By Rev. William Brock, M.A., Queen's College, Oxford, Rector of Bishop's Waltham. London: Hatchard. 1864.

The "Infidelity in high places" is found, according to Mr Brock, in the Dean of Westminster. And we are afraid that there is too much

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there was "a shadow of things to come, but," says the apostle, "*the body is of Christ.*" (Col. ii. 17.) We are amazed that any competent thinker should imagine that such passages as these overthrow the doctrine of the Trinity, and prove that the divine Son and the divine Father are one and the same divine Person.

reason for the allegation;—although we are unable to look at the subject from the precise standpoint of our author. That is the standpoint of one, who is not a thinker, but the utterer of the thoughts of others. And hence there is narrowness; a want too of sympathy with conscientious difficulty; and a vein of denunciation without argumentation. There is also the perplexity that arises from the belief that God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, and that consequently he “will do his own work in his own time and way.” Why, then, should Mr. Brock, we naturally ask, put himself in a pother?

There is, in one of the notes appended to the pamphlet, a long extract from *The Church and State Review*, which contains a good deal of interesting information regarding Dr. Stanley and Bishop Tait. We quote from it the following items:—

“The two favourite pupils of Dr. Arnold were Archibald Campbell Tait and Arthur Stanley: one became his successor at Rugby, the other wrote his biography. It is pleasant to see ties so formed in early years enduring to the end of life; but this pleasure, like all others, has its limit. Dr. Tait, after being rewarded for his seven years’ school-keeping with the deanery of Carlisle, was for no assignable reason elevated to the Bishopric of London, and his friend Dr. Stanley became his Examining Chaplain. These are offices of serious public responsibility. The holders of them are charged with functions which directly affect the preservation of the faith in the leading diocese of the Church of England. We have a right to watch closely, and even jealously, the acts and tendencies both of the Prelate and his Chaplain. For Dr. Arnold, with all his good and genial qualities, cannot be described as sound in the faith. He and Mr. Baden Powell were at the head of the little handful of forty men who rallied to the support of Dr. Hampden when the University of Oxford sought to stop the first inroads of German Neology in 1836. He was in intimate correspondence with Bunsen; whose anti-scriptural theories have subjected his disciple, Dr. Rowland Williams, to the censure of the Court of Arches. He was the first English clergyman who proposed to extend to the Inspired history of the Old Testament the treatment which Wolf and Niebuhr had applied to the history of Greece and Rome. (*Stanley’s Life and Correspondence*, i. 338.) In a word, the germs of all that has shocked the Christian public in the *Essays and Reviews* may be traced to the writings of Dr. Arnold and those with whom he allied himself.

“In turning from the master to the pupils, the first to challenge the attention is the younger and more brilliant of the two. Dr. Stanley, the biographer of Dr. Arnold, is the exponent of his theological opinions. Like all such disciples he glories in being more Neological than his preceptor. He out-Germanizes the Germanizers of twenty-five years ago. His *Lectures on the Jewish Church* are introduced as a result from Arnold’s suggestion; a full realisation of which is to be found in Ewald’s *History of the People of Israel*. (*Jewish Church*, p. xiv.) These Lectures, as our readers may learn from our Review, openly impugn the inspiration, and not seldom the truth, of the Holy Scriptures. In a note at the end of the volume Dr. Stanley endorses Bishop Colenso, though at some risk to his own consistency, complimenting him on having demolished “the popular hypothesis of the uniform and undeviating accuracy of the Biblical history,” and “the ascription of the whole Pentateuch to a contemporaneous author” (p. 521).

“In the University Dr. Stanley is the most prominent champion of the Neological party. His genius and acquirements are of the cast most popular with young men. He laughs at the Creeds in the lecture room, and covers up the Bible in a cloud of “generous” sentimentality in the University Pulpit. He is the constant advocate of Mr. Jowett, the deepest and most pernicious of the “Essay” writers, of whom an eminent Unitarian minister is known to say that the Oxford tutor goes far beyond himself in depreciating the authority of the Scriptures over the conclusions of reason. If Dr. Stanley has refused a bishopric, as it is sometimes said, it is because he is serving his party better by sapping the foundations of the faith, and draining off the supply of candidates for Holy Orders in the University.”—pp. 53, 54.

“It is matter of public and serious alarm when a divine of this description is placed

about the Prince of Wales as his religious adviser and confidant. That the Whig Ministry, while flattering the Evangelicals on one side, steadily pushes the Neological interest on the other, has long been apparent. But it is new to see infidelity lifting its front so close to the throne. The Sovereign of this realm sits on the throne by virtue of a compact with the Church and nation; of which the solemn reception of the open Bible, and the oath to uphold the National Church, are the symbols publicly presented at the Coronation. The natural heirs to the crown have been set aside because their religion is antagonistic to the national faith. The law which substituted the reigning family is careful to extend the exclusion to any member of it who shall embrace the disqualifying religion, or even marry a Roman Catholic. There can be no doubt—as Dr. Stanley and his friends may one day discover—that the common law and the common sense of England are as intolerant of German infidelity as of Italian popery. Our Princes have been heretofore trained by orthodox Bishops, whatever the ministerial policy. The Sovereign has maintained the traditional adherence to the Bible and the Church. It shocks and grieves those who care for “Church and State” that this inviolable tradition should be exposed to suspicion from Dr. Stanley’s official connection and near intimacy with the Prince of Wales. But our principal business at present is with the Bishop of London.

“His Lordship also is fortunate in Royal favour; though it is said for different reasons. His elevation to the Bench is usually attributed to the parental sympathies of our warm-hearted Queen. The offer of the see of York is ascribed to the same quarter, from observing how plainly the Bishop’s powers are overtaxed by the diocese to which he was so hastily elevated. Dr. Tait has been less ardent as an author than Dr. Stanley, and his Scottish temperament is probably more cautious and less romantic. Yet the Bishop of London, if not prepared to avow himself a Neologian, has no objection to the party taking shelter under his official protection. He joined in the censure passed by the Bishops at Lambeth on *Essays and Reviews*; but withstood the subsequent proceeding in convocation chiefly on the ground of his personal friendship with Dr. Temple and Mr. Jowett! In like manner he signed a private, though published, episcopal letter, calling on Bishop Colenso to retire from his ministry; but successfully exerted his influence to prevent his writings from being condemned in convocation as heretical. On the question of subscription, too, he confines himself to abolishing the statutory formula, leaving substantially the same requirement under the Thirty-sixth Canon; but he permits Dr. Stanley to address him a letter advocating the abolition of every subscription and guarantee whatsoever. One can hardly avoid the inference that the Bishop of London either does not know his own mind, or does not choose to avow it.

“The gravest cause of suspicion, however, is Dr. Stanley’s position as one of his Examining Chaplains. This relation is always and properly understood to imply the closest possible agreement in doctrine and ecclesiastical questions generally. We cannot imagine a conscientious chaplain retaining his position for a single moment after discovering that the Bishop was not thoroughly with him, both on the requirements to be complied with by the candidates, and on the statements to be made to them with respect to their obligations and future duties. Nor can we imagine a conscientious Bishop permitting himself to be represented in such inquiries and explanations by any chaplain with whom he did not entertain a perfect agreement in the subject-matter. It is no case for compliment or private friendship. The chaplain enjoys neither rank nor emolument; his labours are onerous and gratuitous, but they affect in the most influential way the faith of the Church, as regards the teaching of the candidates passed or rejected. An Examining Chaplain, holding office in a large diocese for a number of years, may infuse his own views into a very considerable section of the clergy. Is Dr. Stanley the man to entrust with this power? He is of all men the most unfit. It is an office in which he must directly corrupt in others the orthodoxy he disclaims for himself. The tender consciences which he makes it his business to wound at Oxford, he is called upon to heal in London. The scruples which he instils in the Lecture Room he is appointed to meet at the Examination. The subscription which he reviles and ridicules in his pamphlet it is his special duty as Examining Chaplain to see sincerely and intelligently done by every candidate for Holy Orders. Is it possible that the Bishop of London does not see the utter incompatibility of his friend’s published opinions with the duties with which he has burdened him? Is his Lordship prepared to support Dr. Stanley’s denial of the inspiration and authenticity of the Holy Scriptures? Does he accept his *dictum* that there is no pre-

dictive element in prophecy? Is he prepared to banish the Atonement from the commemoration of Good Friday, and the Resurrection from that of Easter Day?

"If the Bishop is not of the same mind with his chaplain in these vital points of inquiry, it is unjust to the candidates, to the Church, and to himself to continue an Examiner in whom neither can repose confidence. If Dr. Stanley, on the other hand, represents ever so generally the views of his patron, the country must see that Dr. Tait is not fit to be a Bishop of the Church of England."—pp. 55, 56.

The signs of the times in reference to the Church of England, are certainly sufficiently grave and ominous. And Bishop Tait never committed a greater mistake than in giving his assent in the Privy Council to doctrinal conclusions, which yield relief, no doubt, to some perplexed spirits hovering about in high places, but which inject, on the other hand, the utmost perplexity into a vast number of other minds, far outweighing, not only numerically, but in moral and ecclesiastical influence, the few for whose benefit the Bishop seems to have acted. There will consequently be a sifting. It has commenced. And in the progress of the operation, dogged prepossessions, doubtless, will take the place of calm circumspection and reasoning. And thus the wheels of progression will be violently arrested. But yet, in the end, truth will prevail. And Christ will reign from pole to pole.

*The Sin of Swearing among the Young: a Sermon delivered in the E. U. Chapel, Tillicoultry, on the evening of Sabbath, December 6, 1863.* By the Rev. James Strachan, pastor of the E. U. Church, Tillicoultry. Tillicoultry: B. Waddell. 1864.

We heartily thank Mr. Strachan for this able, earnest, seasonable, and effective discourse. We could wish that it were sown broadcast over the cities, towns, villages, and hamlets of Scotland. If it were, great good would be the result. The following paragraph will give some idea of the good sense, and the terse way of expressing it, which characterize the discourse:—

"While a sin of awful magnitude in the eyes of both God and men, the sin of profane swearing is one of the most unprofitable and senseless known to us. It has ever been matter of surprise with all reformed swearers why they ever swore. We can easily understand what profit a man will have in lying. A lie may sometimes do him a good turn, though he may have heavy interest to pay in eternity for his deceit. Stealing may have a profit after its own kind. Drinking will certainly yield, at least a passing pleasure. Backbiting may gratify the restless passion of malevolence. Forging may meet the tax which Satan ever levies from those who step within the hidden lines of his empire. But, pray, what does swearing yield? It is a non-descript in speech, an anomaly protruding itself upon us most lawlessly as we listen to the speech of senseless men. Give it a place in our books of rhetoric and elocution, and how shall we classify it? It is not a metaphor, hyperbole, irony, or ridicule. These are holy things. If it pertain to rhetoric, it is rhetoric of the pit—pleasing to Satan, corrupting to self, and polluting to society. It is the empty froth of thoughtless speech, that marks out the perverted heart, as the slime on the path marks out the course of the reptile. Not sense, and scarcely deserving the name of nonsense, it is only senseless and profitless wickedness. Swearer! answer us: what is the profit or sense of profane swearing?"—p. 7.

*Paradise; or, the Present Home of the Holy Dead.* By the Rev. William Crook. London: Hamilton & Co. 1864.

MR. CROOK regards "Paradise" as being "the happy side of Hades." And he holds:—

1. That whether it be a state or a place, it is entered upon immedi-

ately after death. He does not sympathise with the theory of psychopannychy, or, the soul's sleep till the morning of the resurrection.

2. Viewed as a state, it is final as regards character. He does not regard it as purgatorial in its intent.

3. It is a state of intense consciousness.

4. It is a state of mutual recognition.

5. It is a state of exalted happiness.

6. It is a state of eager expectation;—expectation of the arrival of the dead, who die in the Lord,—expectation of the final triumph of the Saviour's kingdom,—expectation of the resurrection of the body, and of the admission of the complete humanity, body and spirit, to the final family home.

The discussion of these topics is conducted with marked ability, and in such a genial spirit, that we love as well as admire.

*The Pentateuch: its genuineness and authenticity proved and defended by facts and arguments, against the hypothetical theories and the conjectural criticisms, historical and literary, of Bishop Colenso.* By Charles Freshman, late Rabbi of the Jewish Synagogue at Quebec, and Graduate of the Jewish Theological Seminary at Prague, Bohemia; at present German Wesleyan minister at Hamilton, Canada West. Toronto: Green. 1864.

A CREDITABLE effort to slay the slain. Mr. Freshman is but imperfectly acquainted with the English language, and with English literature, and indeed with christian literature. He does not know very well the line of distinction between friends and foes in the great questions involved in Bishop Colenso's polemics. But he is able, and ardent, and "fresh"; and says several things that are worthy of consideration.

*A full Collation of the Codex Sinaiticus with the Received Text of the New Testament; to which is prefixed a Critical Introduction.* By Frederick H. Scrivener, M.A., Rector of St. Gerran's, Cornwall. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, & Co. 1864.

The "Codex Sinaiticus" was discovered in the Convent of S. Catharine on Mount Sinai, by the illustrious Biblical critic Tischendorf. And, by his management, it was secured for the Emperor of Russia, in whose possession it is now safely preserved. Internal evidence leads Tischendorf to suppose that it was written in the fourth century of the Christian era. It is thus amongst the most ancient of the documents that have to do with the text of Scripture. It is in an excellent state of preservation, consisting of "345½ leaves of very fine and beautiful vellum, probably fabricated from the skins of antelopes or asses, each leaf being at present as large as 13½ inches in length by 14½ inches high, although marginal notes have sometimes been partially cut off by the ancient binder."

Mr. Scrivener, in an able introduction, gives the history of the manuscript, so far as it is known, and disposes of the strange and almost bewildering allegation, made by Constantine Simonides,—one of the literary world's comets or wandering stars,—that it was he who surreptitiously wrote the manuscript in imitation of the antique.



*The Testimony of the Heathen to the Truths of Holy Writ: a commentary on the Old and New Testaments, compiled almost exclusively from Greek and Latin authors of the classical ages of antiquity.* By the Rev. Thomas S. Millington, Incumbent of Woodhouse, Eaves London: Seeley, &c. 1863.

THIS book, though in no respect a work of great original research, is nevertheless an interesting and useful compilation. It is not, indeed any thing like a "commentary," in the sense of an *exposition* of the Bible. But it is a gathering of a large number of passages from classical writers, which are more or less coincident with many of the historical and didactic statements of the Scriptures. The quotations are given for the benefit of English readers, not in the original languages, but in English; and are, indeed, in general taken from such translations as are in common circulation.

A book of a higher order is still a desideratum:—one that would seize the elements of the primary and universal revelation, and exhibit them in their varied phases and developments, as they are found in the speculations of the thinkers of all peoples, and even in the beliefs of the comparatively unthinking masses of mankind. There must be such a primary and universal revelation. It is the basis of universal responsibility. It constitutes the possibility of hope and relief to the conscience-convicted in all climes. It is the foundation of moral codes, and of all those forms of legislation which are tentative efforts to reach a right or ideal state of social existence. It is the groundwork on which missions and other schemes that aim at the rectification, civilisation, and general elevation of all the peoples of the earth, repose, and in which they find their justification, and the authorization of their prospects of more or less success. It is, moreover, the assertion of the inspired writers. See, in particular, Rom. i. 19, and ii. 14, 15.

This revelation, besides, is not a thing of mere antiquity. It is not antiquated and obsolete. It has continued to run down through the ages, and it is running on to the present day. It is still flashing on the intellect of all mankind. And as it is a veritable communication from God, as he actually is, there is in it a gracious and glorious evangelical element.

Mr. Millington's preface is rather loosely composed; and one of the very first passages which he quotes (*preface* p. vi), one from Epictetus, is unintelligible. It runs thus:—"who ever came into the world without an innate *desire* of good and evil, fair and base, becoming and unbecoming, happiness and misery, proper and improper, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done? We are instructed by nature upon these subjects." (Diss. ii. 11.) The word which we have italicised should be "idea":—and when this, the proper word, is employed, the truthfulness of the philosopher's query is at once perceived.

*The Covenant of Grace.* By the Rev. Henry Wallace, one of the ministers of the first Presbyterian Church, Londonderry. Londonderry: Macpherson. 1863.

THIS is, in several respects, an able production;—it is able so far as a certain force of intellection and of corresponding expression is concerned. But the author is certainly at fault in some of his postulates: and

hence his whole theory of theology seems to us to be vitiated. He starts with the following affirmations :—

“The will of God is the sole original force in the universe. It is co-eternal with God’s own existence, and not as a latent or dormant potentiality, but as power in living activity, ever determining its own purposes. It is ever sublimely free, sovereign and independent in its action. There were no eternal co-existences to bias its counsels, to enlarge or limit the range of its purposes, or to influence the direction of its course. It is the sole sovereign and efficacious cause of all things, carrying within itself the certainty of its own accomplishment.”—p. 4.

Does Mr. Wallace, when he asserts that “the will of God is the sole original force in the universe,” mean to say that there is no force or power in the intelligence of God, or in his love, in relation to the determinations of his will? If he does not, why single out “the will of God,” to the ignorance of “the wisdom of God” and “the love of God”? Why say of it, that it is “the sole original force in the universe”? Why say of it, that “there were no eternal co-existences to bias its counsels”? Were not wisdom and love its eternal co-partners in the divine mind? Why say of it that “it is the sole sovereign and efficacious cause of all things”? Is it the sole sovereign and efficacious cause of the divine wisdom and love?

If, however, our author does not mean that it is “the will of God” that is what he describes it to be:—if he means that it is God Himself, with his infinite intelligence and infinite love, as well as infinite will, that is the sole original force in the universe; and that is free, sovereign, and independent; having no eternal co-existences to bias his counsels, or to enlarge or limit the range of his purposes: if he means that it is God Himself,—in the totality of his infinite being,—who is “the sole, sovereign, and efficacious cause of all things”:—if this be his meaning, what is the reason why he does not say what he means? Why appear to speak of “will” with the distinguishing precision that becomes a philosopher, while yet he thinks, with the undistinguishing looseness that is characteristic of the unphilosophic, of other elements of mind, which are altogether different from will?

When Mr. Wallace begins his argument for invincible grace in such an inexact style, we need not trouble ourselves to inquire how he ends it. His principia are too loose a foundation to sustain any superstructure of weight.

*Memoirs of the Life and Philanthropic Labours of Andrew Reed, D.D., with selections from his journals.* Edited by his Sons, Andrew Reed, B.A., and Charles Reed, F.S.A. London: Strahan. 1863.

WE have read this Memoir with intense interest, and risen from its perusal with a feeling of lofty admiration for Dr. Andrew Reed. Gifted with high intellectual endowments, and with a fine balance of them, he was pre-eminently distinguished by the supremacy of the moral element. It overshadowed the rest of his being, and rose grandly toward God. On its boughs grew blessings for his country and the world.

We trust that our readers will, if possible, avail themselves of the advantage of perusing and pondering the memoir of the life, and love, and labours of this distinguished minister of Jesus. It is composed with admirable discretion and tact; and, as was befitting, is incased by the publisher in an elegant volume, on which the eye rests with comfort and satisfaction.

*The Life of Adam Clarke, LL.D., author of a Commentary on the Old and New Testaments, &c.* By the Rev. Samuel Dunn, Free Church, Camborne. With portrait and engravings. London: Tegg. 1863.

This memoir is rather unmethodical and rambling. But, it is nevertheless, in virtue of its remarkable Subject, of great interest. The author has been fortunate in obtaining "possession of a large number of the Doctor's valuable letters, written during the first ten years of his itineracy, unknown to any of his former biographers." The volume is thus of value, in its relation of a supplement to the preceding biographies of Dr. Adam Clarke.

*A Reply to the Rev. J. Parlans's Assertion, that it is "folly and madness to deny the invincible power of the Holy Spirit's work" in conversion.* By the Rev. R. Mitchell, Hawick. Glasgow: T. Adamson, 165 Cowcaddens Street. 1864.

AN exceedingly able and well-written pamphlet, in which Mr. Mitchell triumphantly establishes his position that the influence of the Spirit in conversion is not invincible, or irresistible, or faith-necessitating. He denies that it is so, (1) because the testimony of consciousness is against the notion: (2) because the testimony of conscience is against it: (3) because the idea of moral government is against it: (4) because the instrumentality which the Holy Spirit uses in the conversion of the soul contradicts it: and (5) because the entire testimony of Scripture is against it.

One must read, however, the pamphlet itself, in order to have any adequate idea of the power of the ratiocination. We very heartily commend it.

*More about Ragged Life in Egypt.* By M. L. Whately, author of "Ragged Life in Egypt." London: Seeley & Co. 1864.

We noted favourably the author's preceding volume. This is entirely akin, and of kindred interest. It indicates a spirit of beautiful devotedness to Christ, and of self-sacrificing zeal to win the precious souls which have been bought by the Saviour's blood, but which are not availing themselves of the blessing that is free for their acceptance. If workers, of the stamp of the authoress, were multiplied a million-fold, the world would soon be lovelier than it is.

*Presbyterian Doings Displayed. A Review of recent proceedings in the United Presbyterian Church Courts against the Rev. John M'Farlane, LL.D., and other officebearers in Clapham Presbyterian Church, London, with documents and letters.* By Andrew Dunn, ex-treasurer to that congregation. London: Houlston & Wright. 1864.

It does not lie within our province to discuss the questions involved in this publication.

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END OF VOLUME SECOND.















